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This thesis traces endeavours in the twentieth century to
provide the 'intellectual' foundations for general medical
practice as an independent, autonomous clinical
discipline. The empirical focus of the study is upon the
application of psychological and 'person-centred'
approaches to general practice; above all, in the work of
Michael Balint, and the Royal College of General
Practitioners in the post-war period. The thesis is guided
by two predominant theoretical concerns. First, to
highlight the complex strategies and the wide range of
means and resources that have been required to give
substance to the claim that general practice is 'by
nature' a person-centred endeavour. Second, to consider and to question certain influential approaches to
medical power in general, and to the social consequences
of 'emancipatory' - person-centred - forms of medicine in
particular. Specifically, the 'power/knowledge' approach
to medical sociology is contested both with regard to its
empirical findings and in relation to its basis in the
work of Michel Foucault (of whose writings on clinical
medicine an alternative evaluation is offered).
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1
PREFACE

The study which follows is intended neither as a narrative
history of general practice nor as a history of ideas
about general practice. Its empirical concern is more
specific than either of these. Focusing upon the twentieth
century and above all the post-war period, it seeks to
analyse some of the ways in which general practitioners
have sought to autonomise their discipline by giving it an
'intellectual' basis. If the 'general practitioner' (or
equivalent) has long existed as a professional label then
nevertheless notions of what unifies the general
practitioner's activities have undergone a degree of
mutation. 1 It is these 'models' of general practice physiological, epidemiological, psychological - which will
be investigated here. As such, the purpose behind the
study is partly of a 'methodological' order. The study
seeks to show that what counts in evolving a coherent
model of general practice is not just the provision of a
'representation' of the general practitioner's activities
but a construction on several levels. One has to align,
for example, the way the profession is organised with the
way it produces knowledge; one has to address the question
of the social 'telos' of the discipline itself. And these
requirements impose limits upon what can and what cannot
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be said in and about general practice. As we shall see, we
are also concerned with 'limits' at a wider level. For
general practice also appears in this study as a kind of
'social laboratory' for wider tendencies that characterise
the nature of our 'present'. Most important here has been
evidence of a mutation towards a mode of governance based
less on anonymous rules and bureaucratic resources than
one which is concerned to utilise the qualities of
persons. In characterising general practice as being
exemplary of modern 'technologies of subjectivity' we
shall also have recourse to some of the works and insights
of Michel Foucault and some of his followers.2

But this endeavour clearly involves some omissions which,
in a narrative history of general practice, would clearly
be important if not unforgivable. Little is said for
example about the role of the general practitioner in the
maternity service; certainly, a long-standing area of
dispute. This is simply because this theme has not played
an important role in the project of autonomising general
practice as an independent intellectual discipline. Other
themes are also omitted; there is little mention of
medical 'politics' (cf. the discussions in Dobson 1971 and
Forsyth 1966), nor of relations between general
practitioners and the hospital service (Honigsbaum 1979;
and, for a work, which focuses upon a similar theme of a
'split' in the medical profession, Horner 1922).
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If the empirical focus of the study is a narrow one it is
because the primary object of interest here is not the
progression of a narrative but what might be termed the
end-point of a series. Following some of the
methodological stipulations of Georges Canguilhem, the
study is analogous to a 'recursive' history which, so to
speak, has its starting point and condition of possibility
only with where the study itself ends (Canguilhem 1988: 123; Canguilhem 1968: 9-23). This 'recursive origin' is
provided by 'person-centred' medicine; that form of
discourse which seeks to promote an ever-greater
sensitivity to the 'ideographic' dimensions of doctoring
(cf. Armstrong 1979). In what follows the focus of
investigation will be oriented towards the rules of
formation of the medical vocabulary of the emancipation of
the person in just one medical field, general practice; a
discipline which has sought repeatedly over the past
seventy years or so to take up the old mantle of the
'clinic' whilst consistently setting itself the task of
treating the 'patient' - and, later, the 'person'

as

opposed to the 'disease'; of treating the living
individual rather than the inert corpse' 3 The study
performs this task on the basis of an 'inventory of
differences'; an investigation of models of general
practice that have existed prior to this 'person-centred'
paradigm which today amounts to a kind of obligatory
'infrastructure' of thought in relation to medicine.
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This 'recursive' interest was instrumental in determining
the 'data-base' of the study. Aside from considerations of
the influential work of James Mackenzie (Part 2) and of
Michael Balint (Part 4) the empirical focus is upon the
labours of the (Royal) College of General Practitioners
(founded, 1952) to institute a patient-centred general
practice. Parts 3 and 5 of this study are indeed
effectively 'reviews of the literature' associated with
this organisation. Yet we have not written the history of
the College itself (for which, Fry et al. 1983). Rather,
our interest was determined by the different ways in which
the College has set itself the task of establishing
general practice as an independent clinical discipline
around the theme of the 'person-centred' dimensions of the
general practitioner's tasks (Parry & Parry 1976: 217).
The history of the College also afforded an exemplary site
of investigation for a study which would be concerned with
the ways in which intellectual endeavours depend upon a
particular kind of organisational 'technology'.
Epistemological statements - even in such a 'common sense'
discipline as general practice - are always dependent upon
an organisational infrastructure through which their
emergence becomes possible.4

The main empirical 'body' of the study is prefaced in
Part 1 by some considerations - relating above all to
Michel Foucault's work Birth of the Clinic - which should
serve to put the present study into a wide theoretical and
methodological perspective.

5

PART ONE

METHODOLOGY AND CLINICAL MEDICINE

6

CHAPTER ONE

ON THE TASKS OF A 'HISTORY OF THE PRESENT'

1. The History of the Present and the Project of
Recuperation

This study should be conceived as belonging to that order
of investigation that Michel Foucault has called the
'history of the present'. This term should serve to draw
attention to the particular kind of problem addressed by
the study as well as to the approach employed in
addressing this problem.

1.i. The notion that there could be such a thing as a
'history of the present' gained its specificity, claims
Foucault, with Kant's essay Was 1st AufklWring of 1784
(Rabinow ed. 1986: 32-50; Foucault 1986: 88-96).
Considering Kant's text, Foucault argues that the notion
of Enlightenment (AufklVrung) - that general project (more
or less incarnated by the 'enthusiasm' for the French
revolution) of the universal progress of reason in the
service of human happiness, emancipation and freedom should be understood as being inseparable from the
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problematisation and questioning of the phenomenon of the
'present' moment.

As Foucault notes, the question of 'enlightenment'
(understood in a general sense) has been at the centre of
philosophical and social reflection especially in
German thought - for some two centuries since the
publication of Kant's essay. Here, typically, the central
concern has been with the recuperation of enlightened
reason from its own consequences, the tendency apparantly inherent to the project itself - for reason to
turn 'despotic' (Gordon 1986c: 72). Numerous varieties of
this theme of betrayal and recuperation could be invoked
here: from Max Weber's well-known theses of
'intellectualisation' and 'disenchantment', a rationality
of modernity having no 'regard for persons', to the claims
made by Adorno and Horkheimer in their Dialectic of
Enlightenment, which stated that the universal programme
of reason had been turned against mankind; that the
projects of the development of freedom and of reason had
come into conflict with eachother. Especially important
for these authors was what they termed 'instrumental
reason', that form of reason which took no regard for
persons but which served only a blind scientific or
technological interest (cf. on this whole theme, Sayer
1991; esp. chapter 4).
.,
Writing very much in this vein, Jurgen Habermas has
recently described how the autonomous development of the
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objectivising forces of science and reason have served
progressively to erase the forms of everyday subjectivity
they were originally called into being to serve:
'The project of modernity formulated in the
eighteenth century by the philosophers of the
Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to
develop objective science, universal morality
and law and autonomous art according to their
inner logic ... Enlightenment thinkers ... had
the extravagant expectation that the arts and
sciences would promote not only the control of
natural forces but also understanding of the
world and of the self, moral progress, the
justice of institutions and even the happiness
of human beings. The twentieth century has
shattered this optimism. The differentiation of
science, morality and art has come to mean the
autonomy of the segments treated by the
specialist and their separation from the
hermeneutics of everyday communication'
(Habermas 1985: 9-10).
Hence, for Habermas, the project of enlightenment is
subject to a 'splitting' between the tendencies of
emancipation and the estrangement brought about by an
ever-narrowing 'culture of expertise'.

Now, Habermas claims that there are various strategies
commonly put forward in response to the betrayal of
enlightenment. The first which he rejects (and associates
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with Foucault amongst others) is the attempt at a
wholesale rejection of the 'culture of expertise' itself
(ibid: 10). But, he argues, the problem will not so easily
be made to go away. We must rather strive to recuperate
the notion of enlightenment that is encapsulated in the
project of a progressive modernity and force our
scientific culture to serve emancipatory ends. For
Habermas this 'project of recuperation' (as we shall call
it) seems to take the form primarily of a philosophical
endeavour; for example in the attempt to state the
conditions of an 'ideal-speech situation' free from
distorted communication.

This is indeed a valuable enterprise. Nevertheless, it can
be argued that it has limitations. Prominent here is the
fact that - in its rather utopian pretensions - this kind
of analysis suffers from a certain blindness to the fact
that the project of recuperation itself already exists.
For this project has gained, especially in the twentieth
century, a certain institutional momentum of its own that
goes well beyond the philosophical, polemical or utopian
specification of its 'ideal' conditions. This
institutional project has sought to reverse the ascendancy
of those elements of the Enlightenment that are conducive
to reification and estrangement in favour of an emphasis
upon the powers above all of subjectification; in short,
to bring about a situation where reason is dictated to
only by the demands of the freedom and emancipation of
persons. But where are these institutional forms of
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'actually existing' recuperation? One will get meagre
results if one looks for this project in 'pure' form. Yet
if one begins to conceive of the spirit of enlightenment
itself as being not just one project of universal 'reason'
but as entailing a multiplicity of diverse rationalities,
then one can see evidence of the emergence also of a whole
range of projects designed to 'rescue' the enlightenment
spirit from the consequences of its own 'despotism'.

One can do no better than to turn to the work of Michel
Foucault, and of those influenced by him, for evidence of
the existence of these rationalities. Indeed the
investigation of these forms of recuperation in the modern
period can be described as the major preoccupation of
Foucault's work.

In his studies of madness

(the

'liberation' of the insane), sickness (the 'free' clinical
'contract'), penal reform (the permanent 'critique' of the
prison system) and sexuality (liberation from sexual
'repressions') Foucault demonstrated the congruence of
enlightened discourses and repressive functions, the often
simultaneous emergence of forms of reasoned 'despotism'
together with the 'enlightened' rationalities for escape
from this despotism.

In the twentieth century, the institutional forms of
recuperation have received their impetus above all from
the 'techne' of psychology (Rose 1985, Rose 1990). Two
themes have been of particular importance. The first is
that of an increasing attention towards promoting the
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'subjectivity' of individuals. Although this attention has
taken a variety of forms evidence from, for example, the
penal system (Garland 1985), the medical domain (Armstrong
1983; Canguilhem 1978), war and labour (Miller 1986, Rose
1990), the education system (Hunter 1988), the welfare
complex (Donzelot 1978; Burchell et al. 1991), and the
domain of psychiatry (Castel et al. 1983) all point to an
enhanced level of alignment between the promotion of
subjectivity and the tasks of social regulation. The
second theme is that everywhere this alignment has been
accompanied by a demand for the services of 'expertise'.
Everywhere subjects are incited to discover their
identities by 'experts of subjectivity'; social workers,
psychiatrists, criminologists, general practitioners. The
promotion of subjectivity always seems to require the
mediation of an expert 'other'. And expertise implies
knowledge; typologies of subjectivity, and - perhaps more
important - typologies of how subjectivity can go awry.
Typically, this knowledge will be of an 'immature' sort.
The sciences of subjectivity are never quite 'sciences';
they never exist within a pure laboratory world, but can
only function within the context of their normative
demands; to cure, to prevent, to promote, to rectify
(Hacking 1979; also the conclusion to Rose 1985).

But it is not enough merely to describe the twentiethcentury enhancement of subjective expertise in terms, for
example, of the expanding 'interests' of a 'service class'
(Lash and Urry 1986) or of the growth of a 'professional
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society' (Perkin 1990). Rather one must seek first, to
integrate with analysis of the 'social' functions of
expert knowledge a detailed analysis of the actual 'internal' - forms taken by knowledge in particular
fields, and, second, to specify the variety of ways in
which the 'subject' of this expertise, that is the model
of the 'expert' him- or herself, has been fabricated
within the co-ordinates of this knowledge.

1.ii. If Foucault's investigative approach has been
exemplary here it is not because - as Habermas would have
it - he has sought to reject outright the project of
modernity and enlightenment. Rather he has sought in his
work to align the notion of a 'history of the present'
with a certain conception - differing from that of
Habermas - of that project itself.

Foucault - through a reading of Kant's text of 1784 proposes his own view of what the Enlightenment itself
constitutes; and of what the 'spirit' of enlightenment
confers upon criticism as a duty. As Colin Gordon puts it:
'Foucault distinguishes between an Enlightenment
of sure identity, conviction and destiny, and an
Enlightenment which is question and questioning,
which is commitment to uncertainty' (Gordon
1986c: 74).
For Foucault, the question of enlightenment is synonymous
with a permanent questioning of the 'present'. Kant,
Foucault writes:
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••

'defines Aufklaring in an almost entirely
negative way, as an Ausgang, an "exit", a " way
out" ... He is looking for difference: What
difference does today introduce with respect to
yesterday?' (Rabinow ed. 1986: 34).
It is this kind of investigation that characterises for
Foucault the tasks of a 'history of the present';
'to separate out from the contingency that has
made us what we are, the possibility of no
longer being, doing or thinking what we are, or
do, or think' (ibid: 45-6).

What are the critical or normative stakes here? The answer
cannot be an easy one because Foucault's notion of
enlightenment as a permanent questioning of ourselves does
not imply any straightforward verdict upon reason or
liberation. Foucault's project is not simply one of
negation or 'refusal' anymore than it is one of
affirmation or celebration. There is no intention to
supply a 'critique' of anything, if by this is meant a
denunciation of something - for example, as ideology or
dissimulation - in order to establish the grounds for some
pre-conceived or a priori alternative. Foucault's project
is not to demonstrate how psychiatry has suppressed a
better, more 'real' psychiatry or how clinical medicine
has suppressed a better, more 'humane' medicine and so
forth. 'Critique' in this sense always seeks closure, it
draws up a dividing line of right and wrong - liberty and
repression - and denounces the side of wrong from the side
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of right. Critique legitimises its political alternatives
by locating the constant repression of these alternatives
in the past. But the logic of Foucault's work suggests
that liberty is not characterised by closure but by
inventiveness. The project of liberty - an 'impossible
practice' - can never be completed; rather, liberty is the
process of questioning itself. For Foucault the objective
is not the romance of critique but the necessity of a
permanent criticism a constant:
' work on our limits ... a patient labour giving
form to our impatience for liberty' (Rabinow ed.
1986: 50).
A key theme here will be to attack those very points where
questioning seems least possible; to undermine, for
example, the 'obviousness' of all that seems to be most
naturally in the interests of freedom, to illuminate the
contingency that resides - often the product of a certain
kind of 'blackmail' (ibid: 45) - within what is given to
us as most necessary. Hence, if there is a normative
intent behind Foucault's work it is:
'to discover to what extent the work of thinking
its own history can free thought from what it
silently thinks and allow it to think otherwise'
(Foucault 1986b: 8-9).
Thus, thought must be freed in order to become inventive.
One must attack precisely those points where inventiveness
seems to be least possible. But the strategy here will
not be that of critique and the alternatives that it
offers but only that of detachment; thought must be
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'allowed to think otherwise', it must be given a space in
which further thought is possible, and this can only be
done by detaching elements from eachother; by drawing up,
for example, what has been called an 'inventory of
differences' in order to bring about a local reversal in
the 'forgetfulness' that conditions all identities, all
absolute convictions, all destinies. But this is not done
in order to be able to 'remember' better but to provide
the conditions for further invention, and the further
practice of liberty. A corollary of this will actually be
a certain modesty of analysis (albeit a modesty which will
not be appreciated by those who wish to be lead by
'theory'), the necessary offshoot of a 'commitment to
uncertainty'. No finite 'answers' are provided; the
historian of the present does not always know what to do.
His or her task is only to open up possibilities for the
tasks of further invention.

2. A 'Sociology of Morality'?

Outlined in this manner, does not the 'history of the
present' find itself at such a distance from contemporary
sociology as to constitute merely an eccentric backwater
of social thought?

2.i. Whatever the stylistic nature of some of Foucault's
own writings and pronouncements this form of study does
not exclude other forms. This is not merely because one
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might wish to espouse a benign - and, possibly, insipid theoretical pluralism. Rather, the history of the present
is committed to its critical ambiguity - or, at least, its
rejection of 'critique' - by the very nature of its
preferred subject-matter. For most typically it takes as
its object precisely claims to liberation or emancipation,
that is, styles of thought that already take the form of
critiques. What absolute 'epistemological' or 'ethical'
ground is possible here? We would argue that a methodology
that takes account of this difficulty indeed which makes
it a condition of the analysis itself - 'permanent
criticism'

-

is

preferable

to

one

that

either

straightforwardly and cynically rejects its objects of
analysis as, for example, so many varieties of 'social
control' or one which fails to see them altogether.

It can be argued that the methods appropriate to such a
form of study can actually be related to some traditional
concerns even of 'classical' sociology. One way of doing
this is to refer back to Foucault's consideration of
Kant's essay where he discusses the question of the
' present' situation. Criticising notions of modernity that
see it only as an 'epoch' or a movement, Foucault prefers
to envisage it as an 'attitude' by which he means:
'a mode of relating to contemporary reality

• • •

a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one
and the same time marks a relation of belonging
and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt,
like what the Greeks called an ethos' (Rabinow
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ed. 1986: 39).
The proper manner, then, to search for the contingency of
the 'present' might be through a kind of 'ethical' study;
almost a sociology of 'attitudes'. But instead of doing
surveys and so forth to find out what people 'actually
feel' about this and that, we might imagine such a form of
investigation as embodying the outlining of what might be
called the 'supply-side' of our ethical ideals. This would
entail, for example, a scrutiny of what have been called
'technologies of subjectivity' - systems of
representation, evaluation, expertise and intervention
that seek to promote certain types of orientation to the
world, to others and to the self (Rose 1990: 8-11). In
short, an investigation of those 'ethical systems' which
mark out a realm of possibility - of, as it were,
'historical a priori' problematisation - through which
subjects come to be governed and to govern themselves in
the circumstances of the 'present'; technologies which,
amongst other things, serve to mark out the;
'conditions in which the human being questions
what he is, what he does, and the world in which
he lives' (Canguilhem 1986: 37).

2.11. The claim that Foucault's concerns can be
characterised in relation to ethical systems or moral
technologies might be reinforced by referring to Colin
Gordon's remarks concerning the points of parallel between
Foucault's work and those of Max Weber relating to the
impact

of

collective

powers

upon

Lebenstil

and

18
Lebensfuhrung (Gordon 1986: 84). As Hennis has shown,
Weber's concerns, like those of Foucault, were focused
upon the establishment of certain ethical values through
the mediation of various kinds of social institution, such
as the economic organisation of the classical oikos or more prominently - various forms of religious belief
(Hennis 1988). What else is religion for Weber if not a
kind of 'ethical system' (see esp. Gerth and Mills 1967:
267-301)7

But if Weber's sociology of religion betrays similarities
of intent with Foucault's project then perhaps an even
more instructive parallel can be made with the work of
that other great neo-Kantian sociologist, Emile Durkheim.
Although there is some dispute as to whether Durkheim's
concern with morality forms a running thread throughout
his career (Hall 1987: esp. 3-12; 218-22) or whether the
concern was merely a feature of the unfinished projects of
his last years (culminating in the 'Introduction to
Ethics' [1920]; Pickering ed. 1979: 77-96) what is
interesting for our purposes is that when Durkheim does
speak of what he calls the 'science of morality', he
connects it - as does Foucault - to the social production
of knowledge (Pickering 1979: 24ff.; Lukes 1973: 420). For
Durkheim, morality is always entrenched in epistemology, a
factor which stems, to be sure, from the way he defines

' morality'

itself.

Thus

he

distinguishes

between

'morality' (morale) and mere morals, the former being
something 'ideal' which exists 'in a region above the
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realm of human actions' (Pickering ed. 1979: 92). For
Durkheim, morality can be analysed sociologically, that
is, through the investigation of the human institutions in
which ideal forms of morality are generated. Durkheim
writes:
'Every morality, no matter what it is, has its
ideal. Therefore, the morality to which men
subscribe at each moment of history has its
ideal which is embodied in the institutions,
traditions and precepts which generally govern
behaviour' (ibid: 81).

Perhaps it is time to return the questions of ethics and
morality to their once-important place within sociology.
In this sense the history of the present is continuous
with an attempt to re-activate the aspiration of a
sociology of morality'. Although certainly conceived very
differently from the norms of Durkheimian sociology, this
thesis will be concerned with an investigation of the
ideals of morality as they emerge in just one social
institution of modernity; medicine.
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CHAPTER TWO

'ANTI-MEDICINE'

1. The Project of Medical Recuperation: Anti-medicine

The term 'anti-medicine' will be used here to distinguish
that mode of thought - or, rather, that 'ethos' - which
regards the history of medical reason as a slow descent
into 'despotism' (see e.g. on the 'scientisation' of
medicine, Pelling's overview, 1983: esp. 379) 1 • What
unifies this ethos is the claim that the medicine of the
past two centuries has been conducted increasingly .
without regard for persons' - hence, the frequent
'without
critiques and denunciations of 'hospital medicine', 'biomedicine', 'doctor-centred' medicine, the 'medical model'
and so forth (e.g. Jewson 1976; Engel 1981; Hart 1985).

1.i. A highly synoptic and synthesised ideal-type of the
totality of forms typically invoked by anti-medicine can
be organised around the themes of 'enclosure' and
'exclusion'. According to the anti-medical schema, medical
space - typified by the modern hospital - is enclosed
space. Confined within the hospital the 'sick man' becomes
artificially cut off from the natural environment. In
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parallel with this spatial enclosure, anti-medicine views
medicine itself as enacting a corporeal enclosure upon the
person of the patient, as the legitimate space of disease
becomes confined - through the mediation of all kinds of
instruments and de-humanising forms of technology - to the
closed space of the body's interior. Here the aetiologies
proper to the so-called 'medical model' reductively
localise pathology, confining it to the impermeable plane
of organs in isolation, invasive microbes, and disease
'entities'. At the same time these archetypes of enclosure
are held to be reinforced by a parallel reduction on the
level of social organisation and within knowledge itself.
Thus the 'profession' monopolises knowledge in a closed
domain - whilst a further gesture of exclusion takes
place, within the profession itself, through the malign
development of 'specialisation'. The profession designates
and excludes those it sees as 'quacks' but above all it
summarily excludes the patient from any say in his or her
treatment. Moreover, the very form of the knowledge
watched over by the profession is held to be of a closed
order; the 'medical model' is a reductive, malignly
objectifying and de-humanising schema instilled during
education around the inert bulk of the corpse - indeed, a
veritable metaphysics of death. Lastly, the medicine of
enclosure could be said to have an 'extensive' logic
whereby the interests of medicine expand further and
further into the lifeworld, colonising ever-more marginal
areas in a malign process of 'medicalisation'.
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But on the other side of this coin is a peculiar kind of
sociological eschatology. Struggling to be emancipated
(and not just by medical sociologists, but - depending
upon the 'setting' - by patients, after-dinner speakers,
legislators, policy experts and so forth) is the
symmetrical converse of the medicine of enclosure and
exclusion. In its eschatological form this is simply the
'medicine of No', the logical converse of the medicine of
enclosure and exclusion that seeks to be not confining,
not enclosed, not occluded, not reductive, not
exclusionary, not specialised, not death-laden, but open,
dynamic,

humanising,

fecund,

inclusionary,

phenomonological, life-affirming.

1.ii. Reconstructed in such stark terms the connections
between anti-medicine and the project of recuperation will
be obvious. Medical reason has become despotic. It has
turned upon its creators and become an instrument of
domination rather than emancipation. This is where much
medical sociology tends to stop; remaining satisfied with
a description of the medicine of enclosure and exclusion
with the addition of a few references to the need to
'return' to the 'sick man' (Figlio 1987). Yet, it is to
the great merit of two recent works in medical sociology Armstrong's Political Anatomy of the Body (1983), and
Arney and Bergen's Medicine and the Management of Living
(1984) - to have demonstrated that anti-medicine has long
been more than just an eschatological theme, that this
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'medicine of No' has actually had a substantial historical
existence and an institutional form.

Both these works take as their subject-matter the
emergence of what might be called 'institutional antimedicine'. Thus both works focus upon general movements
and trends away from 'technological' (scientized,
objectivist) forms of medicine towards more humanising or
'subjectifying' approaches.

Arney and Bergen, surveying the medical field in North
America, write of a 'great reversal' occurring in about
1950 away from a medicine which had its focus upon the
hospital, disease, death, the body, and narrow forms of
treatment towards one which focuses upon the community,
(chronic) illness,

life,

the emotions and patient

'management' (ibid, cf. Arney and Neill 1982 for a more
localised case-study). Armstrong, taking England as his
focus, draws our attention to the growth of what he calls
a 'community gaze' in modern medicine. Dating the
transformation somewhat earlier than Arney and Bergen, he
draws up an inventory of the progressive incursion of
broadly 'psychological' forms of thought within British
medicine. The 'shift' towards a subjectifying,
psychological emphasis is located by Armstrong at the
beginning of the twentieth century when the problem of
mental functioning ceased to be 'madness' but became the
less dramatic but more widely disseminated psychoneuroses
(Armstrong 1983: chapter 3; & 25-7). Alongside this
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development came the aspiration to track such minor
neuroses and socio-medical problems in the community,
especially as these were attached to high priority
pathologies such as venereal disease, tuberculosis and
child health (ibid: chapter 4: and 33). The apparatus
developed for this work of 'integrated observation' in the
community was, says Armstrong, the survey (chapter 6).
Developed in the inter-war years, the survey allowed, on
the one hand, for measurement of relational properties
between people; an attribute which allowed for a novel
conceptualisation of the relation between normality and
pathology:
'In effect, the survey established the
possibility of removing the abnormal/normal
divide. The survey classified bodies on a
continuum: there were no inherent distinctions
between a body at one end and one at the other,
their only differences were the spaces which
separated them ... The survey was a synthesised
gaze to relationships, to the gaps between
people' (ibid: 51).
On the other hand the survey (especially as it developed
in the war years) was a peculiarly 'subjective' apparatus:
'Illness was no longer the preserve of the
medical profession but of the body's own
perceptions; the body had to speak, not of some
abstract pathological theory of illness, but of
immediate feelings' (ibid: 52).
The survey in other words, although it was an apparantly
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'objective' instrument, actually served to incite a
'rising crescendo of individual expression' in the
community (ibid: 52). To demonstrate the impact of these
attributes of the survey Armstrong then goes on to discuss
its application in four main areas; child health,
psychiatry, general practice and geriatrics (chapters 6 to
9). In all of these fields there occured a certain
fabrication of 'subjective space around the object of the
body'

(ibid:

70).

Finally,

this

'subjectifying'

progression culminates in, on the one hand, a 'community
gaze' which - through above all the resurgent science of
epidemiology (chapter 10) - focuses on the dynamics of
morbidity in the community as opposed to the finite world
of mere mortality; and, on the other hand, a model of
pathology and patienthood that focuses upon the 'spaces
between people' (bringing to the fore relationships and
powers of communication). Hence, argues Armstrong, the
concept of the 'patient' itself becomes problematic; from
being something only just beyond a 'passive body' in the
1930s the patient becomes a matter of subjective
'identity' by the 1960s, a problematic 'whole person';
'a body constituted by its social relationships
and relative mental functioning, a body, of
necessity, of a subject rather than an object'
(ibid: 102; chapter 11).

If Armstrong's account is impressive it is because it
illuminates areas and themes of medical activity that are
usually missed by those medical sociologists dominated by
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the anti-medical theme. However, Armstrong seems less
inclined to draw specific sociological conclusions from
his work. He seems content to let the evidence speak for
itself, rather than to spend time on an assessment of
these forms of medical activity. For this kind of
assessment we can turn to Arney and Bergen (cf. for a
discussion of these authors, Silverman 1987: chapter 8).

1.iii. There is not space enough here to dwell upon the
empirical specifics of Arney and Bergen's work. In a few
minor respects their approach is different from that of
Armstrong (being wider-ranging in historical terms and
including, for example, illuminating discussions of
contemporary trends such as sociobiology and the culture
of 'spirituality'). But their over-all emphasis is the
same. Thus, rather like Armstrong, they write of an
increasing incursion of 'subjectifying' forms of medical
endeavour in the twentieth century (and especially from
1950). They invoke, for example, the return of the
experiencing person' (chapter 3) and the appearance of
what they call 'medicine's subjective object' (chapter 4).
However, whereas for Armstrong the increasingly 'social'
and 'subjective' aspects of medicine actually seem largely
to have made sociology and the human sciences possible
(ibid: 113) - hence presumably obviating the possibility
of a sociological analysis of these developments
themselves - Arney and Bergen do seek to provide us with
a kind of socio-cultural evaluation of these developments.
They do not seek merely to criticize or denounce the new
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subjectifying tendencies of what they felicitously call
the 'tyranny of harmony' but to go;
'beyond [the] increasingly appealing and selfcongratulatory image [of medical discourse] and
examine whether [patients] might not be dreaming
a variant of the old dreams that have always
been dreamt about New Cities where nothing wild
can exist to upset the order of things' (Arney
and Bergen 1984: 7).

The burden of their discussion turns upon an implied
opposition between medicine as a discipline centred on
'death'

and

as

a

increasingly with the

'social

technology'

concerned

'management of living'.

In

characteristically vivid terms, they write:
'We believe we are witnessing a great reversal
in medicine. Once ... considerable work was
devoted to the task of taming death. Death was
the great beast that stalked in the darkness and
threatened to attack unannounced at any moment.
Now, in a Frankensteinian reversal, the great
beast is no longer death but life. Life and
living threaten, not death and dying. it is the
lives of patients that present the most
difficult medical issues today; their deaths are
just special management problems' (ibid: 97).
Medicine, they claim, no longer operates according to a
logic of 'exclusion', that is, on the other side of the
borders of life and society. It is no longer concerned
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merely with death and with the excluded worlds of the
hospital and the dissecting room. Now medicine works
through 'integration', 'inclusion', it seeks to institute
a 'joint adventure' between doctors and patients and to
monitor and normalize at the level of the mundane problems
of everyday life; teenage pregnancy, alcoholism, chronic
illness. More and more, they argue, medicine seeks to
impress itself into the very interstices of everyday
living, to weave its way - using the seductive languages
of 'harmony', 'partnership' and so forth - into the
subjective world of the individual and his or her more or
less mundane problems and micro-aspirations.

It is worth stressing at this point that Arney and Bergen
achieve a genuine subtlety in their assessment of these
developments. They eschew for example the conceptual
language of 'social control' (as, incidentally, does
Armstrong: e.g. 1983: 116-7; cf. also Armstrong 1986).
Modern medical power, they argue, does not banish its
'object' to 'a darkened space beyond the limits of the
accepted and the acceptable' (Arney and Bergen 1984: 126).
Nor does it seem to embody an attempt at professional
' exclusion' of others from the medical domain; on the
contrary, it genuinely seeks to include its 'subjective
objects' - patients - in its endeavours (perhaps even to
its cost in 'professional' terms; ibid: 170). In short,
medical power has become productive and individualising,
rather than reductive, 'repressive' and objectifying.
Nevertheless, this development does seem to have certain
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consequences which would serve to suggest that modern
medical power with its incursion beyond death into the
realm of the living is basically illegitimate or, at
least, insidious. Thus, they claim, medical power - on
the basis of its claims to scientificity - ceases to
operate within more or less closely defined boundaries and
begins to insinuate itself into ever further and narrower
regions:
'The scientific discourse about the individual
invents the individual as an object to be
measured and managed in a social space that no
longer has a boundary since it incorporates
everything in the name of "scientific truth"'
(ibid; 126-7).
The burden of their argument thus seems to be that the
'subjects' that medicine creates only seem to be subjects,
but are in fact objects; less free than they thought,
since bound to the project of 'social order' entailed in
the 'tyranny of harmony' (chapter 10). However, lest one
should confuse the new medical object with the kind of
(mechanistic) objects that were prominent in nineteenth
century medicine, Arney and Bergen's preferred term is
(to cite the title of their chapter 4) 'medicine's
subjective object'.

2. Disciplinary Determinism and the Medicalisation of Life
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This present thesis is heavily indebted to the work of
Arney and Bergen, and especially Armstrong. Nevertheless,
there are limitations to the kind of analysis that these
authors provide. The problems arising from their accounts
revolve around the question of medical power. And here a
dimension of both studies must be introduced that has so
far been suppressed - the fact that they are both
expressly motivated by a 'power/knowledge' approach
derived from the work of Michel Foucault (Armstrong 1983:
1-6; Arney and Bergen 1984: 3-6).

2

.10

Armstrong's work is hindered by a form of

functionalism - this can be called his 'disciplinary
determinism' - that has a certain affinity with the antimedical theme of 'enclosure' and which leads him into the
inter-related traps of binarism, totalisation, and
evolutionism.

Armstrong's methodology consists essentially of the
adoption of a word - the 'gaze' - from Foucault's work The
Birth of the Clinic (Foucault 1973) aligned with a
'disciplinary' perspective derived from Foucault's book on
the modern prison, Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979).
The central idea that Armstrong takes up is that of the
Panopticon, an ideal form of power held by Armstrong to be
dominant above all in the nineteenth century. The
Panopticon is conceived as an objectivising technology
which fabricates its targets:
'a

creative

arrangement

of

power which
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fabricated an individual body - that very body
which was to be the point on which repression
could be exercised and into which ideologies
could be inscribed but, nonetheless, a body
which had no existence prior to its
crystallisation in the space delineated by a
monitoring gaze' (Armstrong 1983: 5).
For Armstrong, medical knowledge in the nineteenth century
can be analysed according to a model of 'panoptic
surveillance' in direct parallel to analysis of the modern
prison. Thus the science of pathological anatomy invented
at the end of the eighteenth century 'by which diseases
became localizable in the body of the patient' is, he
argues, comparable to a contemporaneous change which
occurred in the 'regime of criminal punishment' according
to which 'the criminal became incarcerated and subjected
to continuous surveillance behind the high walls of the
prison' (ibid: 2-3). Here then, the doctor's 'gaze' is
directly comparable that of surveillance whilst the
targets of this form of power (prisoners, patients) are
wholly objectivised, passive and 'docile':
'The prisoner in the Panopticon and the patient
at the end of the stethoscope both remain silent
as the techniques of surveillance sweep over
them' (Armstrong 1987: 70).

But if, for Armstrong, the objectivising age of
disciplinary power was eclipsed, in a 'substantive' sense,
by the new rationality of the Dispensary and the community
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gaze, then the type of power involved was still
essentially - in Armstrong's view - of a 'disciplinary'
order. Even when Armstrong describes the new medical gaze
of the twentieth century (the main subject of his book)
which seeks ultimately to construct patients not as
'docile bodies' but as active subjects then even here his
methodological vocabulary remains that of surveillance and
discipline. Thus disciplinary power is not effaced in the
twentieth century; on the contrary, it is cynically
enhanced. Even the Dispensary gaze - that twentieth
century form of power that, in contrast to the Panopticon,
radiates outwards in space instead of inwards - fixes its
subjects in fast, frozen form, the mere ciphers of the
regime of power that produces and embraces them. So if by
the twentieth century the dominant carceral model of
medical power has been replaced, then power remains in any
case basically a carceral phenomenon. Indeed, for
Armstrong, it is knowledge itself which encarcerates and
disciplines by definition. In Armstrong's analysis the
role of 'enclosure' and 'exclusion' is played by knowledge
itself. Hence the power/knowledge relation is not
discussed as a relation at all; rather the two terms are
assimilated and the 'gaze' - a curious trait in a writer
influenced by Foucault - is given 'sovereign' powers.

Leaving aside the question as to how far this approach has
any real basis in Foucault's work, we can now address its
substantive consequences in Armstrong's analysis. First,
the matter of binarism. The new - substantive - regime
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that Armstrong describes as emerging in the twentieth
century is constructed necessarily in symmetrical
opposition to this panoptic form. Hence Armstrong here
opposes the term 'dispensary' - an outward ranging form of
power rather than an enclosing one - to the panopticon
(ibid: chapter 2; 'the new hygiene of the dispensary').
The transformation Armstrong describes is of exactly the
same order as that 'Frankensteinian reversal' analysed by
Arney and Bergen:
'In the twentieth century the diagram of power
is rearranged. The medical gaze, which had for
over a century analysed the microscopic detail
of the individual body, began to move to the
undifferentiated space between bodies and there
proceeded to forge a new political anatomy'
(ibid: 6).
The problem with this binarism is that it is difficult not
to suspect that it is an artefact of Armstrong's
methodology. The contrast between an 'objectivising'
nineteenth century rationality and a 'subjectifying'
twentieth century one seems to define in advance
everything that Armstrong describes. A consequence of this
is that Armstrong's account seems to take on the form of
an evolutionism according to which medicine will become
more and more subjectivising the further away it moves
from the moment of 'reversal' itself. And this is in fact
the case; Armstrong's book clearly sees the subjective
powers of medicine as developing incrementally in the
twentieth century.

34
This leads to a further consequence; that of
totalisation. We mean this in two senses. First, one gets
the impression that the forms of institutional antimedicine described by Armstrong actually work, that is,
they are wholly successful in constructing some finite
kind of 'subject' out of their targets; in short, that
'real people' are more or less determined by forms of
medical power. We shall contest this perspective in detail
further below (and take up the matter again in the
conclusion). In the second place, the implication of
Armstrong's argument is that this newer form of the gaze
is all-pervasive right across the medical field, that it
is basically the same rationality wherever it resides
(although cf. Armstrong's cursory observation that the
Panoptic gaze still exists or, at least, 'has not
disappeared'; Armstrong 1983: 111). This approach - which
makes the subjective form of medicine appear as a
veritable

Weltanschaung

-

clearly

certain
has
consequences. Above all, it leads Armstrong to a kind of
'stock-taking' orientation towards his evidence. Here,
textual works of various kinds (predominantly medical
textbooks) are listed cumulatively as 'expressions' of
various themes and emergences (hence each text is
basically considered as a unit). But what could be called
the 'epistemological workings' of these texts contradictions, inter-relations, conceptual linkages - are
scarcely considered; rather, a mere listing of texts is
sufficient to count as 'evidence'.
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2.ii. Our main criticism of the theoretical approach of
Arney and Bergen can also be related to the themes of
binarism, evolutionism and totalisation. These authors
seem to recognise the problem with a logic of binarism
which would ultimately result in a periodisation of
medical history as a kind of macro-alternation between
subjective and objective forms. Thus, at the very
beginning of their analysis Arney and Bergen introduce the
notion of the 'pentimento l ; 'the term used to describe
those old paintings in which one image is so thin that the
one under it still shows through' (Arney and Bergen 1984:
8). Using this image to some effect, they claim that
modern medicine is like a pentimento with some old objectivising - images still showing through beneath the
new subjectivising veneer:
'In today's medicine different images of the
doctor and patient are entangled, the new not
absolutely clear, the old still discernible but
no longer dominant' (ibid: 8).
The binarism does not disappear, however, since the
pentimento image - insofar as it actually features at all
in the main body of the book - merely serves to highlight
the uneasy co-existence of two totalities rather than to
articulate any degree of contingent inter-relation between
them.

A slight difference from - or supplement to - Armstrong's
account, in the matter of Arney and Bergen's evolutionism,
can be isolated here (and represents a kind of
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methodological complement to Armstrong's 'disciplinary
determinism'). As noted earlier, Armstrong's account is
far more closely honed upon the internal world of medicine
itself. Medicine, for him, seems to be a kind of closed
system which transforms itself endogenously. Arney and
Bergen, however, provide a more 'extensive' analysis;
they seek to argue not just that medicine is becoming more
'subjective' in its internal orientation but that it is
seeping ever more finely into the minutiae of everyday
life, taking up more and more concerns which were once not
considered to be the province of medicine at all. Hence,
their evolutionism seems to be, as it were, exogenuous as
well as endogenuous. This tendency clearly bears
comparison

with

the

anti-medical

theme

of

the

medicalisation' of society. Whilst this is a matter for
consideration in the conclusion to this thesis

one

immediate limitation of this perspective can immediately
be

pointed

out.

This

is

that

the

notion

of

'medicalisation' seems to assume the pre-existence of a
phenomenal realm of the 'social' confronted by a more or
less fixed agent - the 'medical' - which seeks to colonise
it. What such a perspective tends to miss is those ways in
which the concept of the 'medical' itself undergoes
transformation in the course of its development. Such
transformations occur not so much as the result of an
unproblematic extension of medicine's 'interests' as on
the basis of a complex series of negotiations - and,
commonly, arguments and squabbles - as to what properly
'medical' interests are in the first place. Hence, in a
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manner that may be unwarranted,

the notion of

'medicalisation' tends to pit the 'social' in opposition
to the 'medical' - or, in the specific context of Arney
and Bergen's account, 'life' against 'death' - rather than
investigating how their inter-relations are negotiated
(cf. on 'medicalisation', the introduction to Miller and
Rose 1986).

In sum; the analysis of medical rationalities needs to be
suspicious of what was termed 'disciplinary determinism'
with its composite problems of binarism, totalisation and
evolutionism, as well as of theories of 'medicalisation'
in general. Let us now turn to give these hitherto rather
negative methodological considerations more of a positive
content.
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CHAPTER THREE

MICHEL FOUCAULT AND CLINICAL MEDICINE

1. Michel Foucault's Birth of the Clinic

Michel Foucault's under-utilised work on clinical medicine
can be used to illustrate a theoretical perspective on
medical thought capable of bypassing some of the problems
we have located in the work of the authors above.

First, an overview. Birth of the Clinic, claims Foucault,
is intended to be a 'structural' study designed to uncover
the rules of formation - the 'conditions of possibility' of 'medical experience in modern times' (Foucault 1973:
xix). Its object is 'clinical method' which Foucault sees
as a kind of emblem of modern positivism:
'constantly praised for its empiricism, the
modesty of its attention, and the care with
which it silently lets things surface to the
observing gaze without disturbing them with
discourse' (ibid: xix).
Foucault seeks to replace the mere of
clinical thought which tends to emphasise only 'old
threadbare notions that had been medicine's basic tools as
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far back as the Greeks' (ibid: xviii) with a methodology
which focuses upon not thought itself but that 'unthought' ('non-pensee') which 'systematises thought from
the outset' (ibid: xix; cf. 1963: xv). It is important to
stress, however, that the book is not in any sense a
'critique' of this ideal view, which typically stresses
the:
'restraint of clinical discourse (its rejection
of theory, its abandonment of systems, its lack
of philosophy; all so proudly proclaimed by
doctors)' (Foucault 1973: xix).
Birth of the Clinic is only a 'critique' in the sense that
Foucault seeks to claim that clinical thought is not an
age-old un-changing endeavour but has real - structural
and historical - conditions of possibility. These
conditions entailed a mutation at the end of the
eighteenth century (largely around the impetus of new
philosphies of language) in the articulation of the
'perceptible with the statable'; 'the common structure of
what is seen and what is said' (ibid: xviii-xix). Perhaps
the epistemological focus of this transformation can be
isolated in what Foucault describes as 'a welding of the
disease onto the organism' (ibid: xviii) whereby the
nosological theory of the disease 'entity' (which really
amounted to an 'ontology' of disease: cf. Kraupl-Taylor
1979: 5-16) was eclipsed by an orientation that situated
the 'being of disease' in the 'three-dimensional space' of
the body itself; a transformation that was accompanied by
a new conception of the 'author' of medical statements -
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the doctor - as a kind of 'subject of consciousness' able
to trace the 'linear series of morbid events' according to
a new 'grammar of signs' (ibid: xviii).

It should immediately be clear that there is some distance
between Foucault's overview of the clinical 'edifice' of
the nineteenth century and that characteristic of those
anti-medical writers (Armstrong, and Arney and Bergen
included) who regard this period as being dominated by an
'objectivising' medical rationality.

2. Space, Language and Death

In substantive terms we shall argue on three broad fronts,
that is, in relation to the questions of the hospital
(space), language, and death, that nineteenth century
medicine was not - as both the anti-medical ethos, and
Armstrong and Arney and Bergen would have it - basically a
reductive or 'objectifying' totality of practices.

2.1. The initial focus will be the broad level of medical
spatialisation. Here varieties of anti-medicine tend to
focus upon one institution in particular; the hospital.
Interpreters of Foucault's work as well as medical
sociologists tend to have been united in their assessment
of this institution. It is a reductive space which
encloses its victims according to a certain logic - in
Arney and Bergen's terms - of spatial 'exclusion'. Bryan
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Turner's assessment of the hospital as an 'objectifying'
institution is emblematic of this kind of viewpoint when
he claims that medical surveillance brings about 'the
disciplinary individuation of patients within the hospital
bureaucracy' where:
'disciplinary methods subordinated the
individuality of the patient under the routine
of description, administration and control'
(Turner 1987: 37-8).

While it is certainly the case that in Discipline and
Punish Foucault has occasion to turn to the example of the
hospital to illustrate the nature of discipline, we wish
to argue in what follows that this is misleading in the
context of Birth of the Clinic. For in Discipline and
Punish medicine and the hospital serve as the surface of
emergence or point of application for certain disciplinary
technologies. 'Discipline', writes Foucault in that work:
'should

be

identified

neither

with

an

institution nor with an apparatus, it is a type
of power, a modality for its exercise ... a
technology'. As a technology it can be 'taken
over' by institutions - schools, hospitals - 'as
an essential instrument for a particular end'
(Foucault 1979: 215).
So whilst this certainly implies that medicine is a key
site for the operation of power it should not
automatically lead us to a perspective that would force us
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to see medicine entirely, or as a totality, in terms of
surveillance or discipline.

This point can be reinforced by looking at what Foucault
has to say in Birth of the Clinic and elsewhere about the
constitution of the hospital as the site for the
production of knowledge. We shall see, in fact, that
according to Foucault's account the modern clinical
hospital is actually predicated upon the demand precisely
of evading such a description of itself as a reductive,
exclusionary, enclosing, or 'objectifying' institution. In
Foucault's account, the clinical hospital only made its
appearance at the end of the eighteenth century in the
context of a consideration of 'liberty': as a compromise
between the demands of the 'free field' and those of
pragmatism and pedagogy (Foucault 1973: 43 and 82ff.). The
'free field' is the term Foucault gives to the demand - as
much politically motivated as medically required - for
'the suppression of every obstacle' (such as the old forms
of the hospital) in medical space 'so that the natural
needs of the species might emerge unblurred and without
trace' (ibid: 38). Part of this project entailed the
replacement of the old hospital structures with the
provision of 'assistance' in the home, an emphasis one
might say on the free and spontaneous space of the
'community'. If, however, the 'return of the hospitals'
was to become an inevitability this was because of the
demand that medical knowledge should itself be
communicable in a free space, that is, according to the
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pragmatic principles of the immediate communication of
teaching within 'medical experience' itself (ibid: 68).
This new rationality entailed, however, not a negation of
what Foucault calls the 'medicine of liberty' but its
reactivation / as it were, internally to medical knowledge
itself:
'at the end of the Convention / the theme of an
entirely new medicine, based upon the clinic,
swept away the theme of a medicine restored to
liberty that had been dominant right up to 1793
... what occurred was the restructuring, in a
precise historical context, of the theme of
'medicine in liberty': in a liberated domain,
the necessity of the truth that communicated
itself to the gaze was to define its own
institutional and scientific structures' (ibid:
69).
In other words, the possibility of the clinical hospital
depends - at least in thought or'discourse' since nowhere
does Foucault claim that the hospital was consequently a
genuinely beneficient environment for the individual - on
its being so far as possible not a hospital (in the preclinical sense of being a mere 'dumping ground for the
sick') but a free space, appropriate to the idea of a
'medicine in liberty'; something of a compromise, in fact,
between what Foucault calls the 'old clinic' of the
eighteenth century, the old pre-clinical hospital itself,
and university structures.1
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Foucault's well-known article 'The Politics of Health in
the Eighteenth Century' (Gordon ed. 1980: 166-82) also
bears out this contention that the modern hospital, from
its very beginnings, is self-consciously not a 'carceral'
type of insitution as so commonly perceived by antimedical writers. This is largely because the hospital that
existed before its 'clinical' variant was itself perceived
more or less along t carceral' lines. Here
'the hospital appears in many respects to be an
obsolete structure. A fragment of space closed
in upon itself, a place of internment for men
and diseases...' (ibid: 177).
Thus the reform of the hospitals - the reinvention of the
hospital as a kind of clinical 'curing machine' - is bound
up from the beginning with making the hospital less, as it
were, of a hospital. Part of this endeavour entailed that
the hospital should specifically not be an 'exclusionary'
space - or, to invert Armstrong's language at this point,
it should be even from the beginning more of a Dispensary
than a Panopticon, radiating outwards, its staff moving
out into the population and so forth (ibid: 178ff.)
Indeed, tied to this moment is something not entirely
dissimilar from Armstrong's 'community gaze' itself. For,
as Foucault comments, the relation between the social
sciences and medicine (and exemplified for Armstrong by
the 'survey') can be dated further back in time than the
early twentieth century (cf. Armstrong 1983: 113):
'Doctors at that time [the end of the eighteenth
century] were among other things the specialists
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of space ... the first managers of collective
space ... concerned to think the space of
habitations and towns. Countless people have
sought the origins of sociology in Montesquieu
and Comte. That is a very ignorant enterprise.
Sociological knowledge is formed rather in
practices like those of the doctors' (Gordon,
ed. 1980: 151).

Foucault does not claim that the hospital is the opposite
of'carceral'. Matters are more complicated than this. The
hospital is rather a compromise an uneasy alliance between
what are basically 'political' positions. It could be said
in this context that the hospital created the conditions
for its own critique (see Gordon in ibid: 250). This is
due to the fact that part of the significance of the
clinical hospital is that it is a site of knowledge as
well as of cure. Indeed, there is here a point of
convergence with others of Foucault's analyses, which
focus upon what Colin Gordon has aptly labelled
'institutional epistemologies' (Gordon 1990: 12). Part of
the significance of the modern asylum, for example, is
that it - like the clinical hospital - is a therapeutic
instrument; a curative institution and a site for the
production of knowledge rather than simply a 'carceral'
domain. Similarly, one could say that the significance of
the prison of the nineteenth century lies in that it
ceased to be merely a I carceral l domain, but sought to be
a moral institution that reforms its inmates, and so on.
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As Foucault shows, both these institutional forms contain,
as it were, the conditions for their own critique, the
functions of knowledge and institutionalisation existing
in uneasy tension (see e.g. Foucault 1979: 266 & 268; cf.
Garland 1985: 27-32).

If there is, then, something of an uneasy relationship
between what can be called the 'liberating' and
--1

enclosing' functions of the clinical hospital then this

can be further emphasised by considering the model of
knowledge that is employed there. The anti-medical verdict
upon this matter is quite clear (cf. Turner above); the
hospital is a place of bureaucratic 'normalisation', a
place where large numbers of patients can be gathered and
a norm fixed. This does not always, of course, imply an
anti-medical position. For example, Temkin has highlighted
this numerical emphasis:
'Few things mark the chasm between ancient and
modern medicine as impressively as does the
different character of the hospitals. The
ancient hospital, because it housed many
patients, was looked down upon as neglecting
individual sickness. The modern hospital, just
because it houses many patients, was an
institution where individual sickness can be
described with some degree of precision'
(Crombie, ed. 1966: 636; cf. Donnelly 1983;
chapter 7).
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Nevertheless such a 'numerical' emphasis would at least
afford a useful purchase for an anti-medical stance. Yet
Foucault conspicuously omits to take this opportunity (cf.
Foucault 1963: 34). In fact, he takes some pains actually
to contest the primacy of the 'quantitative' or
'objectivist' dimension of clinical knowledge. In the
book's preface, for example, he contrasts the experimental
approach of J.F. Meckel - who used 'the rational method of
weighing equal volumes and comparing them' (Foucault 1973:
xii; cf. the comments on this passage in Rousseau 1980) with the far more 'qualitative' emphasis of the clinician,
Bichat. The clinic, claims Foucault, owes far more to the
latter approach than the former:
'the precise, but immeasurable gesture that
opens up the plenitude of concrete things,
combined with the delicate network of their
properties to the gaze, has produced a more
scientific objectivity for us than instrumental
arbitrations of quantity' (ibid: xiii).
If the notion of normalisation by number is not an
overriding theme of Birth of the Clinic it is because
Foucault's argument is not that medical knowledge is
somehow reductive of individuality (in the manner that a
bureaucracy, for example, is typically held to be
reductive of individuality). Indeed, normalisation and
individualisation do not appear as opposed terms in
Foucault's vocabulary at all. Rather, in his discussion of
medical knowledge he is at pains to show how clinical
knowledge is constitutive of individuality. There is,
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however, once again something of a paradox here; for
clinical knowledge, in a sense, seeks to be something of a
contradiction in terms, for it lays claim to being a
'science of the individual', that is, a rational discourse
that takes as its object the uniqueness of the individual
fact: in short, a general science of singularity; a
'universal knowledge' of 'individual difference' (Donnelly
1983). This is indeed its main claim for significance, so
far as Foucault is concerned:
'The individual is not the initial, most acute
form in which life is presented. It was given at
last to knowledge only at the end of a long
movement of spatialisation whose decisive
instruments were a certain use of language and a
difficult conceptualisation of death ... The old
Aristotelian law, which prohibited the
application of scientific discourse to the
individual was lifted when, in language, death
found the locus of its concept: space then
opened up to the gaze the differentiated form of
the individual' (ibid: 170).
Two key areas were, then, vital in the founding of
clinical knowledge: language and death. A brief discussion
of each, in the light of Foucault's comments, should serve
to draw out further the sense of 'tension' that we have
already noted as being at the heart of the clinic.

2.ii. Foucault argues that it was only through a certain
usage of 'language' that it became possible to see things
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in the body 'as they really are'. Indeed, it is only
through language that the space of the disease itself
could become mapped on to the real space of the body:
'The space of configuration of the disease and
the space of localisation of the illness in the
body have been superimposed, in medical
experience only for a relatively short period of
time - the period that coincides with
nineteenth-century medicine and the privileges
accorded to pathological anatomy' (ibid: 4).
Previously, argues Foucault, the disease had been
conceived as a 'species' and the doctor's task had been to
reach

the

species

essence

by

'subtracting'

the

circumstances of the individual who bore the disease
itself. In other words, disease was a generality. Now,
however, clinical thought superimposes the 'body of the
disease and the body of the sick man' (ibid: 3) so that
the disease always appears in its individual, particular
form. What the doctor sees in the body henceforth becomes
important: as Foucault says, this is the period that marks
for the first time the importance of a certain kind of
vision in medical thought; 'the period that marks the
suzerainty of the gaze' (ibid: 4; we shall discuss the
'gaze' further below). But of key importance here was the
conceptualisation of an alignment of what is seen in the
body with what can be stated by the doctor (both for the
purposes of knowledge - 'discovery' - and of instruction):
'It was ... necessary to open up language to a
whole new domain: that of a perpetual and
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objectively based correlation of the visible and
the expressible' (ibid: 196).
Hence the emphasis upon the development of a form of
language capable of describing the individual fact, a
language sensitive to particularity, detail, density,
tangibility; a kind of language - product of 'an arduous,
delicate work' - able 'to encroach upon that sandy region
that is still open to the clarity of perception but is
already no longer so to everyday speech' (ibid; 169). And
Foucault cites as exemplary of this a text by Laennec of
'extraordinary formal beauty':
'The liver ... slightly mammilated and emptied,
was a yellowish grey in colour; when cut it
seemed to be made up entirely of a mass of small
seeds ... they were fawn or reddish-yellow in
colour, verging in parts on the greenish; their
fairly moist, opaque tissue was slack, rather
than soft, to the touch ...' (quoted in ibid:
169-70).
The 'individual fact' here is hardly a 'reductive' one,
flattened onto the homogeneous plane of numbers,
experiments or reason. Rather, the plane of homogeneity
that it inhabits is marked out by this kind of language one sensitive, above all, to the 'coloured content of
experience' - itself.

Again, there is a certain 'tension' here. Foucault claims
that the form of clinical knowledge that he is describing
is by nature 'positivist'. It privileges above all the
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visible and the experiential in the construction of
'objective' knowledge. But, as Foucault makes clear right
at the close of the book, this positivism also contains
within itself that to which it is opposed; that is, what
we might characterise as the more 'subjective' orientation
'that will be used later, and paradoxically used against
it' (ibid: 199). In particular, claims Foucault, this form
of positivism contains within itself all the elements with
which it was to be opposed by phenomenology:
'the original powers of the perceived and its
correlation with language in the original forms
of experience, the organisation of objectivity
on the basis of sign values, the secretly
linguistic structure of the datum, the
constitutive character of corporeal spatiality,
the importance of finitude in the relation of
man with truth •.. all this was involved in the
genesis of positivism' (ibid: 199).

Clearly to view the medical experience of the nineteenth
century as being somehow reductive of individuality, as
being of a resolutely objectivist nature would be
misleading in the context of Birth of the Clinic; a
consideration that has obvious consequences for those who
would wish to locate the specificity of twentieth century
medical activity in opposition to this objectivism. Rather
that work tends everywhere to locate a certain tension
between the varying impulses of the clinic.
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2.iii. Anti-medical writings have often claimed that
death is central to Western medicine, indeed that medicine
is a kind of necromantic science, that it is preoccupied
with the corpse at the expense of the living individual
(Illich 1977; Figlio 1977; even a historian such as
Richardson 1987: 30). In common with this tendency, we
have seen how Arney and Bergen have characterised the
opposition between the 'old' (nineteenth century) and the
' new '

(twentieth century) medical rationalities as one

pertaining between an emphasis on death and an emphasis on
life. Yet, in spite of the vast centrality of death in
Birth of the Clinic, the accent of Foucault's discussion
is really quite different from this anti-medical theme.

Death is axiomatic to Foucault's discussion of how the
clinic was born as a science of the individual fact.
Death, for Foucault, is what places limits upon the new
descriptive language of the clinic. The internal surfaces
of the corpse - Bichat's tissues - form the essential and
stable points of application for the mature clinical gaze
of pathological anatomy, a fact which Foucault makes much
of at a cultural level:
'Western man could constitute himself in his own
eyes as an object of science, grasped himself in
his language, and gave himself, in himself and
by himself, a discursive existence, only in the
opening created by his own elimination; from the
integration of death into medical thought is
born a medicine that is given as a science of

5
the individual' (ibid: 197).
If, however, Foucault's thesis that this medical event can
be linked up more or less directly to philosophical
factors of the 'birth of man' (in the Kantian question of
the individual being both subject and object of his own
knowledge) (ibid: 197) or to cultural factors such as the
link between lyricism and individuality in Western thought
(ibid: 198) will be to many rather far-fetched, his
discussion of the discursive conditions of death certainly
leaves no doubt that Foucault does not place a wholly
negative interpretation upon this development. Certainly
we would argue that a writer like Figlio is misguided when
he argues, in a passage representative of the anti-medical
perspective that, Foucault's discussion represents:
'a metaphysics of death of the sort Illich
thought was so important to the establishment of
modern medical thought' (Figlio 1977: 273).
On the contrary, Foucault claims that modern medicine is
the first to dispense with the notion of death as being
purely of a 'negative' order:
'For classical thought, finitude had no other
content than the negation of the infinite, while
the thought that was formed at the end of the
eighteenth century gave it the powers of the
positive ... [which] marked at the empirical
level, the beginning of that fundamental
relation that binds modern man to his original
finitude' (ibid: 197).
An appreciation of how death becomes, for Foucault, a
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discursive category of a positive order can be derived
from a brief resume of Foucault's - certainly difficult,
dense and occasionally obscure - discussion of the
pathological anatomy of Bichat.

To begin with one might point out that Foucault is at this
point attempting to be iconoclastic; he is assuming that
his audience are attuned to the thesis - above all
associated with Georges Canguilhem - that Bichat's work
constitutes a kind of primary 'vitalism' (e.g. Canguilhem
1989: 61-3). Canguilhem associates disease with the
specificity of life itself; above all, he claims that it
is man's capacity to fall ill that makes him distinctive,
a line of thought which he associates with Bichat's
discussions of the specificity of 'organic life'.
Canguilhem associates with the work of Bichat, then, that
first alignment between the possibility of life and the
capacity for disease. Foucault, however - whilst certainly
not attempting to refute this viewpoint - claims that
there is a 'third term' (aside from life and disease)
which constitutes this specificity - and this third term
is death. It was in the anatomy room that Bichat
discovered that 'moving death' that formed the stable
trajectory, away from the course of life, along which
disease could be measured. For Bichat, death was not a
negation but a positive, multiple, temporal phenomenon:
'Death is therefore multiple, and dispersed in
time: it is not that absolute, priveleged point
at which time stops and moves back; like disease
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itself, it has a teeming presence ... gradually,
here and there, each of the knots breaks, until
organic life ceases, at least in its major
forms, since long after the death of the
individual, miniscule, partial deaths continue
to dissociate the islets of life that still
subsist' (ibid: 142).
And from this epistemological construction of death the
appropriation by a reasoned knowledge of the individual
fact - and of all those forms of 'vitalism' that resist
the reduction of organic life to the 'mechanical or the
chemical' (ibid: 145) - was given its possibility: behind
every form of vitalism (even that of somebody such as
Illich in his resistance to the necromantic propensities
of medicine) resides this genealogical origin of what
Foucault calls 'mortalism' (ibid: 145): the very
celebration of life (even in its most typical anti-medical
forms) has as its condition this discursive appropriation
of death.

Our discussion of Birth of the Clinic leads to one main
proposition: that the bifurcation (exemplified in the work
of Armstrong, and of Arney and Bergen) between the
'objective' - or the carceralising or mortalist - and the
'subjective' - or vitalist or libertarian - moments of
medicine is in fact internal to clinical medicine itself;
moreover, that the 'self-perception' of the clinic is
firmly toward the libertarian rather than the carceral
axis. This tension or oscillation that seems to have been
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so central to medical thought since the end of the
eighteenth century is of interest in relation to the wider
question of 'enlightenment' that was posed at the
beginning of our discussion.

2.iv. Foucault explicitly - if perhaps rather literally associates the birth of clinical thought with the question
of enlightenment. 'At the end of the eighteenth century'
what mattered was above all the 'element of ideality'
which, as it were, formed the 'infrastructure' ('anterior
to every gaze') governing perception and its object; 'the
unassignable place of origin where things were adequate to
their essence' (ibid: xiii). Now, however, as Foucault
explains, 'enlightenment' becomes, as it were, immanent to
the gaze itself so that an active ,peception and a passive
yet primary object can confront ea6hother:
seeing consists in leaving to experience its
greatest corporal opacity; the solidity, the
obscurity, the density of things closed in upon
themselves, have powers of truth that they owe
not to light, but to the slowness of the gaze
that passes over them, around them, and
gradually into them, bringing nothing more than
its own light. The residence of truth in the
dark centre of things is linked, paradoxically,
to this sovereign power of the empirical gaze
that turns their darkness into light' (ibid:
xiv).
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As has been argued, Foucault locates at the heart of the
enlightenment project - and certainly within medicine
itself - a certain tension or oscillation. No doubt this
is reducible to the grounding project of the clinic itself
- that it should be at once a science of the individual
fact. A link can be drawn between this medical endeavour
and that project relating to the 'sciences of man' that
was Foucault's epistemological preoccupation in the 1960s
(ibid: 197-8; Foucault 1974: 197 & 195-9). In The Order Of
Things Foucault argues that the self-constitution of 'man'
as at once an empirical and a transcendental entity has
typically lead to a kind of double strategy of
'positivism' and 'eschatology' according to which logic
man appears as a truth which is both 'reduced' and forever
'promised' (Foucault 1974: 321-2). This opposition is
effectively given an institutional form in the medical
world (cf. Foucault's comments concerning the relation
between medicine and the human sciences; Foucault 1973:
198). For, in a sense, anti-medicine is itself dependent
upon it; the critique of a reductive, objectivising
medicine accompanied by a veritable eschatology of antipositivist forms that would be more sensitive to the
person. Birth of the Clinic effectively shows that one of
the primary interests of medical thought lies in this
axiomatic relation towards the question of enlightenment
with all its tensions between scientisation and
individuality, positivism and eschatology.

5
In short, the edifice of medicine may well be an exemplary
site for the investigation of enlightenment rationalities
- dialectics, betrayals, and attempts at recuperation. If
so, it will be a privileged site not merely for some kind
of 'medical sociology' motivated by the interests of the
para-professions but for the tasks of a 'history of the
present' in general.
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CHAPTER FOUR

EPISTEMOLOGY, ORGANISATION, GOVERNMENT

1. An Analysis of Rationalities

Let us now turn to the question of the theoretical and
methodological lessons that might be gleaned from Birth of
the Clinic; and attempt to connect them to the present
study.

1.1. It is worth making an obvious but perhaps neglected
point; that Birth of the Clinic is not a 'social history'
of medicine. Rather, it is a work oriented towards - if
not actually occupying - the domain of the history of
ideas. As Foucault himself comments, the work is:
1

an attempt to apply a method in the confused,

under-structured and ill-structured domain of
the history of ideas' (Foucault 1973: 195).
But in a sense this is misleading. For Birth of the Clinic
is not even a history of 'ideas' in any orthodox sense that is, either a history of 'representations' relating to
a natural 'object', and brought into existence through the
midwifery of the powers of inspiration, 'discovery' or
genius. Nor is it a history of

'behaviours',

a
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reconstruction of 'what really happened' in clinical
hospitals at the end of the eighteenth century (and in
relation to which the 'ideas' of those involved might
serve as a yardstick) (cf. on the distinction between
'representations' and 'behaviours', the introduction to
Foucault 1986b). Rather what Birth of the Clinic concerns
might be described as medical 'rationalities'; styles of
thought which typically entail the highlighting of
particular

'questions'

asked of reality;

areas of

visibility which become subject to particular conceptual
problematisations and constructions.

In attempting to specify this level of analysis and its
simultaneous distance from and proximity to the history of
ideas, Foucault was no doubt influenced by the work in the
history of the life sciences of Georges Canguilhem; and,
above all, by Canguilhem's specification of the proper
level of analysis in the writing of epistemological
histories. What Canguilhem attempted to bring into focus
in his works was - similarly - not the history of the
referent (in writing the history of crystallography, he
says, one does not write the history of crystals), nor the
succession of theories that have come and gone in the
sciences (Canguilhem 1968: 16; cf. Canguilhem 1988:
introduction).
1

Both

approaches,

adopting

only

a

spontanteous' orientation towards their subject-matter,

would involve, for Canguilhem, a confusion of the object
of science with the object of the history of science.
Rather, 'epistemological histories' should occupy that
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position between phenomena and theories, where both have
their original 'problematisation' - that is, in the arena
of concepts. A concept, for Canguilhem, is neither a mere
'word' nor a straightforward designation of a 'thing', but
rather a kind of space of 'problematisation'. Foucault's
work is similarly oriented towards 'epistemological
histories'; indeed, this is particularly evident in his
late work where he talks specifically of a history of
'problematisations' (in Rabinow ed. 1986: esp. 388).

But if a history of problematisations or rationalities,
is not quite the same as a history of ideas, then nor does
it exactly occupy the domain of social history. This point
can be underlined with reference to some of the work of
Gaston Bachelard. Taking as his object of interest the
mathematical and physical sciences Bachelard argued that
scientific reason is heavily dependent for its workings
upon what he called 'phenomeno-technics', that is the
building up and construction of experience onto a stable
and workable plane of analysis and intervention via the
instrumental 'materialisation' of theories, or what he
called the "technical activity" of thought' (Bachelard
a

1984: 13). Hence, in looking at scientific theories it
would be necessary to focus upon the material means by
which such theories are operationalised. Foucault, working
upon the albeit much more diffuse and epistemologically
unstable domain of the human sciences, provides what might
be seen as a variation of this theme in his concern with
'human technologies' - with all those material means of

62
rendering thought stable and 'outside ourselves' (Rabinow,
ed. 1986: 388). Hence, the well-known emphasis in his work
on what are often rather misleadingly called 'nondiscursive' factors - political institutions,
architectural inventions, welfare practices, and so forth.
These should perhaps rather be seen as technologies for
the rendering of experience into thought, and - conversely
- of thought into experience; socio-material means for the
rendition to exteriority, visibility, and stabilisation,
of conceptual problematisation.

The point to be made here is that the inclusion of such
'non-discursive' factors in Foucault's works should not
lead to the conclusion that these works occupy the domain
more or less of an externalising 'social history'. Take
for example, the notion of 'police' as it appears in Birth
of the Clinic. In chapter 2 Foucault briefly discusses the
collective investigations of the 'Societe' Royale de
Medecine' which had been founded upon the principles of
what Foucault calls a 'medicine of epidemics' (Foucault
1973: e.g. 25 & 28). Yet this collective - social dimension of medical activity is not itself of great
importance; or, rather, the 'police' aspect of the work of
n'
the 'Societe' is only taken up in an 'epistemological'
context. The intention seems not (cf. Rousseau 1980) to
provide an 'externalist' history of medicine but to show
that even apparantly 'external' areas take part in and are
part of the 'internal' consitution of medical thought. Far
from being, as Rousseau labels him, the 'externalist's
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externalist', Foucault is probably better understood as
something like an 'expanded internalist' (cf. the
discussion in Minson 1985: chapter 4). This is why, in
Birth of the Clinic, Foucault is so selective about the
evidence he adduces from areas that one might think would
otherwise be excellent 'externalist' terrain. He goes into
no great depth with the 'Societe Royale' (cf. Peter 1975),
nor does he consider the French hygiene movement
(Ackerknecht 1967: chapter 13, also La Berge 1984). But
then, his purpose in Birth of the Clinic is not to write
the history of all medicine and its (' external')
'determinants', but is, rather, with the institutionalepistemological relations constitutive of clinical thought
alonel.

1.ii. If this is granted, this 'epistemological' approach
serves to re-open a gap, a sense of distance, that seems
to become increasingly narrowed and uncertain in
Foucault's work of the 1970s (and non-existent in the work
of many of his followers and critics), between knowledge
and power; between the elaboration of a rationality and
the full actualisation of the tasks which it sets for
itself (on this, O'Farrell 1988). Typical of this tendency
is the supposition that the outlining of a rationality or
style of thought has direct and immediate implications for
the practices and modes of subjectivity of persons. In
fact, there is no straightforward identity between the
elaboration of a rationality and their actualisation in
the 'real world'. As Colin Gordon has pointed out, there
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are two fallacies to be avoided here:
'The misunderstanding here consists in a
conflation of historical levels which reads into
the text two massive illusions or paralogisms:
an illusion of 'realisation' whereby it is
supposed that programmes elaborated in certain
discourses are integrally transposed to the
domain of actual practices and techniques, and
an illusion of 'effectivity' whereby certain
technical methods of social domination are taken
as being actually implemented and enforced upon
the social body as a whole' (Gordon in Gordon,
ed. 1980: 246; cf. Armstrong 1983: 133, note
50).
Of course, Foucault would no doubt have had a problem with
any notion of a raw, spontaneous, foundational 'real
world' at all since such an entity can presumably only be
known through the basis of the problematisations of
thought. However, this point should not be confused with
the claim that Foucault reduces the subjectivity or
behaviours of persons to their determination by the impact
of thought or discourse. The historical epistemology of
medical rationalities is not the same as a social history
or medical sociology, according to which the real effects
of medical activity are assessed in relation to the
concrete behaviours or patterns of subjectivity that they
induce. The investigations characteristic of Foucault's
work centred upon the modes of formation of ideal forms of
subjectivity as 'objectified' in thought, and in relation
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to various objects and discourses in different periods.
Thus he could be said to have been working upon the
terrain of aspirations, of attitudes, of programmes, of
ethical orientations towards the world. Such a conception
of inquiry in fact requires that the notion of the
'subject' itself be left as all but an empty category for
the purposes of analysis; even though, as Cousins and
Hussain point out, this carries with it certain risks of
its own since, as they argue:
'the human material on which techniques work is
always already differentiated and hence
resistances and failures may be related to the
human material on which the techniques operate
as well as other factors' (Cousins and Hussain
1984: 256).
Foucault, far from having an inadequate' theory of the
subject, in fact does not have a theory of the subject at
all. Certainly, in the light of this, the kind of analysis
like that of Armstrong which attempts effectively to
reduce subjects to forms of power (indeed, to one form of
power - that of 'discipline') would seem to imply far too
strong a claim for the powers of a 'human technology' such
as medicine.

2. Reconstructing the Methodological Apparatus of Birth of
the Clinic

In some respects it is a mistake to expect to be able to
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summon up a coherent 'methodology' from Foucault's books.
For Foucault's work is in general faithful to the
principle that one tailors one's mode of analysis to the
'object' in hand. We might - adopting a rather 'naive'
mode, perhaps - contrast here a 'toolbox' approach from a
'machine' approach. Thus, one takes a 'toolbox' to the
evidence, one uses only those tools appropriate to the
task in hand; the aim is not to allow the evidence itself
to pass through some kind of pre-fabricated 'machine',
capable of programming all the evidence in advance.
Nevertheless,

if one turns to Foucault's analyses

themselves one can reconstruct certain themes, a 'way of
doing things' that is characteristic. In doing this with
Birth of the Clinic, we are concerned less to be
resolutely faithful to that text in all respects than to
use it so as to provide ourselves with tools for our own
enterprise.

We shall 'read into' Foucault's book on -the clinic a
threefold methodological schema whereby the birth of the
clinic is accounted for along three analytic levels; those
of epistemological articulation, organisational adequation
and what we shall call 'governmental consciousness'. It
should be emphasised that these our not Foucault's terms
but are rather the methodological means that we shall be
deploying in our own analysis. Nevertheless, Foucault's
book can be read through the lens of this threefold
typology, as can now be demonstrated.
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2.i. The key epistemological term in Birth of the Clinic
is the 'gaze'. This term should not, we would argue, be
assimilated to the notion of 'surveillance' (a marked
characteristic of Armstrong's approach), but should be
allowed to retain its more or less 'substantive' function;
that of describing the different forms of epistemological
articulation proper to clinical perception, that is, the
forms of association between that which is observed and
the modes of 'seeing' that object and speaking of it. In
short, the notion of the gaze in Birth of the Clinic seems
to refer to modes of perceptual problematisation; the way
that forms of knowledge, vision and enunciation are
articulated together into a particular perceptual model; a
kind of 'sensory economy' that articulates what the doctor
can see, feel, say, teach, or know and which brings about
more or less of an alignment between these functions.

One example of this epistemological articulation can be
related to the discussion of language -and clinical
perception in the early form of the clinic, before Bichat
(Foucault 1973: chapters 6 and 7). Here, Foucault argues,
one has not seen pathology until one has offered up a
' complete description' of it. Language in this sense, is
not part of 'saying' but relates just as much to 'seeing'
(ibid: 112-4); language is akin to vision, hence the image
that Foucault uses of the 'speaking eye'. On the other
hand, what Foucault calls the 'glance' is unlike the
semio-clinical gaze in that it is sensory and direct; it
strikes at the body at one point, as if one were touching
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the surface of the body with one's eye (ibid: 122). So
here, the gaze relates less to the seeable, or the
sayable, than to the tangible; a matter of importance when
one comes to consider the mature clinic of, above all,
Laennec. For if the gaze is akin to the sensory immediacy
of touching, then touching too, with Laennec, is
effectively a form of 'seeing': so that even the use of
the stethoscope remains for Foucault under the 'dominant
sign of the visible' (ibid: 165).

Another example of epistemological articulation might also
be invoked to indicate this time the way in which certain
'real' aspects of the world itself have to be 'mobilised'
in a certain manner in order for particular forms of the
gaze to be possible. In order for the 'real' space of the
body to become the proper object of the medical gaze,
properties of the body have to be conceived in a certain
manner, and given privileges. Thus, the great achievement
of Bichat was, for Foucault the discovery of 'a principle
of deciphering corporal space that is at once intraorganic, inter-organic and trans-organic' (ibid: 127).
This principle entailed a certain conceptualisation of
corporeal space - 'a space ... concerned with order,
successions, coincidences, and isomorphisms' - defined
entirely by the differential thinness of tissues. Bichat's
achievement was to conceptualise the body as a
homogeneous, yet differentiated space of tissues (twentyone types in all) which cross and intertwine around the
organs; a surface upon which both the complexities of
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pathological function and alteration and the gaze itself
can be fixed:
'On the basis of tissues alone, nature works
with extremely simple materials. They are the
elements of the organs, but they traverse them,
relate them together, and constitute vast
'systems' above them in which the human body
finds the concrete forms of its unity ... Bichat
imposes a diagonal reading of the body carried
out according to expanses of anatomical
resemblances that traverse the organs, envelop
them, and, at the same time, bind them together
... ' (ibid: 129).

2.ii. The second analytical axis that might be considered
is that of organisation (ibid: chapter 5). What are the
forms of association that are implied by the form of
epistemological adequation proper to the clinic? What sort
of institutional structures would be required to promote
these associational forms?

The first matter - that of forms of association - is taken
up by Foucault in the context of Cabanis's report on
medical administration in Year XI, which sought above all
'to provide a theory of the medical profession' (ibid:
78):
'The problem was to assign to it [the
profession] a closed domain, reserved to it
alone,

without

either

resorting

to

the
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corporative structures of the Ancien Regime or
returning to forms of state control that might
be reminiscent of the Convention period' (ibid:
79).
What was effected was a kind of compromise between the
liberal demand ('patently inspired by Adam Smith') that
there should be no authoritarian or exterior control over
medical acts themselves and the demand that there should
be no return to that internal - 'corporative' - control,
that had opposed to the practiced gaze of the clinic the
fixed axioms of the academy (ibid: 80). Instead, medicine
was to be conceived as a 'secondary industry' - which does
not produce wealth but which treats or measures it - whose
practitioners would have to be subject to a rigorous
system of examination in order precisely to protect the
liberty of those that they targetted. But what was
important here - and this is what actually characterises
medicine as a 'profession' - was not so much the knowledge
one possessed so much as the competence - the 'recognised
probity' as Cabanis put it - or the 'set of possibilities'
('ensemble de virtualite') that characterised the person
of the doctor (ibid: 80; cf. Foucault 1963: 81).

Thus, the birth of the clinic entailed a transformation in
what might be called the substance of organisation.
Instead of being directed at the object of knowledge,
organisation was now directed at the 'knowing subject'.
Hence the great importance that Birth of the Clinic
attaches to clinical 'authority', to the 'subject' or
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'author' of medical statements, the doctor. Central here
is the form taken by the reproduction of clinical
knowledge, that is, pedagogy; and the form of the
institution in which pedagogy takes place, the hospital.
The clinician is an authority who combines perfectly the
act of seeing with the act of teaching; of 'disclosing'
the forms of pathology. The hospital is a space in which
the truth of pathology itself - removed from all the
'dogmatic language' of 'university speech' - is allowed
to speak, albeit in a 'language without words':
'It is a question, in the absence of any
previous structure, of a domain in which truth
teaches itself, and, in exactly the same way,
offers itself to the gaze of both the
experienced observer and the naive apprentice;
for both, there is only one languagea: the
hospital, in which the series of patients
examined is itself a school' (Foucault 1973:
68).

_

Thus the liberation of truth from dogmatism entailed a
composite liberation on the terrain of the institution:
'in a liberated domain, the necessity of the
truth that communicated itself to the gaze was
to define its own institutional and scientific
structures' (ibid: 69).

2.iii. The notion of a 'medicine in liberty' (ibid: 69) is
also central to that level that we will call the
'governmental consciousness' of medical activity. Here
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reference can be made to Foucault's later writings on
i governmentality l , as well as to the work of other authors
on 'rationalities' and 'technologies of government' (above
all, Burchell et al. 1991, and Rose and Miller 1991). The
clinic, as described in Foucault's work, displays evidence
of a certain 'governmental consciousness', that is, a
telos of epistemology and organisation that might have
implications for wider - especially liberal - problematics
of government. For on the one hand, as Foucault shows in
the early chapters of

Birth of

the Clinic, climical

medicine concerns irrevocably the question of 'population'
and the maximum of 'longevity' (see for example, the
discussion of Turgot's writings, concerned to generalise
the space of 'assistance' outside the hospitals into the
homogeneous space of the population; Foucault 1973:
18ff.), and the delegation of powers of tutelage over its
health and longevity to a closed yet free 'profession'.
Yet, on the other hand, the form of the clinical encounter
is itself a private one:
' a space with no other morphology than that of

the resemblances perceived from one individual
to another, and of the treatment administered by
a private medicine to a private patient' (ibid:
19).
As such, then, clinical rationality could be said to be at
once 'totalising' and 'individualising', following a logic
of, as Foucault puts it, 'omnes et singulatim' (Foucault
1981). And as he wrote in a text that is entirely in line
with Birth of the Clinic on this matter:
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'The emergence of a clinical medicine strongly
centred on individual examination, diagnosis,
and therapy, the explicitly moral and scientific
- and secretly economic - exaltation of "private
consultation', in short the progressive
emplacement of what was to become the great
medical edifice of the nineteenth century,
cannot be divorced from the concurrent
organisation of a politics of health, the
consideration of disease as a political and
economic problem for social collectivities

which

they must seek to resolve as a matter of overall
policy' (Gordon ed. 1980: 166).
This level of 'governmental consciousness' concerns, then,
the way in which the micro level of intervention is tied
to the macro level of aspirations and programmes of
longevity and security; the way in which clinical
discourse fits itself into, and invokes, wider projects
and rationales. And if there is what we might describe as
a governmental 'telos' here - a form of subjectivity that
the clinic typically seeks to invoke - it is that of the
free citizen who engages in a kind of 'contract' with the
clinic, one who retains his or her own interests whilst
serving the interests of the wider collectivity by
becoming an object of knowledge: a citizen who, whether
rich or poor, is in fact only serving his or her own
'natural interests' by entering into the clinical
contract. In fact, as Foucault argues, in its original
form, this clinical 'contract' actually entailed a kind of
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- more or less cynical - bargain between different social
orders in the context of a strictly 'economic' rationale:
'And in accordance with a structure of
reciprocity, there emerges for the rich man the
utility of offering help to the hospitalised
poor: by paying for them to be treated, he is,
by the same token, making possible a greater
knowledge of the illnesses with which he himself
may be affected; what is benevolence to the poor
is transformed into knowledge that is applicable
to the rich' (Foucault 1973: 84).

3. On the Mechanics of Medical Rationalities

In the following analysis of general medical practice in
the twentieth century a similar schema focusing upon the
analytic

levels

of

epistemology,

organisation

and

governmental consciousness will be used. But, in
accordance with the discussion of the first part of this
chapter, it should be remembered that what are being
described are successive rationalities within general
practice. A major concern will also be with how
rationalities are put together and held together; with
what might be described as the 'mechanics' of the interrelations of epistemology, organisation and government. In
describing these processes some recourse will be had to a
perspective that has been influential in recent sociology
of science; that associated with the work of Bruno Latour
and his colleagues. There is no space to do expository
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justice to the full scope of this work here (Latour 1987,
Callon 1986, Callon et al. 1986, Callon and Latour 1981
are all useful sources); and besides only selective usage
is made of it to suit our particular purposes. Central to
this mode of sociology is the proposition that both
science and society (which are not viewed by these authors
as opposite

terms)

are built up by chains of

'associations' (John Law, for example, has coined the term
'heterogeneous engineering' to describe this process). The
most important concept here is that of 'translation' - be
it of material 'actors' or human 'interests'. Translation
describes that activity of bending the will of something
or someone in accordance with one's own ends; of
mobilising it or 'enrolling' it for one's own purposes
until finally one ends up with a kind of 'network' of
associations or 'alliances'. The purpose behind
translation is always to make something stable and
powerful - for example using a strategy of 'interessement'
through which identities are imposed upon- other actors
(Callon 1986: 207-8) - to make a network hold through
various 'trials of strength'. As Latour in particular has
been concerned to demonstrate, one important means of
doing this lies with the mobilisations of 'inscriptions',
material traces that stabilise a field of investigation
(Latour 1986); this theme will recur in subsequent
chapters of this study.

In what follows, parts of this perspective derived from
the sociology of science will be used to describe the
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construction of medical rationalities. Such rationalities
require a constant integration and association of elements
(epistemological, organisational, governmental); but
another requirement - as will be seen - is that what
results should be as coherent and 'simple' as possible.
The fabrication of a model or rationality of general
practice always requires the simplification of reality,
the reduction of elements in as mutually coherent a manner
possible (on the notion of such 'coherence-conditions' in
the service of a reduction of complexity, the most
celebrated work is Hesse 1974). What follows is an
examination of the way in which - not laboratory
scientists - but general practitioners have sought to
impose upon the heterogeneous reality which they confront
such a sense of epistemological 'discipline'. What these
general practitioners have in common is the task at once

of making general practice a non-'despotic' clinical
discipline (attentive to individuals, patients and - later
- 'persons' as opposed to diseases) and of turning it into
an autonomous and independent domain of endeavour and
investigation in its own right.
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PART TWO

JAMES MACKENZIE AND THE RE-INVENTION OF THE CLINIC

_
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CHAPTER FIVE

MEDICAL INSTRUMENTS AND CLINICAL PRINCIPLES

1. Introductory

There are four reasons for entering the empirical side of
our investigation of general practice with a consideration
of the work of James Mackenzie (1853-1925).

1.i. First, the case of Mackenzie can show how for general
practice to be tied to the project of anti-medicine a
complex operation in thought was necessary. General
practice has no 'natural right' to its attentiveness to
the sick individual - or even if it does,- in order for
this aspiration to be realised a complex operation of
conceptualisation, adequation and alignment was required.
In short, it was James Mackenzie who first made out a case
for general practice being exemplary of the ideals of an
anti-medical - that is, non-'despotic' - clinical
discipline. Second, Mackenzie was indeed the first to tie
general practice to this anti-medical project then it does
not follow that the project has remained the same since
his formulations of it. This is an important point because
Mackenzie is invariably mobilised today as the precursor
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of modern forms of practice that seek to take an
enlightened approach towards the sick individual; that is,
the 'patient's view'. Third, we wish, to illustrate
through a study of Mackenzie that anti-medical forms of
practice invariably resort to an enhanced attentiveness to
the characteristics, not so much of the patient, but of
the doctor. Rather than the 'patient's view' coming into
visibility, it is generally the 'doctor's view' which is
highlighted; if anything, such forms enhance rather than
diminish the doctor's specific claims to expertise. This
is a tendency which will be referred to later as the
generic 'doctorcentrism' of all forms of anti-medical
medicine.

Lastly, the case of Mackenzie shows that - contrary to
the instincts of the anti-medical impulse itself - the
construction of those 'human' technologies which seek to
be attentive to individuality, and to demonstrate their
'regard for persons' is necessarily of the same order
(requiring

similar

strategies

of

'interessement',

translation and so forth) as that required in the
construction of so-called 'material' technologies. The
case of Mackenzie is a particularly apposite one with
which to make this point; and the Latourian vocabulary of
translation will be useful here. There are essentially two
dimensions to his achievement; the first as the inventor
of a 'machine', and the second as as the originator of
certain clinical 'principles' designed to revolutionise
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medicine whilst putting general practice onto an
independent clinical footing.

1.ii. James Mackenzie (1853-1925) - one-time Harley Street
heart specialist - was not a cardiologist but a general
practitioner. It was during his twenty-eight years as a
Burnley general practitioner that he carried out his
initial research into the problems of failing circulation,
heart failure, clinical semiology and the nature of pain.
In 1885 he perfected an instrument - the ink polygraph which could measure the activity of the ventricles and
auricles of the heart; this lead to important findings on
the role of 'auricular fibrillation' in the onset of
ventricular collapse. In 1906, at the age of 54, Mackenzie
attempted to establish himself in London as a heart
specialist; he later worked at the West End Hospital for
Nervous Diseases, the Mount Vernon Hospital in Hampstead,
the London Hospital and University College Hospital. In
1919, wanting to return to general practice, Mackenzie
founded the James Mackenzie Institute of Clinical
Research: here, with a group of co-workers, he intended to
evolve a logic of clinical research -based exclusively on
the skills of the general practitioner - which would focus
specifically upon the early stages of disease where
diagnosis was most imprecise. However, the project was not
a success, and the Institute dissolved not long after
Mackenzie's death in 1925.
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Today Mackenzie is revered by general practitioners as the
'father' of those who sought to put general practice on
the footing of an independent - and professionally
autonomous clinical discipline; the pinnacle of any
modern general practitioner's career being to deliver the
annual 'James Mackenzie Lecture' at the Royal College of
General Practitioners.

2. The Invention of the Polygraph

Central to our treatment of Mackenzie's work - which we
shall approach above all through his prescriptive text,
The Future of Medicine (1919) - there resides a paradox
that has often been commented upon. This concerns the
specification of the grounds for Mackenzie's importance.
Thus on the one hand, his renown relied especially upon
his invention of a medical instrument - the clinical
polygraph - whilst, on the other hand, his own claim to
renown rested with his invention of a gerieral clinical
method and approach which took as its focus, ironically
enough, the denigration of the use of instruments in
medical practice (Reiser 1978: 182). As his Times
obituarist summed up the matter:
'Those members of the profession who love a toy
may remember him for his discovery of the venous
pulse and his share in the evolution of the
electrocardiograph. But deeper minds will
recognize, as he himself recognized, that these
were small matters compared to the great
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principles which he elucidated and the impetus
which he gave to a new study of medicine and a
new outlook ... ' (The Times 1925: 8).

2.1. The focus of Mackenzie's work was - throughout his
career - upon the problem of irregular heart action, and
his invention, the ink polygraph, was designed to provide
physical notation of such action in both auricles and
ventricles (on Mackenzie and instrumentation; Reiser 1978:
103, cf. 174 & 182). This instrument consisted of several
rubber tubes that connected to the various pulses on the
surface of the body, which connected to a roll of paper on
which 'traces' of the differential beating of the pulses
were recorded. The significance of the polygraph was that
it allowed an appreciation of the working of three of the
heart's four chambers independently of each other. From
this it could be seen that the chambers could fail
independently of each other, such as in the case of
1

_

auricullar fibrillation' where the two upper chambers

cease altogether, causing an irregular motion of the
ventricle which eventually wears out leading to general
'heart failure'. The instrument

worked

by recording

systolic activity from the jugular (neck) and radial
(wrist) pulses and correlating them with the 'apex beat'
(felt on the surface of the chest, measuring the left
ventricle systolic impulse, Mackenzie 1908: 73) which
served as the 'normal' rhythm. Thus the polygraph was an
instrument which, as it were, mobilised the actions of the
heart onto a flat, stable, homogeneous surface: or, to use
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Latour's vocabulary, it was something of a 'translation
device' transferring - and transforming - data from the
complicated three-dimensional space of the body to the
more manipulable and analysable two-dimensional space of
what Mackenzie called his 'tracings'. The stability of its
results, moreover, derived also from the mobility of the
instrument and its ease of use:
'I got a very serviceable instrument which I
could carry about in my pocket ... So easy was
this after a little practice, that I could take
a tracing of the radial and jugular pulse, or
apex beat of a patient while the temperature was
being taken, so that it was not time-robbing'
(Mackenzie 1919: 86-7).
Thus under a wide diversity of conditions the polygraph
served to enable equivalence and consistency to be
maintained, and an entire corpus of graphic descriptions
to be built up. This epistemological translation enabled
Mackenzie to demonstrate that extra-systolic activity
could be due to a premature beat of the ventricles (which
did not necessarily imply a pessimistic prognosis) or more
seriously to 'auricular fibrillation' which, Mackenzie
showed, was not caused by an absence of auricular systole
but by the irregular triggering by the auricle of the
ventricle beat ('nodal-rhythm'; Mackenzie 1908: 160) - the
simultaneity of which motion only giving the impression of
an absence of auricular movement - such that eventual
heart failure was caused by excessive movement of the
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ventricle rather than the auricle itself (Mackenzie 1908:
64, 69, Mackenzie 1902, Mackenzie 1919: chapter 4).

2.ii. However, in order to succeed (that is, to be 'taken
up' by others), Mackenzie's invention had to be - as his
first, contemporary, and most insightful biographer
demonstrates (MacNair Wilson 1926) - not just a 'material'
technology (translating raw materials into graphic
evidence) but also something of a 'social' technology.
MacNair Wilson centres his account of Mackenzie's work
largely around his professional struggle with the Royal
College of Physicians - or the 'Giants' as MacNair Wilson
calls them. Until 1907 the Royal College had been
oblivious to the work of Mackenzie - then a lowly general
practitioner in Burnley - and his results had been
ignored. By 1906, however, as MacNair Wilson comments:
'The truth began to dawn on him that if his
discoveries were to be made available to his
professional brethren and to the World, he must
himself carry them into the strongholds of the
giants' (MacNair Wilson 1926: 178).
What made the Giants change their minds was not so much
Mackenzie's move to London and Harley Street in 1907, that
is into the physical 'stronghold of the giants' but the
fact that his move into their social stronghold implied an
acceptance of their conceptual values. Here, in fact, a
social acceptance is disguised as a conceptual one: for
what was 'taken up' were not so much Mackenzie's actual
'findings' as based upon his 'principles' (which we shall
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consider below) but the 'social' status of his data such
that his 'material' technology he offered was only of
value because it was a 'social' technology as well. Thus
as MacNair Wilson argues, in his aptly 'strategic'
terminology, a translation of interests took place on the
basis of Mackenzie's 'scientific' credentials as a man not
of medical principles but of an interesting series of
'traces' (as exemplified in Mackenzie's Diseases of the
Heart (1908) with its mass of scientific data):
'His polygraph was what it is the fashion to
call an instrument of precision. The records he
made with it were "scientific data", things
which

other men, similarly

equiped, could make

and examine ... These tracings could not be
ignored; they were facts ... The Man of the
Tracings, therefore was a force to be reckoned
with' (MacNair Wilson 1926: 205-6).
However, if there was indeed a successful translation of
interests here then it was a translation without complete
mutual alignment. For whilst the Giants of the Royal
College believed that Mackenzie had simply become one of
their number, Mackenzie apparantly believed that he had
succeeded on the basis of his principles rather than his
invention. Thus although, having given up general
practice, success came very quickly for Mackenzie _
Physician at the West London Hospital, Harley Street
Consultant, member of the Royal College of Physicians - it
was a success which was on both sides based on a kind of
misrecognition:
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'He accepted gratefully and gladly the honours
that they offered him, because he thought that
these honours were accorded to his principles.
In fact they were accorded to his polygraph ...
And thus a strange and most comic situation was
brought about - a situation in which both
parties believed firmly that they had conquered
eachother' (MacNair Wilson 1926: 205 & 207).

Consideration can now be made of these 'principles'
themselves.

3. Clinical Principles and the Future of Medicine

Mackenzie's project centred upon an attempt to shift the
emphasis of his contemporary medicine from what he saw as
its preoccupation with disease entities and the
development of instruments to an emphasis on thepatient's
prognosis as interpreted on the basis of the doctor's
'unaided senses'. As such, Mackenzie's project can be seen
as an 'anti-medical' reaction (in the sense of that term
used here) to the impact of

bacteriology with its

apparant 'reification' of the notion of disease
(interestingly enough, Mackenzie himself had been a pupil
of Lister at Edinburgh, see Keele 1963: 104-5).

3.i. Although it can thus be described as a form of antimedicine, Mackenzie's enterprise was in fact only a re-
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affirmation of what he saw as already-instituted clinical
principles. His work

represents in some respects an

attempt to 're-invent'

the clinic. Thus Mackenzie

expressly regretted what he

the recent

saw as

disintegration of medicine into a series of insulated
'specialties'

(especially

those

centred

upon

the

laboratory and the corpse) (Mackenzie 1919: 44-5) and
sought to relocate the 'leading edge' of the profession
with the general practitioner, with his long-experience of
first-hand relations with actual patients.

Mackenzie's starting point was a kind of nominalist
reduction of the concept of disease. Diseases, he says,
are but names, referring sometimes to the 'seat' of
disease (as in peritonitis, galls stones), sometimes to
symptoms (goitre, angina pectoris), sometimes to their
discoverer (Bright's Disease), or to groups of symptoms
and signs (rheumatism, neuralgia). All these forms of
designation have the result that pathology is, as it were,
'reified'

as

having

an

existence

independent

of

aetiological processes in the individual. This
overemphasis upon disease has lead to a similar
overemphasis upon the specialisms, especially pathology
which:
•
ls

now so universally recognised,

that

everywehre facilities are given for its
prosecution, so that it can be said that ample
provision has been made for the study of the
disease, after it has killed its victim' (ibid:
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2).
In fact, Mackenzie argued, this conception of disease
becomes only the tip of the morbid iceberg when disease is
understood in its chronological context. He outlined four
stages through which all disease must pass. Medicine, he
claimed all but ignored the 'predisposing' and 'early'
stages of disease (the domain of the general practitioner;
where few signs or symptoms were present) and instead
concentrated entirely upon the later 'advanced' stage ('
... when the disease has progressed so far that it has
caused destruction or modification of tissue and when its
presence is revealed by a physical sign') and the 'final'
stage (when the patient has died):
'Medicine has advanced so far that for the study
of disease after the patient has died, we find
institutions magnificently equipped, presided
over by men of great experience and training'
(ibid: 3; cf. Mackenzie 1909: 12-14).
Perhaps, then, for Mackenzie, medicine is indeed a kind of
'metaphysics of death' of the sort described by Illich.
But his conception of the alternatives is no great
distance from the clinical principles described by
Foucault. Thus, Mackenzie's notion of pathology is one in
which the 'being' of the disease has indeed disappeared,
to be replaced by an emphasis upon the course of morbidity
as it inheres within the very structures of the body. Yet,
for Mackenzie, the site of the disease has retreated some
way further beyond the range of the gaze: the lesion has
lost some of its importance and disease has become a
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rather uncertain phenomenon which cannot be known except
through its 'manifestations' (symptoms and signs). Thus
disease is something that has always to be inferred
(rather than simply seen) from the evidence at hand: it is
something that must be arrived at 'retroductively' from
the evidence of its manifestations. Yet this viewpoint
itself led Mackenzie at once to re-assert all the
clinical principles of linguistic precision - to match the
visible with the expressible through a close linguistic
attentiveness (eschewing, for example, mere disease
'labels') - and to call for a certain humility in relation
to disease:
'The recognition and due appreciation of our
limits in respect of this imperfect nomenclature
will warn us to make every endeavour to define
our terms, and to make our use of names as
precise as possible that like disease may be
brought together from the unlike, and our
classification be based no- longer on
superficial, and accidental resemblances but by
deeper affinities' (Mackenzie 1909: 14).
Indeed this humility required only an enhanced visual
attentiveness - we must, argued Mackenzie, re-learn what
it is 'to see' - that had to be combined with the clinical
emphasis upon allowing the trained senses to ignore the
obstacles of prejudice and habit:
'The power of accurate observation and precise
thinking is so seldom acquired because methods
have become stereotyped, and many observers do

90
not realise that they are fettered in the bonds
of tradition' (ibid: 2).

3.ii. It can be no surprise, in this context, that a
nominalist appreciation of disease should be combined in
Mackenzie's work with an emphasis upon the sensitive
powers of the doctor - of which the model, for Mackenzie,
was not the specialist but the experienced general
practitioner. This is because the difficult understanding
of pathology can only be achieved on the basis of a
complex - 'aesthetic' - sense of judgement:
'Perhaps if we analyse it deeply enough,
Mackenzie's service to medicine is chiefly
” aesthetic".

Although

his

methods

were

scientific, his real aims were artistic. He
insisted upon personal impressions of the
trained senses, and above all, the discoveries
following from the use of these methods make him
a healer in the great tradition, whose life will
live on in many healed lives' (Williams 1946:
168-9).
Mackenzie, of course, made no claim to having invented
this aesthetic, which, when applied to matters of
prognosis, can seem like a 'sixth sense', a form almost of
'magic' (cf. on the 'clinical' foundations of this
Foucault 1973: 121, and Jacob 1988: 34). Rather, he was
reputed to have first seen it in action in Burnley, as
employed by a colleague of his, Doctor Briggs:
'The mysterious power possessed by Doctor
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Briggs, of knowing what was going to happen to
his patients was neither more nor less than
accumulated experience. Each time he looked at a
new case he saw, in reality, hundreds of old
cases, and remembered how they had fared'
(MacNair Wilson 1926: 50).
However, Mackenzie did devote himself to anatomising this
irrational or magical power in an attempt to find the
principles behind it. The essence of this clinical
experience lay in the doctor's use of the 'unaided
senses': the eye, the ear and the percussed finger;
factors;
'of importance in the perfecting of that
necessary instrument to clinical medicine

the

trained physician' (Mackenzie 1919: 185).
The doctor's approach, whether by eye,

finger

or ear, was

always with Mackenzie contrasted with the use of medical
instruments. Hence, Mackenzie - himself famous, as we have
seen, for the invention of a 'machine' - wrbte repeatedly
of the need to expunge instruments from medical practice
and research:
'The next thing the discoverer of a mechanical
device must do after he has recognized its use
in clinical medicine, is to get rid of it in
practice' (ibid: 195).

The means with which this was to be done, the mobilisation
of this 'sixth sense' of the doctor, and the over-all
medical 'rationality' that resulted, can now be described.
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CHAPTER SIX

MACKENZIE: EPISTEMOLOGY, ORGANISATION, GOVERNMENT

1. Epistemological Articulation

If Mackenzie was to be successful in his investigation of
this 'sixth sense' of the doctor, it was less because of
his recognition that this almost magical knowledge
concerned 'familiarity derived from experience' in all the
principles of morbid recognition - 'the eye has to be
trained to see and the finger to feel, and this can only
be brought about by long and patient education' (ibid:
185) - than from his epistemological elaboration of the
conditions necessary for this experience to operate. For
in order to make the doctor's aura calculable and capable
of reproduction, as it were, Mackenzie had to posit a
'domain of evidence' - a privileged material surface
(analagous perhaps to Bichat's internal surface of
tissues) - that would be amenable to the doctor's gaze.

1.i. Part of this enterprise - it can be called the labour
of epistemological articulation - can be seen through a
discussion of Mackenzie's clinical

1

semiology1 . What is

the difference between the 'symptom' and the 'sign' in
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Mackenzie's work? Some have criticized him for making no
distinction at all: 'Mackenzie had the irritating habit of
using the terms signs and symptoms anonymously' (Mair
1973: 317). Certainly there is little emphasis on the
symptom as being somehow 'subjective' compared to the
'objective' nature of the sign. Rather, both are objective
in that both depend for their existence on the doctor to
interpret their 'value' - requiring designation only if
they possess some kind of significance. However, if there
is a difference between them, it is that the symptom exist
prior in time to the sign and thus may be derived from the
evidence, not of the doctor's senses, but of the testimony
of the patient.

The symptom always relates to the sensation of physical
pain. But even pain is not a 'subjective' phenomenon;
rather it possesses in Mackenzie's work a peculiarly
'material' status on the surfaces of the body. The notion
that pain is a subjective phenomenon - was, argued
Mackenzie, the corollary of the fallacious view that pain
always relates to a particular organ. However, if we cease
to be concerned with locating the organ in question but
trouble to locate, as rigorously as possible, the pain
itself, we will be lead to the discovery that the
radiation of pain has, as it were, its own logic and can
be mapped along the complex pathways of the nervous
system:
'A recognition of the nature and meaning of this
radiation revealed that the usual idea, that
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pain is often so diffuse and vague as to be of
little value as a symptom was wrong, for the
production of pain is due to a stimulation of
certain cells in the central nervous system, and
the location of the pain is in a field definite
and distinct in the peripheral distribution of
nerves and these cells' (Mackenzie 1909: 67).
In order to track these material pathways of pain the
doctor must internalise certain methods of analysis. There
is, claimed Mackenzie, a 'law of association' on the basis
of which we can map the complex of symptoms across the
space of the body:
'in modifying the function of an organ or in
impairing the health of the individual,
[disease] produces a variety of phenomena, and
the application of this law demands a search for
the less prominent symptoms' (Mackenzie 1919:
127).
Perhaps more important, however, was what Mackenzie called
the 'law of progression' since it is this that fixed the
'value' of the symptom. This law states that the discovery
of the symptom should not be the end of the point of
investigation; rather the symptom in question must be
placed within the context of the mechanism which produced
it and which will determine its future. The 'law of
progression' thus has significance only within a kind of
temporal economy according to which a symptom is only
significant in relation to its origin, and more
particularly, its outcome. Thus a symptom - or a sign -
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can never be of importance in itself: its value lies not
its severity or triviality, but in its development (and
association) alone, that is, its value in time:
'No physical sign should be valued by itself,
its assoication with other symptoms has always
to be considered ' (ibid: 166).
This semiology, according to which the doctor's experience
and expertise is able to confer 'value' upon the
heterogeneity of 'manifestations' that are 'signs and
symptoms', was well illustrated by Mackenzie in the case
of auricular fibrillation (Mackenzie 1902). Mackenzie's
'system of observation' revealed that this affection,
occuring early in life or in middle age could, through
over-exertion on the part of the individual, typically
lead to full-blown heart failure (ventricular collapse) in
later life. Hence this form of affection has a kind of
'value', the knowledge of which is distinct from the mere
knowledge of the 'mechanism' which produced the affection
_

itself:
'men

who

scientifically

investigate

the

mechanism of phenomena, are quite content with a
species of guesswork as to the value of
phenomena' (ibid: 95).
On the other hand, in those cases of what he called the
symptoms and signs of 'youthful irregularities' of the
heart, Mackenzie concluded that these were of no 'value',
that is, of no pessimistic prognostic significance:
'I watched those who showed this irregularity
grow into manhood and womanhood ... They never
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showed any signs of cardiac weakness even when
engaged in hard manual labour' (ibid: 99).

1.ii. This evaluating gaze - so sensitive to the long
passage of time and individual prognosis - could, of
course, belong to nobody but the general practitioner,
working like Mackenzie himself in the actual circumstances
of daily practice. Nevertheless, for this gaze to work,
Mackenzie had to posit various substantive characteristics
as belonging to the body itself. Thus his work entailed a
particular conception of the human body as possessing a
series of attributes that make it naturally amenable to
perception; the 'object' of analysis, the body, has to be
made coherently visible, given a workable 'grid of
perception'. In other words, both the body and the kind of
perception which confronts it had to be given certain
characteristics, certain forms, that would allow them to
confront eachother at all. In Mackenzie's work, this task
was performed by what can be called a 'vocabulary of
surfaces'.

First, there are the substantive surface forms that that
Mackenzie mentions which connect the inner world of the
body to the doctor's perception. These forms have the
specific task of being, as it were translatable from one
organ to another. Take the phenomenon of 'pain'. This, as
a generalised symptom is something that is common to all
organic affections. Pain, for Mackenzie, follows specfic,
traceable pathways: the 'viscero-sensory reflex' and the
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'viscera-motor complex'. The phenomenon of 'pain', as a
material trace across these reflex pathways, forms a
region of 'obligatory passage' common to all organic
pathology. Moreover, as Mackenzie was concerned to show,
the organs themselves are not susceptible to pain at all.
But if pain rests upon a kind of area that is
'homogeneous' in the body (obviating the necessity, for
example, of working out a separate form of knowledge
relating to each organ) it also resides in areas that are
peculiarly susceptible to the gaze of the physician. In
particular, areas of 'non-striped' (non-striated) muscle
are especially prominent sites for pain; that is, the
surfaces of muscle wall that surround and project fragile
organs (e.g. the bowel, gall-duct, the uterus).
Mackenzie's work makes visible an entire vocabulary of
such surfaces that traverse the body now and then coming
to the surface, to be amenable to pressure on the skin (as
in the case, for example, of those affections which
produce 'cutaneous hyperalgesia') and thus - to the direct
scrutiny of the doctor. The vocabulary of surfaces not
only unites the analysis of separate and diverse organs,
but provides a kind of link between the inside and the
outside of the body, a homogeneous grid of perception.

Second, we can say that this vocabulary of surfaces
extends to the very exterior of the patient; the patient's
'aspect' and 'appearance' (see e.g. Mackenzie 1908:
chapter 4). The state of this exterior surface provides a
clue to those of the interior:
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'When people past the middle age suddenly
develop a pallor, the sign is one of grave
significance, and may be the first clue to the
beginning of some malignant affliction ...

1

(Mackenzie 1909: 100).
In particular the doctor should look out, argued
Mackenzie, for pallor, staring eyes, the appearance of
fatigue, all of which can provide clues to the patient's
condition. Mackenzie's vocabulary of surfaces is, then, a
way of 'homogenizing' the body, a way of making it
amenable to a coherent analysis from a single point; the
view, in short, of the general practitioner. It is a means
of giving the body a specific kind of visibility, whilst
allowing the gaze that confronts it to be pre-eminently
simple, governed by a limited number of widely applicable
principles of perception.

1.iii. Mackenzie's epistemology represented a brilliant
and coherent attempt to outline an approach - tied
uniquely to the powers of the general practitioner - that
would focus upon the 'patient' rather than the 'disease'.
Yet it would be strictly anachronistic to read back into
this the notion that Mackenzie was a practitioner - or
precursor - of 'person-centred' medicine. For Mackenzie's
patients are indeed just that - patients, and not
'persons' (cf. Abercrombie 1959: 18). If Mackenzie did
indeed tie the enterprise of general practice more or less
irreversibly to the fortunes of the patient, then this was
not at all an attempt to 'include' the patient in medical
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practice, to fathom a kind of consciousness, or to
manipulate the 'soul' of the sick subject. Dr Annis
Gillie, for example, is therefore quite wrong when she
claims that Mackenzie's interest in pain was driven by
'compassion' (Gillie 1962: 10). Or, at least, this
compassion played no part in Mackenzie interpretation of
pain. Rather his purpose was to subject the notion of
'pain' to a rigorous localisation, for him, pain was a
material not an 'emotional' concept. As he wrote:
'It is beside my purpose to enter into abstruse
metaphysical

considerations

regarding

the

consciousness of pain and its mental affinities'
(Mackenzie 1909: 22).
In fact all forms of 'psychologising' language were
completely alien to Mackenzie's way of doing things, a
factor that has lead his successors to correct this
'omission' for him. Thus Pinsent has noted the
proponderance in Mackenzie's work at St. Andrews of a
peculiar notion of 'exhaustion', when today 'we would
probably think of anxiety states and psychoneuroses as
fitting more closely [this] description' (Pinsent 1963:
11-12). In fact the patient's consciousness was, for
Mackenzie, as much an obstacle to the gathering of
information as a condition for it. So if it is indeed the
case that 'Mackenzie demonstrated as few, if any, others
have done the importance of listening to the patient, and
evaluating the evidence that the patient can provide'
(Gillie 1962: 19), Chen it is not the case that this
entailed anything like empathy or an 'understanding' -
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based for example, upon the doctor's own reflexive
capacities - of the patient's emotions. If there is
anything to be understood it is that the patient, as an
indispensible source of knowledge, can be extremely
difficult to handle. For example, the model of the
clinical encounter in Mackenzie's work does not follow the
logic of the confessional. Rather, it takes the form - to
use Mackenzie's own term - of an 'interrogation':
'In all cases the patient's replies must be as
direct and to the point as the question asked.
The tendency to prolixity which some patients
show must clearly be repressed; a clear reply
should be obtained to each question and no
question allowed to pass until the answer is
obtained' (Mackenzie 1909: 102, cf. Mackenzie
1908: 20).

Mackenzie's system was, in short, an attempt to found a
'patient-centred' medicine, but not a 'person-centred'
one. His work represents for perhaps the first time the
possibility of a discourse that is able to speak
simultaneously of the 'patient' and of 'knowledge'. Where
it foundered, this was due, on the one hand, to the
limits placed on generalising this form of knowledge (that
is, on the level of 'organisation') and, on the other
hand, to the limits of the conception of the 'patient'
that it invoked (on the level of 'government').
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2. Organisational Adequation

An emphasis upon simplification is absolutely central to
Mackenzie's project (chapter 5 of The Future of Medicine,
for example, bears the title; 'the simplification of
medicine'), and can be seen as a vital aspiration in the
context of organisational adequation; for the more
coherent, the simpler a medical system, the easier it is
to reproduce, that is both laterally (across the
profession) and pedagogically.

2.i. The stipulation that the doctor should deploy only
his 'unaided senses' in his work is no doubt part of this
emphasis of simplification (Mackenzie 1919: 166); yet in
fact Mackenzie's entire project is an attempt to stabilise
the field of medicine, to make it workable in the simplest
way possible. Thus we have seen how he outlined a
particular conception of pain, a particular vocabulary of
bodily surfaces, a certain conception of the doctor, a
certain understanding of disease all of which, we might
say,

are

enrolled

in

a

kind

of

network

of

problematisations: this is Mackenzie's 'system'. This
system has in particular a 'physiological' emphasis; it
concerns especially organic functions. In his final years,
at the St. Andrews Institute, Mackenzie attempted to
formalise this physiological system even further, using as
his central principle the notion of 'vital activity'
(Mackenzie 1926). This later theory - centering on the
notion of the 'reflex arc' as origin of disease and
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introducing a 'law of fluctuation' to account for all
organic activity (ibid: 67, 102) - classified symptoms
according to either an 'Increased' or 'Decreased' (or
'Deranged') level of 'Activity'. Hence, a generically
physiological theory of disease, in which:
' a symptom of disease is only an exaggeration of
or an interference with a normal response'
(MacNair Wilson 1926: 302).
Such physiological emphases have often in the course of
medical history displayed the advantage of systemacity
and relative simplicity. This is because they reduce the
plane of analysis down essentially to one dimension; here,
that of 'activity'. As Georges Cuvier wrote of a similar
'equilibrium' theory, that of John Brown:
'Brown's theory richly deserved ... success ...
owing to its extreme simplicity and to certain
beneficial changes in practice that it
instituted. It seemed to reduce the medical art
_

to a small number of formulas; that life is a
kind of combat between the living organism and
external agents; that vital force is dispensed
in fixed quantities ... that attention should be
focused on the intensity of vital action ...'
(quoted in Canguilhem 1988: 42).
This demand for a simplicity of problematisation is, as we
shall see, a key feature of all those programmes that seek
to make general practice into an independent, autonomous
discipline, even if a specifically physiological emphasis
has not itself always been central to this demand. For
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this emphasis itself possessed certain limitations, if
seen from the perspective of the 'economy' and 'scope'
that it conferred.

In fact, the kind of knowledge advocated by Mackenzie
could scarcely lend itself to either reproduction or
coherent organisation. For, to take the first of these,
how can one teach what can only by definition be gleaned
from - necessarily lengthy - experience? The very
'context-bounded' nature of general practice is exactly
what gives it its archetypal status for Mackenzie; that
the general practitioner, through long experience knows
his patients so well. Thus, for Mackenzie, the doctor is
only able to make his diagnosis on the basis of his
personal knowledge of the patient over a period of years.
The doctor's techniques cannot, then, be applied to any
patient, rather 'knowing the patient before these changes
occured, the attention is arrested by the alteration'
(Mackenzie 1919: 182). Thus it seems that the doctor's
knowledge of his patients has to be personal and
'pastoral':
'To the untrained eye the members of a flock of
sheep are so like one another that it seems
impossible to recognise separate individuals,
yet the intelligent shepherd knows the
peculiarities of each individual, though he may
not be able to give a comprehensive description
of the features by which he differentiates them'
(ibid: 200).
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So one cannot just bring a 'template' to the patient; the
gaze is not instantly workable on any material (although
cf. the clinical examples given in ibid: 186-9). In other
words, the very logic of the form of knowledge proper to
the general practitioner actually precludes the
reproduction of this knowledge in an economical form:
rather, one has to become a general practitioner in order
to do general practice, a form of expertise that cannot be
taught. There is a contrast here with one of the defining
characteristics of the clinic, as delineated by Foucault.
The clinician, claims Foucault, was distinct from the mere
'officer of health' in that, for him, knowledge was 'free
of all example' since, to adopt Foucault's rather obscure
phrasing, 'the integration of experience occurred in a
gaze that was at the same time knowledge, a gaze that
exists, that was a master of its truth ... (Foucault
1973: 81). Mackenzie's general practitioner, however, was
more like an 'officer of health', employing a kind of
controlled empiricism' - 'a question of knowing what to
do after seeing' - and for whom the most important
pedagogic element was 'his years of practice' (ibid: 81):
'Practice would be opened up to the officers of
health, but the doctors would reserve the
initiation into the clinic to themselves' (ibid:
82).
In other words, what Mackenzie's system lacked was a sense
of exclusive insight as being proper to the general
practitioner. We shall argue later that it was only with
the turn to a 'psychotherapeutic' model of general
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practice - and especially Balint's conceptualisation of
the 'apostolic function' - that such a sense of natural
insight could be claimed for the general practitioner.

2.11. But Mackenzie's system was also deficient in the
fact that it did not conceptualise adequately the site of
organisation appropriate to general practice, nor the
means of the codification of knowledge proper to it. The

solitary practitioner might produce research of equal
calibre as the practitioner bound up to a wider form of
association; thus for Mackenzie there was no particular
organisational form from which the general practitioner
had to speak. Similarly, the question of forms of the
codification of knowledge is of particular interest in the
context of discussions of medical recording systems and
techniques of inscription that will appear later in this
study. Clearly the standardisation of such techniques
would be a necessity should one wish to pass on knowledge
to either colleagues or students. The tracings of the ink
polygraph were themselves a good example of such
standardisation in action. Yet beyond this - and in spite
of his strong advocacy of record-keeping (see e.g.
Mackenzie 1920) - Mackenzie did not provide a standardised
system of notation capable of stabilising the forms of
knowledge that were produced in general practice (a
standardisation on a par, for example, with the kind of
information possible to obtain within the consistent space
of the hospital; see Foucault 1973: chapter 5). These
factors have indeed been cited as being at the root of
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the failure of Mackenzie's work at the St Andrew's
Institute. Thus, in comparing the work of Mackenzie's
Institute with that of the College of General
Practitioners (founded in 1952), Pinsent notes that in
spite of their common concern with record-keeping and with
devising methods of research and education that would be
unique to general practice as an autonomous discipline,
there the similarity ends:
'for while the unit at St Andrews was the
inspiration of one man, the College was the work
of many' (Pinsent 1963: 15).

3. Governmental Consciousness

A similar - albeit far more productive - limitation of
emphasis can be attached to what we are calling the
'governmental consciousness' implied by Mackenzie's work.
What was the governmental 'telos' of Mackenzie's
enterprise? What kinds of subjects did it construct as its
targets of intervention? What, for example, is the model
of 'health' or of 'cure' that is being invoked here?

3.i. To answer these questions we need to go back once
more to the level of epistemological articulation. The
epistemological network that Mackenzie built up was
peculiarly dependent upon the exemplary properties of the
heart. The beating of the heart - provided it is monitored
over a lengthy period of time (such as thirty years) - is
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something that can be measured; its irregularities provide
a kind of index of individual destiny (Williams 1946:
130). The heart is also peculiarly indicative of
individuality: partly because of its association with the
emotions, but also because it both concerns the whole body
- 'physiologically speaking the heart is the pump which
sends blood to the whole body' (ibid: 130) - and its
fluctuations can be used as an index of individual
prognosis in general (the termination of the heart results
in the termination of the individual). Building upon this
'exemplary' status of the heart Mackenzie worked out an
entire theory of 'health'. For the heart's time is
irreversible time; it is, like a 'reservoir', subject to
depletion - and this property of the heart was translated
by Mackenzie onto the wider level of general principles
applicable to other organs, indeed to the organism itself.
Thus for Mackenzie each individual has a store of
'efficiency'

or what he called

'reserve strength'

(Mackenzie 1919: 156). Using this notion, Mackenzie
developed the procedure of getting his heart patients to
exert themselves in order to observe when their 'reserve
strength' should run out.

What he was measuring was the 'diminishing reserve force'
(Williams 1946: 160) of the patient. But this
physiological principle of cardiac efficiency was further
translated by Mackenzie, on the one hand, from a principle
relating to the organ's response to effort into one
relating to the individual's response to the hardships of
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life such as in particular, pregnancy, or more generally,
work, labour, and on the other hand, into an even more
generalised physiological theory relating to the very
nature of 'health'. Health is itself conceived by
Mackenzie as being a matter of 'reserve strength':
'There is a certain sense of "well-being"
present in every healthy individual. Until the
health is impaired one is barely conscious of
its possession, and its impairment is the first
sign conveyed to the individual that all is not
well with him' (Mackenzie 1909: 15).
So from a certain notion of the heart's functioning in
relation to effort we have moved to a conception of health
in general as a kind of 'reserve force', in relation to
which the doctor must monitor its physiologial
'efficiency'. From the heart Mackenzie, as it were, moves
outwards, to the functioning of the organs in general,
through to the health of the individual. It is in short as
if the individual has come to be 'represented' by the
notion of the heart: this is how we can move from the
1

centre of Mackenzie's epistemological enterprise outward
to the wider level of 'governmental consciousness' of his
enterprise.

3.ii. A model of what the patient must be in order to be a

'patient' can be derived from this physiological emphasis
upon the heart. The most important factor is an emphasis
upon prognosis. The patient is only a patient in relation
to his or her future; as we have seen, some problems like
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'youthful irregularity' are not enough to turn somebody
into a patient, whereas cardiac irregularities in a
pregnant woman will be since they can have a grave
prognostic significance. It is, then, the patient's future
and the future of the patient's afflication that is at
stake. In this game of prediction the patient is conceived
in relation to what he or she must be expected to
withstand in the environment or in relation to the tasks
with which he or she is confronted in daily life. In other
words, patients are only patients if they are definable in
relation to their life tasks; patienthood is tied to
social obligation. Thus a labourer with a weak heart might
have to give up certain tasks if a future ventricular
collapse is to be avoided. Similarly, a heart symptom in a
young woman will be of significance when one considers
that this woman is likely to become pregnant and thus
might, during labour, aggravate what might be otherwise an
unimportant condition. This prognostic knowledge also
works in a 'negative' way; thus, during the war, Mackenzie
became

especially

interested

in

something

called

'soldier's heart'. He was able to show, on the basis of
his earlier work in general practice, that many symptoms 'murmurs' - previously thought of as dangerous were in
fact unlikely to to have serious consequences, whatever
the tasks and stresses facing the prospective soldier;
thus Mackenzie no doubt contributed to a reduction of the
numbers of recruits that would previously have been
rejected as unfit.
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3.iii. In short, Mackenzie's project was - if certainly
limited by its epistemological conditions of possibility tied beautifully to the three most important sites of the
doctor's tasks pertaining before the introduction of the
National Health Service. The general practitioner becomes
a kind of mediator of the obligations

of

citizens in

relation to the demands of war, labour and reproduction.
The soldier, the pregnant woman and the adult male
labourer can be designated as privileged objects of
visibility for the general practitioner during the period
of the 'panel' system. Here pathology only has
significance in relation to the labours one has to
perform. The doctor's role is to assess the physiological
efficiency of his patients in relation to their social
obligations. In fact it is possible to argue that the
governmental logic internal to Mackenzie's programme was
in certain ways congruent with then prevailing
rationalities of government and welfare; specifically,
with what Garland has called the 'programme of social
security' in early twentieth-century Britain (Garland
1985: 130-142, cf. Rose 1980; also Luhmann's notion of the
'social' state, Luhmann 1990)*1

First, Mackenzie's theory of 'health' (as reconstructed
here; cf. for his later theory based on the 'reflex arc',
Mackenzie 1926: 39-49) can be aligned to certain features
of this welfare programme. As the foregoing implies, the
primary 'targets' are the same, namely those subjects that
can be described as 'employees of society'; those with
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social obligations such as workers and soldiers. Second,
this entails an alignment in terms of vocabulary;
especially in terms of the concern to promote 'efficiency'
(on the imperative of aligning 'individual' and 'national
efficiency', Garland 1985: 131). In Mackenzie's programme
an unhealthy person can be described as one who is no
longer physiologically 'efficient' or whose efficiency is
retarded or threatened. Indeed, it becomes the doctor's
task to decide whether the individual's efficiency is
threatened or not. At this point, another feature of the
programme of 'social security' can be mentioned; this is
the requirement of making as rigid a demarcation as
possible between 'security' for the able, disciplined and
'efficient', and segregation for the unfit. Garland quotes
Beveridge from 1909:
'The line between independence and dependence,
between the efficient and the unemployable has
to become clearer and harder' (Garland 1985:
..
140).
Clearly this is a distinction between the possibility of
employment and unemployability; so without overstating the
congruence of this logic with the system of health care
(for instance, by claiming that Mackenzie's programme
amounts to a technology of 'segregation' of the unfit!) it
can be observed how, similarly for Mackenzie, the doctor
effectively becomes a kind of relay for distributing in
the particular context of the health field, the patient
between these destinies of efficiency and inefficiency. In
short, Mackenzie's programme - whilst emphatically not
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being a mere 'expression' of the rationality of social
security - is in certain respects aligned with it. If so,
this should not be taken to imply that the doctor's was a
cynical enterprise. On the contrary, as Mackenzie noted, a
mark on an insurance form, for example, could lose a
patient the possibility of future income:
'I have known of so many instances in which
gross injustice has been done to individuals,
not only from a pecuniary aspect, but in having
imposed upon them great expense, un-necessary
treatment and mental disquiet, because the
meaning and prognostic significance of some
simple symptom had not been recognised'
(Mackenzie 1907: 251).

Paradoxically enough, the coming of the National Health
Service actually undermined the coherence of an enterprise
like that of Mackenzie in its governmental aspects. For,
whatever the degree of continuity existing between a
governmental rationality of 'social security' and that of
'welfare' (as it emerged after the Second World War), the
latter differs at least insofar as it implies a universal
space of security, that is a rationality centred upon the

entire

population (on this distinction between the

'social' and the 'welfare' states, Luhmann 1990: 5-6).
This called for new conceptualisations of the general
practitioner's tasks, new conceptualisations of his
primary objects of visibility, and hence a new
epistemology for general practice. These tasks meant that
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general practice could not simply 'return' to Mackenzie's
principles, although they were to be nevertheless invoked
often enough; rather new forms of epistemological,
organisational, governmental consciousness had to be
found.

PART THREE

THE TAXONOMICAL PROJECT

The College of General Practitioners in the 1950s
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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE COLLEGE OF GENERAL PRACTITIONERS

1. Introductory

Would it be possible to organise general practice in such
a way as to turn it into a 'discovering science'? Would it
be possible to evolve a logic of practice that would have
equal purchase in the narrow space of the surgery and
across the 'free field' of the population? In short, would
it be possible to combine in a single movement the
aspirations of general practice to be both a form of
knowledge and a form of practical intervention; to
_

produce, in fact, via an ardous process of selfdefinition, a kind of intellectual 'culture' proper to
general practice? What form of organisation would be
necessary in order to combine these aspirations, what
models of practice and intervention would be required,
what kind of space of operations would need to be created,
and what kind of doctor would move through this space?

1.1. The College of General Practioners (founded in London

in November 1952) attempted to answer such questions not
with a manifesto or a general programme of intent (in the
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manner of Mackenzie's Future of Medicine for example) but
with a kind of philosophy of 'actual organisation', that
sought to combine in practice and in thought a series of
diverse elements; a concrete form of organization, a model
relating to practice intervention itself, a model of
research, and a model relating to the 'social vocation' of
general practice as part of the post-war complex of
welfare institutions. The epistemological focus of the
College was to be, foremost, upon the macro terrain of
morbidity studies and collective epidemiological
investigation (here the function of the College was to
monitor the collection of data by individuals on the
'periphery' and to integrate this data at the 'centre'). A
secondary interest related to a micro domain of 'family
studies' (here the focus was upon children and the
mother).

The

characterised

model
as

an

of

knowledge here might be

un-motivated

'objectivism'

of

approach, whereby, as we shall see, what was at stake was
a vast collective labour of definition. The domain to be
investigated centred not upon the doctor's own persona (as
was to occur later) but upon the space of the practice.
Also important here was a certain ideal conception of the
general practitioner himself; one centred upon the model
of the 'country practitioner'. Organisationally, the
College attempted to situate itself in what we shall call
the 'free field' of general practice by setting up a kind
of 'organic' relation to its environment; the College was
not to be 'political' or legislative but immanent and
permanently monitoring, achieving a kind of natural
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integration of the free field. Lastly, on what we have
termed the governmental level, there emerged in the 1950s
an emphasis upon 'population' both in the sense that
general practice was to be the discipline that would
monitor patterns of morbidity across the totality of the
population, and in the sense that the aspiration grounded in a rationality that we shall label
'pronatalism' _ was to promote the numerical (and
'qualitative') growth of population, that is to maximise
population.

This chapter is not a history of the College in this
period but an investigation of some of the heterogeneous
elements, and the articulations between them, that were
invested in the construction of this epistemological,
organisational, and governmental network.

1.11. The foundation of the College was a response to the
state of 'crisis' in which general practice found itself
in the years following the creation of the National Health
Service in 1948 (Honigsbaum 1979, Armstrong 1983: 74,
Stevens 1966). However, some care needs to be taken as to
the manner in which we interpret the nature of this
'crisis' and the literature associated with it.

On the face of it matters were fairly simple. It was
widely observed that the quality of general practice, and
the morale of practitioners, was at a very low ebb. J.S.
Collings's study of standards amongst one group of GPs

1:
became a key reference point in the 'crisis' debate, with
its denunciation of shoddy practice and dirty, decrepit
premises, forms of organisation and conditions (Collings
1950). On the other hand, it is possible to see the very
existence of a 'crisis' of general practice as evidence of
its newfound 'visibility' as a form of medical endeavour
in its own right. Thus, what was labelled a crisis was in
fact equally a raising of the 'profile' of general
practice. This coming into sight of general practice as a
problematic discipline, was afforded by the very imputed
causal factor in most contemporary 'denunciations' of
general practice, namely the founding of the National
Health Service (cf. Armstrong 1983: 100). With the coming
of the new 'socialized' service, general practice became
for the first time a homogeneous field of (potential)
investigation, whilst becoming simultaneously, and as a
result, something of a welfare descipline.
A homogeneous field of medical endeavour. With the advent
of the National Health Service the practitioner, one could
say, ceases to be a medical 'entrepreneur', vying with his
competitors for patients, and gains instead a 'list', a
segment of the population apportioned to his care.
Moreover, only now do these patients themselves become a
homogeneous group; for the first time, a GP's patients
include unequivocally a community of 'citizens' (see on
this, e.g. Ryle 1960: 314). No longer are his patients
made up of discrete categories; the workers on the
'panel', the expectant mother, the private patient, etc.
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Morevoer, and no doubt in a more 'negative' sense,
practitioners are forced into something like a potential
'common identity' merely by the harsh terms of the N.H.S.
Act itself. Un-represented as a body at the negotiation of
the Act, they had been 'excluded' from the hospitals, a
'contract' had been imposed upon them, and the pathway to
consultant status had been blocked (Honigsbaum 1979
documents this split). General practice had become
effectively a life sentence.

A welfare discipline. It would be bland to assert merely
that, since Beveridge, medicine has been linked
systematically to the provision of welfare - as we know,
medicine has always been involved in this field (Foucault
in Gordon ed. 1980: 150-1; BMA 1951: 33). The doctor (as
in those famous comments of Virchow) has always demanded

for himself something of a 'social vocation'. However, the
National Health Service was not just the effect of a type
_
of power (as Armstrong seems to suggest; Armstrong 1983:
100); it also consolidated, and re-forged various
possibilities for social regulation. Central here was, on
the one hand, the promotion of that general emphasis upon
collectivism and solidarity that had grounded the birth of
the NHS, and on the other hand, the notion of the 'family'
as the target of expertise, advice and regulation.
Building on what was no doubt something of a 'myth' - the
ideal of the 'family doctor' (brilliantly documented in
Loudon 1984: esp. 349) - the medical profession as a whole
was able, in the context of the universalist space of
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operations provided by the N.H.S, to stake out a claim to
be the collective advisor to the nation in all matters
relating to health, well-being and welfare. But,
conversely, this 'universal' claim itself seemed to reinforce the potency of the concept of the 'family doctor',
making it in turn, perhaps, something less of a myth. This
was a kind of inverted logic that the British Medical
Association's (BMA) Charter for Health (1946) brought out
very clearly:
'The central idea is that national policy should
be directed towards the satisfaction of human
needs and the promotion of welfare ... Thus the
doctor becomes the health advisor not only of
his individual patients but of the nation as a
whole. In this way the doctors collectively,
without entering the sphere of party politics,
can guide medico-sociological developments in
the direction of the promotion of human welfare
... The collective function of the doctors is a
recent development and it promises to become an
increasingly valuable asset to the people' (BMA
1946: 5 & 23).
Thus one could say that the roles of the personal doctor
and the doctors of the nation in this way became mutually
re-inforcing; the space of the collectivity (the medical
profession advises...) and the space of the individual
citizen (the family doctor advises...) become aligned;
medicine becomes, as it were, and at every level, a
'matter of state'. We might recall at this point
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Foucault's comments upon the governmental rationale of
l omnes et singulatim' - the government of all and of each
- and point out that general practice is here seeking (as
we shall see in what follows) to align both the micro
aspiration of individual tutelage and the macro aspiration
of the regulation of populations (Foucault 1981).

But if this is indeed the case, this does not mean that
medical activity can be reduced to a 'state function' in
this (or any other) period. Medicine does not become the
extended arm of the state, an instrument of repression, of
discipline or even simply of 'surveillance' (cf. in this
context Navarro 1978 and Armstrong 1984). Medical activity
- being always dependent on particular and local
problematizations, inherited models and borrowed analogies
of functioning - is, no doubt, always too localized, too
diffuse to be able to play such a role, even if an
aspiration to such a role does indeed, as we have seen,
_

have coherent conditions of possibility. In fact, if
medicine as a whole was concerned to achieve anything in
the post-war period it was that it should seek to situate
itself in a new domain of operations; a domain we shall
call the 'free field'.

1.iii. We borrow this term from Michel Foucault's analysis

of pre-clinical medicine; in France around the 1790s
(Foucault 1973: chpater 3). The notion of the free field
is used to describe the domain, dreamed of in the 1790s,
that would be entirely absent of all obstacles (medical
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institutions such as hospitals, doctor's associations,
university faculties and so on) to the passage of the pure
medical gaze:
'[a] medical field, restored to its pristine
truth, pervaded wholly by the gaze, without
obstacle and without alteration

• • •

a form

homogeneous in each of its regions, constituting
a set of equivalent items capable of maintaining
constant relations with their entirety, a space
of free communication in which the relationship
of the whole was always transposable and
reversible' (ibid: 38).
The College aspiration to produce a totalising 'natural
history of disease' has, perhaps, something in common with
Foucault's free field, that 'nosographical dream' in which
'the natural needs of the species might emerge unblurred
and without trace' (ibid: 38). There is similarity too in
that both are associated with the elimination of
_
'obstacles' to the free medical gaze. The free field that
is our concern here is not opposed to fabricated and
enclosed spaces of practice as such, but is, rather,
concerned with linking them up into a homogeneous domain
and with elimiating all obstacles within and between these
spaces. Indeed; a 'space of free communication in which
the relationship of the parts to the whole was always
transposable and reversible'; a kind of network where
equal force is exerted at all points. But if the field
described by Foucault was constituted in relation to
notions of liberty and enlightenment, then the free field
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of the 1950s always entails additionally the evocation of
the sick 'living individual' that moves through it. Tied
to the notion of the free field - and existing in a degree
of tension with it was the discourse of the living
individual, an area in which general practice (at least
since Mackenzie) was accustomed to claim some level of
authority.

The free field, then, was not a 'psychological' domain
nor, on the other hand, was it posed in direct, binary
opposition to the closed world of the hospital or
laboratory. Rather, it was what we have already referred
to as the 'homogenization' of the medical field that made
the free field possible. For the first time all medical
institutions were linked together - at least in 'theory'
(the reality, as usual, was somewhat different, Webster
1988: esp. 12 & 34-5) - into a network of insitutions,
interlinked, monitoring the sick population that passed
through it. Thus, it is possible to say that, in the postwar period, the hospital became something less than a
hospital, and the laboratory less than a laboratory since each should be 'clinical' and should now take
account of the living individual. Take, for example, a
document published by the Medical Research Council in 1953
entitled Clinical Research in Relation to the National
Health Service (MRC 1953; CGP Archives; cf. on the later
concept of the 'hospital' CHSC 1969). After noting the
'piecemeal' arrangements for the pursuit of medical
knowledge in the pre-war period, the report went on to
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elaborate a new organizational domain for research, and effectively - a new object of research itself. A
centralized Clinical Research Board was proposed. This
would consist of a small group of 'advisory experts' from
a variety of fields who would be responsible for the coordination of research throughout the country. But this
elitism at the centre was aimed only at promoting a kind
of diffusion at the periphery:
'We consider that there should be a measure of
"decentralized" research.., where there should
be the greatest possible freedom from detailed
supervision in promoting clinical research'
(MRC 1953: 11).
A whole framework of action - a model of power itself was, no doubt, presupposed by this institutional structure
(not at all unlike that of the College of General
Practitioners): one of empowerement and advice rather than
force and constraint; of autonomy and decentralization
rather than control and supervision. And along with this
decentralization went an emphasis on the 'sick individual'
(ibid: 3) as the object of research. Even the laboratory
worker (with which the report was especially concerned)
must return to the domain fo the sick:
I

...

the idea of research in medicine implies to

many laboratory work with a severing of all
clnical contacts. But that is not the concept of
clinical research. In this, close constact with
patients is essential ...' (ibid: 15).
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What we have labelled the 'free field' was also a feature
of an earlier document, published by the British Medical
Association (B.M.A.), in 1948 on The Training of the
Doctor (BMA 1948). This report, it is true, did not set
out the domain in which medicine was or was not to
operate; but it did argue self-consciously for a
conception of disease that related more to the suffering,
living individual than to the pathological 'disease
entity' itself. Indeed, a medicine devoted to 'life'
rather than death - in all fields:
'The living patient, and not the corpse, should
be the central theme in the teaching of
pathology'. (ibid: 139).
In sum, the report called for 'a different approach to
both medical education and medical prctice', one which
stressed the reaction in the individual (the 'disturbance
or disequilibrium in the structure and function of the
organism') to the disease, rather than the disease itself.
Future practice should be based 'on an understanding of
the patient as a 'whole'', which implied:
'a search for the cause of the deviations in the
normal in that particular patient, and... an
understanding of the patient's history
andenvironment, clinical observation,and the
interpretation of the facts elicited.' (ibid:
52).

But, oddly enough, in spite of this advocacy of a focus on
the sick individual, and the environment and history of
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that individual, the report did not advocate general
practice as the model for all medicine (as Mackenzie had
claimed two decades earlier). This was not, however, due
to oversight; general practice, claimed the committee,
was, like other branches of medicine, a 'specialty' in its
own right, but for that very reason it should not take
pride of place (ibid: 9). If, on the other hand, general
practice was later to claim the status (and with some
degree of success) of being the discipline to take charge
of the domain of the 'sick individual' this was due to a
process of struggle, or at least of labour, on the part of
general practitioners. This domain of the sick individual
had to be defined (and, even more arduous, rendered
operable) and an organizational space had to be
constructed apppropriate to the free field in which the
sick individual was held to reside and move about. It was
around these tasks that the College Of General
Practitioners was brought into existence, and at which it
was to labour in particular ways throughout the 1950s.

2. Labours of Definition

What were the functions of the College to be? Towards the
end of 1951, several general practitioners - notably F.M.
Rose and J.H. Hunt - began to circulate the idea of a
college of general practitioners; not as a 'political'
body but as an academic one (Rose 1951; Fry et al. 1983:
chapter 2; Report 1952; Hunt 1952). The aim was to
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emancipate general practice from the sense of repression
and neglect under which it had so long laboured by
founding an academically oriented institutional apparatus
that would express the status of general practice as a
specific 'clinical discipline' in its own right. The
common starting point of all these writings was the
question of whether general practice was or was not a
' specialty'. There was, however, no doubt about the answer
to this question. After all, did not general practice have
what could be described as a veritable 'ontology' (see for
the use of this term Gaukroger 1978: 39) in the cluster of
notions surrounding the figure of the patient; notions,
for instance, relating to the continuity of the doctor's
relationship with his patients; to the fact that the
general practitioner is the first line of 'medical
defense' seeing disease before it is given a name; seeing
disease, as it were, in its natural state, beyond the
walls of the hospital. Thus, for example, in a paper read
at a meeting of the B.M.A.'s General Practice Review
Committee in October 1951 (which had as its topic this
very question), F.M. Rose attempted to define the proper
'ontology' of general practice:
'It is the doctor-patient relationship which is
the first and dominant fact. The general
practitioner is the doctor who sees disease in
all its forms first' (Rose 1951: 174; cf. BMA
1951: 21; Hunt 1951 and Armstrong 1983: 80-81)
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2.i. This 'ontological' emphasis had long been a familiar
theme; we have seen a variant of it invoked in the work of
James Mackenzie. Nevertheless, the notion of the
practitioner as the first line of defense, the expert of
the sick person and his environment (variously conceived)
remained an empty statement, a polemical formulation and
nothing more, until this notion itself could be made
operable; until, in other words, a 'domain of evidence'

(cf. Gaukroger 1978) could be linked systematically with
this basic 'ontology', and until this domain itself could
be made 'calculable', through an array of appropriate
techniques, and stable, through the construction of
appropriate institutional forms.

When a General Practice Steering Committee began to meet
in February 1952, under the chairmanship of Henry Willink
Q.C., in order to work out

the

particular form that a

College of General pracitioners might take, and to sift
_

through testimony from a variety of countries as to what
general practice actually consisted of, it was faced with
what we might well call a 'paradox of organization' (see
e.g. CGP Archives 1951). This paradox related to the fact
that general practitioners, being hardy individualists to
a man, were possibly incapable of organizing together as a
kind of corporate body (the grounds for resistance to
anything involving co-operation with local authorities
serving as an example of this mentality). That the
practitioner was generally held to be of sturdy
independence of mind and action ('general practitioners,
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thank God, tend to be individualists'; Symposium 1957:
139) was not some kind of accident simply due to common
class origin or personal charcteristic; rather it was
considered to be fundamental to the very nature of his
chosen occupation.

The Cohen Report of 1951 (BMA 1951; cf. MacFeat 1951)
illustrates how the model of the doctor centred upon
various characteristics in order that his persona should
be appropriately fitted, in a kind of homological
relation, to the individual. Thus following on from the
'ontological' statement that general practice entailed the
underlying unity of medicine, and has as its goal the
study of the 'whole man', the report proceded to describe
the 'desirable personal qualities' of the 'ideal general
practitioner' (ibid: 25). Aside from being a man of
'independent' inclinations ('for those who value
independence, a broad outlook, and a close personal
_

contact with one's fellow man, there is no other branch of
medicine which presents such a full and satisfying life';
ibid: 27),'[t]he general practitioner should be a man of
culture as befits a member of a liberal profession'. He
should cultivate interests outside ths sick room - 'music,
literature, sport, gardening, or another science' - all of
which will be of value to his medical practice, since they
will 'develop the whole man in him' and will give him,
perhaps, a practical insight into the lives of the people
with whom he deals:
'For example, a general practitioner who learns
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to use his hands in some manual occupation will
obtain a useful insight into the problems and
difficulties experienced by a patient returning
to similar work after illness or accident'
(ibid:27).
All in all, the report claimed, 'in no other branch of
practice is it so vital that the practitioner should be
termperamentally and physically suited to his work' (ibid;
27).

But although this individualist persona was understood to
be essential for the good conduct of general practice in
the 1950s, we should note that this was a minimal
condition for good practice rather than being actually a
constitutive element of such practice. If the doctor was
necessarily an 'individualist' then this was a condition
of his objectivity as a doctor, and was not in
contradiction to that objectivity. This point is important
_

in that, later, for example in the work of Michael Balint,
the theme of a 'philosophy of the physician' (as Temkin
has it) will take on a renewed significance as it came to
be realised that the doctor's very individuality worked
against his objectivity as an observer; indeed the
doctor's very 'perspectivism' came to be seen as
constitutive of the nature of general practice knowledge.
For now, however, let us observe that the problem
consisted more of attempting to align this individualism
to an appropriate form of organisation than of aligning it
with particular kinds of knowledge.
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This 'paradox of organisation' was inseparable from the
question: how does one educate a doctor for service in the
free field, how does one impose the rule of the
institution on the autonomous individual? The answer, not
surprisingly, had to be, in the most 'naturalistic' manner
possible, that is, in the free field itself. Thus an
educational role was proposed for the College which would
entail a kind of universal system of apprenticeship
(although cf. Westwook 1955 for hostility to the existing
training system). As recognized by the steering committee:
'in the old days there was much good in the
system of apprenticeship, with its impalpable
influences of example and personal contact'
(Report 1952: 1323).
Hence, an undergraduate education committee would later be
formed (January 1953) under the chairmanship of Geoffrey
Barber, to exhort the educational authorities to let
general practitioners train general practitioners both in
_
universities and in the field itself. This policy was
carried out only according to the logic of, as it were,
'spontaneous association' in the free field. There was to
be no political campaigning:
'the young college believed that the most
effective way of influencing undergraduate
education was to encourage local faculties [of
the college] to foster links with medical
schools while, centrally, the college remained
willing to respond to any requests from a
medical school. It was deemed inappropriate to
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initiate action from headquarters' (CGP 1953:
54).
The College was, however, prepared to influence this logic
of apprenticeship in a more indirect, as it were,
'advisory' manner, through its role as a 'clearing house'
of information. Thus, the Postgraduate Education Committee
of the College was to set itself the task of making the otherwise isolated - 'experience' of the general
practitioner, as it were, calculable and capable of
reproduction and dissemination:
'In many practices much useful experience and
many good ideas, developed by trial and error
over a number of years die when the practitioner
himself passes away. What is wanted so badly is
a storehouse and clearing house for all this
information about general practice' (Report
1952, ii, 1321).

We shall look further at some of the work of the

Postgraduate Education Committee below in connection with
its labour of definition and standardization of practice
premises. Let us only note for the moment how the notion
of a possibly calculable,
I

if

still

'impalpable',

experience' proper to general practice was enshrined even

in the terms of College membership decided upon by the
steering committee; either twenty years experience in
general practice; five years experience plus a commitment
to accept a certain amount of postgraduate training each
year; or five years in practice plus a postgraduate
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diploma (Fry et al. 1983: 78). We might characterise this
pedagogic model of apprenticeship as being one in which
training is subordinated to practice (in that all one
needs to do to train is to practice). This is of interest
for comparative reasons. For, interestingly, this is a
model that will be in a sense reversed in the 1960s so
that to practice will become subordinated to a particular
- 'vocational' - model of

training (in that practice

itself will come to be seen, in ways which we shall
examine, as a form of training.

2.ii. To this question of the form of organisation and the
relation of the individual to it, we must add another with
which all those who reflected on the nature of general
practice as a 'specialty' were immediately confronted; the
question of the 'range of service'. This problem concerned
the fact that there was a lack of fit between, to revert
to our previous terminology, the commonly ascribed
'ontology' of general practice and the 'domain of
evidence' with which it was confronted. For this domain
was clearly far from stable. What did general
practitioners actually do? Every paper in the 'crisis'
literature found itself having to ask this question, and
then answer it with a list of items that, typically,
tended to read like a 'Chinese Encycloapeadia' of
heterogeneous classification. F.M. Gray, for example,
listed the field thus:
'(a) diagnosis and treatment of all minor
maladies (b) the preventive aspect of all

I
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diseases (c) diet, clothing and individual
hygiene generally, (d) ante-natal care and
infant welfare (e) minor psychological
conditions, including those found in patients
with organic disease

(0

certain other subjects

not adequately covered in the undrgraduate
course. It would probably be wise to include
here paediatrics and dermatology (g) methods of
research in general practice' (Gray 1944: 121;
cf. Rose 1951 for a similar list).

It would probably be true to say that this problem was
never conclusively solved; in fact the heterogeneity
problem at the level of the domain of evidence and
investigation was only to get worse. For example, in 1955
a report of the College of General Practioners
'Examination Committee' found itself making up a list of
'five hundred or more important diagnostic, prognostic,
therapeutic, technical, medico-legal and administrative
problems which play so large a part in the life and work
of the family doctor' (CGP 1955: 33 & 33-7 for the Exam
Committee Report). The problem of reducing this huge and

diverse domain

of evidence to more coherent and manageable

propositions took a variety of forms, some of which will
be considered below. What was always involved and at every
step was a kind of labour of economy; above all, the
aspiration was to reduce the field to its essentials using
anything that will allow a coherent domain of evidence and
investigation to appear through techniques that would
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still allow access to the sick, living individual. As we
shall see, in the 1950s this labour involved particular
models of activity and investigation (that, for example,
of the 'country practitioner') and particular metaphors of
coherence (surrounding, for example, the technique of
'writing'). But, above all, what the matter of the 'range
of service' required was further, possibly endless,
investigation. The entire field of general practice must
be defined and described in the most minute detail. This
was the labour of definition.

Thus, the paradox of organization and the problem of the
range of service were turned into positive advantages;
each met in the imperative of research, the labour of
definition. It was the category of research, the need to
define everything about general practice, that united all
the necessities of education, the person of the doctor,
and the problems of organization into one moving paradigm
of activity. To all problems the solution Was - further
investigation, further description.

2.iii. The organisational structure of the College was not
designed to direct the labour of definition so much as to
regulate and co-ordinate it. College headquarters was to
be a kind of advisory centre regulating the free field of
general practice. Thus, a faculty system was devised which
would cover the entire country and provide local points of
focus for educational activities and research; local
faculties were expected to liase with their local medical
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school (faculties were purposely sited in proximity to
university medical deparments in order to facilitate this)
and to pass on and receive information from the central
headquarters in London. At headquarters committees would
meet to process information and re-distribute results back
to the periphery in a kind of circular process of
knowledge accumulation and standardization. The functions
of the Research Committee of the College illustrate these
principles of organization very well (ibid: 33). At the
centre there was to be a Research Advisory Committee
(composed of members from a whole variety of fields) whose
task was to sift through proposals for research (typically
concerning small individual projects and collective
investigation alike - on the subjects of morbidity,
epidemics, conditions of practice etc.), assess their
feasability and offer advice through what was known as the
'consolidated comment' system (Fry et al. 1983: 59-73; CGP
Archives 1957 has a collection of these from the 1950s) as
well as putting researchers in touch with relevant expert
bodies should further advisory assistance be necessary. On
the other hand, the Research Committee's task was also to
liase with outside bodies interested in the mapping of
the free field (the Ministry of Health, statistical and
research organisations and so forth) on advisory matters
or in the organisation of larger scale research projects,
and, if necessary, to activate the extended technology of
the College's Research Register (a list of practitioners
across the country who were prepared to take part in
collective investigations) in collecting information in
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the field:
'The college research organisation can work both
centrally and peripherally. The central
organisation will be equipped to cope with the
consolidation of clinical records and material
from practitioners and their study groups all
over the country, and to advise with regard to
techniques for the collection and analysis of
this material and the necessary controls'
(Report 1952: 1324).

The College's collective research technologies can be
considered in due course; what concerns us now is this
organisational morphology itself.

2.iv. The College's organisation was fitted perfectly to,

and was homologous with, the free field itself. Thus on
the one hand, according to this organisational schema,
nothing is imposed upon the individual practitioner beyond
his co-operation. He is not asked to change his ways but
only to monitor his activities for the academic
enlightenment of the collectivity. On the other hand, this
freedom gives the College headquarters a purchase on the
minutest limits of the free field itself. The tendrils of
the College network extending with maximum sensitivity
into the heart of the world of the sick individual, this
knowledge is then fed back outwards to the periphery in

the form of advice; thus standards are monitored and built
up. In this sense the College network could be compared to
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a kind of living organism, whose internal organization is
linked with maximum sensitivity to the patterns of
organization existing in the environment. The College is
self-regulated, the periphery informs the centre, the
centre informs the periphery. Moreover, the College
network exists in a close - but 'free' and autonomous articulation with other organizations that have the free
field as their focus; the Ministry of Health, the
statistics department of Birmingham University, the
Medical Research Council, the General Register Office, the
Public Health Laboratory Service, Medical Schools, etc*
(for a list of these liasons in the first year of the
College's foundation; CGP Archives 1953). Very quickly and no doubt on the basis of a kind of generalised
l interessement' strategy - the College was to turn itself
into a kind of 'obligatory passage point' for access to
the free field. If general practice was to have a social or 'governmental' - vocation, a relationship to the
workings of 'power' it was to be within this space of
operations. As an editorial in the second Research
Newsletter issued by the College was to sum matters up:
'It is a curious quality of humanity that
similar thoughts, ideas and beliefs may spring
up at one time in the minds of several different
people... The pendulum has started to swing away
from

the hopstial world,

the world of

departments, the world of the fragmented man...
back to the study of the whole man as the varied
stress factors of his life may affect him. It
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may be that the next advances in medicine will
come from a fuller understanding of the field in
which 20.000 general practitioneres are daily at
work and means must be found for exploring this
field of clinical material' (Editorial 1953, 2:
3).

That there were sufficient practitioners interested enough
to bring this field into the arena of collective
visibility was indicated by the rapid early popularity of
the College. Thus, within, three weeks of its foundation,
1.077 members had been enrolled. After six months this
figure had reached 2.000 (1/10 of all GPs in the country
at the time). Meanwhile, the numbers on the College's
Research Register the 'ready to hand observer network'
went from 380 in 1954 to 632 by 1958; the network was at
least in place.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

TECHNOLOGIES OF THE FREE FIELD

1. Research at the College of General Practitioners

In the 1950s the spotlight of College research was very
much on the existing activities of the members of the
College itself. To study the free field meant largely to
study practitioners themselves (their premises and
equipment) as well as - or, even, rather than - the
supposed objects of their activities; sick individuals.
An entire domain of investigation appeared relating to the
various technical operations of general practice. The
'unit of analysis' of this discourse was the space of the
practice, and the focus was upon the technical methods by
which this space might be brought to a coherent level of
visibility; organised and made known. Adopting a
distinction used by the practitioners themselves, we shall
divide these kinds of investigation into two; relating to
technical (techniques of practice) and operational
(concerning the space of the practice) forms of research.
At the core of both - and functioning as a kind of
metaphor of coherence - lies the necessity of writing.
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1.i. In his study, published in 1954, Taylor asked himself
what made up 'good general practice' (Taylor 1954). After
sitting in on the surgeries of ninety-four 'good' general
practitioners, Taylor came to the conclusion that a good
general practitioner was only so good as the technological
infrastructure of his practice allowed him to be: '[t]hese
doctors have evolved a technique of good general
practice'. Without actually giving this technique a
specific name, he then proceeded to list all the
logistical advances these practitioners had included in
the operation of their practices; all these relate to the
organization of the workload through systems ranging from
group practice, rotas ('an ingenious device', the greatest
innovation since the N.H.S.; Taylor 1954: 123), ancillary
services, rationalization of equipment, clinical records
and forms and paperwork of a great variety of kinds; all
those matters, in short, which dominated all discussion
about what is distinctive to general practice, what makes
it a 'specialty' (inter alia, Walford 1955: 53; Watson
1957; Mallet 1955). What all these techniques of
organization had in common was, no doubt, that they
implied a certain written 'externalization' of the
practice. All implied as a pre-condition a labour of
representation of the components of the practice in, as it
were, a one-dimensional space. There is a kind of
generalised pragmatics of writing at work here; at every
level it seems to be writing - or, more generally, forms
of inscription - that, in the 1950s, provides the primary
coherence conditions of general practice. But, this
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technology of writing should not be seen as being a
subtraction from the status of general practice as the
domain of personal interaction between individual doctor
and sick individual. On the contrary:
'Writing is a part of every profession ...
Certainly it is a part of every profession with
any claim to the title of 'learned'. Anyone, who
supposes that any kind of medical practice can
be properly conducted without the use of the pen
(or the typewriter) is living in an unreal
world. In general practice in particular it is
by the pen that almost all positive action is
initiated... By the pen the doctor extends his
knowledge of the patient's illness by calling in
the pathologist, the radiologist or the
consultant. Above all, by the clinical records
he keeps with the pen he greatly simplifies
diagnosis, and daily saves himself hours of
work' (R.J.F.H. Pinsent in Fry ed. 1954: 28).

At a number of levels writing is the constitutive medium
of the free field. It is an activity proper to the work of
that cultured indvividual, the professional doctor; but it
also makes possible a certain relation - and hierarchy between the aspirations of vigilance and logistics.

Vigilance: this inscriptional emphasis was held to permit
a certain access in time to the 'ontological' domain of
general practice - the patient. Above all, by the use of
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clinical records the doctor gains access to the
pathological 'life-course' of the patient; or, at least
this is always conceived as a possibility. As most
discussions are at pains to point out, clinical records
are not a kind of instrument of surveillance for the
doctor but rather an 'aide memoire' in treatment, markers
to reactivate the doctor's memory and experience of the
patient. Taylor, for example, describes clinical records
as 'exercises in relevance' (compare Mackenzie's massive
detailed histories, closer to the aspirations of Richard
Bright than of Taylor and his colleagues) and as the 'key'
to good general practice, providing 'the long-term chronic
picture' against which any attack of acute disease must be
judged' (Taylor 1954: 148). Similarly, an article in the
College newsletter in 1955, discussed the relationship of
the clinical record, and the episode of illness recorded
there, with the life-course of the patient:
'Illnesses should be regarded as chapters in the
life of the patient, and each chapter should be
separated from the rest' (Walford 1955: 53).
However, this notion of putting people's lives into
writing was to remain only at the level of aspiration. In
fact, although the notion of biography (or, of what
Armstrong has called an 'ideographic' medicine) was often
attached to the usage of records, in fact no such usage
was satisfactorily deployed. This was because of the
impossibility

of

intermeshing

the

longitudinal

or

'biographical' details of patients in a one-dimensional
space of comparison (e.g. with the aid of statistical
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analysis); a plane of consistency could not be found that
could stabilize - on the basis of inscriptions - the sick,
living individual. Or at least, this would have been
impossible without compromising the logic of that field in
other ways; for it was imperative that the keeping of
records and the way they were kept should be left to the
discretion of each individual doctor. There should be no
rules, only 'guidelines':
'Methods that have tried and found helpful are
described in the hope that others may find them
equally useful or may adapt and modify them to
their own personalities' (ibid: 53).
However, members of the College - as we shall discuss
further later - always dreamed of designing the perfect
' continuous' record, the most perfect instrument of
biographical technology (such as the so-called 'S' card,
for example) that would have the capacity to fix the
pathological life-course of the individual in a stable
form, amenable to instant mental appropriation at the
least glance of the practitioner's eye. For example, at a
time when the emphasis on writing was perhaps losing
favour as a means of access to the free field, in 1961 the
Ministry of Health invited the College to give written
evidence on the possibility of designing a card to be
similar to the immunisation records then in use, which
could serve the individual forever:
'The aim would be to try to train the public to
carry this inside the Medical Card and its use
would not cease with the end of the infant years
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... This card would cover the individual
permanently' (CGP Archives [n.d. 1950s1).
if the emphasis on writing in general

Nevertheless,

practice in the 1950s was another technology to get to
the free field, indeed to provide a preliminary mapping of
that field of the sick individual, then nevertheless, this
sick individual itself actually seemed to elude this
gaze, and to elude it constantly, whatever technological
forms were put in place to capture it (a failure also
noted by Armstrong in an interesting paper; Armstrong
1985: esp. 604).

Logistics: through writing, inscriptions and paperwork,
and the 'externalizations' they allow, appointment systems
emerged (Taylor 1954; Hadfield 1953: 701; Mallet 1955:
113) which order patients in the context of a calculated
time, rotas (Taylor 1954: chapter 5) were set up (again,
this was always more prominent in aspiration than reality
in the 1950s)

which allowed the entire space of the

practice to be covered by a team of doctors day or night.
It was through these techniques that the free field was
covered, made homogeneous and continuous, in order that
its constitutive elements sick people - might pass
through it with the minimum of obstacles and the maximum
of visibility. In this dimension, a certain plane of
consistency - the space of the practice - is aligned with
the domain of evidence (all the activities of the doctor
with the sick). As we shall see, this entire technological
dimension was crucial to the carrying out of research
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projects as well,

via records,

statistics,

coding

practices and so on. But it was also dependent upon them;
research into the space of the practice (operational
research; discussed below) is in fact vital to the
appearance of all these logistical forms since an
appointment system presupposes the existence of studies
which will measure the length of the consultation; rotas
require estimations of workload and so on.

The advent of the College - which was, in fact, only a
wider space, in perfect homogeneity with these
technologies of the free field (individual practices
linked in a network) - saw a generalized cascade of
inscriptions (as Latour might have put it). Thus as the
official historians of the College noted, the very first
task in setting up a College headquarters entailed the
emplacement

of a whole series of apparently

trivial,

mundane technologies of inscription:
'Arrangements were made for a great many papers
to be printed - application forms for membership
and associateship memorandum and articles of
association and bye-laws, bankers order forms,
receipt forms, writing paper and other items'
(Fry et al. 1983: 34).
These, then, are far from incidental factors or trivial
irrelevancies in relation to the real 'substance' of
general practice. But what is it that the technologies of
logistics and vigilance seek to achieve? Two functions are
served; one of stabilization; and another relating to the
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maximum reduction of distance. Stabilization: the space of
the practice - when linked to the totality of other
practices - becomes a kind of plane of consistency, that
is, a space that is standardized and broadly comparable
from practice to practice, and from centre to periphery
and back again, as information is collected from the
periphery and then returned to it in the form of advice
(to raise standards, standards must first be found). The
task, no doubt, is not to make all practices the same but
to find a consistent way of speaking about all practices
simultaneously; a vocabulary able to link different kinds
of practice space (in rural, urban, market town, and
industrial areas alike). Whatever the differentiations in
practice conditions, whatever the personal inclinations,
or individual interests, of doctors, the field will be

aligned with

itself on the level of techniques.

The systematic reduction of distance: Latour and others
have shown in some detail how forms of inscription are
used for purposes of 'action at a distance', to reduce the
wide, ungovernable spaces of the world to one-dimensional,
manageable planes of analysis (Latour 1986). However, here
the reduction of distance means something more than this;
it refers to all the efforts to remove obstacles and
distractions between the practitioner and the object of
his work. In short all these technologies are instruments
to reduce and eliminate, so far as possible, all forms of
interference or mediation between the free field and the
gaze which appropriates it. As Taylor put it:
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'The purpose is, after all, nothing more than to
free oneself as much as possible from
inessentials, so as to be able to concentrate on
the essentials' (Taylor 1954: 174-5).
The greatest aspiration here is that of unimpeded
visibility; communication without friction.

This aspiration - to clear the field of practice from all
interference - explains why a principle of organization,
such as that of 'group practice', which might otherwise
seem to undermine the doctor's autonomy and individuality,
could be adopted, or at least advocated, so widely; '...
group practice can provide the conditions in which...
doctors are set free for doctoring' (011erenshaw 1953:
620; cf. Watson 1958). While the 'group' principle became,
from the mid-1960s a matter for the production of
1

1
vigilance
, at this time its emphasis is primarily

logistical.

The group practice, with its array of ancillary services,
secretaries, nurses and other workers allows a space to
appear that is, in fact, medically 'purified' (which is
why it is such a wholly different space from that of the
health centre, which is, on the contrary and to its
detriment, essentially a social space, that is, under
local authority control):
'By relieving one of the burden of necessary but
non-medical work the organization possible in a
group leaves us free to meet our patients, not

149

only with more time at our disposal, but with
minds undistracted by the 'mechanics' of general
practice' (011erenshaw 1953: 620)
All these logistical and inscriptional techniques, then,
are methods of displacement; methods that allow the sick
person to appear in a pure space free of all reductive
mechanisms. And hence the relation of hierarchy that
logistics preserves over vigilance; for all these methods
of stabilization and the reduction of distance certainly
'free' the sick individual for doctoring. Nevertheless,
this space is not sufficient for a general knowledge of
this sick individual to be established. Logistics did not
deliver the sick man' into discourse, Indeed, in the
1950s it was not to be the patient, nor even the person of
the doctor that was to be the unit of analysis of this
discourse but the space of the practice itself.

1.ii. All these principles - writing, logistics,

vigilance, stabilization, reduction of distance - can also
be seen at work again in the second kind of research
mentioned above; namely operational research. However,
this form of research is concerned, not so much with the
set of techniques proper to general practice, as with
research into the actual space of practice itself. This
kind of research was predominantly the concern of the
Postgraduate Education Committee of the College. The task
was to establish a stable, standardized space of the
practice; not so that all practices would be the same but
only that all might be at least comparable, amenable to
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classification. Again, a labour of stadardization was
necessary, since it was hoped to advise young
practitioners, lacking the benefit of long 'experience',
on their 'needs' in practice; in terms of the
architectural layout of the surgery, the equipment they
would need and so on. Once more, research into how general
practice functioned was linked with advice on how it ought
to function;

a circular process of research and

standardization.

In 1956 the Postgraduate Education Committee reported to

the College Council on the subject of 'the professional
amommodation and equipment of family doctors and those
intending to enter general practice':
'One of the functions of the College will be to
act as a Centre of information for young
practitioners on their needs in general practice
on methods of record keeping, on new methods for
diagnosis or treatment, and on the equipment
needed for these' (quoted in Fry et al. 1983:
150-1)
Proposing the setting up of a Committee specifically to
deal with the question of premises and equipment, they
suggested that:
such a committee would be concerned with (1)
questions connected with general practitioners
waiting rooms, dispensaries, consulting rooms,
etc. (2) the administrative problems and record
systems of family doctors, including details of
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the charts (temperature, dietic, intake and
output etc) and diet sheets, needed by family
doctors to make sure that these were the best
for their use, (3) the apparatus used by family
doctors' (ibid: 150-1).

Investigations were soon underway. By May of 1957 a 'pilot
scheme' relating to eight practices, divided into 'rural',
'country town',

'urban',

and

'industrial'

kinds of

practice, was begun in order to establish a 'standard
method of presentation' that could be used in order (in
the apt phrase of a memorandum of July 1958) 'to put the
practice into writing' (CGP Archives [.d. 1950s]). This
standardized procedure, as outlined by the Practice
Equipment and Premises Committee involved details of
practice organization, ancillary help, appointment
systems, rotas, size of rooms, decoration, furnishings,
lighting and temperature, ventilation, finances and costs,
and the inclusion of architectural plans and photographs.
Eventually, it was hoped, enough practice descriptions
would be

collected to

form what would be an advisory

dossier available from College headquarters on all aspects
of the space of the practice. Additionally (in 1958) a
'Practice Equipment and Premises Room' was set up at
College Headquarters (then in Cadogan Gardens, London) in
order for an ideal practice room to be housed there for
the edification of young practitioners (although by the
end of October 1958 only one piece of equipment had thus
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far been donated and that was considered too large for
display).

The activity of putting one's practice into writing was
far from being a marginal exercise in the 1950s, as a
glance at successive editions of the journal The
Practitioner (a journal with, at the time, close
connections with the College) will bear out. The
Practitioner was in the 1950s a journal of clinical
medicine, taking for its quarterly topic a particular
theme of medical research. In the 1950s the theme of
general practice research did not relate to diagnostic
innovations and so on but primarily to the study of the
space of the practice premises; especially in a regular
section of the journal called 'Equipping the Surgery'. A
special edition on 'General Practice Today and Tomorrow',
for example (Practitoiner 1953, 170, 1020), contained as
well as a series of photographs of exemplary practice
premises, articles relating to 'The Doctor's Surgery',
'The General Practitioner's Premises', 'Organization of
Group Practice' and so on. Meanwhile, in the following
years, in an issue of the journal devoted to 'Advances in
Treatment', the section on general practice (included as a
section in its own right for the first time) passed
quickly over the questions of advances in diagnosis and
treatment (i.e. the two themes which dominated the other
articles) and concentrated almost entirely on what was
termed the 'way of life' of general practice, which are
then laboriously described: 'It is here that the greatest
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advances have taken place in general practice over the
last two or three years' (Barber 1954: 468). After listing
the latest advances in practice organisation the author
declares that with these new techniques:
'G.P.s can happily face the greatly increased
demands that are made on family doctors and much
more efficient service can be given without
losing the old personal family doctor
relationship' (ibid: 469).
Here, however, it is the act of description itself rather than the techniques - to which we wish to draw
attention; for, what is clear is that the mere labour of
description of the elements of this 'way of life' is
itself an important form of 'research' proper to general
practice.

2. Spatialisation in General Practice

What are the aspirations behind these labours of practice
description? What kind of practice constitutes the ideal
medical space? Above all, perhaps, what is sought is a
well regulated internal environment, which includes a kind
of 'atmosphere' (both physical and emotional), allowing
for maximum visibility and freedom of movement; the
absence of all obstacles that might divide the world of
the sick from the gaze of the doctor. Anything that allows
free flow of movement - albeit very carefully regulated
(via appointment systems, electric buzzer calling devices,
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receptionists and so on) - will be deployed, as long as a
certain balance is maintained between the practice space
as a 'scientific' domain, on the one hand, and as a
'homely' domain on the other (Robertson & Cusdin 1953:
581).

2.i. The importance of light in achieving the correct
atmosphere is always emphasised; even insofar as a
judicious form of lighting can be used to establish the
correct (im)balance of reciprocity between doctor and
patient:
'The doctor's desk is best placed so that from
his chair the doctor can watch the patient as he
comes into the room. If the doctor's chair is
placed

with its back to the window light his

face will be in shadow and an anxious patient
will be able to read his thoughts less easily.
Conversely the patient will sit in a good light
_

so that the expression can be clearly seen'
(Pinsent in Fry ed. 1954: 23).
ff the doctor has a kind of one-way visibility with regard

to the patient, then the mind of the patient should be
allowed to focus on the 'friendliness', the
'individuality', of the doctor. The consulting room, for
example,

should be an extension of the doctor's

personality:
'The mantelpiece of one consulting room will be
adorned by antique jade, of another by an array
of cups denoting the doctor's prowess at golf,
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or there may be photographs of large trout. Thus
things will confirm in the patient's mind the
feeling that he is visiting a friend rather than
an impersonal medical official' (ibid: 22).
If there is any 'psychological' component to the
consultation, then it derives more from the premises than
from the person of the doctor. This effect can be
enshrined even in the very decoration and layout of the
surgery:
'A glass panel is let in the door to establish
spiritual communion between the waiting-room and
the rest of the building, and from the North
Wall of the waiting room there projects a wall
bracket on which is kept a bowl of flowers. The
height of this bracket is such that to the
patient in the hall, the bowl of flowers is
framed in the glass panel of the waiting room
door. Patients often remark that they feel
better as soon as they enter the waiting room;
complete cure, however, enabling them to
dispense with the doctor's service has not been
reported' (CGP Archives [n.cl. 1950s]).

But how does the fabrication of this space of the practice
give access to the 'free field' that naturalized space of
the sick citizen? Is not the surgery by nature - even by
intention ('contemporary in conception with traditional
overtones') - a modern space and hence an artificial
space? Can such a fabricated, ordered space be appropriate
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for the 'family doctor', whose expertise lies by
definition beyond anything resembling closed hospital
structures? And is not one of the defining features of the
general practitioner (we shall turn to it below) that he
should treat patients in - and know the intmate details of
- the home?

But we are forgetting that (to put it crudely) the 1950s
represents an age of 'reconstruction'; an age, quite
literally, where questions of building and architecture
are of a peculiar salience, and are bound, with perhaps a
new coherence, to questions of social utility and
regulation (see e.g. Shaw 1985: 93; Donnison 1980: esp.
56-63). Even the home, of all places, is not exactly a
'natural' space in this context. Indeed, if one turns to
writings from the same period - we will take as our
example a text by Mackintosh (one quoted in medical
writings) - relating this time to the 'ideal home' and its
construction, one sees a degree of homology between this
ideal space and that of the surgery (Mackintosh 1952; cf.
vu similar themes Riemer 1941). This level of homology had
as its condition of possibility the fact that both home
and surgery were, above all, 'medical' domains, having as
their point of intersection the family:
'Housing takes a central place in the background
of

health

representation

because
of

it
home

is
and

the
the

material
family'

(Mackintosh 1952: 10).
Of paramount importance in the home is, in common with the
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surgery, the need to maintain a carefully adjusted and
monitored internal environment; a kind of physiology of
the home in which the emphasis is on the functions - as
opposed to the structure - of the home, and the family

relations that architecture makes possible (see e.g.
Arnold and Ware 1953). This theme of the internal
environment of the home also shares with the surgery the
fears surrounding overcrowding, and the lack of visibility
this entails; the slogan 'one family, one dwelling'
serving to remind us that the family home was itself more
an aspiration of policy, something that needed bringing
into existence, than an already mappable, wholly 'natural'
space (Crowden 1952: 593-64). Tied to the fear of
overcrowding in the family is a concern with minor
morbidity (also mirroring that in general practice); great
pains are taken with minute descriptions of systems of
ventilation, fresh air supply, air temperature etc in
order to ensure the least submission to the course of
respiratory infections and to maintain the optimum
' atmosphere' (physical and emotional). But, above all, the

desire for a systematic regulation of the interior space
of the home demands attention, in parallel to the concerns
in the surgery of logistics and vigilance, to the
functions of rooms and the maintenance of constant
visibility over offspring:
'The sliding panel between kitchen and diningroom might be glazed, so that the mother could
keep an eye on her children playing in the
sitting-room' (BMA 1946: 44).
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The persona at the centre of familial regulation is, not
un-naturally, the mother. She is the worker of the home
which, in turn, is the specially designed workplace of the
mother:
'Some families like to eat their meals in the
kitchen. This habit ought not to be encouraged
in the home of the future. The kitchen is the
housewife's workplace and preparation room'
(ibid: 44).

There is, then, something of a parallel or homology in the
positions of mother and doctor in their respective
domains; a homology that recalls Donzelot's notion of a
kind of 'organic link' between mother and doctor (Donzelot
1979: 19). If there is anything novel in this link and the
manner of its articulation in the 1950s then this relates
more to the space in which it is embedded rather than the
form of the link itself. The homology is a complex one.
First, the surgery becomes continuous with the home; so
that if the surgery is a fabricated space - that is both
'scientific' and 'affective' - then it is not, for all
that, an artificial space; the surgery, like the home,
will be an apt site for the observation of relations
between mother and children. Secondly, this means that
other sites - beyond home and surgery - become, at least
from the doctors' view, inappropriate for family
observation; hence the denigration of child guidance
clinics and other 'alien' sites of intervention that we
find in writings of this period:
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' schools,
schools

clinics and other social services

outside the family will have a large share in
the national life, but they cannot take the
place of the influence of the family
environment' (ibid: 33).
Third, in spite of the homology that exists between home
and surgery, in fact the home has priority; there can be
no substitute for actual observation in the family space.
And who is better qualified to observe this space than, as
we shall see below, the family doctor himself who has such
natural - moreover, such un-resented - access there?
Fourth, just as there is an asymmetry of emphasis between
the sites of observation, then also there exists an
asymmetry of emphasis between the subjects of that
observation; for the 'organic link' between mother and
doctor is less an 'alliance' between these two personages
interested in the welfare of children, than a
problematisation of the figure of the mother herself. What
is at stake, what is forever uncertain and under a
perpetual suspicion, is always the competence of the
mother herself, since she is the key to family functioning
as a whole.
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CHAPTER NINE

FAMILY STUDIES AND MINOR MORBIDITY

1. Governmental Consciousness

This narrow regulatory space of the family soon becomes
one of the general practitioners's primary targets of
expertise. To understand the ways in which this was so we
need briefly to consider some of the prevailing
rationalities of 'government' and social intervention
targetting the family at the time, and - more particularly
- at some of the ways in which some (but by no means all,
for this was certainly a minority interest in terms of
actual research) general practitioners attempted to link
the domain of general practice into these prevailing
rationalities which had as their aim the government of the
internal space of the family.

1.i. The family itself had become a privileged object of
scrutiny in the immediate post-war years as part, no
doubt, of a wider 'governmental' problematic relating to
the
of

state of the 'population' as a whole. The experience
_

total war, the 'universal' provision of welfare, and

the socio-political imperatives of mass liberal democracy
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combined to make desirable if not straightforwardly
practicable the life-conditions of the populace as the
continuous object of investigation. The family represented
the privileged focus of such regulatory scrutiny in that
it was the 'training ground for the future citizen' as
well as being the 'basic unit' of society itself (BMA
1946). Of course there was nothing especially novel (cf.
the neo-hygiene movement of the inter-war years, for
example; cf. Rose 1985: 147) about taking the family as
the object of social regulation and as a target for a
variety of types of expertise. What have changed (as we
shall argue) are the technologies of access, the
imperatives and emphases involved in this scrutiny, rather
than the project of scrutiny itself. There was not, for
example, much that was new, and not merely a re-invention
of old aspirations, in that movement that Riley has
labelled 'pronatalism' (Riley 1983: 157ff.); that broad
problematic of social intervention that had as its
founding scriptures the ongoing work of the Royal
Commission on Population (1944; News Chronicle 1949 is a

useful contemporary source).

The Commission had been established in 1944 in the context
of 'national alarm' concerning the low birth rate (a
context that provided the social rationale for the Family
Allowance Act of 1945) and had as its primary prescriptive
focus first, the encouragement of motherhood, and
secondly, the reinforcement of a social necessity for
technologies of what Riley calls 'corrective inspection'
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in the home. The theoretical problematic around which
these necessities of intervention clustered was found in
that broad range of ideas known as 'Bowlbyism',
characterized by 'an intense concentration on the married
mother permanently in the home with the child' (ibid:
109). Let us single out only two implications of the
pronatalist problematic that had Bowlby as its apotheosis;
first, the central importance accorded to matters relating
to 'affectivity' (the effect of 'separation', or of
'maternal deprivation' in general, is said to be the
'affectionless character') and the importance that is,
therefore,
relationships

attached
in

to

the

general,

emotional
and

the

content

of

mother-child

relationship in particular. Second, a certain 'antiinstitutional' bias (creches, nurseries, hospitals etc are
denigrated as being un-natural spaces) stressing the
importance of the home; this bias also having a kind of
methodological corrollary in the emphasis laid, not so
much upon 'training' the mother (in clinics, etc.), as
upon the corrective 'observation' of the course of
familial relationships as they evolve. These two points
are stressed since it is, perhaps, above all around these
themes that general practitioners sought to elaborate the
elements of a broad paradigm of 'research' in the home
that was, on the one hand, undertaken of necessity at a
'micro' level of investigation (by single practitioners
etc) and, on the other, intended to be linked directly to
the 'macro' aspirations of 'government' and pro-natalist
strategies of welfare.
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Affectivity and anti-institutionalism:
'In the domestic warmth of the kitchen, in the
snug atmosphere of the surgery, there are so
many more opportunities for this kind of
instruction than in the cold comfort of the
clinic; where, be the health visitor never so
neat, the nurses never so charming, the
voluntary helpers never so motherly, intimacy
and the consequent will-to-learn are hard to
generate' (Editorial 1957: 127).
The doctors - with their surgeries in a homologous
relation with the family home - were in a position to
designate as 'artificial' the space of the welfare clinic,
and other institutions not considered part of the free
field. The move away from 'closed' or 'artificial' sites
of intervention - and the limited pathological forms they
made visible - had already been given an 'historical'
interpretation in the Charter for Health:
'Attention was then [i.e. at the turn of the
century] directed in a variety of ways, such as
clinics, health visitors, school inspection and
so on, to the health of the individual, first to
the mother, then to the infant and finally to
the school child and the adult suffering from
specific diseases such as tuberculosis and
venereal disease... But the unit of society is
the family and attention is now increasingly
directed to the mass of preventable disease and
death still occuring in the first few years of
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life, to the psychological effects of bad homes
and allied social factors and to the large
number of preventable still-births and premature
births' (BMA 1946: 28).
The paradigm of corrective inspection within this family
environment (the general practitioners knew this field as
'family studies') was, as we have seen, the observation of
relationships, especially as they involve the mother,
rather than a centering simply upon the child as such. One
doctor claimed, for example, that one could no longer
speak of the 'deprived child' since deprivation was a
phenomenon that related to the entire moral condition of
the family (which was to be understood in ' ecological'
terms) rather than to any single member of it (Craig 1956:
25). One must find a way, then, of observing the family
and its pivotal relationships as a whole, and with a
minimum of perceived, distorting interference. But what is
one looking for? What is the character of this family
_
space? It is 'psychological' certainly; first because what
one is looking for in the 'general atmosphere' of the home
are matters of temperament, patterns of affection and so
on; secondly, because the solution is often a matter of
psychotherapy, advice or management (of the mother). But
this space i's also ' sociological'; concerning 'problem
families', 'deprivation' and so on; one must observe
patterns of cleanliness, living conditions, the state of
the garden and so forth. Lastly, the family space is
'medical'; the home is a kind of 'crucible' for minor
morbidity, partly deriving from physical conditions
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(especially relating to respiratory conditions) but also
to the minor infections of infancy.

1.ii. Who better to cover this space than the general
practitioner, with his experience and expertise in all
these fields? The general practitioner stands at the
boundaries of a variety of forms of knowledge, a position
that enables him to arbitrate, in any particular case,
between the claims of each form. His ability to
distinguish between what is somatic and what is not is
complemented by the ability to demarcate what is normal
and what pathological even within the range of common
afflictions. For example, minor morbidity is not always
simply a somatic problem relating to the child alone:
'In children it is of vital importance to assess
the home situation and the competence of the
mother as a mother. The over-anxious and unsure
mother is the one who will require management
rather than the child who is suffering from
abdominal pains, headaches, vomiting bouts or
asthma' (Fry 1956: 561).
But as well as possessing this wide-ranging technical
knowledge, the general practitioner also has conditions of
work which enable family scrutiny to take place all but
unheeded:
/ as privileged persons with entry into all the
houses in our practice we are better placed than
many to observe and record other things about
our patients than their ailments' (Editorial

166

1956: 4).
But, more than this, since the family suspects nothing
from the family doctor except friendliness and advice, the
doctor's corrective activities will pass all but unheeded
and the liberty proper to the free field will have been
upheld. For example:
'The education of the mother by the family
doctor must be re-inforced by help from the
health visitors and the district nurse. [But] He
alone is able to walk freely into any part of
the house; he is not an inspector; and advice
and warnings perhaps carry more weight on that
account' (Editorial 1958: 3).
Likewise, if the general practitioner is, in part, a
psychiatrist, then he is so only to the extent that the
patient is unaware that he is one:
I ...

a general practitioner may offend and lose

a patient by suggesting an interview with a
psychiatrist, neurotics not always being willing
to admit that they need psychological help. It
is, therefore, necessary for the general

practitioner to understand psychiatry and to be
able to practice it to some extent' (Burdon
1957: 28).

2. The Mother
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However, if the rationale for the doctor's privilege as
the all-seeing but unseen observer of the family space
centred upon the family as a whole, the privileged point
of intervention always remained the mother and the
question of her 'competence' (see e.g. Thomas 1958: 364).
In the person of the mother resided the intersection of
all the important family relationships and problems; the
mother was a kind of 'obligatory passage point' for all
these, a kind of mobile representation of the internal
space of family life (which was, no doubt, why the
surgery, a place where the mother could be brought
without, as it were, loss of information, could be
conceived of as a potential extension of the 'affective'
yet 'scientific' space of the family home.) Again, this
question of the mother's competence could be a
'iilsjchological' - or, rather, 'psychiatric' - matter, as
in the case of the 'emotionally unstable mother':
'Much of this family's illness was due to the
mother's temperament. The mother seems to spend
her time trailing around the streets windowshopping or gossiping with her sisters or
friends...

There are

frequent matrimonial

quarrels and discipline is inconsistent and
harsh' (Maclean 1956: 61-2).
But the great source of the doctor's power in such cases
was not so much even access to the home as the ability having a command of both fields - to distinguish between
psychosomatic and somatic afflications.
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2.i. One exemplary form of pathology, where childhood
morbidity was often referred to the person of the mother
and the question of her competence, one which resided on
the boundaries of the psychosomatic and somatic, the
normal and pathological, was that relating to the
'catarrhal child'; a particularly common problem, since as
the College journal's readership was informed, over 50% of
childhood problems related to problems of the respiratory
tract (Symposium 1958: 42-59). The 'catarrhal child' is in
fact quite normal and merely going through a stage in
life, part, in fact,

of the normal 'process of

development':
'All children pass through these phases, yet 50%
are constant attenders at the general
practitioner's surgery. There is a definite
correlation between the frequency of attendances
and the amount of anxiety expressed by the
mother' (ibid: 51)
If the child is ill, badly behaved, anxious and so on,
when it is in fact 'normal', then this is the fault of the
mother:
'The child with an an anxiety-prone mother who
attempts to mould him according to her own
immature needs and complexes, must of necessity
pass through more stormy passages than the child
of a more mature adult' (ibid: 51).
The problem of the 'catarrhal child' can only be solved by
the establishment of a good 'rapport' between mother and
doctor, having as its pre-condition a strong sense of
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trust on the part of the mother, a form of trust which
must develop, as it were, in the free field, on the basis
of past medical encounters and personal familiarity:
'As I have said proper management of the
catarrhal child depends to a great extent on
good rapport between mother and doctor, and
takes time for this to develop and the time to
get to know each other and to appreciate each
others views, and the mother to believe in and
have confidence in her own family doctor. How
can this vital and essential relationship become
established at a 'clinic' when the contacts are
highly impersonal,

and where

the

medical

personnel do not attend the family during times
of illness' (ibid: 46).
In addition, let us acknowledge that the resort to the
person of the mother in problems relating to the
catarrhal child' and to 'wheezy children' in general, was
_

as much based on an 'epistemological' necessity, as well
as one relating to the demands of social utility. For it
was virtually impossible to develop satisfactory
differential diagnoses relating to these conditions. Thus
for instance, it was argued - in what may have been an
extreme view - that, rather than merely relating catarrhal
conditions to parental anxiety, they could themselves
(making a kind of virtue of necessity) be defined by the
presence of such anxiety:
'The utilization of the child's illnesses by the
parents or the child must be the determining
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factor in our classification of the case as a
member of the catarrhal group. The catarrhal
child as seen in practice has attached to it a
parent with a free-floating anxiety, ostensibly
related to the child's condition' (Nichols
1959: 44).

In one sense the catarrhal child is an inadequate example
for us to take simply because it was the form of pathology
where the aspirations of family studies were most
successfully realised; thus, studies were undertaken at a
1 micro
•
1

level of observation, re-inforced by more wide-

ranging statistical information, and also tied to the
'macro' demands of social policy and pronatalism. More
generally, the paradigm of family studies did not take off
in general practice - except as a very general and rather
ubiquitous aspiration - in such a coherent and effective
manner. Let us attempt to cite some of the reasons for
this relative failure.

2.ii. The 'low epistemological profile' of these forms of
intervention can be noted. As already seen, the notion
that it was the general practitioner's duty to be a kind
of 'naturalist observer' of the family home was invoked
often enough. However, on the whole, this remained merely
a general aspiration, without specific epistemolical
conditions of coherence attached. In a sense, the general
practitioner's claimed range of intervention here was too
general; for instance, he was concerned not with, say,
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'problem families' but, presumably, with all families. But
as Riley points out the trend in this period amongst
welfare agencies was to focus upon and isolate only
particular kinds of family for intervention:
' a series of specialised agencies, such as the
new psychiatric social work, " open up" only
certain kinds of families to corrective
inspection, like the revived category of the
"problem family" ...' (Riley 1983: 170).
The general practitioners were hardly in a position to
establish themselves as a specialised family 'agency' in
this sense. Moreover, the doctor's power in this field was
based, above all, on 'informal' knowledge of patients and
the 'affective' powers of his influence. These powers of
intervention were easy enough to invoke - especially in
polemical opposition to other agencies of intervention but, bearing only a weak 'epistemological profile', they
were extremely difficult - bar a few exceptions such as in
the case of the 'catarrhal child' - to place on a more
systematic footing.

But if the breadth of the general practitioner's expertise
was at once both the condition for his claims to intervene
succesfully in the family and the guarantee of the
limitations of this claim, then, similarly, the
consequence of this breadth of scrutiny was a kind of
'dilution' of powers; powers that others in narrower
spheres found it easier to invoke. For instance, the
doctor could perform statistical studies in relation to
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childbearing, but others could do so more comprehensively
(cf. Riley 1983: chapter 6). Similarly, the doctor's
powers were based, above all, on the depths of his
' experience'

and

were

thus

intangible

almost

by

definition. Yet, in relation to 'family studies', his
technical resources were more or less the same as those of
any 'psychiatrist'. Certainly, a 'psychological' approach
that was unique to general practice was not at stake here:
the doctor himself, for example, was not yet conceived as
being himself a kind of 'psychological' subject, whilst
the model of intervention remained strongly 'corrective'
or judgemental (these two points are in contrast to later
developments, analysed in the next chapter, where general
practice becomes as it were wholly constituted by a
psychotherapeutic rationality). Yet this very
intangibility of the doctor's role was an advantage as
well as a drawback; for, it enabled a link to be made with
another form of 'micro' investigation; one, moreover,
containing more possibilities for an alignment with wider
'macro' themes of government and policy; namely, that
rationality - which was basically 'epidemiological' as
opposed to 'psychological' - relating to the tracking and
description of minor infections and epidemics in the free
field. The basis of this link was derived from a
particular conception of the person of the doctor; that
is, the model of the 'country practitioner'.
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CHAPTER TEN

COUNTRY PRACTICE AND COLLECTIVE INVESTIGATION

1. The Country Practitioner

The epidemiological model associated with the activities
of the 'country doctor' was perhaps the most prominent
paradigm of collective and individual investigation in the
1950s (Gibson 1973; Theokston 1957; Pickles 1948;
Honigsb.aum 1979: 211). In his ideal form - of which there
was a living expression in the person of William Pickles
- the country practitioner combined two related forms of
knowledge; first, an intimate familiarity with the home
lives and personal idiosyncracies of his patients; and
second, a research orientation into the minor epidemics of
the countryside.

1.1. The form taken by this intimate familiarity is

'pastoral' rather than properly psychological as such. In
fact, psychological conditions - or at least, neuroses
were supposed to be rare in the countryside; at any rate,
the model did not allow the clear 'visibility' of such
conditions. The country practitioner is the archetypal
'generalist', in two senses: First, he sees all kinds of
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patients (not just those on the panel, etc.). Moreover, he
knows these patients not just as patients but as members
of the community of

which

he himself is a (privileged)

part. And secondly because, being alone (cut off from
hospitals, laboratories, midwives, social workers, even
vicars) he does everything himself (minor surgery,
dispensing, preventive medicine, friendly advice; Hughes
1958; 8). Moreover, in the country one's patients tend to
be simple folk, with ways of their own which have to be
(indulgently) understood; patients are in fact more or
less equivalent to children in the countryside. And
because the country practice is a close-knit community,
the doctor himself will be a well-known character in the
village, with powers of influence of his own. In short:
'The doctor in country practice cannot help
taking a real personal interest in his patients;
he enters into their joys and sorrows, and is
well versed in all the small details which go to
build up their relatively simple existence'
(Pickles 1948: 201).

The country practitioner's personal knowledge is, then,
based upon a kind of personal, 'pastoral' communion with
what amounts to his 'flock'. He is by no means a
psychiatrist, even if on occasion he does resort to the
techniques of psychiatry which he knows just as he knows
the basics of all the specialties of medicine; certainly,
psychiatry bears no privileged relation to the form of
knowledge particular to his endeavours. In fact, the true
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object of research undertaken by the country practitioner,
deploying all his personal knowledge, is minor morbidity,
and epidemics in particular. William Pickles provided the
model for this kind of investigation in his Epidemiology
in a Country Practice (Pickles 1939; cf. Watson 1960 for

an appication of a similar 'country' model), a seminal
work in general practice mythology: and Pickles duly
became, later on, the first president of the College of
General Practitioners. The particular circumstances of
country practice, typified by a closely defined community
with clearly defined boundaries and patterns of behaviour,
are by no means only 'circumstantial' to the form taken by
his research:
'There is something in country practice ... I
believe it is the deep bonds of friendship which
exist between doctor and patient - that breeds
content and it would be unthinkable in most of
us to change our habitat.'(ibid: 3)
This intimacy is important in that it makes it possible
to trace the movements of the people in the area, to
follow - in the case of infectious diseases at least - the
'natural history of disease', where it enters the
community, who catches it from whom, where lies the focal
point of the spread of the condition and so on. It is,
then, only in the context of epidemics and patterns of
infection

that

the

doctor's

knowledge

of

the

'relationships, friendships, and love affairs of all his
patients' (ibid: 4) will come in useful for research.
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1.ii. Pickles, a kind of Gilbert White of the free field with more than a little assistance from his wife and
daughter (and the Medical Research Council) - evolved an
ingenious and simple technique for mapping the 'natural
history of disease' in one-dimensional space. By the use
of charts marking off in squares the days on which people
in the practice contracted particular epidemics, a visual
picture could be built up that revealed the time-intervals
between contractions of the infection; hence allowing
calculation of the typical incubation period of the
disease, the period when it is at its most infectious, the
length of its stay in the community, its juxtaposition
with other infections and so on. In short, an entire, as
it were, 'quantitative' mapping of the temporality of
infections became possible. Moreover, using his personal
knowledge of his patients, their relationships and their
whereabouts, Pickles was able to provide a kind of
'qualitative' account of the course of the infection,
where it came from and how it spread. This kind of
investigation, then, depended for its efficacy upon the
existence of a closed community of known individuals as
the site of investigation. Indeed a kind of 'vital'
epidemiology of the free field, a living experiment:
'Wensleydale in early days must have been as
much a closed community as those herds of mice
which experimental epidemiologists find so
useful in studying the ways of epidemics' (ibid:
14).
In Pickles's work, the cause of an epidemic entering the
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community will always be either some outside connection
(gypsies, a visit by a villager to a large town) or a
carnivalesque social occasion, with all its attendant
dangers ('There are now cinemas, and there are, of course,
concerts, whist-drives, and dances...'; ibid: 21). The
most important crucible of infection is, however, the
school, even though, fortunately, in the case of Pickles's
Wensleydale; 'the headmaster is epidemiologically minded
and alive to the dangers of the school helping an epidemic
around the countryside' (ibid: 21).

Two facets of Pickles's research endeavour are of interest
in the light of some of the collective activities of the
College of General Practitioners. First, the fact that by
his methods he was able to make real discoveries on the
basis of a knowledge that only the general practitioner
could possess. Take, for example, epidemic catarrhal
jaundice (ibid: 65ff). This has a long incubation period
(as it was Pickles's achievement to demonstrate) and
individual contractions of the infection can seem so
isolated in time and space that its nature as an infection
at all was in some degree of doubt; indeed, it was thought
to come from a common (sanitational) source such as the
water-supply. But Pickles was able to show, by a
combination of his time-chart analyses and his tracing of
the movements of the individuals concerned, the 'personto-person' nature (through droplet infection) of the
epidemic and, hence, the long incubation period involved.
Second, part of Pickles's achievement lay in his linking
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of general practice to wider questions of social utility;
not just for making the general practitioner more
effective

at

preventive

medicine

than

its

own

practitioners (Pickles himself was M.O.H. for his
district), but for demonstrating, by example, that general
practitioner knowledge can be important even for the
'macro' activities of the government of populations. One
exemplary instance of this relates to October 1944 when
Pickles himself gave evidence to the Royal Commission on
Population,

his

contraceptive

evidence

habits

of

chiefly
his

concerning

patients,

the

involuntary

sterility, the utility of home helps and family
allowances. The interest of Pickles's evidence as a
witness to the Commission lay above all in its detail, his
obvious intimacy with the minutiae of conditions of life
in Wensleydale, whereas:
1 ...

naturally much of the evidence we get,

although also very valuable, is of a very
general character and is the impression of
witnesses in reference to the whole country'
(Royal Commission on Population; Report of
Evidence 1944: 1).

2.

The Collective Investigation of Minor Morbidity

Would not the kind of intimate knowledge possessed by the
likes of William Pickles be even more powerful, of even
greater utility, if it could be related - on a systematic
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basis - to the whole country? In spite of certain
unavoidable departures from the model, the Epidemic
Observation Unit of the newly founded College of General
Practitioners represented an attempt to put the
investigations of Pickles onto a nationwide basis; to
establish the project of a natural history of disease as a
collective endeavour.

2.i. A 'natural history' of disease: the disease takes a
course in the community, the free field, which will have
to be mapped, where previously it was invisible (in 1775,
and in another 'free field', Fothergill had suggested the
possibility of a natural history of influenza in this
way). Previously, only notifiable infections
(tuberculosis, syphilis) could be made visible; now, it
was suggested, non-notifiable infections would come under
medical scrutiny as well. These were the conditions rarely
seen inside the walls of the hospital, conditions of which
the full clinical picture or the typical course of
infection remained unclear; epidemic winter vomiting,
pyrexia of unknown origin (shere fever), influenza,
measles, mesenteria, lymphadenitis, various respiratory
conditions. Just as in the work of Pickles, the purpose of
the Unit was to make visible, by use of technological
forms (in this case, not an inscriptional cascade of
'time-charts', but through the collection of independent
observations by individual doctors), an infection which,
taken case by case, would have remained obscure; to
describe both the 'picture' of the disease (characteristic
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signs and symptoms) thus making diagnosis more reliable,
and its natural course (incubation period, typical rate of
spread and so on):
... to locate a considerable outbreak of some
undiagnosed illness and to define its clinical
features' (Editorial 1954: 3).
Once the disease picture had been outlined, it would then
be possible to begin pathological work (using the services
of the Public Health Laboratory at Colindale) in order to
find the offending organism; a kind of large-scale
collective epidemiology of the free field becomes possible
through an amalgam of smaller, localised epidemiologies.
Let us note, parentheticaly, how 'traditional', in terms
of its methodological aspirations at least, this kind of
research remains (describe the clinical features, isolate
the microbe); all that is new is the scope of the
research, its wide domain of investigation.

A collective endeavour: In order to make these forms of
minor epidemic morbidity more visible a technology needed
to be set up through which practitioners could alert one
another of outbreaks and, in turn, report their findings.
Once again, a kind of paradox of organisation is involved:
morbidity in the free field must be allowed to emerge
spontaneously, yet practitioners must be left free to
follow only those research endeavours which interest
them. Guided by the product of all these diverse interests
a more or less stable plane of consistency should
eventually appear, sensitive to all the fluctuations of
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the minor morbidity in the free field. Thus, the
technology consisted of an 'advisory' function at centre
and periphery, and a 'warning' system, with the College's
Research Newsletter (and, later, a publication called -

enigmatically enough - Between Ourselves) serving as the
means of communication between them. Advisory functions
existed both at the centre (College headquarters) in the
form of the Research Advisory Panel, and at the periphery:
'The appointment of a research member to the
board of each of the Regional Faculties of the
College will complete a general practitioner
research network covering the British Isles'
(CGP 1953: 21).
Membership of this network consisted of all those on the
Research Register of the College (by 1954 there were 380
names on the register); these members, a kind of 'home
guard' against epidemic invasion, could be alerted of
outbreaks through the 'warning system' of the College.
Thus, a practitioner who - on the basis perhaps of just a
few cases - suspected that he had the dim outline of an
epidemic appearing in his practice would notify the
director of the Observation Unit at College headquarters.
Next, a 'yellow warning' would be sent out to inform all
those on the research register to be on the look out for
similar cases and, should any appear, to inform the
originator of the warning. Should the outbreak be of
special interest a 'red warning' would be sent to all
members of the Research Register. A 'purple warning',
meanwhile, would inform those interested that a full
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report of the outbreak would be published in the
forthcoming Research Newsletter:
'For example, in December 1953, all members of
the College in Hampshire and Dorset were
notified within forty-eight hours of an unusual
outbreak of

'pyrexia of unknown origin'

occurring in Bexley, Hampshire. The distribution
of the observers throughout the country is
satisfactory, and in future it is unlikely that
any epidemic of general interest will occur
without soon being reported' (CGP 1954: 25).
Thus, by a kind of cumulative and circular process, from
periphery to centre and back again, various 'pictures' of
disease as it occurred in the natural domain of the free
field were to be built up; it is the College organization,
its

associational

form,

linked

by

practices

of

inscription, that makes possible this new form of
collective vigilance.

2.ii. The case of epidemic winter vomiting provides a good
illustration both of the workings of the Observation Unit,
and of what it was able to make visible. This condition
is an example of an affliction rarely seen anywhere but
in general practice; moreover its clinical picture is
unclear, being a kind of vague concatenation of symptoms
(mainly vomiting) with no physical signs present.
'What is known about this disease has largely
come

from localized outbreaks

in closed

communities such as schools, hospitals etc. One
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aim was to study the disease as it appeared in
general practice, with special reference to its
seasonal incidence and its spread from one
locality to another' (Symposium 1955: 90).
Over the winter of 1954 approximately 1,300 cases had been
reported in 120 local outbreaks involving 120 general
practitioners. As a result - and aside from being able to
give a clearer 'picture' of the disease itself (its
symptomatic

form,

period

of

incubation

etc)

-

practitioners were able to differentiate the condition
from others. Thus, a symposium on the condition held in
1955 was told:
'It was shown that during the autumn of 1954 the
area of maximum prevalence and the direction
spread of the winter vomiting disease were
different from those of virus B influenza,
giving support to the view that there are two
distinct diseases' (CGP 1955: 28).
In addition the unpredictable nature of the course of the
condition was confirmed as a clinical fact:

'We now know that this form of infectious
vomiting may be either sporadic or epidemic; in
epidemic form it may affect only one child in
each of several houses or a whole family or
school' (Symposium 1955: 94).

3. Assessing the Paradigm of Collective Investigation
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What is the purpose behind this project of collective
investigation? Is there, for example, an intimation of
social utility lying behind it? How might it be linked to
other, perhaps wider, aspirations and endeavours?

3.i. First, the paradigm of collective morbidity entails a
rationality that could surely only have gained its initial
problematisation in the context of warfare. This, to be
sure, is not the warfare of large mobilisations, great
battles, outsize heroism and generalised carnage. It is
modelled more upon the fantasy of espionage: there exists
in our society a secret army of epidemics, infections and
undefined viruses, that need to be sought out so that one
can mobilise one's defences against them. This model is
compounded by a fantasy of totalising visibility: the
notion that, given the right techniques and resources and above all by mobilising a kind of army of the 'common
man' (allusions to the . 'Home Guard' are difficult to
resist) - one can make this entire field of minor
morbidity visible. What is interesting about this
visibility is that its subject - the doctor, and the
collectivity of doctors - is itself invisible; they exist
in the pores of the collectivity and carry out their
investigative tasks only in the course of their daily
occupations.

What is no doubt important in a 'governmental' context
here is the notion that danger lies in the minutiae,
within the interstices of life; the threat is not
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cataclysmic and finite but minor, and continuous. What is
required therefore is a form of continuous monitoring;
uniting the micro-world of the individual in the locality
with the macro-world of the population. Nevertheless, this
nosographical project as such was not in itself a new one
(cf. Foucault 1973: chapter 2). For instance, as we have
already noted, in aetiological or diagnostic terms nothing
new was being sought here; no new typology of disease
exclusive to general practice was forthcoming. Rather, all
that is at stake is that a new apparatus is put in place
for the detection of minor disease entities; a kind of
naturalisation' of bacteriology - out of the confines of
the laboratory and into the free field.

Second, there was naturally an intended economic utility;
if the patterns of disease in its natural environment
could be known, then, equally, these patterns could be
predicted and prevention might become possible; hence,
this research is 'economic' in the sense that it would cut
down on involuntary inactivity in the population and would
reduce - or so it was argued - the burden on expensive
hospital care (since, in certain groups of the population,
these minor afflictions can lead to more serious
conditions) (CGP 1953: 7). However there was no sense in
which it could be claimed that these forms of activity
could replace hospital medicine and so forth through, for
example, a kind of generalised prophylactics in the
community; these activities were strictly incremental to
already existing medical endeavours.
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Third, and certainly more important, if more obscured,
than this economic utility, was the link that epidemic
research (as tied to the model of the country practitioner
and the forms of knowledge he espoused) was able to make
with the various problematics of pronatalism that took as
their target the reconnaissance and maximization of the
capacities of the child. For, above all, in all these
cases of minor morbidity, albeit in a manner which is
perhaps so fundamental, so obvious, that its
acknowledgement barely appears, it is the child which is
at stake. This child was not the same as that observed by
the sort of 'family studies' discussed above, that is,
according

to

a

broadly

'psychiatric'

model

of

intervention. However, what these two forms of
investigation had in common (at the 'micro' level) was a
similar orientation towards the link between the normal
and the pathological. For the minor morbidities of
childhood are, when derived from knowledge of their
collective incidence, normal, natural events in the midst
of the process of development. They are, then, events
which the doctor can, if necessary, 'subtract' from the
more serious, underlying pathologies that threaten the
child, but they are also events which are, above all,
precarious, for example, if they occur too frequently (a
sure sign of pathology in the whole family), or lead to
more serious conditions. Only the doctor, as we have seen,
is able to arbitrate along this boundary of what is proper
to normality and what is proper to pathology, of which he
is the absolute master. It is not that the boundary
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disappears altogether (as claimed in Armstrong 1983: 90),
but that its uncertain outlines can only be resolved,
brought into focus, by the expertise of the doctor at work
in, and with knowledge of, the free field.

3.ii. However, it is not intended to suggest by this that
epidemic observation was an extraordinarily powerful form
of investigation; rather, the links that it was able to
make with other demands, other forms of study were, at
best, unsystematic. In fact, as a paradigm of the kinds of
activity proper to general practice, the collective
endeavour of epidemic observation did have several
drawbacks. First of all, in what it had to discard from
the paradigm of country practice as embodied in Pickles's
work: the doctor's personal knowledge of his patients was
no longer necessary in the collective context, in which
the tracing of the movements and habits of patients to
establish the point of entry of the epidemic could have
had little meaning. All 'biographical' elements, those
proper to the very 'ontology' of general practice,
disappear:
'Much is to be hoped for from the marriage of
the science of statistics to general practice
though the reduction of such abstracts as
emotion, fear, anxiety, and the components of
mental illness to exact terms will be far from
easy' (Pinsent 1958: 26).
Later we shall see how this epidemiological emphasis lead
to charges of reductionism - an alienating movement from
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the person of the patient to the reified figure of
disease.

Second, the loss of this link between personal knowledge
and epidemic observation entailed the widening of the gap
between the 'micro' and the 'macro' levels of practice. In
Pickles's work, the 'macro' knowledge of epidemics
informed his 'micro' work in the home and, naturally; vice
versa. On the collective level the intensity of this link
was diminished in that a certain distance opened up
between knowledge and intervention. Since knowledge
becomes 'collective' it separates itself to a certain
extent from the daily activities of the individual such
that what was at stake at the micro and macro levels were
in fact, in the end,
Lastly, this

different kinds of knowledge.

linkage of everyday practice and epidemic

knowledge was further compromised by the very choice of
the targets of epidemiological study. Thus the
circumstances of collective investigation meant that 'only
a limited number of outbreaks can be located by the
Epidemic Observation Unit at any one time' (CGP 1954: 76).
The nature of the kinds of morbidity encountered by the
Unit was somewhat at odds with the wider aspirations of
the

College to investigate 'minor morbidity' in general;

by this term was meant common illnesses not generally seen
in

the hospital but nevertheless pervasive in the free

field;

in this way general practice might become the

specialist disicpline of minor morbidity. However, what
actually became the object of study was not so much minor
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- but common - morbidity in this sense, such as measles,
as obscure morbidity (pyrexia, etc.); in other words,
those illnesses that could not be made visible outside of
the macro dimension afforded by collective investigation
since they occured too rarely in the locality to be of
significance.

However, in spite of these limitations, the paradigm of
collective epidemic observation was important, at least,
in the manner in which it fitted in with, and was a part
of, the general project of a mapping of morbidity in the
free field; for in the 1950s this entire project was
viewed, at least by the members of the College, as a novel
endeavour of great significance in its own right.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE LIMITATIONS OF TAXONOMY

1. The National Morbidity Study

As writers in the College journal (and elsewhere) never
tired of pointing out, the very fact that morbidity in the
community was being made calculable at all was of great
significance in its own right. Previously, medical
statistics had been reliant on the classification of
mortality alone; only the analyses of notifiable
infectious disease had shown the way to what a general
analysis of morbidity might look like, whilst the work of
the Epidemic Obervation Unit of the College had, since
1953, endeavoured to extend this kind of analysis into the
realm of non-notifiable infectious disease. There was a
kind of rationality of 'vitality' behind this aspiration;
a kind

of

anti-medical

rationale

of

clinical

'recuperation' designed to be in opposition to medicine's
reliance on the grim evidence of death:
'To increase man's knowledge of himself he must
study the circumstances of his life as well as
those

which cause

his death' (Pinsent 1958: 26).

Meanwhile other organizations as well had, in the post-war

191

period, been investigating the extent of morbidity outside
the space of the hospital (the Ministry of Pensions and
National Insurance, for example); although none had
attempted to do so across the entire free field of the
nation itself.

1.1. This was a project the College was (from its
inception, in fact) now planning. A College Records Unit
was planned to supervize a constant monitoring of
morbidity in the population:
f

...

to carry out a constant and continuous

watch on the illnesses of the community through
the eyes of an observer-group of perhaps a
hundred practitioners. In many ways this watch
will resemble that kept on the weather by the
Meteorological Office,

where reports

from

numerous field workers are co-ordinated and
translated quickly into information valuable to
us all ... It will be our task, with whatever
help we may receive, to bring the sources of
family illnesses to the surface, to measure
their effects and to take steps to prevent
spread or further recrudescence' (ibid: 334).
However, the Records Unit, when it finally did appear (in
1957), was actually to be far more concerned with the
methods

(or, the means of codeability) of data collection

and typologies of morbid classification proper to general
practice, than with extensive investigations of this kind.
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But such an investigation (albeit not in continuous form)
was, nevertheless, to be undertaken.

Like the College's epidemiological work, the National
Morbidity Survey was intended as a contribution to a
general project of the 'natural history of disease' (GRO
1958; 1960; 1962; cf. esp. Editorial 1953: 6-7). This
conception, in fact, implied an entire historiography; an
allusion to a period when disease had not been linked to
the lesion or the microbe, the hospital or the laboratory,
but had existed in a wholly natural space, amenable to
systematic collection. This, then, was strictly a
preparatory stage, a 'stage of taxonomy' in fact, when all
the facts which are to make a science possible are
gathered together 'and set in order so that all may
understand them.' Indeed:
'This is the stage of taxonomy applied by
Linnaeus to natural history, by such workers as
Bentham and Hooker to botany when it became a
separate study, and by Farr and others to man
when his knowledge of the patterns of
presentation of disease first made accurate
definitions possible' (Research Committee 1959:
140).
And no one could doubt that the principles on which a
natural history of disease would be founded would differ
substantially from previous forms of medical
classification. As Pickles declared in the first 'James
Mackenzie Lecture' at the College:
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'A nomenclature which is based on morbid anatomy
or on the presence of infecting organisms finds
little place in the daily records of general
practice' (Pickles 1955: 4).

1.ii. How, then, was such a taxonomy to be created? What
would be the necessary organisational forms and alliances
that would be appropriate for its creation? What would be
the techniques of data collection, analysis and
presentation proper to such an endeavour? Above all, how
might such techniques of data collection be put into
operation without disturbing the contours of the free
field itself?

Superficially, the answer to these questions was obvious
and already in place. Did not the College itself
'represent' the free field? Surely, all that would be
necessary was the collection of information across the
organisational parameters of the College network:
'It may be that the next advance in medicine
will come from a fuller understanding of the
field in which 20,000 general practitioners are
daily at work and means must be found for
exploring this field of material' (Editorial
1953: 2).
But finding these means was not simply a question of
collating at the centre the entirety of haphazard
information collected around the periphery; for the domain
of evidence and investigation of general practice was
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simply

too

diffuse,

simply

too

many

forms

of

classification were possible.

This was a problem that had already been encountered by
the Research Advisory Committee of the College when
considering applications for research studies coming from
the faculties. A 'consolidated comment' system was devised
to monitor research strategies and to decide upon their
viability (and to reject proposals which showed little
likelihood of succesful fruition); thus, members of the
Committee would reply to the research proposals of local
faculties with their comments on the research in question.
Going through this material, one quickly perceives that
the problem in the 1950s was less one of sub-standard
research proposals but rather one of a lack of 'standards'
altogether. Thus, although a host of individual
practitioners had mapped the profile of morbidity in their
practices all that had emerged was, far from a continuous
picture of disease in the population, a mass of confusing,
if impressive, heterogeneity.. For instance, we may quote
from one of the Advisory Committee's 'consolidated
comments' on a submitted proposal entitled 'A Year's Work
in General Practice':
'I always wish that GPs who are interested in
this kind of work would use the same
classification so that their figures were
comparable. Truly he will get something out of
it himself but how much more could be obtained
if his results could be compared with those of
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other similar observers?' (CGP Archives 1957, no
page numbers: Report on draft proposal of
Hadfield-Jones, August 1957).

But how was a uniform system of classification to be
devised when it was, precisely, a taxonomy of the 'free
field' that was expected to be the outcome of such
research? The research decisions taken in preparation for
the National Morbidity Study, and some of the studies
relating - under the broad shadow of the Morbidity Study to questions of classification in general, show up this
dilemma very clearly; a dilemma that can, in fact, be
reduced to the question of the difficulties entailed in
this strange marriage between the science of statistics
and the art of the sick individual that general practice
conceived itself to be.

1.iii. The Morbidity Study was intended to measure, first

of all, the 'amount of sickness' encountered in the
population:
'to provide data of value to the medical
research

worker,

the

sociologist,

the

administrator and, by no means least, to the
general practitioner himself' (GRO 1958: 1).
This data was collected from the clinical records of 106
practices in England and Wales between May 1955 and April
1966, and was analyzed by statistical coders at the
General Register Office. In fact, this data related to two
dimensions; the general diagnosis and the diagnosis
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recorded at each consultation: 1 Upon these two items of
information - consultation and diagnosis are based all
the tabulations in this study' (ibid: 17).

The problem was that the very dependence of general
practice on the sick individual made the coding of
diagnoses highly uncertain. Unlike the hospital case,
where a diagnosis could be entered when the patient was
discharged, in the case of general practice a diagnosis
had to be entered at each encounter. This meant that,
since diagnoses were liable to change and since patients
were liable to attend the surgery more than once in a
year, the unit of analysis could not be the patient. Thus,
the morbidity survey could not relate to the sick
individual at all; but related only to the 'period
prevalence' of disease, i.e. the number of patients who
would be consulting with a particular diagnosis over a
particular period (which would thus be greater than the
actual number of patients under study). Even a special
means of codeability was devised to cope with the problem
of diagnoses which changed over time; a diagnosis (e.g.
dyspepsia) that was changed to another was placed, to
borrow a phrase, 'under erasure' (that is, it was crossed
out in relation to the patient concerned but still
appeared legible as a statistic in the study) and another
diagnosis (e.g. gastric ulcer) took its place on the
record card (ibid: 10). As was pointed out at the time,
this procedure eliminated from the analysis one of the
elements

most closely associated with the 'ontology' of
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general practice, namely, the chronic patient with an
underlying condition that manifested itself as a series of
different conditions:
'The fundamental difficulty of recording the
total 'morbid' picture of a patient may prove
insuperable' (Howard 1959: 125)

What made matters worse was the sheer number of diagnoses
that appeared in the survey itself, requiring to be coded
into a manageable form; over 500,000 in fact (compare the
mere 2,400 different diseases recorded in that previous
record-breaker in the annals of medical nomenclature;
Sauvages's Nosologia Methodica of 1763). This problem
actually stemmed from a rather extraordinary concession
that had been made to the demands of the free field;
namely, each doctor being allowed to use the terminology
that suited him best. The Records Unit of the College,
when it came into existence at the end of the 1950s, found
itself especially concerned with consideration of the
question of diagnostic classification:
'Basic units of measurement had to be decided
upon; whether the illness-experience of an
individual, the doctor-patient contact, or the
episode or 'spell' of illness, should be used'
(Report 1958: 110).
However, a pilot study done under the auspices of the
College Research Committee had already indicated the
difficulties of applying strict diagnostic categories to
conditions - usually vague 'symptom-complexes' rather than
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clearly defined 'diseases' as such - encountered in
general practice. Thus only 55% of diagnoses by the twelve
doctors studied could be labelled as 'firm' (whilst only
about 70% of these would later prove to be accurate); and
30% of diagnoses were found to be initially only tentative
(Report 1958: 117).

Moreover, it was also recognized that the codings, which
in the National Morbidity Study were worked up centrally
by coders at the General Register Office, were themselves
possibly arbitrary and of doubtful value. Take, for
example, the largest diagnostic category in general
practice; respiratory infections. Do these represent a
real batch of diseases? This is a realm where aetiological
details are almost unknown and clinical differentiations
notoriously difficult:
'one causal agent may provide a whole variety of
differing

clinical

conditions,

and

alternatively, one clinical condition may result
from a whole variety of causes' (GRO 1962: 16).
Diagnostic nomenclature was particularly insensitive in
relation to respiratory infections; for example, are there
not over 100 synonyms for infections of the lungs alone?
Is it really a solution to break up the respiratory tract
into two regions in order to produce two broad, perhaps
wholly

arbitrary groups, relating to the upper

respiratory tract (colds, sore throat and so on) and the
lower respiratory tract (bronchitis, pleurisy etc) (ibid:
chapter 2: 32)? The problem lay, no doubt, in the
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impossibility - that is, without breaking with established
medical knowledge altogether - of forging a coherent set
of diagnostic classifications proper to what we have
called the 'vitality' of the free field; that is, a
classification that would represent a break from that
based on morbid anatomy, on the corpse. Thus, the basis of
the coding operations was a modified version of the
International Classification of Disease and Causes of
Death, a classification that, as a College report on
disease nomenclature acknowledged in 1959 '[was] not the
most suitable classification for use in the continued
observation of morbidity through its many changes'
(Research Committee 1959: 140).

Finally, how useful was the Morbidity Study once it had
been completed? Did it relate to clinical practice itself,
could it be useful in aiding forms of intervention
specific to general practice? Did it reveal anything
specific to the 'natural history' of disease; or was it
mrely an impossible attempt - only of interest to the
statistician and sociologist - at measuring disease in the
community according to traditional criteria but in a new
and highly unreliable space of operations? Volume III of
the study, which was produced by the College itself, was
concerned with translating the statistics derived from the
observation of practitioners back into a recognizable
general practice language, that is, in 'a clinical rather
than

a mathematical medium' (GRO 1962: v). In fact, as the

introduction

to the volume acknowledged, what was perhaps
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most striking about the study was, less the information it
gave concerning the prevalence and incidence of illness in
the community 101

than the way in which it revealed that

statistical results were themselves largely dependent on
the doctor concerned:
'It was found, for example, that there are a
number of levels of diagnostic accuracy, and
that each general practitioner uses by habit
working diagnoses that may not fit accurately
into categories designed by others' (ibid: 2).

2. Towards a 'Perspectivism' of the Doctor

In other words, towards the end of the 1950s, as doctors
started to analyse the results and achievements of the
stage of taxonomy', it slowly became clear that the
appropriate plane of consistency where the elements of
general practice could be seen and assessed was not the
space of the practice alone, but the person of the doctor
had to be taken account of as well.

2.1. In order to stabilize the domain of evidence in
general practice the particular perspective of the
individual doctor would clearly have to be included in
that act of stabilization. This became all the more
obvious once it was considered that disease appeared to
be, as it were, 'socially constructed' by the doctor's own
research interests and pre-occupations:
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'Doctors who make a special study of a disease
always find more cases in their subject than
disinterested workers (GRO 1962: 36).
The 'occupational bias' of particular practitioners became
evident:
'Bias of interest in a subject may make
individual observation of the incidence of
morbidity a practice of doubtful value' (Howard
1959: 129).

Simultaneously, towards the end of the 1950s, writers
began increasingly to point out the lack of relevance of
the statistical project as a whole to the aspirations of
general practice knowledge, and its 'ontology' of the
patient. Already, in 1955, one delegate to a Conference of
Faculty Chairmen of the College had pointed out that:
'all the work written or discussed had concerned
individual disease. Yet the particular role of
the GP was to follow the same patient through
many diseases. We should, in our researches,
concern ourselves more with the patient' (Report
1955: 21).
Yet this was to remain an aspiration only, something
always just over the horizon, an ever-residual problem to
be ironed out. The College report on 'A Classification of
Disease' commented, for example, on the problem in
statistical surveys of:
'relating illness to the person who experiences
it... It was hoped that any classification to be
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brought into use by the Records Unit of the
College be used in its relation to the patient,
as well as in other ways' (Research Committee
1959: 157)
The interpolary nature of this aspiration is only
underlined by its vague and ritual repetition:
'It is hoped to relate this information to the
life and state of health of the patient who
endures the illnesses, as well as to the doctor
who observes and records as part of his daily
work' (ibid: 157).

If the person of the doctor had been problematised by the
obstacles encountered over diagnostic classification, then
so too did the desire to 'return' to the person of the
patient lead, as of necessity, to the medical persona. In
fact, it is striking that whenever the patient is invoked
them

so are the personal attributes of the doctor:
'In this age of specialists the general
practitioner is the specialist in domiciliary
medicine, and, to my mind is the specialist in
treating patients as human beings - and such a
calling demands personal qualities besides
medical qualifications' (Fleury 1957: 316).

It was recognised that if the patient was to be made, in
some manner, calculable, then one had to turn to the
doctor's persona to do it. An example from the
'consolidated comments' literature of the College will
illustrate this, since it shows the nature of the
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difficulties encountered by the paradigm of 'taxonomy'
when confronted with the patient. In March 1959 a doctor
submitted a research proposal relating to 'The Possibility
of Predicting a Patient's Future Physical and
Psychological Development and History by Clinical Methods
and Observation, Examination and History Taking'. What
could be more proper to the 'ontology' of the free field
than that? The 'consolidated comments' by members of the
Research Committee, in spite of being unanimously
sympathetic to the ideals behind this kind of research,
all reveal a similar logic; namely, that this was not a
subject upon which they felt equipped to advise since it
entailed

matters

of

self-discipline,

of

'self-

surveillance', of education:
'It is perhaps a philosophy to be incorporated
in medical teaching rather than a principle
subject to objective general-practitioner
research.'
And:
'This is surely not a project for research, but
the suggestion of a method for personal selfdisciplinee and the awareness-training of the
prognostic facet of his art, to be carried out
as a long-term personal plan by each G.P.
individually' (CGP Archives 1959: 2)

2.ii. The concern with the patient - and hence with the
person of the doctor - was also no doubt overdetermined by
the impact of questions relating to psychological disorder
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that gained in salience as the 1950s progressed (see e.g.
Horder 1959; Kagan 1959; Fry 1960; Report 1958b; Hopkins
1956). On the one hand, the problems of nomenclature,
discussed in brief above, faced a particular obstacle in
relation to psychogenic illness. This was first of all
because the psychoneurotics that everybody knew placed a
great burden on the average practitioner failed to show up
in statistical analyses, since - for the purposes of
statistical study - everybody had to be given a more or
less firm diagnosis:
'The troublesome neurotic is not revealed
statistically' (GRO 1962: 41).
Second, because evidence of psychogenic afflictions
themselves were notoriously uneven. A review by Philip
Hopkins for example of 14 surveys relating to patients
with psychic disorders in general practice revealed a
variation from 6.5% to 70% depending no doubt partly on
the area in question (the 'country practitioner' paradigm
being notoriously ineffective in relation to psychic
problems since these are so rare in the countryside) and
partly on the system of classification used, and the
personality of the individual doctor (Hopkins 1957).

However, if psychic questions represented an obstacle in
this way, then they were also a kind of surface of
emergence for the possibilities of practitioner research.

This was partly because of 'institutional' reasons; the
projected contents of the Mental Health Act (a
'Psychiatric Working Party' had been set up at the College
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- on the prompting of the Ministry of Health - in 1956 in
order to consider the possibilities of treatment in the
community; Report 1958b) not surprisingly gave psychiatric
questions a wide visibility in the closing years of the
1950s. But there had also been hints that a recourse to
psychic functioning might be a way out of the problems of
diagnostic classification encountered in research. Indeed
Pickles himself had mooted this possibility in 1955. He
had been impressed by the way that psychiatric nosology
had made considerable strides in World War II by adopting
a notion of health as a variation from the normal without
the actual presence of disease, i.e. a functional
classification capable of handling the 'dynamic' entity of
the patient:
'By drawing on the major symptoms of the
patient, and using terms denoting broad mental
states and attitudes of mind, by adding thereto
sufficient descriptive terms to give a wordpicture of the sufferer, the problem was
satisfactorily if clumsily sovlved... Might not
general practitioners, also, accept the fact
that health is a state in which vairiations from
the normal or average may occur without disease
being present' (Pickles 1955: 5).
Pickles, interestingly enough, was proposing a radical
solution to the myriad diagnostic problems before they had
even been fully encountered, in demanding 'a completely
new approach to the nosology of the minor maladies met
with in general practice' (ibid: 4-5). This call was,
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indeed, to be taken up by others, albeit in different
ways,

throughout the decade in a variety of suggestions

for alternative - invariably 'functionally' based theories
of general practice diagnosis (cf. on Seyle's theories,
for example, the special edition of Practitioner 1952,
172, 1027; or ibid 1959, 182, 1087; also Meillet 1955:
16).

But

these alternatives were to reach their apotheosis in a

way of thinking about general practice that bypassed
problems of taxonomy altogether in favour of an approach
that combined more directly the act of diagnosis with the
act of intervention, therapy and cure - the clearest
expression of which is to be found, as it were,
crystallised, in the works of Michael Balint which shall

be discussed in the next chapter.

3.

The Taxonomic Project of the Free Field and its Failure

The discussion in this chapter was not intended as an
account of the 1950s as a 'period', for example, as an
covering of the
practitioners
the

'world-view'
world-view' of the sum of general

at that time. What we have described was, on

one hand, a kind of 'rationality' amongst those

general

practitioners who wished to make their discipline

'autonomous' and, on the other hand, less a periodisation
than

the point of greatest intensity of this rationality;

that is, the point at which various problematisations were

207
given their clearest expression. This rationality can be
analysed epistemologically, organisationally and
governmentally.

3.i. The epistemological focus was upon the project of a
general labour of 'definition'; to draw up a 'taxonomy' of
all the circumstances of practice. This entailed the
project, on the one hand, of a 'natural history' of
disease that would be built up from the sum of localised
studies by individual doctors and, on the other hand, of
all sorts of operational' investigations where
practitioners would describe the techniques employed in
their practices. Common to both these was the question of
writings and inscriptions; the determination of the
appropriate methods and means of codeability proper to
morbidity studies, the drawing up of a rota, the writing
of a prescription or a letter of referral, the operational
task of 'putting the practice into writing' - everywhere
the general practitioner was the one who has recourse to
methods of inscription. The model of the doctor at stake
here

was derived from the image of the 'country doctor',

the generalist in all things, naturalist of minor
morbidity, intimate of his 'flock'.

The organisational focus was upon what we termed the 'free
field', that world without obstacles where the sick,
living individual would become fully visible. Although we
um that other areas of medicine similarly enjoined the
need to get back to the 'clinical' emphasis upon the sick
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individual, it was perhaps the general practitioners who
claimed most forcefully to be the specialist discipline of
this field. This was partly because the general
practitioner was himself understood as being a kind of
archetypal individual living and working in the 'natural'
space of the population - thus perfectly 'adequated' to
the circumstances of the free field. The model of
organisation involved here might be described as one of
free association; if the profession enjoyed a certain
degree of integration then this was only insofar as all
general practitioners were alike

in being

free,

independent individuals. Thus the institutional
organisation to which some of them chose to refer - the
College of General Practitioners - did not exist over and
above the body of general pracitioners in the field, but
was rather in a relation of immanence to the ecology of
that field, serving merely to regulate and channel
patterns of interaction and communication within its
totality.

The governmental focus can be derived, first of all, from
these organisational characteristics of immanence and
totality themselves. The notion of a perfect un-hindered
visibility of all and each - where the totality is in
perfect equilibrium and alignment with the parts - is, no
doubt,

itself constitutive of the ideal of 'liberal'

government

where the population as a whole is fostered

through the sum of micro-patterns of pastoralism and
tutelage

in a wholly 'naturalised' domain. Here the
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apparatus of government itself is immanent to its targets,
and invisible to them in the sense that its activities
imply a minimum of distortion of the natural properties of
the field itself. So, if in this - organisational - sense
alone the network we have been describing possesses some
characteristics proper to the themes of a liberal
government, we might, secondly, add to these a prominent
substantive theme that constituted what might be called
the 'political consciousness' of general practice in the
free field.

This theme cohered around the problematic of 'pronatalism'
which took as its rationale of social intervention the
fact of a declining birth-rate and the consequent aim to
maximise the numbers of citizens through, above all, a
regulation of the family. But the family was less the
target of this problematic than the principal institution
through

which this problematic sought to work; the family

was the 'training ground for the future citizen'. Through
observation of the circumstances of the family
environment, and especially through observation of the
mother, the doctors sought to participate in the project
of maximising the body of healthy citizens for the future.
What we have here, then, is a problematic of social
welfare; emphasising the nurturing of the totality of
citizens of a population within an aspirational framework
of solidarity (compare the more partial 'social security'
problematic

discussed

earlier

in

the

context

of

Mackenzie's work, which focused upon particular kinds of -
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labouring - citizens). If there is an implicit model of
citizenship being promoted by this welfarist rationality
it might be characterised in minimal terms as being
centred on the ideal of a collectivity of citizens;
citizenship here is largely a question of integration, of
the promotion of social cohesiveness. The collectivity of
the doctors themselves was the archetype of this kind of
cohesion; united - although free and individual - by bonds
of common solidarity.

Nevertheless, because the sick individual - that
'ontological' foundation of general practice - effectively
escaped the gaze of collective investigation, no content
could be given to the kinds of subjectivities of
citizenship that it was seeking to target and promote.
This point can be made more clearly by recalling that what
the paradigm of collective investigation failed to do was
to integrate the format of knowledge proper to it to the
matter of day-to-day activity and treatment. No guide for
action in the surgery in relation to patients could be
said to have derived from the form of knowledge proper to
epidemiological investigation. Where the project succeeded
in its focus upon sickness (morbidity in the free field)
and vitality (the emphasis upon the living as opposed to
the

dead), it lost out in relation to the sick individual

-which

remained obscured. In this sense, the taxonomic

project of the free field was a failure.
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3.ii. By the end of the 1950s what the doctors had termed
the 'stage of taxonomy' was drawing towards a kind of
horizon. Under the pressure of certain difficulties encountered with the means of codeability (forms of
diagnostic classification); the appropriate plane of
consistency and stabilisation (the doctor as well as the
space of the practice); the domain of evidence and
investigation (the massive, undercoherent, range of
practice); and the projected 'ontology' of general
practice (the patient) - 'psychological' issues (the term
is used widely) gained, perhaps, a new kind of emphasis
and problematic status. It became conceivable, at least,
that such psychological issues might provide, at last, the
foundations of coherence,

the unifying thread of

aetiology, classification, therapeutics and, possibly,
even of the social vocation of general practice.
Nevertheless it would be a mistake either to deny the
impact of questions of psychic functioning on general
practice before this time or to claim that the era of
practice description, of the statistical mapping of the
free field, came to an abrupt halt, or died an
unceremonious death, by the end of the 1950s (far from
it).

Questions of psychic functioning: that general practice
had long possessed a certain

relation to matters

psychological and psychiatric is,

nO doubt, well

established (cf. Armstrong 1983; chapter 8; also Armstrong
1979 and 1984). The 'ontology' of general practice, its
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concern with the individual, with prognosis, had long been
appreciated (just as had been the fact that confrontations
with neurotics of various kinds was part of the grind of
practice). But this did not mean

that 'psychological'

knowledge as such was to be deployed in any systematic way
in

relation

to

the patient.

Similarly,

that

the

practitioner had to be - in certain contexts - a kind of
psychiatrist was also well-established, as we saw in
relation to the minor discourse of 'family studies' which
drew upon psychiatric models (see also the special issue
of Practitioner 1951, 167, 998; Thorne 1958, or the works
of C.A.H. Watts). But, then, he also had to be an
obstetrician, a dermatologist, something of a surgeon, and
so on. Thus, the question of psychic functioning certainly
bore a relation to general practice, but it had never
before been tied, as it was to be, above all, to the
person of the doctor; that is, at the centre of
problematisation of that discipline. No doubt, certain
obstacles can be cited to account for this; the model of
the

country practitioner, the emphasis on the taxonomy of

the space of the practice, the status of psychiatry
itself;

but also because other coherence conditions - we

have cited, in particular,

the paradigm of a general

pragmatics of writing and inscriptions that served to
unify various levels of investigation - existed already,
and would have to be displaced. Thus, if a certain
'personalism'

of the patient had long existed, before the

end of the 1950s
tied

psychological knowledge had not been

to the very identity of general practice as an

213
autonomous 'intellectual technology' in the form of a
'coherence-condition' (see, inter alia, Perth 1957; Model
1959: esp. 178 & 180; S.E. England Faculty 1959: 193; also
Leigh 1953).

An unceremonious death? The project of taxonomy is still
with us (Watson 1982 alone is testimony of this). It is
not the demise of this form of knowledge that we have
attempted to document here, but only the recognition of
the inadequacy of this form in its claim to be the
technology of the free field of pathology beyond the walls
of the hospital; that is, to form the basis of general
practice as an independent and autonomous clinical
discipline. Today - as we will discuss further in chapter
4 - the work of the College of General Practitioners is
still concerned largely with the issues that confronted it
in the 1950s; the tracking of influenza epidemics, systems
of diagnostic classification, advice on standards in
practice and so on. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1950s
a certain 'moment' had passed; a moment when, it was
thought, that an independent discipline of general
practice could be founded on the basis of a labour of
taxonomy, a labour of definition alone; a moment when it
was

believed that, since the circumstances of 'good

general practice' already existed, all that remained to do
was,

through the establishment of a particular kind of

organizational form, to bring it into the light of day. In
the 1950s it was felt that what was necessary was
definition alone; even research took the form of a
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mapping. Yet what appeared was a map of the free field;
the occupant of that environment, the sick indvidual, did
not appear; if anything, the person of the sick individual
became more obscured even by the very process of taxonomy
itself. Thus, after the stage of taxonomy, it was
recognized,

at least,

that good general practice,

especially if it was to get a grip on its proper
'ontology',, would have to be, first of all, not discovered
but invented.

Even so, one thing at least had been partly achieved; the
status of general practice had been partially restored by
the College's achievement in overcoming the paradox of
organization proper to the very nature of general practice
circumstances, and perhaps above all, the very existence
of general practice had been demonstrated:
'General practice is no longer in the doldrums.
The tide has turned and is flowing strongly'
(Watson 1957: 488).
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PART FOUR

BALINTISM: A PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC RATIONALITY
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CHAPTER TWELVE

ANTI-MEDICINE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

'One need be no talented prophet to foretell
that one day numerous courses will compensate
psychoanalysis for previous contempt.'
Sandor Ferenczi

1. Introductory: Balintism and Psychology

In the pages of The Doctor, His Patient, and the Illness
(Balint 1957) - that classic work in the annals of general
practice - Michael Balint first outlined a coherent role
for the general practitioner as a kind of psychotherapist;
it is difficult to conceive of a work situated at a
further remove from collective investigations, taxonomies,
and the activities of country practitioners. Balint's
significance was not that he founded a 'school' of general
practice but that he crystallised in his writings a
general rationality, a way of conceiving what general
practice was all about that went well beyond the specific
teachings to be found in his works. This rationality will
be given the name 'Balintism'.
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1.1. Before giving some consideration to what is meant by
this term, it should be said that we are not immediately
concerned here with whether or not Balint personally
caused the mutation that we are about to outline. The
closing pages of the last chapter would certainly lead us
to think that this was not the case; after all, matters
psychological were coming to the foreground in general
practice towards the end of the 1950s regardless of the
intercedence of Balint's work. The question of Balint's
'influence' will be considered further at the beginning of
the next Part; at this point it will be sufficient to draw
up a kind of 'balance-sheet' of Balintism itself in order
to emphasise at the outset how its various themes differ
from those of the taxonomical projects of the 1950s.

On an epistemological level, Balintism replaces the
emphasis upon the morbid space of the practice population
with an emphasis upon stabilising the persona of the
doctor himself. The doctor's personality becomes the plane
of consistency, the perspectivist optic through which
everything is visualised. Hence, a very noticeable feature
of all those influenced by Balint is that they are
obsessed with the doctor's reflexivity, his understanding
of himself. And hence, a marked feature of Balintism is
its replacement of the theme of surveying one's practice
(using all the relevant inscriptive techniques) with the
theme of surveying oneself; with 'self-surveillance'.
Hence, too, the marked pedagogic emphasis of Balint's
work; here 'knowledge' comes to consist less of surveying
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a 'field' than of working upon the doctor's persona;
pedagogy takes on an epistemological import. This
transformation also heralds the end - or, at least, the
re-location of the obsession with inscriptions and
writing. Now, what matters is less writing things down
than listening to people's voices in the consultation or
the

seminar.

On an organisational level the model of association is one
of

interpersonal relations; the 'atmospheric' tensions and

forces linking up members of the group practice, the
'team', the training seminar, or the family and the
'doctor-patient relationship'. Now the units of
organisation centre upon the homogeneous field of
'persons' ;

a genuine personalism emerges. At the centre of

this mode of organisation stands its most focused
expression, the consultation, which becomes at once the
paradigm

of all relationships and the main 'object' of

research

and pedagogy. At the same time, on a governmental

level,
upon

the mobilisation of forms of conduct. But it does not

so not
get

Balintism succeeds in gaining a certain purchase

in order

to judge the patient 'morally', but to

the patient to assess him or herself 'ethically'.

Balintism

can

subjectivity'

be

argued -

a

'technology

of

that seeks to bring about a certain

ethicalisation
relationship

described as

and autonomisation of the subject's

to self (cf. Rose 1990: 10). And - as will be

it provides a 'technical' basis for bringing this

about, based upon a chain of 'identifications'.
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These emphases can be reduced to four themes in
particular. These form the 'substance' of Balintism.
First, an emphasis upon the reflexive subjectivity of the
doctor

(sometimes

this

be

will

termed

Balint's

I doctorcentrism'). Second, a reliance upon techniques
associated with the uses of the group; a form of
organisation that now takes on an aspect less of
'logistics' than of 'vigilance'. Third, an emphasis upon
the narrow world of the consultation which becomes both a
kind of 'affective' and 'scientific' space. Lastly, an
important epistemological consequence of Balintism; a
certain 'anti-scholastic' emphasis upon the values of
'practice' above those

'knowledge'. This is not to say

that Balintism is 'against' forms of knowledge, rather it
is against formal knowledge, abstract formulations,
objectivist modes of analysis (such as taxonomies).
Balintism favours, rather,
'workability'

an emphasis upon the

of a formulation;

for example, upon

immediate therapeutics rather than troublesome, formal
diagnostics. This is the 'anti-scholastic' or
'interventionist' impulse of Balintism. This, it should be
noted, is not a vulgar empiricism but an impulse which is
grounded epistemologically in the substance of Balint's
work itself.

1.ii. The governing force behind all of these
problematisations is psychology, which now becomes
actually constitutive of what it is to do general
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practice; an epidemiological model is replaced by a
psychotherapeutic one.

This, in fact, raises a prior question; the identity of
'psychology' itself. What exactly is pyschology
contributing to Balint's project? As we have seen, the
association of general practice with problems of psychic
functioning is, as Armstrong has demonstrated, a longstanding one. Yet Balint's work inaugurates a new
departure within or beyond this old relation. So it needs
to be specified exactly what psychology is doing for the
general practitioners. And this question is inseparable
from the wider matter of what psychology actually is: what
is it, for example, about psychological forms of knowledge
that has given them their tremendous 'parasitical' power,
that power which enables them to graft onto other
disciplines - social work, industry, warfare, advertising
- and to transform them from within? And tied to these
questions are the 'governmental' matters concerning; what
kinds of subjects are presupposed by these incursions of
psychology? - or, more specifically, how do projects such
as Balint's seek to impose certain models of conduct upon
their subjects? This, in short, is the question of the
power of psychology.

There is, however, an even wider dimension to this
question. This concerns the relation between psychology
and the project of Enlightenment that was the subject of
our opening remarks in the first chapter. For to raise the
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question of the power of psychology is in some respects to
go against the logic of 'psychologisation' itself. For
does not psychology, in fact, always seek to be opposed to
power? Is not the project of psychology and the therapies
in which it is enmeshed all about the specification and
recuperation of aspects of humanity and personhood from
all those technological forms that otherwise reduce,
suppress and repress them? Psychology is in fact the
paradigm of a form of activity that would recuperate the
Enlightenment project; by seeking to reconcile both
rational knowledge and the emancipation of persons. What
follows is, in this sense, a case-study of this project of
psychology in one context, that of general practice.

2. An Outline of Balint's Project

The work of Michael Balint (1896-1971) is well-known and
well-esteemed in the world of psychoanalysis (Khan 1969;
Kohon 1986). A one-time pupil and colleague of Sandor
Ferenczi, Balint had been director of the Budapest
Psychoanalytic Institute from 1935 to 1939. After
emigrating to Britain in 1939 he worked at the Tavistock
Clinic in London (where he set up his first teaching
seminars for general practitioners) from 1948 until 1961
(officially the year of his retirement) when he moved to a
post at London University. At his death in 1971 he was
President of the British Psychoanalytic Society.
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2.i. Balint's analytic orientation tended - from his early
writings of the 1930s (and especially under the influence
of both his first wife, Alice, and Ferenczi himself) toward an emphasis on research into analytic technique.
Drawing upon, and extending, the 'object-relations'
perspective Balint concentrated his attentions especially
upon the phenomenon of the analyst's counter-transference;
that is, more generally, upon the powers and reactions of
the analyst himself in the particular setting of the
analytic encounter (Balint 1952; 1968; Khan 1969). As an
important recent assessment sums up the matter:
'The contribution made by the Balints in
Ferenczi's footsteps is the introduction of the
analyst as a subject of observation' (Haynal
1988: 77).
It is this emphasis upon technique and upon the
analyst/doctor that characterises Balint's contribution to
conceptions of general practice from the late 1950s
onwards.

Indeed, if it is the case that Balint's name still
commands a high reputation in psychoanalytic circles, if
anything, that reputation is even higher amongst general
practitioners. Balint's fundamental statement here is his
classic study The Doctor, His Patient and the Illness
(Balint 1957) which came out of research done in the
context of a seminar Balint had set up for general
practitioners at the Tavistock in 1950. The setting up of
the 'Discussion Group Seminar on Psychological Problems in
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General Practice' should be seen in the wider context of,
first, Balint's background in Budapest psychoanalytic
circles, and second, what has been called the 'Tavistock
Programme' (Miller and Rose 1988). Common to both lies the
aspiration to extend psychoanalysis and forms of
psychotherapy generally beyond the question of psychoses
and further into the more mundane problems of psychic
functioning in the community; this aspiration lay behind
the work of both the Budapest Out-Patients Clinic in the
1930s and the Tavistock Clinic after the Second World War
(Dicks 1972; Gosling et al. 1967). General practitioners
were, for Balint, excellent potential agents in this
project since, as he argued, like it or not, the general
practice consultation is characterised by psychic
structurations similar to those found in psychoanalysis
itself. Thus, very early on the research seminar at the
Tavistock came to the conclusion that the doctor acted as
a kind of 'drug' upon his patients; an influence that
Balint ascribed to an 'apostolic function' that was deemed
to be basic to the doctor's powers in the consultation
(Balint 1957: chapter 1). In his book, Balint outlined his
views relating to what he saw as the unique and hitherto
underrated importance of the 'drug' doctor and its
influence in - not just treatment itself - but in the very
initial 'organisation' of symptoms by the patient in the
first place. In a special way, then, via his responses to
the patient's 'offers' (of symptoms, and complaints) the
doctor is implicated in the very construction of the
patient's problem; a fact which necessitated a close look
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at the 'doctor-patient relationship' itself as an
embattled site of potentially distorted communication. The
doctor's task was - through the medium of, for example, a
'long interview' - to help the patient realise his or her
psychic problem (of which the organic complaint was
generally merely an expression) and to use the powers of
the 'apostolic function' in its amelioration - for which
special hard-won techniques, such as that of 'listening',
would also be necessary.

Balint's ideas evolved in various ways in the years
following The Doctor, His Patient and the Illness. Most
notably he attempted in the late 1960s to increase the
scope of therapy and make it applicable to more patients
by introducing the so-called 'flash' technique. This
utilised the spontaneous empathy between doctor and
patient as a therapeutic tool, thus making a 'long
interview' no longer a necessary stage of treatment. After
Balint's death in 1971 this method was further developed
by his followers, and perhaps represents something of a
shift from the 'deeper' diagnosis of psychic
malfunctioning originating in childhood to a more
pragmatic approach concerned with the 'here-and-now
interactions between people'. In any case, the basic
component of the Balint technique remains; the emphasis on
the psychic behaviour of both doctor and patient in the
bringing about of an amelioration not of organic
pathology -

but of the 'doctor-patient relationship'

itself; if there is a central concern of Balintism it is,
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then, the question of the intersubjectivity of doctor and
patient.

2.ii. Balint's project - which bases its own reason for
existence upon an assessment of what it sees as being
wrong with existing medicine - is firmly in line with that

general body of ideas we have labelled 'anti-medicine'.
The tropes are familiar; the past one hundred and fifty
years of medical specialisation have served to fragment
the integrity of the person (Balint 1965). Against the
'traditional' form of diagnosis which merely sought to
localise pathology, Balint would seek to promote the
practice of an 'over-all' diagnosis of the patient's
condition. This, however, would not entail merely adding
the sum of the patient's 'components' together. Rather
what Balint calls the 'whole person' is not just an
amalgam of parts but a new entity. It is not merely the
patient's 'illness' that is to be treated but what Balint
calls the 'agreement' between the patient's 'offers' and
the doctor's 'responses' in the consultation (cf. Balint
1957: 21-36). This entails treating the person of the
patient as opposed to the actual symptoms he or she brings
to the surgery. In short a potentially new object emerges
for general practice.

This object - the 'person' of the patient - is only
visible to the general practitioner. The specialist cannot
see this figure; he deals with the mere mechanics of
separate parts of the body. In fact it seems that for the
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general practitioner to become a specialist of the whole
person, it is necessary that the hospital consultant
should remain something of a mechanic. In Balint's view,
the hospital specialist should be deployed only as the
general practitioner's 'expert assistant' (Balint 1957:
99-101), the technician to whom the general practitioner
may occasionally refer his patients during certain brief
'episodes' of their basic underlying illness (ibid: 286).
But this position of hierarchy over the consultant was not
to

be bought at the price of subservience to the

psychiatrist or pscyhoanalyst. Balint was adamant that he
was

not simply 'applying' psychoanalysis to general

practice. Rather, he intended to create a new autonomy for
general practice as a psychotherapeutic disicipline. A
Uric' of 'interessement' strategy is at stake here. Balint
has,

as it were, positioned himself between psychoanalysis

and medicine,

mobilising both just as both felt that they

were mobilising him. As Enid Balint put it:
'I do not think that he "applied" psychoanalytic
theory and technique to medicine or vice versa,
nor is it important which was his first love.
Rather it was his way of thinking and the way he
related to people which led him quite logically
from one field to another - so that he allowed
himself to be "used" in the two fields which
most interested him' (Williams and Clare 1975:
139).
In short

Balint's project faced in two directions. It

aimed, on the one hand,

at extending the principles of
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interpersonal forms of therapy beyond the rarefied
confines of established psychiatry and psychoanalysis, and
on the other, at making general practice an autonomous
discipline concerned not with diseases alone but with
patients in their totality.

3. Patients and Doctors
At this point a problem emerges. How is one to mobilise
this 'whole person'? How is a general knowledge of this
most particular entity to be possible? Balint's answer is
simple; forget the whole person, work only on the doctor's
personality. As Pequignot succinctly puts it; 'Not being
able to work with the totality of patients, Balint works
with doctors' (preface to Sapir 1972: 10).

3.i. The technical necessity of ignoring the patient and
working upon the doctor was acknowledged by Balint
himself. Towards the close of his most important work on
the application of psychotherapeutic techniques in
medicine, Balint acknowledges that he has scarcely paid
any attention to the person of the patient:
'we decided to centre our discussion on the
doctor's technique and have hardly mentioned in
this book the patient's psychotherapy or
dynamics' (Balint and Balint 1961: 207).
But, he noted, bypassing this aspect seemed to be the very
condition for making a 'whole person medicine' a workable
proposition rather than an empty aspiration. Indeed, since
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the figure of the patient is absent, the validity of the
techniques could only be assessed in relation to the
efficacy of those techniques themselves:
1

we have not paid much attention to the

aetiology of illnesses - but perhaps we may take
the fact that our plan could be carried out and
yielded some acceptable results as a proof that
our view may have some validity' (ibid: 207).
So if we have here a whole-person medicine that ignores
patients, we have, on the other hand, a whole-person
medicine which works (or of which, at least, the
conditions for its operationalisation can be stated). And
it works because it is simple and economising; a radical
reduction of complexity is achieved. But this reduction is
not merely of a 'logistic' order (it being easier to gain
access to the personalities of doctors than of patients);
it is also of an epistemological order.

We have already mentioned that Balintism is an 'antischolastic', 'interventionist' rationality. What this
entails is a kind of re-balancing of the relations
existing between the terms knowledge-practice, diagnosistreatment, and research-teaching. For Balintism, the
principle is not to apply methods on the basis of what one
already knows; rather knowledge follows upon whatever is
workable in practice. For Balintism, the doctor does not
first diagnose and then - subsequently - treat the
patient; rather, diagnosis can only derive from treatment
itself since the 'apostolic function' dictates that there
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is never a moment when 'treatment' is not actually taking
place, never a moment when the doctor is not helping the
patient to 'settle' into one or other diagnosis. Lastly,
for Balintism, even the production of truth - research is itself dependent upon practice, or more specifically,
upon education; which, to be sure, entails the consequence
of a certain re-signification of the terms 'research' and
education' themselves. Balintism shifts the main point of
application of research towards the personality of

the

doctor himself so that to do research in general practice
comes largely to signify research upon the deployment of
one's self; 'research' will come to imply above all a
process of the monitoring of knowledge, not upon an
'absolute' level of jurisdiction, but upon a reflexive
level; that is, through 'self-surveillance' with the help
of others. In other words; through education. But the
notion of 'education' has itself, in this process,
undergone a mutation in significance. Education comes to
imply less the formal inculcation of knowledge than the
permanent - 'vocational' - practice of self-surveillance.
Hence, Balintism is not just a matter of an increased
emphasis upon education; rather it places education at the
centre of the epistemological status of general practice .
itself.

These are all emphases that shall be investigated in
greater

detail below. What is important to observe here is

that - for an anti-medical rationality - Balintism
possesses

certain features in common with the most
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'scientific' forms of reasoning. Psychotherapeutic
rationalities are often held to be rather 'woolly'
affairs. On the contrary, Balintism - as can now be
investigated - is a veritable 'phenomen-technics'; it
aspires effectively to produce the reality of which it
speaks.

3.ii. We have said that Balintism ignores patients. This
was perhaps misleading. In fact, Balintism as a technology
seeks to mobilise 'whole persons' in their absence. By
working upon the doctor's personality, Balint seeks the
effect of 'acting-at-a-distance' upon the personality of
the patient; he works on patients through the medium of
doctors. What are Balint's grounds for making this a
possibility?

To begin with, it is an important principle that the
doctor only gets those patients he deserves. It is
extraordinary, argues Balint, how the characteristics of a
doctor's list of patients will tend to mirror the
particular interests of the doctor himself (Balint 1957:
54: Balint 1961: x). Thus, each practice will tend to be
automatically 'self-selecting':
'Even the people who constitute the practice
seem to be characteristic of that particular
doctor' (Balint 1961: 80).
But this all-important 'doctor-effect' does not simply
stem from the fact that patients tend to register with
doctors

whom they find amenable. Rather, it is the product
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of the inevitable 'apostolic function' of the doctor, that
'calling' (the religious terminology is endemic: Balint
1957: 226) which causes the doctor to seek to 'convert'
his

patients to his own particular way of thinking and

acting in relation to illness:
'Apostolic mission or function means in the
first place that every doctor has a vague but
almost unshakeably firm idea of how a patient
ought to behave when ill ... it was almost as if
every doctor had revealed knowledge of what was
right and what was wrong for the patients to
expect and to endure, and further, as if he had
a sacred duty to convert to his faith all the
ignorant and un-believing among his patients'
(Ibid 1957: 216).
The 'apostolic

function' is an inevitable part of

doctoring - especially in general practice where the
doctor has a 'continuous' relationship with his patients.
A doctor moulds his patients to his ways even before he
has

begun to treat them. This occurs, first of all, on the

level of

the isolated presenting illness. When the patient

presents at the surgery the disease - and this is a
distinctive aspect of general practice - is un-formed. The
patient 'offers' various illnesses to the doctor which he
mist

either accept or reject. The patient, argues Balint,

will

tend to keep presenting illnesses until doctor and

patient

can finally 'agree' to 'settle' the symptoms into

an 'organised'
'apostolic

illness (ibid: chapter 2). But, the

function' also works on a broader level in that
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- as it were, macroscopically - it determines what kind
of patients there will be in the first place. So, if
patients tend to come along complaining of organic
illnesses this is because they have been (regrettably)
trained to do so by the medical profession:
'By their apostolic function doctors train the
population from childhood what to expect and
what not to expect when they go to the doctor's.
This training, though not very efficient, is not
unalterable. We have taught our patients not to
be unduly embarassed when showing us their
bodies; it should not be very difficult to teach
them that often their psychological problems
have to be shown too. The first step towards
achieving this aim is, of course, to train the
doctors' (ibid: 227: cf. 239).

Here, then, it is above all the doctor that determines
everything; a kind of phenomeno-technical subject. The
doctor determines what kind of patients there will be; the
doctor determines what kind of illnesses these patients
will have. The use of the term 'doctor-centrism' to
describe this emphasis should not be taken as an implied
criticism. On the contrary, is it not the case that any
patient-centred approach will result in a valorisation of
the

doctor's technical powers? Rather, we should perhaps

be impressed by the technical skill with which Balint has
made a 'whole-person' medicine operable in practice.
Moreover,

he makes use of well-established grounds in the
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elaboration of his 'phenomeno-technics' of the doctor, as
can be seen from an analysis of the context of Balint's
project within the field of psychoanalysis.

4. Psychoanalytic Writings and the Question of Technique

In fact, a brief review of some of the psychoanalytic
themes that underlie Balint's work in general practice may
help to clarify the specific contours of his general
'project' within general practice. For the mobilisation of
one discourse in the service of another does not merely
entail a straightforward task of 'application' of the one
to the other;

there is no clear entity called

'psychoanalysis' that is waiting, as it were 'ready-made'
for 'application'. Rather, the particular characteristics
of Balint's own project within psychoanalysis need to be
specified.

4.1. Freud's work is not renowned for its emphasis upon
technique; that is, in the way the analyst should actually
conduct the analysis (see, for example, the comments of
Enid Balint in Priest ed. 1982: 80). In fact, where Freud
did consider the matter it tended to be in the context
less of the 'day-to-day' methods of the analyst (where to
sit, what to do with the cushion and so forth) than of the
dual theme of the possibility of terminating therapy (i.e.
of 'cure') and of the extension of psychoanalysis, that
is, its expansion beyond the rarefied confines of
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Hampstead or upper-middle class Vienna to confront general
neuroses and problems in the community. Both these themes
- which have their most famous conjunction in the work of
Balint's teacher Sandor Ferenczi - were tackled by Freud
in his famous 'Budapest Address' of 1918 (Freud: 1919).
Here Freud gives cautious approval to the 'active'
experiments of his colleague Ferenczi. These experiments
were designed to overcome the 'deadlock' or lack of
progression that occurred in many analyses through the use
of a temporary 'role-playing' technique for the analyst
(Freud 1919: 162: cf. the more hostile comments in Freud
1932: 153: also Ferenczi 1916: 39: and 1955: 198). Such
'activity' on the part of the analyst was designed
ultimately to shorten the length of analysis itself. Once
this possibility had been considered, in turn, it was felt
(above all, by Ferenczi) that the 'extension' of analysis
might itself become a possibility, since if methods could
be laid down and analyses shortened then more and more
people could undergo treatment. As to this second goal,
however, Freud seems to have been generally sceptical,
since the extension of analysis presupposed, for him, not
only the possibility of shorter treatments but of defining
successful treatment, that is, of concluding the analysis
with a successful 'cure'. But as Freud was fond of
[minting out he was far from being a 'therapeutic
enthusiast' (Freud 1932: 151); psychoanalysis could help
an

individual to accomodate life's adversities but it was

unlikely to be able completely to cure the individual.
Rather,

it seemed to him that any attempt to extend
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psychoanalysis into a general 'psychotherapy for the
people' (via, for example, the use of 'institutions or
out-patient clinics') would end up being forced to alloy
the 'pure gold' of psychoanalysis with the meagre 'copper
of direct suggestion' (Freud 1919: 167-8: also quoted in
Rose 1985: 218).

Part of the specificity of Balint's project can
immediately be located in relation to this debate. For, as
we have noted, Balint's project was endemically tied to
the project of the extension of analysis (Haynal 1988:
chapter 6). However, unlike Freud it appears that Balint
did not believe that it would be necessary to solve
definitively the question of the possibility of
therapeutics and 'cure' for this to come about. Rather, by
locating the possibility of an 'extension' of
psychoanalysis outside the realm of psychoanalysis itself
- in the world of general medical practice - Balint
discarded the need for a therapeutic eudaemonism of
approach. For the general practitioner is somebody who is
stuck with his patients in any case; the 'doctor-patient
relationship' is a fixed, ongoing 'project' which is not
'terminated' even when a specific disease 'episode' is
cured. Here then was the perfect field for the project of
extension.

4.1d. Another specificity of Balint's approach can be seen
to emerge through a brief comparison with the work of
Ferenczi. It is interesting to note that for Ferenczi -
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above all, in his early work - there was an implicit
opposition set up between the analyst's activity' (as
advocated by Ferenczi in his 'experiments') and forms of
analysis that were what might be called 'analysandcentred'. For Ferenczi's early experiments in active
technique were strictly limited in scope. If, in these
experiments, the analyst did indeed play an 'active' role
then this was merely to be temporary and strictly
catalytic. This active role, Ferenczi claims:
'is only a makeshift, a pedagogic supplement, to
the real analysis whose place it must never
pretend to take' (Ferenczi 1926: 208).
Indeed for both Freud and Ferenczi, the possibility of an
'active' form of therapy runs against what could be termed
the otherwise desired 'patient-centredness' of the
analytic encounter, that is the form of analysis where the
'free associations' of the patient have free reign. For
Ferenczi, active therapy was only to be used when the
analysis was in a stagnated state; after this:
'the expert will immediately resume the
passively receptive attitude most favourable for
the efficient co-operation of the doctor's
unconcious' (ibid: 198).
For Freud, attention to the patient was only to be
achieved through the maximum passivity of the doctor. In
some famous passages Freud was to speak of the analyst's
nle as being like that of a 'receptive organ', geared to
the patient's individuality, listening without judgement,
adopting an 'evenly suspended attention' (Freud 1912:
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112):
'He must adjust himself to the patient as a
telephone receiver is adjusted to the
transmitting microphone... The doctor should be
opaque to his patients and, like a mirror,
should show them nothing but what is shown to
him' (ibid: 117 & 118: cf. Haynal 1988: chapter
1).

Balint, however, reverses both this emphasis upon the
'temporary' nature of active forms of technique (as well,
it might be noted, as the association of 'activity' with
either 'role-playing' or 'denial' of the patients wishes)
and the association of a 'passive' analyst with the
maximisation of the subjectivity of the analysand.

For Balint, the 'subjectivity' of the doctor/analyst is
something that can never be avoided in the course of
analysis (cf. Ferenczi 1926: 198). Without rejecting the
metaphor of the analyst as 'mirror' to the patient, Balint
seeks, as it were, to radicalise its significance:
'Returning to Freud's metaphor, we see that the
analyst must really become like a well-polished
mirror - not, however, by behaving passively
like an inanimate thing, but by reflecting
without distortion the whole of his patient. The
more clearly the patient can see himself in the
reflection the better our technique; and if this
has been achieved, it does not matter greatly
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how much of the analyst's personality has been
revealed by his activity or passivity, his
severity or lenience, his methods of
interpretation, etc.' (Balint 1952 [1939]: 207:
cf. Kohon 1986: 58).

What has been introduced here, then, is not so much the
periodic 'activity' of the analyst so much as an emphasis
upon the continuous use of his 'subjectivity' in
constructing the conditions necessary for analysis. What
Balint foregrounds are the 'productive' aspects of the
analyst's personality in creating a particular
'atmosphere' in which analysis can take place (cf. Haynal
1988: 77). This subjectivity on the part of the analyst
does not,

in Balint's work, have the effect of

(temporarily) causing a diminution in patient-centred
therapy, rather it is a condition of such therapy (cf.
Ferenczi's later writings on how the analyst's 'tact' and
'elasticity' should serve to 'mould', as it were, the
unconscious of the analyst to that of the analysand in a
flexible relationship; Ferenczi 1955: chapter 8; cf.
Balint 1952: 155-6). In short, for Balint, the emphasis
upon doctor-centrism ('activity') is aligned with the
demand for patient-centredness.

Mil. What exactly does Balint mean by 'technique'? His
usage

of the term seems to differ from both Freud (who, as

R have seen, did not give much thought to the matter
outside

certain particular contexts) and Ferenczi (who
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uses the term 'instrumentally', that is, in relation to
bringing about particular effects in the treatment). For
Balint, 'technique' refers to the continuous activity of
the analyst which, regardless of the intentionality behind
it with regard to particular effects, contributes to the
production of a particular 'atmosphere' during treatment.
In short, techniques are productive of phenomena; they
produce analytic reality. This understanding of
'technique' cannot be separated from two further themes;
first, a parallel extension - some might say 'overextension' (Kohon 1986: 54) - of the notion of 'countertransference', that is, the totality of emotions (and
behaviour) produced in the analyst by the analysand and
especially by the analysand's own transference (Laplanche
and Pontalis 1985: 92: Balint 1952 [1939]: 201-8); and
secondly, and connected with this, something very much
associated with Balint's own name in psychoanalysis
(Laplanche and Pontalis 1985: 278: Balint 1952 [1949] 209222) - the adoption of an 'object-relations' perspective.

Central to both these emphases is Balint's conviction that
psychoanalysis must go beyond what, following Rickman, he
calls a 'one-person' approach (that is, essentially, an
'objectivist' and 'individualist' perspective; Balint
1968: 21) in order to encapsulate the intersubjective
world of person-to-person relationships. Now, this is not
just a 'methodological' demand on Balint's part but also,
for him, an assertion of one of the fundamental
propertiesof psychic life in general (Balint 1952 [1937]:
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74-90). Balint's great bugbear in the psychoanalytic world
is the theory of 'primary-narcissism' which concerns an
early state in which the child cathects its own self with
the whole of its libido thus allowing no psychic energy
for the 'outside world'. Balint's view on this matter, put
crudely, is that 'primary narcissism' does not exist;
rather object-relations are a more or less permanent
feature of psychic life even at the earliest stages
(Balint 1952: 86). Leaving all the relevant subtleties
aside, we can state simply that what this boils down to is
the assertion that all psychic life is characterised by
inter-relationships; rendering the naive 'one-person'
emphasis more or less redundant. If this demand does,
indeed, become a 'methodological' one (relating to the
requisite techniques in the analytic situation itself) it
is not simply because the analytic situation is by
definition also an 'interpersonal' one, that is one that
involves - in the manner of all social life - a
'relationship' between active personae, but because there
is an important homology between the earliest stages of
object-love and the analytic situation itself; since, for
Balint, the former is, via the transference of the
analysand, effectively reproduced in the latter (see e.g.
Balint 1952: 134). Thus, the analyst in the session
corresponds with the object of the primary object-love of
the analysand (Balint 1952: 131). Again leaving aside
relevant subtleties we may note that this conception makes
of the relationship in the analytic encounter not one
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amongst others but a uniquely privileged kind of
situation.

For Freud, it could be said, the actual analysis was
connected by a relation of 'exteriority' to the life of
the analysand; the patient comes to the analysis equipped
with a whole (largely unconscious) domain of past
experiences, fantasies and so forth. For Balint, the
analytic situation - in general practice, the consultation
- becomes the privileged point in which the key objectrelations of that life are stabilized (since they are made
homogeneous within the analytic situation) and confined.
This, of course, makes of the encounter - and, hence,
analogously, the general practice consultation an
enhanced technical instrument; the analytic situation
(unlike the life of the patient) is a relatively 'stable'
working environment - one can, for example, work with
emotions within it, and apparantly exclusive to it,
without worrying too much about recourse to the actual
past of the patient since the space of the analysis takes
on its own 'autonomous' reality; it becomes a homogeneous
working space.

The analytic encounter - and its

equivalent, the general practice consultation - has thus
become analogous

to a 'centre of calculation', a relay-

centre which acts both as the point of convergence for
sundry object-relations and the point of distribution for
umliorated affects.
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What guarantees the 'stability' of the encounter, and
which gives the data that emerges there its 'validity',
is the analyst's counter-transference which, in Balint's
extended usage of the concept, becomes homogeneous across
the entire space of the encounter since everything is, as
it were, measured through it, being the 'index' of the
state of the relationship. If it can function as an index
in this way, it is because the analyst actually produces
the 'atmosphere' of the consultation himself. Between
Freud and Balint, as Masud Khan has written:
'something has radically changed in the theory
of analytic technique: both in its means and
aims, and this difference lies very largely with
provisions made by the analyst towards the
creation of the analytic process and situation'
(Khan 1969: 238).
But really we might say that what have changed are less
the actual techniques themselves than the initial
conception of 'technique'. A technique is no longer that
which mediates between the 'theory' of psychoanalysis and
its 'practice'; rather techniques (which, in Balint's
work, refer overwhelmingly to the ways in which the doctor
'uses' or 'deploys' himself in the consultation) are now
at the source of all psychoanalytic data; moreover they
stabilise

such data. The encounter (or, the consultation),

iqual is the arena for the deployment of technique,
becomes
Clinic:
where

like the hospital described in Birth of the

a 'domain in which truth teaches itself'; a domain
all modifications are levelled out into an
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equilibrium in that those modifications, as they derive
from the doctor/analyst's personality, are at the 'phenomenotechnical' - source of everything that occurs
(cf. Foucault 1973: 109-110).
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

BALINTISM AND GENERAL PRACTICE

I.

Michael Balint and General Practice

In drawing attention to the theme of 'technique' in
Balint's work within psychoanalysis we do not wish to
pretend that there is a complete continuity between this
and Balint's work with general practitioners. Indeed,
certain factors within the psychoanalytic oeuvre would
seem to work against the possibility of any assimilation
of themes. To begin with, the weighty emphasis upon the
transference situation could be said to be mainly relevant
to those patients who 'regresi l during analysis; probably
not a vast proportion of general practice patients! On the
other hand, those forms of analysis - of which Ferenczi's
'active experiments' are only the extreme version - which
privelege the analyst's powers tend also (aside from being
particularly concerned with categories such as psychotics
or children) to stress, as in no other area, both the
importance of the analyst's own training analysis and the
existence of long psychoanalytic experience; hardly
propitious circumstances for transferring these techniques
to general practice. Ferenczi commented, for example,
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that:
'Beginners, or analysts of no great experience,
do better generally to refrain from it as long
as possible...' (Ferenczi 1926: 209).

These comments are not meant to show that Balint's usage
of certain ideas from psychoanalysis is not legitimate.
For, after all, Balint draws broad themes and emphases
rather than conceptual specifics (with the partial
exception of the notion of 'transference') from
psychoanalysis. But there is another - this time
methodological, or theoretical - intent behind our
discussion of technique. That is, to show that Balint's
project is, in fact, itself something like an intellectual
'technology', or a 'technology-in-thought'; to show, in
short, that there can be such a thing as a human
technology, one which takes human beings as its
components. Let us attempt to anatomise - on the levels of
epistemology and organisation - the workings of this
technology itself, beginning with its central component
that Balint specifically describes as a 'technical'
instrument, the doctor.

1.i. Balint begins his most famous work on general
practice by pointing out what he takes to be an obvious but hardly ever observed, and never hitherto researched fact; that is, that the doctor acts like a 'drug' upon his
patients. It was quickly revealed in the Tavistock
research seminar that:
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'by far the most frequently used drug in general
practice was the doctor himself' [but that] 'the
of

paucity

information

about

this

most

frequently used drug is appalling and
frightening, especially when one considers the
wealth of information available about other
medicaments, even those most recently introduced
into practice. The most usual answer is that
experience and common sense will help the doctor
to acquire the necessary skill in prescribing
himself. The shallowness of this self-reassuring
advice becomes apparent when it is compared with
the detailed instructions based on carefully
controlled experiments with which every new drug
is introduced into general practice' (Balint
1957:
That

1).

the doctor is able to produce the atmosphere of the

consultation is given further credence in Balint's account
by the very un-evenness regarding the spread of neurotic
problems in general practice. As he comments, although the
number of neurotically implicated problems in general
practice is generally put at about one-third of attending
patients, this figure oscillates wildly - as the surveys
of the 1950s found - between individual practitioners
(ibid: 54). Balint's own accounts would seem to put the
figure far higher than one-third. In a rough survey of two
surgery sessions by doctors in the Tavistock seminar, out
of

a

total

of

thirty-two cases only seven are not

designated as either psycho-somatic or neurotic in some
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fashion (ibid: 51-58). For Balint, the high figures of
neuroses recorded in the practice populations of
particular doctors is, however, a function, neither of
over-zealous psychiatric forms of diagnosis nor of the
existence necessarily of a massively neurotic population
in general, but of the way of working of those doctors
themselves:
'the doctor's personality and subjective
interests may have a decisive influence on what
he notices and records about his patients'
(ibid: 53)
so that, on the one hand, he diagnoses a greater number of
neurotic problems, and on the other, patients with these
kinds of problems gravitate towards his practice.

This determination is achieved by the doctor's capacity to
'settle' the patient into the illness. At this stage of
the argument, the link with the psychoanalytic literature
is fairly direct. The illness, for Balint, is like an
'object' that the patient wishes to create out of him- or
herself and, in the attempt, must go to the doctor for
validation of the results. Thus the patient will 'offer'
and the doctor will 'respond' and, under the auspices of
the 'apostolic function' the patient will be allowed to
settle into a diagnosis (ibid: chapter two). In this
labour the doctor himself is the diagnostic instrument:
what is required is that the doctor should be acutely
aware of his own uses and effects. As Balint writes:
'I wish to state that the tool in psychotherapy
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- the counterpart to the surgeon's knife, the
physician's stethoscope or the radiologist's Xray apparatus - is the doctor himself. That
implies that he must constantly see to it that
he is in good repair and in a serviceable
condition [and that] he must learn to use
himself as skillfully as the surgeon uses his
knife, the physician his stethoscope and the
radiologist his lamps' (ibid: 281).
In a direct parallel with the psychoanalytic literature,
Balint declares that the doctor must have an-'elasticity'
with regard to the patient, reflecting the patient's
personality. Thus, on the one hand, the techniques
actually recommended by Balint seem wholly passive.
Balint's central technical demand is that the doctor
should learn to 'listen' to the patient. Thus the
interventionist techniques of the 'history' or the
'physical examination' are of little use with regard to
the

emotional traumas of general practice:
'Our experience has invariably been that, if the
doctor asks questions in the manner of medical
history-taking, he will always get answers - but
hardly anything more' (ibid: 121).

Thus, for example, in the 'long interview' the doctor must
sit back and absorb - the parallel with 'free association'
is obvious - whatever it is that the patient has to say.
But, on the other hand, this 'listening' is not at all a
privileging of the patient's subjectivity such that the
patient in any way determines his or her own treatment. It
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is not stretching matters too far to draw a parallel with
this technique of listening and what Foucault calls the
structure of 'visible invisibility'. This refers not just
to the movement whereby the doctor 'sees' into the vast
invisible depths of the body using the basis of prior
anatomical findings, but also to the un-covering of the
'individuality', the hitherto invisible uniqueness of the
pathological deviation, in the process (Foucault 1973: 168
& 170). But if what produces this 'individuality' in
clinical thought is the 'incisive, patient, gnawing
language' of a clinician like Laennec, in Balint's work
this determination comes from the workings of the
personality of the physician himself:
'While discovering in himself an ability to
listen to things in his patient that are barely
spoken because the patient himself is only dimly
aware of them, the doctor will start listening
to the same kind of language in himself' (Balint
1957: 121).
Thus, the 'domain of evidence', as it were, which allows
diagnosis comes not so much directly from the statements
of the patient but from the reflexivity of the doctor
which reacts to them like an 'active' mirror. In this way
the doctor will know - no doubt, in his heart rather than
in his head - which matters to raise, which are of
importance and which can be discarded, so as to reach the
'deeper diagnosis' beyond mere organic symptoms. The
condition for such a reflexively conditioned diagnostic
outlook is provided for the doctor by self-examination,

250
something which is as inevitable as it is useful:
'Somehow when we examine our patient, we cannot
escape examining ourselves which is tantamount
to disclosing our own ideas and wishes about
what ought to be done in the particular
situation' (ibid: 224; cf. the similar comments
by Enid Balint in Priest ed. 1982: 80).

Two questions could be said to arise from this account.
First, on what grounds does Balint assume that the doctor
can trust to his own reactions in this way as a valid
index to the individual pathology of the patient? Second,
how is this apparant guarantee of validity 'technically'
achieved?

The answer to the first question can be sought in the
context of the 'consultationism' of Balint's approach: and
the answer to the second in the context of the technology
of the 'group'.

1.ii. If the doctor can trust to his emotions as the index
of the 'deeper' pathology of the patient it is because
both his own persona and the 'setting' in which he works
are uniquely privileged. On the first point, Balint's
assumption is that the equivalent of a transference
relation exists between patient and doctor. If within
psychoanalysis the state of the transference is largely
dependent upon the state of the analysand at the time of
the treatment, Balint assumes that, in the context of
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general practice, it remains fairly constant; that is,
that the patient constantly uses the doctor as an 'object'
in the actualisation of more or less unconscious wishes.
This is one of the most flattering concessions Balint
makes to the general practitioners; even if he is only
really making use of that long-standing trope to the
effect that, due to the 'continuity' of the relationship
between doctors and patients in the 'first line of
defense', the patient has a peculiar dependency upon the
doctor and the all but mystic power that he seems to
wield.

But, as Laplanche and Pontalis point out, the notion of
tranference is generally associated, not with an on-going
relationship, but specifically with the circumstances of
the analytic situation; thus, transference tends to mean
'transference during treatment' (Laplanche and Pontalis
1985: 455). Similarly, in the general practice context,
the consultation is a domain, sequestered from the rest of
the world, where the patient's object-relations can be
allowed to work themselves out upon the persona of the
doctor:
'the doctor provides a setting for the work to
be done, and for the [therapeutic] event to
happen, and this setting thus acts like a
boundary or a frame separating the whole
occurence from the rest of the world' (Balint
1961: 144-5).
So this domain has ceased to be a physical affair; a room,
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a desk and chairs, an examining couch. The setting of the
consultation now signifies a space saturated with the
doctor's personality and the range of emotions that it
produces:
'By setting we mean the sum total of the fairly
constant relations created by the doctor's
individual way of practicing medicine which the
patient may make use of and must accept... In
other words, it is the therapeutic atmosphere
' offered' to the patient to get on with his
endeavour to obtain professional help' (ibid:
43).

Now, if the consultation is a privileged setting in this
way it is, no doubt, only because it is, simultaneously,
so representative of wider object-relations in the world.
In the rarefied atmosphere of the consultation the patient
'uses' the persona of the doctor as, in Balint's
terminology,

the

'primary-love

object'

(typically

exemplified by the roles of 'father' or 'mother': cf.
Ferenczi 1952: 43) effectively in order to work through
the relational and emotional problems that are at the root
of the patient's 'flight into illness'. So the
consultation, as a particular kind of 'setting', is only
the concentrated terrain for the working out of
relationships that could be said to pertain in the outside
world and of which the famed 'doctor-patient relationship'
is the corresponding expression. This term thus has rather
a precise meaning for Balint; that is, less the on-going
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series of encounters between a doctor and the patient that
he knows well so much as the 'immediate' therapeutic
'atmosphere' of the consultation. Balint characterises
this 'relation' as being one of 'mutuality' (he sometimes
refers to his psychoanalytic work as entailing a principle
of 'mutual analysis') wherein the patient comes along to
the consultation in order, as it were, to recognise
himself through the medium of the doctor's own powers of
self-recognition. Thus the consultation is 'essentially an
interaction between two people'. One of them, the
therapist, creates and maintains by his professional skill
an atmosphere in which the patient can reveal and
recognise himself:
'Prompted by his symptoms and sufferings, and in
response to the setting provided by the
therapist, the patient becomes wiling to let
emerge to the light certain parts of his own
pesonality, his character, his past history'
(Balint 1961: 47).
Thus, what confers a sense of 'validity' upon what the
patient 'offers' his doctor and upon

what the doctor

actually responds to in these 'offers'

is the kind of

push-and-pull effect provided by the

merging of two

subjective personae in the protected

setting of the

consultation.

The

consultation is, literally, a kind of translation-

device. All the tangled object-relations of the patient's
woad here become flattened out into a homogeneous space.
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The consultation in Balint's hands becomes precisely a
technology capable of capturing the relational world of
the patient, as it were, in miniature; hence translating
the reality of that world into a workable and more or less
autonomous domain. Moreover, no aspect of the outside
world eludes the space of the consultation. Thus, for
example, in an article upon psychoanalytic technique
dating from 1949, Balint comments that the orientation
which he is proposing - which aims 'at understanding and
interpreting every detail of the patient's tranference in
terms of object-relations' - is specifically intended to
circumvent arguments by sociologists and anthropologists
that psychoanalysis is only concerned with the isolated
individual at the expense of social relations (Balint
1952: 211). Rather,

these relations are themselves

mobilised; that is, their effects are transferred

into

the circumscribed space of the encounter. Instead of
making the domain of evidence for this 'social'
investigation the totality of the patient's social
relations in the 'real world', the domain of evidence
becomes, conveniently and with admirable economy, the
consultation itself (Balint 1961: 217).

Hence, no doubt, the extraordinary emotional saturation
attributed to the consultation in Balint's work; a domain
of complex ethical choices and 'sexual' counterbargaining, an endless source and object of analysis and
uncovering. Yet, the very hyper-emotional quality of the
consultation also marks it out simultaneously as a

255

rigorous and even scientific domain. The very fact that
the consultation is a kind of circumscribed world,
governed by the homogeneous plane of emotions that make up
the 'doctor-patient relationship', makes it a kind of
laboratory, a world where emotions can be examined
'scientifically'. As Balint puts it:
/ ... the doctor's surgery, with its jealously
guarded intimacies, has been turned by our
methodological research into a scientific
laboratory, in which properly observed
psychological experiments can be carried out'
(ibid 1961: 36).
A felicitous reconciliation this: a merging of the demand
for 'scientificity' with the demand for 'affectivity' and
attentiveness to the 'person' (the world of emotions and
relationships). Might not, this 'consultationism' be said
to represent - in a highly limited and specific form - one
local solution to the demand, characteristic of both antimedicine and the project of recuperation, that science and
reason should be distanced from 'despotism' and begin to
speak an ethical language, attentive to the qualitative
properties of persons?

1.111. However, since the consultation is by definition
private - the option of directly invading its sacred
boundaries for the purposes of research being wholly unthinkable for somebody like Balint - a parallel,
organisational, space is required, one which exists in
strict homology with the space of the consultation, where
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the personality of the doctor can be scrutinised, analysed
and stabilised. It has been pointed out elsewhere that
the group is a (relatively recent) technical invention of
superior importance in the maximisation of human resources
(Rose 1990: x-xi). To see how the group functions as a
technique in general, one can confront its workings on a
local level, its point of insertion in regional
technologies of which general practice is one.

Although Balint is far too 'practically'-oriented to
provide us with anything like a 'theory' of the group
(indeed the group emphasis is itself typical of this
'anti-scholastic' orientation), he is noted for the fact
that as early as the 1940s he was advocating the
development of group perspectives within the domain of
psychoanalysis itself. The area of group relations, he
wrote, was an 'extremely important field where both
subject and object can be observed simultaneously; [where]
some transference of emotions invariably takes place from
member to member, i.e. object-relations develop before our
eyes' (Balint 1961 [1949]: 219-20). Clearly the Balint
research seminars were not designed as specifically
'therapeutic groups' in this sense, but then nor were they
straightforward 'work groups' designed to solve specific
problems (Bion 1974 [1959]: 1290. Rather, the point about
hlint groups is that they combined several functions at
once.
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First, the group has an 'organisational' significance. In
the context of the project of the 'extension' of
psychoanalysis this should be clear enough: the group is
the equivalent of the 'training analysis', that is, it is
an economical form for stabilizing the doctor's
personality as a particular kind of plane of visibility
for use in the consultation. Logically, it could perhaps
be argued, this form of self-analysis alongside one's
peers should not be terminated so long as a doctor remains
practicing; but Balint proposes that the group itself
kings about an irreversible shift in the doctor's way of
practicing (Balint et al. 1966); this is the 'limited
though considerable change of personality' that group
training is said to effect (Balint 1957: 303).

In the context of the demands of general practice itself,
however, the group method has another significance. It
mild be said that the group is a peculiarly 'liberal'
form of association as a
the norms that are
spontaneously from the

training method, not only because
inculcated there derive as if
intersubjective 'agreement' of

one's peers, but because in the course of this
intersubjective activity the individuality of the doctor
is not reproached and regulated but actively analysed and
pmmoted. The group, in short, is a form of association
that

actually promotes individuality; a form of

tganisation that, whilst clearly exerting a degree of
'discipline' and 'normalisation', does not work against
the

freedom of individual autonomy. Once again, we have
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here a perfect example of the demand - anti-medical,
recuperative - that the values of universalism and reason
should not compromise the value of the sanctity of the
autonomy and individuality of persons.

Second, the group is, of course, a crucible of knowledge
and research. What form does this take? The leader of the
group - generally a psychiatrist - begins with the
question 'who has a case?' - and somebody, anybody,
begins. Working from memory, the doctor recounts a case
with which-he is having difficulty. Whether the case has
any overtly apparant psychological content or not is not
relevant; by the end of the ensuing discussion the case
will be saturated with psychological speculation and
interpretation (see, for example, the transcript of a
seminar in Gosling et al. 1967: 114-143: cf. Sapir 1972:
99ff). What is it that is being 'researched' here? The
answer relates neither directly to the pathology of the
patient nor to the proper conduct of the doctor confronted
with a particular situation. Certainly the question of
what kinds of patients there are and how to deal with them
does arise for Balint; just as does the question as to
whether psychotherapeutic techniques are actually in
general succesful (of which the criterion seems to be not
the rate of 'cure' but of more or less accurate
'prognosis'; Balint 1957: 323-380). At any rate, the
emphasis of the seminar is not upon curing the patient in
question but upon analysing the reactions of the doctor.
Certainly, the conduct of the doctor is endlessly
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discussed, but the object of the research is not to devise
- or even less to teach - an ideal course of conduct to be
taken in difficult situations. Rather, knowledge here is a
strictly individual affair; it concerns the effects of the
doctor's own personality; it is research into the
particular 'atmosphere' produced in the consultation by
each individual doctor. So, we might say that on the level
of 'knowledge' the project of the seminar is to gain
general insight into the workings and 'side-effects' of
the 'drug' doctor (ibid: 1), and, on the level of
research' the seminar seeks to deliver up to the doctor
self-knowledge regarding the effects of his own
personality (that is, in psychoanalytic terms, the
'doctor's counter-transference to his patient': Balint
1957: 310), the particular 'atmosphere' that he typically
engenders in the consultation.

The research seminar - and, as will be seen later, the
group practice and the

team

are similar forms of

association - represents a space of analysis with unique
access to the otherwise closed world of the consultation.
Akind of translation of object-relations takes place from
the one to the other, and back again. If one can indeed
deduce, from evidence gained far away in the group, the
particular 'atmosphere' generated in the private space of
the consultation by the doctor this is because the group
and the consultation are spaces which exist in a rigorous
analogical relation to each other. Both are sites of
relationships, emotions and, above all, of counter-
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transference. The reporting doctor acts as an emissary
from one to the other: he moves, carrying, as it were, his
counter-transference within himself, lifting it out of one
set of relationships into another. When one works upon the
personality of the doctor who is reporting a case in the
research seminar, one is simultaneously researching into
the characteristics of that doctor's patients - the two,
indeed, are inseparable. Thus, all of the doctor's
feelings in the consultation emerge, in the group, as
valid information about the patient:
'if any feelings or emotions are engendered in
the doctor while treating the patient, these
must be evaluated also as an important symptom
of the patient's illness' (Balint 1961: 61).
Hence, a 'technology' of the whole person; whereby the
patient is mobilised in the group through the agency of
the

doctor.

Third, the group is, of course, an instrument of training.
It should be noted here, in this connection, that if the
group

context is the analogue of the consultation this can

only be because the doctor is, as it were, the homologue
of the patient; the doctor in the consultation has to be
something
process
Thus,

of a patient himself in the group. The reporting

in the group is itself evidence of this homology.

Balint notes that his group methods derived directly

from the Hungarian psychoanalytic system of supervision
where:

'the worker had to report freely about his or

261
her experiences with the client in a way
reminiscent of "free association"' (Balint 1957:
300).
Thus the report is itself the analogue of the patient's
'manifest dream-content'. Similarly what happens to the
doctor in the group seminar can be compared with what
happens to the patient in the consultation. The peers of
the reporting doctor do not ask questions, rather they
'listen'; nor do they seek to direct (the psychiatrist or
leader especially, is not a directive kind of 'teacher':
Gosling et al. 1967). In the group seminar, the doctor is
not 'cured'

of a complaint;

rather,

through the

collective ministrations of his colleagues a change is
brought about - albeit obscurely and beneath the level of
language or one's mere 'beliefs' about oneself (Balint
1957: 302) - in the self-knowledge of the doctor - that
is, in his personality. Of course, if this change is to
occur the group itself must have a therapeutic atmosphere
so that the doctor is able to see the truth about himself
frankly and without shame; a transformation that cannot
occur through traditional, more 'scholastic' methods:
'Intellectual teaching, however good, has hardly
any effect on this process of liberation and
general easing up. What is needed is an
emotionally free and friendly atmosphere in
which it is possible to face the realization
that one's actual behaviour is often entirely
different from what it was intended to be, and
from what one has always believed it to be... if
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there is good cohesion between doctors in the
group, the mistakes, blind-spots and limitations
of any individual member can be brought into the
open and partially accepted by him' (ibid: 303).
Training in the group, then, like therapy in the
consultation occurs according to a logic not of control
but of self-recognition; the doctor comes to discipline
himself only in the context of openness and freedom.

1.iv. So far our discussion of Balint's writings on
general practice has centred around the question of how
Balint provides the grounds for his lphenomeno-technics';
that is, how the personality of the doctor produces
information concerning the (absent) whole person. The
principles behind what we called 'consultationism' and
'group' organisation served to provide a structure within
which the statements of the doctor concerning the patient
and himself can be regarded as 'true'. But if, as this
suggests, Balintism can indeed be regarded as something
like a 'regime of truth', it would be a mistake to suppose
that the statements that it produces could be 'grounded'
outside this regime itself. Nor would Balint presumably
wish to ground his work in this way (for example, by
recourse to some kind of universal and exterior
1

standard');for

everything he does

the

doctor

automatically

validates

merely by taking action.

As already noted briefly, Balint rejects what might be
taken to be the usual priority of diagnosis over
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treatment. The clinic described by Foucault was like this;
first one diagnosed (for instance, by localising the site
of the lesion) and then, subsequently, one took the
appropriate action. In a sense, however, it could be said
that there was a problem here in that, as Ackerknecht
pointed out in his classic study, clinical medicine was
very good as a form of knowledge but less so as a form of
therapeutics (Ackerknecht 1957). But if it was the
achievement of the clinic to have aligned the functions of
research, knowledge, and training within a single movement
(and, we might add, all within the context of what
Foucault calls the 'medicine in liberty'), it was Baltnt's
achievement to have aligned knowledge and research (into
the doctor), training, and - at the same time _
therapeutics.

As Balint writes, generally speaking in general practice,
'no diagnosis is possible without therapy' (Balint 1957:
67). To think otherwise would be to suppose that the
doctor could impose a diagnostic 'verdict' upon the
patient without taking the effects of his own personality
on the patient into account. But the diagnosis does not
concern the patient alone, it also relates to the doctor
and his relationship with the patient:
t ...

the doctor's responses may and often do

constribute considerably to the form of the
illness to which the patient will settle down'
(ibid: 20).
Nevertheless this reversal does not amount to a wholesale
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rejection of 'theory' in relation to 'practice'. For
example, in rejecting the priority of diagnosis over
therapy, Balint does not dismiss the import of diagnosis
altogether. Far from it; diagnosis is vitally important but only once it is understood that diagnosis is, for the
patient, actually part of the therapy itself (ibid: 25).

What is at stake here is not a straightforward rejection
of knowledge in favour of action. For, of course, this
very prioritisation of intervention is, for Balint, a
'theoretical' matter. What Balint is saying is that one
does not have to wait around for 'knowledge' in order to
embark upon practice. He would reject, in this sense, the
notion of a 'stage of taxonomy' designed to conduct a
preliminary mapping of the field (as we described in
chapter 2); he is not concerned with theorising how
general practice might be a speciality since for him it is
so already. Rather, for Balint, the task is to research
and develop techniques which already exist. The point,
then, is not that theory or knowledge is unimportant but
only that it is what takes place in practice that produces
the kinds of theory or knowledge that are worth having.
Thus, if Balint rejects what we have called 'scholastic'
forms of

knowledge

-

that

is,

abstractions

or

'intellectualisations' (ibid: 31) - he does not belittle
'knowledge' per se. It is merely that now knowledge
resides in different domains; its place concerns
techniques and 'means' in relation to treatment not
objects and 'ends' in relation to diagnosis.
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2. What Is It That Balint Has 'Offered' General Practice?

We are now in a position to consider the question of the
uses of Balintism for general practice? What grounds does
Balint provide for general practice to establish its
disciplinary autonomy?

2.i. Nothing could be more mistaken than to suppose that
Balint

has

solved

any

long-standing

aetiological

difficulties within general practice; in particular, that
concerning the relation between mind and body in the
causation of disease.

For Balint, simply everything has a psychological
component. Thus, although he occasionally quotes estimates
in his works that put the number of 'neurotic' complaints
at about one third, it is clear that Balint thinks that
basically all problems, neurotic or not, have some kind of
psychological

component at their basis (see e.g. Balint

1957: chapter five). Thus he often tended to place his own
contribution

within the tradition of psychosomatic

medicine of Ferenczi, Jelliffe and Groddeck for whom all
organic illness basically originates in emotional conflict
(Balint 1965b: ibid 1957: 254). Nevertheless, Balint was
realistic enough not to expect general practitioners to
treat all problems psychotherapeutically. Indeed, he
specifically warned against this arguing that the great
asset

of the general practitioner's role was that he could

turn off and on almost at will the kind of treatment he
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delivered (Balint 1961: 144). So if it is the case that a
cigar can indeed, on occasion, be just a cigar then
sometimes too it is admissable - for the general
practitioner

to treat a broken leg as simply a broken

leg.

This sense of 'flexibility' (ibid: 144) in the
practitioner's role is itself one of the assets provided
by Balint for general practice. Indeed, the fact that
Balint seems implicitly to believe that all organic
problems are, in effect, emotionally based in no way
commands those who have been influenced by him to accept
it, let alone to try to prove it. For what matters is not
so much that the patient's complaint is psychosomatic in
origin
1

but

that,

consultationism',

according

to

the

logic

of

the consultation itself - a highly

charged emotional interaction between two people and a
host of absent objects confers upon the complaint an
unavoidable psychological dimension. Whatever the nature
of the patient's complaint he or she will be entering the
world of object-relations in the consultation; such are
the

powers of the 'doctor-patient relationship'. And since

everything has to pass through the consultation then
everything

2.

can safely be said to be psychological.

ii. The demand for psychology also derives,

secondarily, from a veritable symptomatology of
civilisation' that here and there comes to the surface in
Balint's work (above all in ibid: chapter 1). It might be
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observed here how much Balintism is presupposed by
urbanism and by those phenomena so often associated with
it - loneliness, rootlessness, the breakdown of family
ties and so forth (see esp. ibid: 2). Compare, in this
context, the emphasis upon social relations in the
countryside that seemed to be such a characteristic of our
case-study of the College of General Practitioners in the
1950s. Indeed, one might speculate at this point that
there is a contradiction in the logic of Balintism here.
For on the one hand, we have the notion of the general
practitioner

as the expert of the 'doctor-patient

relationship'

in general. And on the other hand, we have

the general

practitioner as a specialist of minor

neuroticisms,

and particular psychological complaints

derived from

the debased circumstances of contemporary

civilisation.

Moreover, whilst not wishing to be

ungenerous, does not the latter

emphasis actually

undermine the former in that lonely, rootless individuals
will be less likely, by definition, to be involved in
long-standing relationships with their doctor? Or is the
doctor to be a kind of secular priest, a figure that any
individual of the appropriate faith, and in whatever city,
will be able to turn to?

In fact, Balint does frequently use terms characteristic
of religion and 'confession'. Indeed, he writes of the
doctor as a kind of 'father-confessor' (ibid: 227); a
trusted friend to the individual in the face of the onset
of social misery and decay. But the general practitioner
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is not simply a vicar or a priest in medical garb; he is
to be a 'professional' with a specific field of operations
and expertise.

In Balint's view, the use of the 'everyday', or 'common
sense'

techniques of 'sympathy' or 'reassurance' are

almost completely useless in the sensitive - yet, as we
saw, 'scientific' - world of the consultation:
'The uses of empirical methods acquired from
everyday life are as limited in professional
psychotherapy as are carving-knife and
screwdriver in surgery' (Balint 1957: 109; cf.
Balint 1961).
For Balint it is only the discarding of such techniques dismissively characterised by the term 'bedside manners' and their replacement by the 'limited though considerable
change in personality' that comes from group training that
can raise general practice to a properly 'professional'
level (Balint 1961: xi). 'Bedside' medicine for Balint is
a

mere 'private' relationship, not a 'professional' one,

the latter being distinguished by 'the existence of a
special and relevant kind of knowledge and skill in one of
the two persons' (Balint 1961: 137-8). 'Professional'
understanding, in fact, is characterised by a mixture of
'emotional' and 'intellectual' elements (ibid: 136),
occupying a 'borderline position' between each and between
which the doctor can oscillate as the circumstances
demand.
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So the general practitioner differs from the priest, even
in his pastoral functions. In fact, his expertise is to
relate to a specific sphere. At this points, Balint
suggests a kind of strategy of professional 'enclosure'
for the general practitioners around the mundane problems
of everyday life. Thus again - and here we quote a passage
which Arney and Bergen would surely enjoy - the mission of
general practice is specified and thus enhanced:
may we claim for general practice and for
proper psychotherapy, the other field that
covers everyday life [that is, aside from
hospital medicine which deals with the 'crises'
of life] the many little or greater irritations
of human existence, involving not so much life
or death but what are perhaps equally important,
contentment and human happiness?' (Balint 1961:
128).
Thus general practice is to be made the science of the
mundane and the emotional; it is to get into the
interstices of life. Here the opposition is less one of
'vitality' versus 'mortality' (or, a medicine of death as
()posed to a medicine of life) than one of imundanity'
versus 'crisis'; that is , a medicine of the everyday
rather than a medicine of catastropic injuries and heroic
interventions. Social danger is now to be located in
relation to everyday existence.

This fabrication of general practice as entailing a
particularly specialised form of concern and intervention
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is also paralleled in an 'organisational' context. As

we

argued earlier, Balint is very much concerned, like others
before him, to reverse what he sees as the prioritisation
of

'specialists' over generalists in medicine. Hencehe

puts forward an organisational model according to which
the priority of 'responsibility' is reversed between
general practitioners and consultants. This, as we noted
earlier,

is

not entirely unlike previous renditions of

this theme; that because the general practitioner knows
his patients he should have over-all responsibility for
them. Balint, however, gives this argument some force by
coating it with a psychological gloss which meshes well
with other themes in his work. This is done by positing
the consultant-general practitioner relationship as
homologous to the doctor-patient relationship itself.
Thus, he claims that the consultant-practitioner
'relationship' itself is typically characterised by a
pathological 'dependency' on the part of the general
practitioner analogous to that much maligned phenomenon;
the

'teacher-pupil' relationship (Balint 1957: chapters

eight and nine). The general practitioners, in Balint's
term,

'collude' in their own domination. Thus, equally,

their liberation is up to them. The implication, then,
more or less, is that general practitioners must seize
'responsibility' themselves both for their own conduct and
for their patients and hence - eschewing the complications
of 'medical politics' - bring about their own professional
'liberation'.
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Lastly, still on this question of what it is that Balint
actually contributes to the professional standing of the
general practitioner, we have the question of research.
The whole point about 'doctorcentrism' in this connection
is that the only person who can research in the field is
the doctor himself. After all, anybody can do a survey;
but only the general practitioner can investigate the
effects of his own personality:
'A real change for the better can be expected
only as the result of long-term research into
the pathology of the whole personality
corresponding to what was described above as the
deeper level of diagnosis. As the problems
belonging to this field constitute the problem
of general practice, no-one but the general
practitioner can undertake this research' (ibid:
103).

2.iii. But Balint's contribution really goes beyond either
the

avoidance of knotty aetiological matters or

professional 'flattery'. For Balintism also provides
grounds for the coherence of the different elements of
general practice.

First, this has entailed a certain simplification of the
domain of general practice by 'problematising' it in a
certain way. On the level of the 'data-base' of general
practice, as we have seen, particular aetiologies and so
on

for all intents and purposes bracketted in favour
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of a concentration upon the area of the consultation and
upon the doctor's own emotional reactions to the patient.
Similarly the actual evidential 'content' of general
practice has been simplified to the homogeneous level of
language and emotions: no special pieces of equipment are
necessary for the working of Balint's system; no
sphymographs or surveys - all the instruments are present
at hand, in the form of the practitioners themselves.
This, indeed, is why one can describe Balint's system as a
form of 'personalism': simply because the whole field has
been problematised on the basis of the attributes of
persons understood in terms of the object-relations they
have with each other and the world.

Second, there is a dynamic element to Balint's
problematisation of the parts of general practice; having
problematised the field in this 'simplified' way he also
provides means for the inter-connection of its parts, as
well as the foundations of a general 'programme', a
direction in which general practice will have to travel. A

coherent system of organisation is worked out; a
connection of different spheres of relations - thus we
travel from the patient's personality (understood in
relational terms; relations in childhood, with friends,
parents, spouses etc.) to the site of the consultation
(transference relations with the doctor) a space which is
itself, as it were, stabilised by the group or seminar
relations which support and stabilise the doctor's
personality. It is as if, to borrow Latour's vocabulary

once more, the patient's personality has been made
technically mobile by Balint through the agency of that
of the doctor and the translation-device of the
consultation. In short, what Balint has done is to have
given the general practitioners a specific 'ontology'
(that of the pathology of the 'whole person') combined
with a specific domain of evidence and investigation (that
of the emotional space of the consultation) and made this
ontology and this domain capable of observation and
supervision along a line of force which 'relays'

the

personality of the doctor through the self-enlightening
and self-stabilising powers of the group.

Lastly, Balint's system is, as we have stressed, eminently
workable. This is not just because it is a simple system
allowing for the mobility of information through its parts
but because, again as we have already pointed out, it is
actually workeable before it is knoweable or made mobile.
One way of putting this is, adopting a 'strategic'
vocabulary, to say that Balint has achieved his strategy
of 'interresment' by asserting that 'enrolment' (to his
way

of doing things) has already effectively taken place

(cf. Callon 1986: 206 & 211). Balint's contention is that,
whether the doctor adopts the techniques he is
recommending or not, he will necessarily be practicing
psychotherapy in any case: indeed this follows from the
original contention that the doctor acts inevitably, like
it or not, as a 'drug' on his patients. Above all, this
emphasis allows for the achievement of a what might be
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described as a long-held 'ambition' of all clinical forms
of knowledge: t'at is, to combine in one movement a form
of aetiological-diagnostic knowledge with a therapeutic
rationality. Even the Parisian physicians of the late
Eighteenth Century failed to provide any coherent
therapeutic models to complement their achievements in the
field of clinical knowledge. Balint has done so by
actually deriving the form of knowledge from the form of
therapy and connecting them both in the persona of the
doctor. The possibility of both knowledge and therapy are
now, as it were, relayed through the medical persona.

3. The Power of Psychology

If Balint's enterprise is indeed a 'psychological' one,
then, we are now entitled to ask, what role is psychology
actually playing here?

3.i. Psychology has, above all, an epistemological
function. Proceeding very schematically, we contend that
what we term loosely the 'psychological' orientation has
peculiar efficacy within the intellectual programmes of
other disciplines because it combines two functions that
have generally been opposed to eachother. The first is the
capacity to make visible a domain, to confer homogeneity
Upon heterogeneity. Psychology does this, on the one hand,
by making everything in that field flat and homogeneous;
the world is composed of persons and their emotions,
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entities to which everything else can ultimately be
reduced. On the other hand, this domain is not conceived
as being fixed and static but fluid and composed of
nothing but relations. This has the effect of tying the
domain together; every entity seems related to all the
others, a magnificent coherence is achieved. In the case
of Balint, we have seen how this works in the context of
the roles of the persons involved themselves. Thus, we
have seen how the patient in the consultation bears a
relation to the doctor in the group. But also there is an
inter-relationship achieved between the functions of the
activities in question as well. Thus, we have seen how in
Balint's 'system' a relation is • set up between the
functions of research and training, and between training
and therapy; to perform any one of these functions is
simultaneously to perform the others. A curious, 'formal'
quality is thus achieved.

Second, in contrast to this 'formalising' aspect, there
emerges another that, one might think, would normally be
in opposition to it. Thus one might normally imagine that
the greater the internal 'coherence' of a discipline the
less would it be the extent of 'correspondence' achieved
with the world. Yet, as we have seen, although Balintism
is able to achieve a 'formalising' effect in relation to
its subject-matter it is also able to privilege the powers
of intervention and therapeutic 'aggressiveness' according, perhaps, to the logic of what we have termed
as

logic of interventionism. Thus just as Balintism
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imposes order upon the world it sets up the conditions for
intervention within it.

3.ii. The considerations relating to what was called the
project of recuperation with which this study began will
lead us to some obvious conclusions at this point.
'Psychology' - if our case-study of Balint can be accepted
as evidence - is a powerful kind of perspective from the
standpoint of this project. For it combines at once a
rigorous, 'scientific' standpoint - a kind of Spinozism
where there is only one substance, relationships,
undergoing a multiplicity of modifications and affections
- with a veritable 'human touch', since these
relationships are themselves properly 'human' values. At
last; the possibility of a 'scientific' rationality
(since, it occurs in the controlled atmosphere of the
consultation) attentive to persons?

It is to be hoped that

we

have succeeded in conveying

what we think is most remarkable about Balint's
enterprise. A certain amount of iconoclasm has been
involved here. We have claimed that, far from being
simply a tender-hearted therapeutic eudaemonism, Balintism
better distinguished by the rigours of its construction

is

a kind of 'technology'; a kind of machine composed of
____\
wing parts that mesh together, and implicate eachc4her
as

at

every step. So far, however, we have concentrated upon

matters of epistemological articulation (upon the doctor,
the

evidence in the consultation) and of organisational
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adequation (the group) and discussed how these matters are
tied together by Balint. However, there is obviously
another dimension to the notion of 'technology'; that is,
that this notion implies a 'telos' - targets and effects
that are sought out, material to be worked upon. Balint's
network is indeed a 'human technology' in this sense. It
has, has can now be investigated, 'governmental'
implications.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE GOVERNMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF BALINTISM

1. Patients: On the Therapeutic Tasks of Balintism

Every rationality that takes human subjectivity as the
object of its contemplation and intervention must project
for itself a world in which intervention is required and,
equally, in relation to which the rationality in question
is uniquely equipped to intervene (see on this, Colin
Gordon in Gordon, ed. 1980: 248). What, then, is the state
of the world projected by the logic of Balintism, and what
is the space of intervention that it sets out and reserves
for itself? One can gain some provisional insight as to
the specificity of Balint's contribution here by reference
back to the problematic of social intervention that
prevailed in the 1950s.

1.i. Under the aegis of a prevailing governmental

rationality of a welfarist 'pronatalism i l 'enlightened'
general practice took as its social task, above all in the
1950s, the observation of the economy of family relations
in the material space of the home. Here, the model of the
practitioner - working preferably in the home itself or in
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the 'homelike' space of the surgery - was that of the allseeing but unseen observer of relationships, taking as the
priveleged object of observation the mother whilst, it
could be said, the privileged object of actual 'interest'
was the child.

Balintism is, as one might expect, both fairly close to
and yet at a certain remove from this rationality. If one
takes the domain of 'family studies' in the 1950s, for
example, there is, on the one hand, a sense in which both
this domain and that of Balintism presuppose something of
a 'psychological' orientation: both, for example, see the
family space as being one criss-crossed with precarious
emotional involvements which the doctor must, above all,
seek to 'understand'. In certain respects it is possible
to claim a similarity of prevailing concerns governing the
two rationalities: thus, if we were correct in ascribing
to the logic of 'pronatalism' an affinity with the
thinking of John Bowlby it can be argued, for example,
that both are concerned with the question of 'attachment
behaviour' in the family domain (see on this the article
by Pedder in Kohon 1986: 295-308; esp. 296). On the other
hand, in the manner in which this relational domain is
problematised and, above all, in the actual logic of
organisation presupposed by each, the two rationalities
could be said to differ greatly.

If they could be said to have in common the presupposition
that the domains with which they deal are, if not exactly
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'natural' domains but ones which can be conceived as being
immanent, autonomous and self-governing then the first
important difference between them could be said to lie in
the fact that, within the logic of Balintism, the doctor
is actually himself part of the domain which he
'confronts'. In the 1950s, it could be said, the general
practitioner, for all his involvement, was an 'outsider',
a privileged 'observer'. Now, however, that domain
'addressed' by the ideal practitioner, as

we

have seen,

also includes his own self. This, of course, is only a
reflection of the fact that the very domain addressed by
Balintism is, in a sense, far more 'rarefied' - and,
additionally, more therapeutically oriented. The domain of
evidence moves out of the material space of the family and
surgery

and

into

the

'emotional'

space

of

the

consultation. The effect of this, not surprisingly, is to
privilege the relationship between the doctor and the
patient so that on the one hand, the visibility of
specific inter-familial relationships declines - the
privileged emphasis upon the mother-child relationship, in
particular, recedes; Balint has all but nothing to say
about children - and, on the other hand, the 'immediate'
situation of the family loses importance and makes way for
an

emphasis upon previous relationships in the patient's

life (important figures from which coming to 'correspond',
as

we

have seen, with the person of the doctor himself).

lai. In

this sense, Balintism is far more individualistic

in implication than was the problematic of the 1950s.
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Thus, Balintism, it can be argued, envisages a world where
the predominant forms of social pathology derive not from
the breakdown of familial 'attachments' but from the
breakdown of relations between the individual and the
environment (composed of other individuals). But this
individual is, as it were, 'universal'; it can be anybody.
Balintism does not focus upon, for example, the child but
upon people in general; adults in their relations with
themselves and with others.

Nevertheless, if Balint hardly ever actually talks about
the actual patient, how is it possible that the
governmental 'telos' of his work is directed towards the
promotion and regulation of this 'universal'
individuality? First, we can look at his theory of
pathology. As will be seen, this entails a conception of
pathology as being at once consitutive of individuality,
and

-

when it reaches the form of an 'illness' -

threatening to it. Second,

we

can follow the logic of

doctorcentrism itself; we can scrutinise doctor in order
to find the implied model of the patient.

1.iii. What happens when the 'whole person' falls ill? For
Mint, every illness is but the expression of the
patient's personality. Thus he writes that the illness:
'is a kind of child, in this case a bad damaged
child which instead of bringing pleasure brings
pain and disaster to its creator' (Balint 1957:
253-4).
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Illness can, of course, bring gratification as well;
either through what Balint calls 'direct gratification' or
'secondary gain' (ibid: 261). Moreover, for Balint, the
illness is not only an 'expression' of individuality being 'as much a characteristic of the patient as the
shape of his head, his height or the colour of his eyes';
it is also actually constitutive of individuality. Thus
Balint asks:
'Which is the primary, a chronic organic illness
or a certain kind of personality? Are the two of
them independent of eachother, interdependent,
or is one the cause and the other the effect;
and if so which?' (ibid: 255; Balint 1968 is an
extended elaboration of this theme).
Balint effectively answers this question concerning the
relation between disease and personality by resorting, as
it were, retroductively, to a common source that will
account for both. This is the theory of the 'basic fault';
an example of a concept which, in his general practice
writings,

Balint

takes

over

directly

from

his

psychoanalytic work (Balint 1957: 255-8 & 360-2: cf.
Balint 1968: 18-23: cf. Kahn 1969: 244).

Rejecting the 'accident' theory of illness (wherein, as
with medicine in the hospital, each illness episode has no
'meaning' at all: Balint 1961: 125) Balint contends that
each episode stems from a basic lack of fit - 'in the
biological structure of the individual involving in
varying

degrees both his mind and his body' (Balint 1957:
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255) - between the individual and his or her (personal)
environment. This lack of fit both is and stems from the
'basic fault', that 'love-deficiency condition'
experienced by the child in his early years. But what is
'basic' about this condition is that it is more or less
inevitable for all people since it derives ultimately from
the split between a world before birth where the
individual and the environment are un-differentiated, in
a state of 'one-ness', and the world after birth where
objects necessarily intrude themselves:
'Birth is a trauma that upsets this equilibrium
by changing the environment radically and
enforces - under a real threat of death - a new
form of adaptation' (Balint 1968: 67 and chapter
twelve: cf. Freud 1955: e.g. 62).
Hence Balint's notion is that, not merely does illness
confer individuality upon a person, but that illness when referred back to the 'basic fault' - actually is this
individuality:
'Although an individual may achieve a good, or
even a very good adjustment, the vestiges of his
early experiences remain and contribute to what
is called his constitution, his individuality or
his character make-up, both in the psychological
and in the biological sense' (Balint 1957: 2556).

Balintism would be, then, a technology designed to bring
about enhanced ego-functioning in relation to the 'basic
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fault' which resides in all of us and which is the source
of individuality. Individuality is, then, both in a sense
'pathological' and inherently 'normal' in that it is to be
the objective of therapy and cure. Illness becomes
constitutive of the self.

What the doctor must seek to strengthen in relation to
this 'basic fault' is character. Character is not in
opposition to individuality, but it must exist alongside
it if it is not to become a liability for 'government'.
'Character' is a notion that seems to be defined for
Balint according to the extent of either the 'volatility'
or the 'stability' of the individual's emotions or objectattachments. The volatile character would be a threat to
society; the stable but individual character (presumably)
an asset. In fact, this notion of character itself seems
to be at the root of Balint's pre-occupation with the
'extension' of psychoanalysis in the first place. For, as
he wrote: the man with 'a weak character' is an
'everlasting danger' for society (Balint 1952: 162).
Character is what controls 'the relation of man to the
object of his love and hate', indeed character is a
particular way of loving and hating (ibid: 160):
'A man with a strong character is a gain for
society, a man with a weak character an
everlasting worry, an everlasting danger' (ibid:
162).
The social imperative of Balintism, it could be said, lies
less with the need to promote 'solidarity', the alignment
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of the roles of individuals with other roles, other
individuals, so much as individuality itself - 'strong
character' - with maturity and 'solidity' alongside this.

This emphasis upon strengthening character was re-inforced
by the turn towards so-called 'focal therapy' in the late
1960s. But the method through which this was to be done
was not to entail the promotion of 'regression' in the
patient. In fact, Balintism is actually distinguished by
its emphasis away from the recovery of past influences
upon the patient's present problem. If general practice,
for Balint, was a question of delving into past
experiences, relations to the father and to the mother
then, surely, the project of the 'extension' of
psychoanalysis would not have got very far. Rather the
whole point is that, through transference and countertransference in the consultation, these matters can be
dealt with, as it were, 'on the spot'. Balint and his
successors were increasingly pre-occupied with defining
how this effect of 'immediacy' was to be achieved: hence,
the development of notions such as the 'here-and-now'
technique (Gosling et al. 1967) or so-called 'focal
therapy' or 'flash technique' (Balint and Norell 1973:
esp. chapter two). The purpose behind these techniques was
to develop a quicker form of therapy than the so-called
'detective method' that used a 'long interview' to get at
the patient's problem (ibid: 7). Instead, the doctor is to
v----,
one in upon a single focal area of the patient's problem
by seeking for a 'flash' effect; a sudden moment of
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'intimacy' between doctor and patient, a spontaneous
mutual awareness between them of something that is
important to the patient. This form of therapy was
designed for incorporation into the average six-minute
consultation; a literal 'quick fix', for the therapy was
to make no attempt to get beyond the patient's defenses,
nor to return to key episodes in childhood, but instead on the basis of the uses that the patient can derive from
this sudden 'intimacy' with the doctor - the task was to
enhance the patient's ego-functioning. The purposes of
technique are then to strengthen the autonomy of the ego,
strengthen the patient's character, promote the patient's
autonomy.

Whilst these notions of the 'basic fault' as pathology and
the promotion of 'character' as the 'telos' of general
practice intervention do figure in Balint's work, they do
not occupy centre-stage. This is because, as we have
argued, Balint does not really trouble himself too much
with the question of the patient at all. But we can turn
his doctorcentrism to our own account here; for there
resides within Balint's writings on the doctor an implicit
model of what the patient should become.

2. Doctors: Balint's Ethicalisation of General Practice

What are the doctor's tasks? The answer to this looks easy
at first. For would it not be possible at this point to
succumb to a wholesale critique of Balintism; to declare,
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for example, that its emphasis upon the 'basic fault' in
all patients leads it to a logic of 'medicalisation'
whereby everybody is designated as being sick?

2.i. However, as the very logic of doctorcentrism implies,
the class of those who are pathological (which is indeed
coterminous with the class of all persons) is not actually
the same as the class of patients. For Balint, the
pathology, the 'problem', only really becomes an 'illness'
once the patient has decided to go to the doctor: thus, he
writes, the consultation only occurs when patients 'have
converted the struggle with their problem into an illness'
(Balint 1957: 257). Moreover, the presenting complaint
can only be settled into a proper 'illness' with, in any
case, the doctor's 'co-operation'. Before this occurs it
is quite possible that people will be coping with the
inherent miseries of human existence more or less
adequately. But, more than this, the emphasis on the
'immediacy' of the situation in the consultation (the
'here-and-now' situation as it is sometimes expressed by
Balint's followers), actually dictates that delving into
the fundamental conditions of the patient's life is not
actually the doctor's business. The task, for the general
practitioner, is not actually to uncover the 'underlying
conflict' (ibid: 273). This may indeed be the business of
the psychoanalyst (Balint 1968: 22), but, as Balint never
tires of pointing out, the general practitioner is not
just a second-rate psychiatrist or psychoanalyst (which is
why one will find very little actual psychoanalytic
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vocabulary in the work of even Balint's immediate and
closest followers). Rather he has his own field of
concerns that derives from but can not be reduced to the
model of 'patienthood' that has as its basis the notion of
the 'basic fault'.

2.ii. However, in a sense, this is to evade the matter.
For is not Balintism a form of 'medicalisation' in the way
in which it seeks to exert a kind of 'moral' influence
upon the patient? Could not Balint's work be analysed
under the rubric of 'social control'; for example, by
arguing as do Arney and Bergen that medicine is becoming
concerned with more and more areas of life with which it
was not previously interested. In fact, as will be argued
more extensively in the conclusion, Balintism is perhaps
better understood not in terms of 'moral' regulation but
in terms of 'ethical' regulation. What Balint achieves and one could extend this verdict to all those who take
the 'psy' disciplines as their model for general practice
- is an 'ethicalisation' of medical practice and
endeavour.

Clearly,

prior to Balint medicine had been concerned with

'ethics', that is, with quandaries concerning action to be
taken, with the moral implications of medical
interventions and so on. But Balint goes further than this
in that he makes general practice, as it were, productive
of ethical situations. If general practice has become what
an be called an 'ethical technology' this is not because
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it embraces, for example, a species of 'victim-blaming' on
the basis of the modification of lifestyles, nor because
it is concerned with explicitly 'moral' direction or the
normalisation' of its targets, but because it exhorts its
targets - patients - to problematise themselves in an
ethical manner.

How does Balint's intellectual technology seek to do this?
After all, there is actually very little in Balint's work
that deals directly with the aims of treatment, with what
effects one is generally trying to achieve with the
patient. But these aims can, we argue, be reconstructed on
the basis of our analysis of Balintism as a particular
kind of rationality. For the patient in the consultation
is only an analogue of the doctor in the group seminar. In
both settings an 'atmosphere' of self-surveillance is set
up through which one can come to self-knowledge and
'maturity' on the basis of a working-through of one's
relations with others and with oneself. In the
consultation, the doctor 'uses himself' upon the patient
in order to effect a 'change of personality' analogous to
the

one experienced in the group seminar by the doctor

himself. The doctor does not instruct the patient how to
Use - this would be a form of moral judgement or
normalisation from the standpoint of, for example, a
transcendent value - but rather becomes, more generally, a
kind of model reflexive being, who, considering himself in
relation to others, finds what he must be in order to
become himself. If the doctor is, for Balint, a kind of
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'teacher' then this is not because the aim of therapy is
to instruct the patient but to:
'enable the patient to understand himself, find
a

better solution for the problem facing him,

and thus achieve the integration which has not
yet developed, or has broken down because of a
diminished relationship between him and his
environment' (Balint 1957: 127-8; cf. Balint and
Balint 1961: chapter 8).
The goal, then, for both doctor and patient is a certain
'maturity' (a favourite term of Balint's) in which the
demands of individual autonomy and environmental
integration are reconciled. So rather than promoting a
definitive 'guide for living' Balint's work could be said
to promote a generalised ethical problematisation of modes
of living, exhorting the patient to come to reflect upon
what he or she may be in order to come to a fuller sense
of self-possession. Balintism is a technology for the
inoblematisation, surveillance and affirmation of the
self.

2.ii. In spite of these considerations, Balint does in
fact use the word 'teacher' to describe the function of
the

doctor (Balint 1961: chapter eight: 'The Doctor's

Responsibility'). But he emphatically does not mean by
this

that the doctor must teach the patient how to live in

order

to attain the mimimum of misery out of life. The

doctor

is not a 'teacher' because there is anything

specific

to be taught; on the contrary, the whole point is
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that there is nothing definitive to be taught:
'We have to accept the fact that the world,
including theology, philosophy, ethics and
science, does not offer the doctor unequivocal
advice about the crucial decision of what to
teach' (ibid: 114).
What necessitates teaching on the doctor's part is fate
itself; one teaches because one must. Training is, in a
sense, part of the discovery of the nature of one's own
particular, personal fate as a doctor. Thus, Balint
effectively advises the doctors; 'become what you are!':
'... the therapist must always have the courage
to be himself and be willing to accept as much
of his own peculiarities, weaknesses, and
strengths, skills or limitations as he is able.
He must not try to 'put on an act' for his
patient' (ibid: 158).
This is because, when he is before the patient, the doctor
is already beginning to teach regardless of any of these
limitations and so on which he may possess. The doctor
teaches because it is part of the 'apostolic function'
that he should do so; it is merely one of the
'pharmacological' effects of his personality:
'It is a painful responsibility to realise that
teach we must - our only choice is what to
teach' ... it does not matter whatsoever whether
the doctor shuts his eyes and refuses to see
what he is doing or accepts his role and chooses
consciously what he teaches - teach he must'
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(ibid: 110, 'italics' in original: & 114).
So, if this teaching has no pre-given 'content', what does
it involve? Certainly not anything as crude as, for
mmple, a 'proper, free and satisfactory sexual life'.
Rather it will depend upon the doctor: each one must make
a choice of what ethics to teach, whether explicitly or
*licitly - and these ethics must derive only from one's
own responsibility to oneself. If one merely becomes what
one must become then good teaching practices will
automatically follow;
personality;

he

the doctor teaches with his

teaches

the

practice

of

'self-

understanding' which itself (regardless of its content) is
the benchmark of maturity'. And in the on-going
relationship he has with his patients he becomes for them
not, note, a 'super-ego' but rather 'a kind of additional
or subsidiary ego' (ibid: 146). It is more as if the
doctor is a teacher, then, 'by example'; he is a model of
exemplary conduct.

The doctor therefore teaches not with codes and rules but,
as it were, with his very 'being'. Such teaching may
indeed take a long time:
'If a gardener consistently prunes a tree in the
same way, the effect of his conscientious work
will show up more and more impressively as the
years pass by' (ibid: 115).
Ntwhat is it that is exemplary about this figure? In
hat way is the doctor a 'model' for his patients if he
does not preach a philosophy or deliver instructions from
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a manual? Partly the influence resides in the persona of
the doctor himself - the 'apostolic function' is expected
to mould the patient to the interests of the doctor - and
this would presumable extend even to the factor of
'advice' on the part of the doctor as to sexual and
emotional matters and so on. In this sense the patient is
expected to be actually like the doctor - since after all,
the patient has chosen to go to that particular doctor.

But beyond this, the doctor's influence is both more
general and more 'personal'. This exemplarity surely
consists simply in what we could call the doctor's
'practice of freedom', his coming to self-knowledge and
maturity on the basis of a kind of working through of his
relations with others and the constant labour of selfsurveillance this implies. The doctor becomes a model
reflexive being, who, considering himself with the help of
others, finds what he must become in order only to be
himself. At its minimum this 'teaching' will entail,
presumably, the promotion of the principle of selfsurveillance, self-awareness, self-understanding itself.
It is the fact that one must monitor oneself that is to be
taught; for this self-monitoring (which the doctor enables
the patient temporarily to do) will enable the patient 'to
feel more and more a part of, and more related to other
people' (Balint 1961: 143). Illness is presumably an
excellent opportunity for this teaching to take place
since it is a time when one's 'individuality' is most
evident (since in illness, as we know, the 'basic fault'
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has come to the fore) yet when one's 'character', one's
maturity, one's autonomy has been lost (which is why one
goes to the doctor - for 'support'). Hence, sickness is,
presumably, when one is most vulnerable to change and
self-transformation - an irreplaceable opportunity for the
'teacher' to do his work.

Finally let us note what is implied 'politically' by what
we have termed this 'practice of freedom'. Once again the
values that are implied are perfectly those of a liberated
reason proper to what was termed the project of
recuperation. Nobody is coerced in this schema, everyone
is merely guided by the ministrations of others to become
themselves; autonomous, mature, responsible characters.
Balintism: a perfect (re-)incarnation of the 'medicine in
liberty'?

Coda: Exemplary Personae of Modernity

In 1913 Max Scheler - doyen of characterology and
'personalist philosophy'

-

wrote an essay entitled

'Exemplars of Person and Leaders' (Scheler 1987: 125-198:
cf. Schnadelbach 1984: 186-191; also chapter eight). Here
he argued forcibly that the role played in what we might
call the constitution of subjectivity by 'personal
exemplars' had been neglected in favour of more obvious
models in the guidance of conduct:
'While it is true that we can find an immense
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literature on the problem of leadership, there
are only a few who have seen the significance,
formation, and effectiveness - the power of the
moulding of our souls - that exemplary persons
have exercised' (ibid: 129).
Scheler's claims as to the actual primacy of the personal
exemplar in the formation of conduct of 'ruling
minorities' would no doubt (and not unlike his political
views) seem a little overstretched to us today (ibid:
136). Nevertheless, the general emphasis is surely both
praiseworthy and illuminating:
'What has a forming and grafting effect on our
souls is not an abstract universal moral rule
but always, and only, a clear and intuitive
grasp of the exemplarity of the person' (ibid:
134).
Scheler went on to outline four basic differences
separating the concept of the 'leader' from that of the
'personal

exemplar':

first,

it
argued,
heis

characteristic of the personal exemplar that, unlike the
leader, he does not know that he is a personal exemplar;
second, the personal exemplar is, unlike the leader,
independent of time and space (he may be a God, a demon or
an historical figure); third, the personal exemplar is,
unlike the leader as if by definition, morally worthy; and
fourthly, whereas the leader demands and inspires
action', the personal exemplar demands 'our being and the
cast [gestalt] of our souls' (Scheler 1987: 135).
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If one were now to resurrect Scheler's long-forgotten
project for an outline of the course of the 'personal
exemplar' in history the work of Michael Balint and his
colleagues might surely provide some interesting material.
For the Balint doctor is not a 'leader' with access to
transcendental values, rather he is an 'exemplar'; he is
like the patient, only an expert in self-understanding and
maturity. We might, however, wish to modify some of the
distinctions made by Scheler

between the personal

exemplar and the leader in the light of this evidence: and
perhaps it is not surprising that such modifications
should be made - after all, it is not supposed to be
characteristic of 'liberal' societies to devote too much
favour to the rhetorical sway of 'leaders', especially
morally corrupt ones! If one were to suggest that the
doctor of the whole person constituted something of a
personal exemplar then we would have to argue that there
has been something of a 'reversal of visibility' with
regard to this concept in recent times. So, for example,
if it is true that the personal exemplar should indeed be
morally worthy and that his effects relate, less to heroic
action than to our very 'being', we should have to point
to the curious 'concretisation' of the personal exemplar
in other respects. Thus, now it is consitutive of the
personal exemplar (at least in the form of the whole
person doctor) that he is broadly aware of his effects;
indeed, he seeks to exploit them in order to influence the
government of the conduct of life amongst the populace; in
fact, he becomes an instrument for the promotion of such

conduct. Similarly, his 'exemplarity' ceases to be
independent of time and space: the exemplary person
becomes a very 'concrete' figure, and he has his base of
operations in every high street. A veritable 'technology'
of the personal exemplar is formed (cf. Horobin 1986).

Of course, as Scheler stresses, a particular social
formation will only get the personal exemplars that it
deserves or desires. The Balint doctor holds up a mirror
to some of our values; a practical self-monitoring sort of
fellow combining all the advantages of scientific
knowledge with practical know-how and personal and sexual
wisdom. Balintism is a kind of technology designed for the
production of such values. In fact, Scheler himself even
mentions the category of the 'physician' in his
discussion. This figure is, in his account, amongst those
categorised as 'the leading minds of civilisation' along
with 'scientists and technologists', that is, those whose
value 'does not lie in disclosing his self-value' but in
'actions and accomplishments'.

Now, this assessment would have to be reversed; the
doctor's value lies precisely in his self-value. The
Balintised general practitioner is not a heroic figure - a
brain surgeon or a flying doctor - but a disciple of
everyday life. The general practitioner's 'heroism' lies
in his humility, his responsibility, his maturity and
perhaps in his capacity as, in Scheler's terms, to be a
'master of being' (Scheler 1987: 196-7).
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PART FIVE

THE REGIME OF SELF-SURVEILLANCE
A Balintist Rationality at the (Royal) College
of General Practitioners
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

FROM TAXONOMY TO PEDAGOGY

1. Balintism and the End of the Taxonomical Project

All the themes of this chapter seek essentially to draw
attention to the same basic transformation that will be
the focus here, and which has guided the selection of
material in what follows. This transformation is simply
the shift towards the problematisation of the person of
the doctor as the primary epistemological resource within
general practice. All the material in the following pages
- running from the early 1960s to the early 1980s - will
be adduced as evidence of this shift. Thus the chapter
should serve simply to give this transformation a certain
visibility. But in doing this it is also intended that the
breadth of this regime be made visible. A Balintist
rationality? Not, certainly, in the sense that all members
of the College were committed followers of Balint or
quasi-psychotherapists or psychoanalysts. But Balintist in
terms of a certain emphasis of themes already located
within Balint's work itself; the doctor's perspectival
powers of reasoning, his thaumaturgic powers of treatment,
his reflexivity, the focus upon the consultation, a
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commitment to group organisation, a reversal of the old
link between treatment and diagnosis - these are what the
two discursive regimes have in common. A kind of
vernacular Balintism, then; or a generalised 'regime of
self-surveillance'.

1.i. Around the start of the 1960s the project of taxonomy
was displaced by a new rationality. Taking the work of
those associated with the College of General Practitioners
as a 'data-base' (and the College journal in particular) a
certain displacement of old themes becomes evident. In the
1950s the concerns of the College centred around the
question of discovery and research. The task of the
College was, above all, to draw up a taxonomy of the 'free
field' of general practice; to draw up morbidity profiles
of practices, to investigate the complex pathways of minor
epidemics in the community and to develop diagnostic
practices and aetiological schemas proper to general
practice as an independent discipline. The image of the
doctor was modelled above all on the 'country doctor';
personal friend, amateur scientist, local personage and
practical generalist. The model of collegiate organisation
was that of a kind of organic collectivism; the College
was conceived as an information-gathering centre whose
purpose was to reflect the natural equilibrium of the
'free field', and to circulate information
homogeneous network of general practice.

across the
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But by the early 1960s these collegiate emphases shifted
to the issue of training (Editorial 1964: 303); from
objectivising the 'free field' to working upon and
conceptualising the persona of the doctor. This
transformation was as much a rearticulation of the old
themes as a wholesale reversal away from them. In fact all
the main themes from the previous decade remained; those
of

research,

of

education,

of

'logistics'

and

'statistics',
statistics' of the status of the doctor and so on. But
these themes were ordered according to a new economy. The
transformation was not a move away from the project of
founding a general practice attentive to the living
patient rather than the corpse; rather, this project was
re-sited around the issue of training itself. Two areas
evidence this continuity.

First, the question of the 'patient' or what was termed
above the projected 'ontology' of general practice. This
ontology remained stable insofar as general practice
remained linked as an independent endeavour to the 'antimedical' concern with patienthood, that is, with treating
the patient and not the corpse or the disease. But if this
was the long-term clinical ideal behind much thinking
about general practice, it remained difficult - as has
been shown - to operationalise on the level of knowledge
and research.

In fact during the 1960s the ideal form of this patientcentred ontology itself underwent transformation. In the
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1950s the aspiration for a patient-centred medicine
revolved around the question of the 'sick individual'
moving through the grid of time. It would be anachronistic
to read back into this conception of the individual any
will to capture a 'biographical' or 'holistic' patient for example, using the tools of psychology. In the 1950s
to be a 'generalist' implied that one performed, as a
doctor, many functions. It was only in the 1960s that the
'generality' of the practitioner's tasks came to refer to
properties of the patient as opposed to those of the
practitioner himself; that is, it is only now that the
patient becomes a 'general' phenomenon with all the
demands that this implies by way of 'wholism', biography
and subjectivity. But - as this chapter will show - an
entire - 'technological' - infrastructure was necessary
for the actual appearance of this figure.

Second, consideration can be made of the status of
psychology. It is not only at this point that medicine in
general and general practice in particular became
concerned with the domain of the 'psychological'. David
Armstrong has convincingly outlined the long genealogy of
the impact of psychological ideas - especially grouped
around the problem of the minor neuroses - in twentieth
century medicine (Armstrong 1983). Further psychology has
long had a special status in the history of anti-medicine
itself; the work of J.L. Halliday in the 1930s, for
example, is testimony to this (Halliday 1948; Figlio 1987;
Armstrong 1983). Psychology in these cases possessed
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primarily an aetiological function in that it was
recognised that there was a psychological dimension to
many illnesses. In the 1960s, however, the status of
psychology was transformed from this rather narrow
aetiological function to become central to the very
consitution of general practice as an autonomous
discipline. As such it began to traverse the whole space
of general practice; it became, as it were, residual
everywhere; a factor in diagnostics, therapeutics,
pedagogy, professional identity and even in the question
of medical organisation. At the same time, this diffusion
of psychology at, as it were, all levels lead to a
generalised personalism; all levels of general practice
became constituted by the subjectivity of persons; general
practice became - not just a 'patient'-centred discipline
- but person-centred. This sense of an ubiquitous
personalism and of psychology as constitutive of the field
of general practice at all levels has already been
illustrated in the case of Balint; indeed, his work is a
kind of blueprint of it. But what was the extent of
Balint's actual influence on this transformation itself?

1.ii. By the 1980s doctors and others, surveying the
field, felt it to be evident that Balint had had a major
impact on the discipline (e.g. Freeling in Pendleton and
Hasler 1983: 161- 175; Stimson 1978). What was the nature
of this impact?
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In some senses, the influence was more or less direct. In
particular, it is worth singling out a very important, if
certainly controversial, training publication sponsored
by the RCGP (discussed further below) that was more or
less explicitly derived from Balint's insights; The Future
General Practitioner, Learning and Teaching (RCGP 1972).
However, if one assesses 'direct' influences such as
Balint's training seminars in numerical terms, the results
are scarcely impressive (see e.g. Marinker 1970). The
comparative figures given by Sapir for the early 1970s
reveal the relative success of Balint-style groups in
Germany (the seminars around H. Stolze drawing some 1,000
practitioners each year) and France (where some 10% of the
doctor population had participated in Balint groups);
whereas in Britain only 1% had been involved in such
groups by 1974 (Sapir 1972: 185-8; Honigsbaum 1979: 310311). Similarly, if one looks for a specifically
qialintist' legacy in British general practice one will be
disappointed; we will not have reason to examine, for
example, the Journal of the Balint Society here since it
remained a strictly marginal publication. It can be
pointed out, however, that those doctors who did take part
in seminars
disproportionate

under

Balint's

influence

tuition have had
upon

general

a

practice.

Honigsbaum comments that those who had attended Balintstyle

seminars - people like J.P. Horder,

M.L. Marinker,

P. Hopkins, and P. Freeling - 'exerted an influence far
out

of proportion to their numbers' (ibid: 311); notably,

in fact, in relation to the training policy of the Royal
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College of General Practitioners. Yet even these writers
were not 'Balintist' in the sense of seeking dogmatically
to defend and extend the legacy of the 'master'; one will
find few concepts in their work explicitly derived from
Balint's writings, nor even do these authors make much use
of psychoanalytic concepts in general. So even here the
influence is less of a 'direct' nature, than a general one
of orientation; perhaps, a certain 'style of thought'.

This is no doubt why writers on general practice are
unanimous in stating that Balint's work has been greatly
influential whilst at the same time finding it difficult
to pin down the nature of that influence to anything more
than the most general terms. Sowerby, in a critique of
Balint's ideas, acknowledged in 1977 that Balint's work
'has probably had more influence than any other on the
development of general practice over the past twenty
years' (Sowerby 1977: 583) whilst seven years earlier an
editorial in the College journal noted, but was unable to
specify, its general influence and intrinsic 'greatness'
(Editorial 1968: 408). An editorial in the same journal in
1973 declared of Balint's work that it:
'marked a watershed in the development of
general practice. Even now ... it can be claimed
that this [The Doctor, His Patient and the
Illness] is the most important book on general
practice to have been published this century'
(Editorial 1973: 133).
The editorial continued by observing that, although Balint
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himself probably only personally dealt with a few hundred
general practitioners (of whom, it noted, 'many were of
Jewish origin and many were outstandingly able'), his
influence was both vaguer and yet more generalised and
far-reaching than a merely numerical survey could suggest:
'It may be that ... in time his greatest
achievement will be seen to be his effect on
those doctors who never met him ... He who in
his seminars elucidated the role of the father
figure has become a father himself ... we
believe that what Freud has become for
psychiatry, Balint will become for general
practice' (ibid: 135).
More recently Christian Heath has praised Balint:
'who more than anyone else brought to the
profession's attention the importance of
communication in the consultation. This is not
to suggest that many general pracitioners formed
or participated in 'Balint groups' or were
directly influenced by his work. Rather his
powerful demonstrations of unexplored illness
and the criticalness of communication to
diagnosis and treatment permeated the profession
and gave support to the growing arguments for
postgraduate training and research in general
practice' (Heath 1986: 2).

Ba

lint's influence might be described, then, as being

1
cata

lytic'; at best his work made possible a heightening
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of visibility of certain themes (those of the doctor's
reflexivity, communication, etc.). Yet to acknowledge this
influence is not the same as to suggest that Balint's work
operated in a straightforwardly causal manner in
transforming general practice away from the taxonomic
project. Rather, his work exists within and is part of the
same intellectual 'atmosphere' of the newer themes and
trends that began to be consolidated in the early 1960s,
and which formed the basis of what is now often labelled
the modern 'renaissance' in general practice. Indeed, as
Balint himself pointed out there is a sense in which a
'Great Man' - or 'causal' - view of his work is precluded
by the very nature of that work itself. After all, the
only 'method' of the research seminar is to let surface
only what must necessarily surface, as dictated only by
the nature of the preoccupations of the present times:
'Our seminars are based on a spontaneous
participation without any prepared agenda ...
one soon becomes aware of a sort of inherent
system which reflects the spirit of the time...
that is, which grows naturally out of research
work and has not been imposed on it from
outside' (Balint 1969: 203).

However, we must attempt to state the 'causal' status of
Balint's work a little more closely than this if certain
misunderstandings and 'over-interpretations' of the
evidence are to be avoided. The first point to be made
concerns the definition of Balintism itself. What emerged
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from the previous chapter was less a . coherent,
instrumental set of 'doctrines' (tied to a specifically
psychoanalytic vocabulary) so much as a collection of
inter-related themes; Balint's emphasis upon the reflexive
subjectivity of the doctor, upon the 'ethical-scientific'
space of the consultation, an appreciation for group
relationships

and

person-to-person

dynamics

more

generally, and lastly the 'anti-scholastic' bias that
afforded a certain privileging of practice before
knowledge, treatment before diagnosis, education before
research. And these themes - rather than specific doctrine
or a specifically psychoanalytic vocabulary - summed up
what was meant by Balintism.

What we will be looking for in this chapter, then, will be
evidence of a congruity with these themes rather than
evidence of specific 'adherence' to Balint's teachings. As
such, the analysis presented here actually precludes
causal considerations. Rather, what will be at stake are
not dogmatic affiliations but, as it were, lines of force
which link the themes of Balintism to wider, institutional
themes in general practice. In short, Balint's own work
and the wider, 'Balintist', rationality in general
practice that we are about to describe are in a
relationship of juxtaposition; a relation of 'adjacency'
rather than 'causality'. Moreover, in the process of
translation from one - more or less narrow - context to
another - far wider, more diffuse - field, the themes and
emphases in question will clearly undergo a certain
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transformation, a loosening of conceptual intensity, which
should not be evaded. And this means, that the themes in
question will themselves be subject to a diffusion, a
heightening of ambiguity. No doubt there are many lines of
force that one might trace linking Balint's work to wider
rationalities in general practice and elsewhere; the
signification of his work is neither uni-directional nor
pre-determined. In this study we will be concerned with
three such line of forces in particular. First, with
outlining the connections, alignments and re-alignments
pertaining between Balintism and the general
epistemological theme of self-surveillance. Second, with
the way in which these emphases come together to form a
veritable organisational 'technology' of general practice,
based upon a 'chain of identifications' linking trainer,
trainee and - lastly - the 'whole person'. Third, with the
genealogy that links a person-centred psychotherapeutic
approach in general practice - perhaps rather unexpectedly
- with a neo-liberal 'governmental' emphasis upon the
1

responsibilisation' and autonomisation of subjectivity.

2. Surfaces of Emergence

What were the surfaces of emergence of this general
spirit of the time' to which Balint refers in the above
quotation? Certain more or less contingent themes and
perspectives can be isolated as conditions of emergence of
the themes both of Balint's own work

and of the

310
rationality of 'self-surveillance' considered in this
chapter. Some of these have already been considered; for
example, it was shown in the last chapter how matters

' psychological'

became

increasingly

visible

and

simultaneously problematic (since so apparently 'doctordependent') in the results of the surveys themselves (see
e.g. Playfair 1961: 419-442). Similarly, a mutation in the
notion of 'madness' received institutional recognition in
a manner relevant to general practice during this period.
Thus the 1959 Mental Health Act proposed a new, general
category of 'mental illness' (itself placed at the most
generalised region of a kind of continuum marked by
'severe abnormality', 'subnormality' and 'psychopathic
disorder') to replace the more restricted and 'negative'
terms of 'unsound mind' and 'mental defect' (Royal
Commission on Mental Illness 1958; for the general
practitioner's views on this; Editorial 1960; also B.M.A.
1960). The Act also, of course, made minor 'madness'
everybody's concern - and especially the general
practitioner's (Curnow 1962: esp. 23) - in an immediate
'community' context as well as in a conceptual one.

2.1. A similar and related mutation occurred in the
context of what can be called the pharmacological
problematic. This influence was marked on several levels
which can be linked broadly to the impact of psychological
or 'behavioural' perspectives. First drugs - especially
librium and valium - objectively enhanced the social
visibility of minor depressions, emotional upsets and so
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on simply because of the rise in prescriptions that
resulted from their introduction (Jeffreys and Sachs 1983:
54). Here, the reaction (excessive prescriptions) to an
apparent onrush of psychological and behaviourial problems
was deemed as being as pathological and dangerous as the
problems themselves (Lane 1969: 101; cf. Grant 1957: 16).
As an Editorial put it in the College journal in 1979:
'it was a pharmacological revolution which
exposed this deficiency... [and] drew the
attention of government, public and profession
to a reality which had previously been
underestimated' (Editorial: 1979: 325).
Second,

drugs themselves were recognised to have

psychological effects (Handfield-Jones 1962). To study the
problem of drugs was to study the psychological aspects of
therapeutics (Balint et al. 1966 classically addressed
this question). Indeed, as with Balint's therapeutics of
the doctor the pharmacological problematic is one that
seems to emphasize the priority of therapeutics above
knowledge: one prescribes a drug because one knows it will
have effects rather than because one has fitted the cure
to the aetiology of the disease. This is no doubt why
Balint deployed the pharmacological problematic in his
conceptualisation of the doctor as a kind of powerful,
dangerous 'drug' requiring a constant labour of monitoring
and assessment (Balint 1957:1). The drugs problem also met
up with this necessity of self-surveillance by the doctor
in the question of 'prescribing habits' which were known
to differ individually from doctor to doctor: in other
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words, drugs were a psychological matter in relation to
the doctor as much as to the patient (Eimerl 1962: and the
findings of the Hinchcliffe Committee of 1959).

Third, the pharmacological question related to a sense of
urgency and crisis in the present, indeed to a new theme
of 'present-centredness' that contrasted with the
objectivizing aspirations of general practice in the
1950s. The emphasis moved from a concern with identifying
the (morbid, organisational) properties central to general
practice as an independent field, to a vigilant concern
with identifying the emergent problem, the contingent
trend or event and the tasks necessary for dealing with
these; a theme that can be described as the 'problemcentred' focus of general practice emerging at this time.
In relation to the terminology of an earlier chapter, it
can be said that here vigilance has taken precedence over
logistics; or, at least, that the latter is now to serve
the purposes of the former. What is interesting about this
theme is that it was mirrored on other levels of general
practice; most notably on that of diagnosis and clinical
ratonality itself where - as will be seen later - the
identification of problems and tasks became central to
treatment.

Connected with this concern for the contingency of the
present was the emergence of a new link between
'prevention' and 'urbanism' which can be usefully
contrasted with the problem of infectious disease in the
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Nineteenth Century. As de Swaan notes the very idea of
the 'urban' was tied both to infection and a 'police'
network of prevention:
'Nearly all urban concern for order, decency and
cleanliness could be collapsed in the paradigm
of infectious disease and at the same time this
notion hinted at a programme of prevention' (de
Swaan 1990: 124).
For the general practitioners of the 1960s - emerging from
a paradigm largely centred upon 'country practice' - the
problem of the urban present was, schematically, not one
of hygiene (whether posed in terms of filth, sanitation or
even 'mental' health) but of isolation, solitude,
depression. This theme was given paradigmatic expression
in Balint's work:
'Particularly as a result of urbanization, a
great number of people have lost their roots and
connections,

large

families

with

their

complicated and intimate interrelations tend to
disappear and the individual becomes more
solitary, even lonely' (Baliht 1957: 2; for
similar expressions of this theme, inter anal
Watts 1972: 233; and esp. R.C.G.P. 1977: 205-6).
What was at stake in the 'present' was, above all, the
breakdown of old - especially familial - ties of
interdependency which as a corollary made the supportive
functions of the doctor ever more important (e.g. Browne
and Freeling 1967: 32 & 38). The field confronted by the
general practitioner came to be conceived less in terms of
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families and their disruptions than in terms of the
potential breakdown of family life altogether. But if the
isolated individual was conceived as a 'threat' to social
stability, what had to be promoted was not the opposite of
isolation - collectivism, solidarity - but autonomy, selfreliance, self-responsibility, individual maturity, the
ability to live with oneself without dependencies.

2.ii. One particular consequence of this trend of
problematising present contingencies was a certain
denigration of the powers of 'theory' or formal knowledge.
This can be connected to the comments already made about
psychology. In general practice one confronts contingent
problems in practice itself, not through a priori
judgements or preliminary 'taxonomies'. Without doubt, the
import of a 'psychological' orientation resides largely in
that it is the incarnation of this 'retreat from theory'.
Thus

it

is

a

commonly-held

characteristic

of

'psychological' approaches that they should be
interventionist, dynamic, and open rather than closed,
artificial, theoretical. In fact, in a rather paradoxical
way, psychology represented the attempt to conceptualise
this retreat from objectivisation and theory in general
practice. Now, what is at stake here is specifically a
'psychological' perspective as opposed to a 'psychiatric'
one. Psychiatry is a discipline that can indeed be
'applied' to general practice (e.g. see the work of the
General Practice Research Unit at the Insitute of
Psychiatry, collected in Shepherd et al. 1981, 2nd ed.;
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also Williams and Clare 1979). But what now takes on a
certain provenance is not psychiatry as a mere 'aspect' or
'branch' of general practice, but psychology as pervading
it. This distinction is one that emerged very clearly from
the College's own report into psychology published in 1967
(RCGP 1967). After a certain amount of agonising over
definitions, psychology emerged as that form of activity
that deals with 'human relations' (known as "nonspecialist psychiatry" [which] the members found difficult
to define') an activity concerned - in contrast to the
rarefied concerns of both 'formal psychology' and
psychiatry -

with 'the basic problems of everyday

personal and family medicine' (ibid: 1, 15). Thus
psychology represented that tendency to get away from the
"objective" view of disease, which obscures the essential
unity of the human being' (ibid: 13). This explains the
hostility to psychiatry found amongst many person-centred
practitioners (e.g. RCGP 1972: 19), the frequently-stated
indifference to precise calculations of the exact
component of psychiatric problems in general practice
(e.g. Byrne and Long 1976: 14-15). What was at stake was
not particularly the assessment of psychiatric pathology
but a more generalised focus upon, above all, the
emotional relationships (e.g. Mitchell 1971: 2);
interpersonal relations at work within the individual, in
the family, in society and in the consultation. This
status of psychology actually explains why one finds very
little conceptualisation of 'psychic' matters in the
general practice field. Here, psychology designates a
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general emphasis, a general ordering of the field rather
than any commitment to specific dogmas. Cline sums this
up:
'In its widest aspects psychological medicine is
the science of understanding human emotions,
personalities and relationships in the medical
field' (Cline 1961: 243).

3. The Emergence of the Imperative of Vocational Training

Psychological ideas, as in the case of Balint's own work,
were also important in providing an intellectual basis for
training doctors. It is to a brief descriptive overview
of the entrenchment of this pedagogical rationality both
in the College and in general practice as a whole that we
now turn. (Pereira Gray 1982; Hasler in Pendleton and
Hasler 1983, and Horder and Swift 1979: 24-32 are main
sources on the history of vocational training.)

2.i. The College, and other bodies, had of course been
interested in the question of training and education
before the mid-1960s. As Pereira Gray comments the Cohen
Report (BMA 1948) in declaring general practice to be a
specialty thereby implied the need for a specialist form
of training in the discipline (Pereira Gray 1982: 1-17;
although cf. Editorial 1964: 303 which describes training
as a new emphasis). Indeed, in 1948 the government had
agreed to set up an assistant trainee scheme whereby post-
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registration students could be attached to practitioners
who would receive government remuneration for their
services (Fry 1988: 62-3). The ethical notion
1

vocationalism'

('continuing education'

of

throughout a

doctor's entire career), however, was not yet tied to this
demand: what was required was merely a respectable gap
between registration and entry into independent general
practice. During this period the trainee would be an
'assistant' to a principal practitioner but the latter was
not required to possess any specific educational skills,
let alone an exemplary 'persona' with which the trainee
should identify. During this period the trainee would
merely gain experience and be inculcated with the skills
specific to practice. By the late 1950s, in any case, the
assistant trainee scheme was agreed to be in a state of
collapse (Evans 1967 reviews the failure of the scheme).
On the one hand, the numbers applying for traineeships was
declining and those in traineeships were complaining of
being used as cheap assistants, learning little, at
government expense; a problem which reached its peak in
1965-6 (Pereira Gray 1982: 4, 7). On the other, the
purposes and content of training appeared to lack any
coherent ideological rationale or underpinning, let alone
commonly agreed standards to be achieved; standards which
the research-orientation of the College had done little to
illuminate.

Calls for a more comprehensive provision of postregistration training received an ideological boost from
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the 1961 Christchurch Conference on Postgraduate Education
(Fry 1988: 65) which called for local postgraduate centres
to be set up as permanent regional facilities for
continuous education, and an institutional one from the
acceptance

by the Ministry of Health in 1964 of the

principle that postgraduate education was the
responsibility of NHS exchequer funds (Pereira Gray 1982:
7). Nevertheless, the problem still remained as to what
this education should consist of: what should be the
'ends' of training, what sort of doctor should it produce?

2.ii. It was to these questions that the College of
General Practitioners was to give special attention from
the early 1960s, turning its resources from the matter of
research to that of postgraduate education and training,
with an influential series of reports and documents on the
content and organisation of training (e.g. RCGP 1967 &
1969) 1• These immediately register the shift of emphasis
from the concern to illuminate the characteristics of the
'free field' towards the delineation of the ideal
properties of the general practice doctor:
'The need in the community is for a doctor with
a very broad training. His essential task is the
assessment of problems which are presented by
patients and families in his care. Such
assessments demand an understanding of
psychological, social and economic factors which
influence health and disease as well as an
understanding of physical pathology' (CGP 1965:
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1).
In their submission of evidence to the Todd Commission
(1968) the College working party on vocational training
recommended a post-registration period of five years, two
of which were to be spent working in general practice and
the rest in hospital posts (preferably in the fields of
obstetrics, paediatrics and psychological medicine); a
period reduced by the BMA and the Department of Health to
three years (RCGP 1969). In 1967 the General Medical
Council of the BMA accepted the recommendation that all
doctors should undergo vocational training, a
recommendation also echoed in the Royal Commission on
Medical Education 1968; cf. also JCPTGP 1982). But what
matters for the purposes of this discussion is less the
apparatus of vocational training than the ideals it
implied. For its significance lies less in the fact that
it gave rise to a longer period of qualification for
doctors than the fact that it made training into a kind of
permanent ethic of practice (e.g. Horder 1969: 9).
Vocational training prepares the general practitioner for
practice; it makes him a minimally competent (that is, not
'dangerous') practitioner; a 'safe' practitioner but not a
composite practitioner (cf. the comments of Fry et al.
1983: 78; cf. Horder 1969). This latter status can only
come about, not throught qualifications but through evercontinuing education; an understanding of the general
practitioner's entire career as being a never-ending
learning-process.
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If on a 'political' level the institutional implementation
of vocational training was beset by delays and failures largely due to hold-ups at the Conference of Local Medical
Committess over the question of payments to trainees then it is nevertheless true to say that the aspiration
itself remained at the heart of general practice discourse
across the 1960s and 1970s. No doubt the very tardiness of
the implementation of vocational training was contributory
to this discursive persistence (in 1968 there were only
ten centres in the United Kingdom offering vocational
training schemes, and one hundred and two by the end of
1973; Hasler 1974: 614). Thus, it was not until 1975,
under the auspices of the RCGP and the General Medical
Services Council of the BMA, that a Joint Committee on
Postgraduate Training for General Practice was set up to
devise guidelines for training and to handle the
logistical matters of finding hospital posts, trainers and
trainee practices for trainees. Whilst the big
breakthrough in legislative terms came with the NHS
Vocational Training Act of 1976 (see for details:
Parliamentary Papers 1975/6) the actual recommendations
deriving from this were only to be implemented over a
relatively long time-scale. Thus the Act stipulated that
it would not not be possible after February 1981 to become
a principal in general practice without having completed a
(vocational) training year or having earned a certificate
of equivalent experience, and that by August 1982 it would
no longer to be possible to enter general practice as
principal without having completed a three year programme
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of vocational training, including at least twelve months
in an approved training practice. But in effect, the mere
emphasis upon training achieved what the taxonomical
project of the free field had failed to do; to turn
general practice (albeit by fiat rather than 'discovery')
into, in Pereira Gray's words, an 'independent clinical
discipline'. Thus, the 1976 Act might indeed be compared
in its significance with the 1858 Medical Act (Pereira
Gray 1982: 17; Editorial 1976).

Of course, the College was not uniquely responsible for
the emphasis upon vocational training that was to be such
a feature of the two decades after 1965. The Platt Report
(1961), for example, had already emphasized the principle
within the hospital service itself by arguing that all
non-consultant grades should have training status. But the
College (especially through its programme of 'training the
trainers') was to give this general movement an 'academic'
or 'intellectual' substance, and - in the process - sought
for the general practitioner an 'exemplary' status
(indeed, as the archetypal 'clinician') within medicine as
a whole. In this way the College was able to raise its own
profile within general practice. It was by no means the
obvious vocation of the College to take upon itself the
role of researching into, and setting, training aims and
standards. In 1964 Kenneth Robinson, then Minister of
Health had suggested the founding of a new institution to
counter the declining rate of recruitment of general
practitioners:

322

'Surely general practice must in future require
special postgraduate training. A desirable
development is the idea which is being canvassed
for setting up an Institute of General Practice
which would have the job of carrying out
research and education and establishing
standards' (quoted in Hunt 1965: 79).
The College had to transform itself in intellectual and
organisational terms in order to take on this role. It was
to do so not merely by exerting an intellectual
'influence' on training schemes and so on, but - on a more
concrete level - by turning itself into a kind of
' obligatory passage point' for those who wished to

demonstrate high standards in general practice.

2.iii. By the early 1960s it had come to be recognised

that the impact of the College on education in general had
been minimal. As John Hunt, one of the founders of the
College, put it:
'After eleven years of the College's work all
this is disappointing; ... the main impact of
our College on training for general practice
itself can never be in the undergraduate phase'
(Hunt 1964: 139; cf. Editorial 1964: 303).
With recruitment to the College on the decline, he
proposed - in a perfect example of the logic of
'interessement' - to link the fortunes of vocational
training to the very identity of the College itself;
specifically by making vocational training effectively a
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compulsory condition of elligibility for membership
(including a commitment to continuing education) so that
'students will take much more interest in our College's
work than they do at present' (ibid: 143).

By July 1968 the College had introduced - in a reversal of
its founding principles - an examination requirement for
entry; the 'MRCGP' (see on the retrospective rationale
behind this e.g. RCGP 1974, College's evidence to the
Merrison Commission). A three-year period of vocational
training - provided it was on a scheme specifically
approved by the College - would qualify the candidate to
sit the exam for College entry. The adoption by the
College of an entry-examination had effects that were
relevant both to the internal structure of the College and
to its place within the wider field of general practice.
In fact the whole question of the exam had been almost
coterminous with the foundation of the College itself; an
1

examination committee' had already reported on the

subject in 1955 (CGP 1955: 33-7). However, succesive
Annual General Meetings of the College were to reject the
idea as not complying with the ideals of general practice
where, in the absence of a formal ladder of advancement,
seniority was necessarily predicated upon long-earned
experience rather than evidence of the attainment of
formal knowledge. But with the adoption of the idea of the
exam the role of the College underwent a subtle shift (cf.
'College News' 1960 and Cookson 1960). From being above
all a research organisation it was now to become
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simultaneously a 'professional' and 'educational'
organisation regulated by specific entry standards. Entry
to the College guaranteed a certain competence but above
all a particular orientation to general practice; in
short, to the 'patient-centred' orientation espoused by
the College itself. But if in this way, with the adoption
of the exam, the College effectively entered into the
field of 'professional politics' this was concealed by the
strictly 'academic' nature of the College's concerns. For
the exam itself was primarily an academic matter:
'The mere exercise of defining the scope of the
exam will itself give a guide to those whose
duty it is to teach undergraduates and organise
postgraduate courses; and general practitioners
themselves will gain a clearer idea of the range
of the work' (Editorial 1962:3).

More widely, what was significant here was that, since
completion of a vocational training scheme carried with it
no formal qualification, the MRCGP - which could be taken
only after completion of those training schemes
specifically approved by the College - soon came to
fulfill this role; with the effect that possession of the
MRCGP itself came to signify qualification for the status
of principal in general practice. An exemplary
i interessement' strategy was involved here according to
which general practitioners, in being tied to the
professional necessity of vocational training, were
simultaneously to be tied to the ideals of the College. On
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the one hand, if students wished to gain an academic
qualification in general practice then they would have to
take the College's MRCGP exam. On the other hand, passing
this exam meant that they would be members of the College
itself, and hence tied to its principles; person-centred
medicine, continuing education. So, without actually
making College membership compulsory for aspirant
principals, by instituting an exam for entry which was
simultaneously a certificate of completion of vocational
training the College was placing itself strategically in a
position, as it were, between the personal aspirations of
younger practitioners and the wider - 'professional' vocation of general practice as a particular kind of
discipline. Thus the College was able effectively to align
the personal ambitions of practitioners and the values
which the College was seeking to disseminate within
general practice.

The effectiveness of this strategy was reflected in
recruitment to membership of the College. In 1960 only
about one-fifth of all general practitioners in the United
Kingdom were College members (Fry 1960: 390; cf. Fry
1988); by 1988 over half of existing principals in general
practice were members (a figure which includes those who
had been principals before 1981 and therefore had no
vocational 'need' to join the College).
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

COLLEGIATE PATTERNS OF ORGANISATION AND RESEARCH

1. The Group Environment

The organisational transformation that occured at this
point can be characterised as entailing a movement away
from a 'free field' conception to a 'group'-centred one.
What was at stake was the 'material' of organisation
itself; in place of an emphasis upon the space of the
practice, its 'population' and morbidity profile the
organisational domain confronted by the College came to be
seen as being composed wholly of the relationships between
persons.

1.i. During the 1960s the concept of the 'group' - though
not always the word itself - came to signify the
organisational principle towards which general practice
naturally tended. For writers associated with the College
of General Practitioners, the 'field' of general practice
ceased to be, as it were, 'free', bounded only by the
region or the locality, but became defined by a microinstitutional network of group relations. Clearly, a
certain degree of 'reciprocal causality' was at stake

327
here. On the one hand, the idea of the 'group' itself,
largely under the aegis of broadly 'Balintist' educational
prescriptions (as put forward in both the initiatives of
the College and the recommendations of official discourse,
for instance those of the Todd Report of 1968) exerted a
certain influence, whilst, on the other hand,
organisational and financial constraint made something of
a necessity of ideology here. This dimension of constraint
is illustrated by the crisis that hit the profession in
the mid-1960s which centred around the questions of
underfunding, declining remuneration, low standards and
lack of manpower (Klein 1983: 84-8, Gibson 1981: 95-7). In
the BMA's 'Doctor's Charter' (BMA 1966) the notion of the
'group practice' emerged as part of the solution to these
problems in that group methods of organisation facilitated
the granting of funds for resources that would otherwise
be denied the individual practitioner, whilst
simultaneously retaining the 'personal' emphasis of
doctoring alongside the autonomy of doctors that might
have been threatened under the alternative organisational
conceptions founded on the control of local authorities.
Group organisation had, of course, long been advocated
although, for the Cohen Report its definition seemed to be
unclear (MOH 1954:

17).

Now,

the notion emerges

effectively as a compromise between the independent,
personal

doctor

and

the

collectivist,

implications of local authority provision.

salaried
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1.ii. It is of interest to note in this context how the
concept of the (long-advocated, little implemented)
'health centre' could also, with certain modifications, be
brought under the umbrella of the group principle (see
Harvard Davis Report on group practice, DHSS 1971;
Sluglett 1961; Forman 1962: esp. 376). Thus, the Todd
Report proposed both large group practices (even in the
countryside; a proposal that would effectively obliterate
the country doctor) and health centres so long as the
doctors acted as a 'group' (Royal Commission 1968: 33-4;
cf. the discussion of general practice organisation in
Armstrong 1983: 82-4).

The group notion was useful precisely because of its
applicability to a number of different levels of
organisation (as pointed out by e.g. Dermott Grene 1966:
119). Thus, aside from its obvious - and paradigmatic training uses (enshrined, for example, in Section 63 oi
the Health Services Act of 1968 with its provision for the
setting up of Postgraduate Education Centres) the group
principle has what might be termed a 'horizontal'
significancg relating to the 'peer' group (the group
seminar, the group practice) and a 'vertical' significance
(particularly applicable in the health centre) which
'concerns the doctor's relations with other medical and
ancillary workers. Amongst doctors themselves the group
principle was indispensible; the doctor could achieve
'wholeness'
wholeness as a professional through the inducement to
reflexivity and self-awareness guaranteed by his peer
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group; the medical profesionals with whom he worked (see
e.g. Freeling 1976: 180-197; Courteney 1981: 57-65). As
regards non-'medical' colleagues, it should be noted that
the 'team' concept was itself only taken up within the
context of a 'group' problematic. In fact, from the
beginning of the 1960s the College had wedded itself to
the principle of 'attachment' according to which health
visitors, nurses, secretarial staff and midwives would
join practices (see esp. Report 1961; cf. Baker 1964). Far
more contentious was the role of the attached social
worker; partly since social workers brought with them
dreaded nuances of local authority control (Council 1968:
e.g. 314) and partly because of claims, for example by
Margot Jeffreys, that social workers should actually be
the leaders of the team (on which matter, Editorial 1968;
and - for some extremely forthright opinions - the letters
pages of the BMJ and Lancet throughout the 1960s).
Ancillary workers in general, however, were seen as being
consistent with personalist and wholist rationalities in
general practice (see e.g. Jeffreys and Sachs 1983);
partly, as the phrase went, because they 'freed the doctor
for doctoring' by performing otherwise dreary or
administrative tasks (Wallace and Harvard Davis 1970;
168); partly because the very interaction of health
professionals was a spur to attempts to define the field
proper to general practice itself (Marinker 1970: 79);
partly because it was widely felt that the keeping of
paramedical staff under the noses of the general
practitioners would also keep them under general
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practitioners' substantive control (e.g. Lord 1965: 251);
and lastly in that the very fact that the Team could pose
a threat to the 'whole person' (a diversity of experts
dividing up the patient) also served as a spur to the
constant programmatic re-iteration of that project itself
(Cartwright and Anderson 1981: chapter 5; Marsh and KaimCaudle 1976: 13-23). Of course, all this was only
acceptable - and the whole person could only be protected
from fragmentation - provided the general practitioner
himself remained in ultimate charge, as himself the most
'responsible'

member

of

the

team

with

ultimate

'responsibility' for the patient (Central Health Services
Council 1963: 38; Mackichan 1976).

2. Changing Imperatives of Collegiate Association

This 'group' or 'person-to-person' conception of the basic
organisational field of general practice was tied to a
shift in the way in which the College viewed its own
relation to that field. This can be represented broadly
as a movement from an 'ecological' model, whereby the
College was seen as being, so to speak, part of the
'environment' of general practice which it served to
regulate, to an 'instrumental' and more 'executive' model,
whereby the College was to take a more distanced and
strategic stance from the world of general practice; a
'mutation' that can be traced in the pages of the Annual
Reports of the College in the 1960s (cf. Fry et al. 1983).
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2.i. This mutation is evidenced above all in the realm of
the organisation of research, the original raison d'etre
of College organisation. It has already been seen how in
the 1950s the organisational axis of the College lay with
its research activities at two levels: research intended
to make visible the extent of community pathology and that
related to the workings of practices themselves
('operational' research). Both kinds of research were
essentially 'descriptive': knowledge of the 'free field'
was built up through a dialectical process of observations
on the periphery and collection at, and re-distribution
from, the centre. Thus, the role of the centre was
primarily 'informational': it did not exist, so to speak,
'above' the 'free field' but was immanent within it. Now,
in relation to research, the centre loses this relation of
organisational immanence. This transformation was due, no
doubt, to the relative epistemological failure of general
practice research (CGP 1958:

40ff). The numerical

proliferation of projects was coupled with the
recognition of the lack of commensurability amongst those
projects themselves. As discussed earlier, it soon became
clear that no totalizing and objective knowledge of the
'free field' was ever going to emerge along a single and
manageable dimension. By 1965 it had become clear, at
least, that general practice research could never exist in
an anagous relation to parallel forms of 'specialist'
research and discovery:
'The direction in which research in general
practice will develop is becoming easier to
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discern. There will always be something to offer
the medical specialties but general-practitioner
research will never compete with them in their
own research fields... He must relate his
observations to those of the biologist, the
social anthropologist, and the geographer rather
than to the pathologist, the radiologist or the
clinician' (CGP 1965, 13: 37).

2.ii. But what occurred was not the wholesale eclipse of
research as an important dimension of general practice but
the recognition that 'better' general practice would
depend not so much upon the the discovery of objective
knowledge as upon the better education of practitioners
themselves. A corollary of this was the demand that
general practice should imitate the specialities in terms
of their hierarchical composition (rather than in terms of
the specialist aspiration to extend knowledge): 'The
'Chief' in general practice as well as in hospital, needs
his housemen and registrars' (ibid: 38). Central here was
the turning away from a paradigm of benign 'amateurism'
(the almost 'botanical' Gilbert White-inspired model of
natural investigation which had been a defining feature of
the 'free field') towards one of a more resolute and
specialist 'professionalism'l.

The early 1960s was a period of stock-taking and review largely undertaken on the grounds of financial
considerations - within the College. Whilst the basic
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structure of a centre existing in relation to a
multiplicity of provincial faculties remained intact, the
nature of the centre itself was transformed. Within the
domain of research organisation itself, the foundation of
the Records and Statistical Unit under the directorship of
D.L. Crombie in 1961 signalled the beginning of this
trend. This marked a movement away from, first,
central

emphasis,

accorded

within

research

the
to

'epidemiological observation' and, second, from the
organisational tenet that all co-ordinating activities be
- if situated at the centre - 'immanent' to the periphery,
to a paradigm where research arrangements would become
situated at a certain distance or remove from both the
everyday, clinical activities of College members on the
periphery as well as from central College concerns
themselves. Hence, the Unit, financed by a grant from the
Nuffield Foundation, was established in Birmingham away
from the College centre, and with a degree of autonomy
from College Council and the Research Committee itself;
the College maintaining merely an 'advisory' role with
regard to research through the auspices of an enlarged
Research Advisory Unit, also situated in Birmingham (CGP
1962: 32-4; CGP 1963: 32; Pereira Gray 1982: 13).

3. Transformations Within Conceptions of Research

Within the domain of morbidity research itself there were
some epistemological corollaries to these organisational

transformations.

3.i. There emerged in the 1960s something of a reaction to
the 'scientific' pretentions of the epidemiological model
that had been at the heart of the College's activities in
the 1950s. By the time of his Mackenzie Lecture of 1972
D.L. Crombie could note how, in the past, general practice
had not lived up to the aspirations expressed by the
College motto, 'Cum Scientia Caritas':
1

• • •

we have lamentably fallen short of the

sentiment expressed by this phrase. Medicine is
a vocation and not primarily a science. This is
a fundamental fact that we forget at our peril'
(Crombie 1972: 7).

Part of this relative disillusion with 'taxonomic' forms
of research stemmed from the fact that epidemiological
investigation could be done by other kinds of professional
worker: it was not specific to general practice (see e.g.
Kalton 1968: 81-95). The implicit hostilities to what was
viewed as 'incursion' emerged in an editorial in the
College journal from 1971 which, reviewing a book by a
team of academic epidemiologists - sneeringly described as
'a group of colleagues well known to one another' - could
declare that:
'Epidemiology is a subject in which there is no
immediate and obvious benefit. This is in
contrast to patient care where, if all goes
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well, there is a visible end-product in the
recovered individual' (Editorial 1971b: 313-4).

Nevertheless, what occured was not a wholesale rejection
of epidemiology but a shift in its perceived use-value
(the work of G.I. Watson was testimony to the enduring
appeal of the epidemiological paradigm; Watson 1982). The
numbers on the College research register increased
progressively across the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover,
individual studies were often successful; for example, the
research concerning the 1957 epidemic of Asian influenza heavily indebted in its investigative atmosphere to the
work of Pickles - which had disproved the thesis that
teenagers with the illness were less infectious than young
children (Eimerl et al. 1969; Watson 1960: 44-79). But
what had become clear was that epidemiology could not
become the basis of a governing rationality of general
practice at all levels. What was the nature of this
relative eclipse of the role of epidemiology?

3.ii. Large-scale investigations of morbidity became a

more specialised activity not perceived as central to the
daily endeavours of the typical College member. This was
partly the result of the fact that - in spite of the
individual successes - as many as one-tenth of the
projects undertaken under the auspices of the Research
Committee in the 1960s failed to get off the ground
(Editorial 1961: 345-8). Moreover, the lack of
comparability of individual studies had certainly dampened
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their over-all research significance by the mid-1960s.
Thus, one survey of some thirty-seven individual research
projects concluded with:
'a plea to workers in this field to publish
future findings in a form which lends itself
readily to general comparison. Our own survey
demonstrates beyond any doubt the serious
difficulties that confront anyone who tries to
shape general hypotheses from the mass of
material that has accumulated since 1945 and to
which additions are continuously made' (Lees and
Cooper 1963: 435).
The recognition that research was an enterprise requiring
both sophisticated methods and a certain amount of
financial expense contributed to the idea of setting up a
separate Research Foundation in the early 1960s and
shifting the leading-edge of research thinking away from
the central organisation of the College to the academic
GPs at Birmingham University (ibid: 346). This body was
primarily responsible for conducting, along with the
Department of Health, the second national morbidity survey
in 1970-1 (OPCS 1974; RCGP 1976; Crombie et al. 1975: 874879).

3.iii. On the other hand, research did remain an important
aspiration

for

the

individual

practitioner

but,

paradoxically, not primarily as research. Thus in the
preface to the second edition of Eimerl and Laidlaw's
Handbook for Research in General Practice (the central
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work on this topic in the 1960s) the purposes of research
are located principally in the domain of the doctor's
understanding of self' and the knock-on effects this was
seen to have in relation to treatment:
'All these experiences lead to the conclusion
that the family doctor who undertakes this selfimposed discipline is enabled as a result to
offer a better standard of care to his patients'
(Eimerl and Laidlaw 1969 [1962]: viii; cf.
Howie 1979).
In other words, the fact that the individual study is an
individual study is now at the very centre of its
importance: there is less expectation that these
individual studies might be possible to put together to
describe one homogeneous field. Research becomes an aspect
of self-education, transforming the doctor's now allimportant conception of self:
'The survey has led me to ponder over things
more deeply than is normal in general practice
and it has enabled me to understand my practice
the better' (Ryde 1964: 294-7).
Similarly in two much-quoted articles T.S. Eimerl praised
the aspiration of 'curiosity' for its own sake above
(although not in opposition to) any objective ends it
might serve. After specifically criticizing the ideal of
the large-scale uniform investigation using a mechanical
punch-card system, conceived in abstraction from the
practice of investigation itself, Eimerl went on to argue
that the best kind of research in general practice was the
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kind which contributed to the doctor's self-understanding:
'All this effort enables the participating
doctor to better himself, to educate himself in
matters primarily unknown to him, to become a
more knowledgeable person and, it is hoped, to
offer a better service to his patients' (Eimerl
1961: 636, Neale 1961: 43).
A perspective like that of Eimerl was clearly not in
opposition to epidemiology as such. Rather, epidemiology
had to be adjusted to the specific, situational
perspective of general practice. What such an adjustment
had to consider, above all, was that it provided 'the
necessary freedom to the recorder' since, in an important
sense, it was the recorder who was the object of
investigation.

Moreover, this project of adjustment also had to take into
account the fact that epidemiology, at least in the
context of general practice, was a broader field than had
previously been imagined. Thus, a way would have to found
of problematising the emotional content of general
practice within this epidemiological problematic. After
all, were not current epidemics primarily mental in any
case?
'If the amount of bodily disease in the world
reached the same proportions of the many
existing, social ills with mental and emotional
causes.., an epidemic state of emergency would
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be declared and strong measures would have to be
taken to combat the menace' (Eimerl 1961: 43).

This project spawned a series of attempts to devise new
micro-technologies of recording data that would serve the
purposes of monitoring individual patient biographies,
illuminating emotional relationships and contributing to
the doctors self-understanding as a vocationally unique
individual with emotional effects on his patients.

3.iv. One of the first devices to be promoted was an
invention of Eimerl himself, the 'E' Book or 'loose-leaf
ledger' (Eimerl 1960). This system was intended to
reconcile the problem of correcting the lack of
commensurability

of individual studies with that of

maintaining the

very individuality of the doctor. The

actual objective

was for the individual practitioner

simply to record

everyday diagnoses in his practice in

such a form as to facilitate both quick recording and ease
of transfer onto punch cards for analysis by the Records
Unit. No actual

discoveries were expected from this

method: the knowledge revealed by the analysis of 'E' Book
data would serve to

illuminate particularities of

individual practices and their practitioners rather than
yield information about general practice as a whole. Thus,
analysis showed the usual predominance of problems such as
the common cold, acute tonsillitis and acute bronchitis:
actual discoveries are, rather, made within this generally
unsurprising horizon of morbidity, about particular
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characteristics of individual doctors:
'The effect of individual professional attitudes
is shown clearly for acute tonsillitis where Dr
W. records at least twice as much of this as his
colleagues... These aspects of the assessment of
the case-load of general practice are puzzling
yet not unexpected; they add materially to the
problem of what happens in general practice...'
(Eimerl and Laidlaw 1969: 54).
The 'doctor effect' that became such a visible aspect of
all studies of general practice morbidity also troubled
the work of the Records and Statistical Unit. Part of the
problem, they found, actually related less to the doctors
themselves than to the disease labels they habitually
employed. A study of whether disease labels commonly in
use actually fitted 'the aetiology, pathology, and
morphology of the disease process actually described by
the label' concluded that there could be 'no great
confidence in the accuracy with which the labels imply
aetiology or pathology', especially in relation to
personality disorders and mental and emotional illnesses
(Symposium 1963: 204). The reaction to this kind of
classificatory problem in

their modified College

'Classification of Disease' was to place diseases relating
to more or less vague symptoms and complexes into a
category of their own (ibid: 204-16). Nevertheless, the
dream of a classificatory system, perfectly fitted to
general practice conditions had now disappeared2.
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Instead, attempts were made to develop means of measuring
individual morbidity across time, but in a manner that
would make comparison of results possible. Hopes centred
particularly upon the summary 'S' Card (named after Dr.
Richard Scott), designed to be both stable and flexible,
usable with minimum interference to the doctor's daily
tasks yet capable of central analysis (Records and
Statistical Unit 1966: 34-40). The cards were designed to
'allow a picture of the sickness experience of an
individual to accumulate over the years and be made
readily available'. Information entered would include
details of matrimonial status and social class as well as
purely 'medical' data (ibid: 38). However, in spite of the
durability of the programme of instituting biographical
methods amenable to inscription the practice itself
remained strictly a marginal one. This was, no doubt, due
to the basic incompatibility of biographical and
statistical approaches. For the paradigm of central
analysis here remained 'epidemiological' in that it
concerned analysis by disease label rather than of the
'biography' of the individual as such (see the follow-up
study in the Birchfield Research practice; Research Unit
1973). The domain of investigation here - although
certainly representing an attempt to get away from some of
the more 'disease-centred' aspects of epidemiology in that
it sought 'to demonstrate patterns in the sequence of
illness' in individuals (Research Unit 1972: 380) related to such aspects as whether a child who gets
measles before chickenpox would be more likely to get
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rheumatoid arthritis than one who has had chickenpox
first. In other words, this form of analysis related to
'longitudinal' disease patterns rather than 'patientcentred' biographical data as such (ibid: 380).3

4. Rationalities of Self-Surveillance

It could be said that all such 'inscriptional' models of
research were still tied to a kind of 'totalisine
rationality; to the idea that one might be able to write
down the entirety of an individual's history, family
relationships and so on. There now emerges another
research rationality that - to revert to the vocabulary of
a previous chapter - actually puts 'vigilance' before
'logistics'; a rationality that concerns not totalities
but rather contingent problem-areas and the isolation of
particular tasks. This rationality is contingent, presentcentred, evaluative, even political; but, above all,
reflexive. It can be accounted for on both a micro and a
macro level.

4.1. On the 'micro' level of investigation - and in a
clear parallel with some of the concerns of Balint - there
emerged a concern that was concerned with investigating
the doctor's own powers of reasoning; and in particular
with the 'constitutive' powers of diagnosis. This had an
obvious relation to the demands of education; and was also
to be instrumental in promoting an interest in methods of
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'audit' in general. Crombie, in an Appendix to the
College's evidence to the Todd Commission (1968), used
such an analysis - of the doctor's habits of diagnostic
pattern-recognition - to demonstrate how general practice
differed from hospital medicine (Crombie 1966). In
particular, it was found that in 65% of cases there was no
need for an examination but that diagnosis could be
achieved on the basis of the history alone, and especially
on the doctor's experience of the patient (ibid: 28). The
signification of diagnosis here takes on both an enhanced
importance and an augmented uncertainty. Important because
the diagnosis has itself an instrumental value in relation
to treatment of the patient (that is, diagnosis is part
of, and subordinate to, treatment; see e.g. Report 1961:
135). Yet uncertain because - for this very reason - the
actual accuracy of the diagnosis may be in doubt.
Diagnosis thus came to be in effect a self-validating
process, since the diagnosis itself was understood to
possess a kind of force of its own. Browne and Freeling,
for example, noted how the circumstances of the
consultation themselves modified the diagnosis: 'any
interview involves interaction between doctor and patient
which begins to modify the situation being presented'
(Browne and Freeling 1967: 1). Hence the accuracy of
diagnosis was given less emphasis than the doctor's
intuition concerning what course it would be necessary to
take:
'This system of starting treatment before there
can be any certainty that it is essential is
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based on the system of probabilities that cannot
be measured accurately' (Crombie 1966: 29; cf.
Drury and Hull 1979: 176ff. for a similarly
'probabilistic' emphasis; although cf. Castel's
comments on risk in his article in Burchell et
al. 1991).

The model of the doctor's reasoning here, although
classically 'intuitive' according to the best 'clinical'
traditions (Atkinson 1981; cf. Atkinson 1983b: 237-9), is
nevertheless now considered understood as deductive as
opposed to inductive: the doctor typically measures
probabilities amongst a variety of alternative diagnoses
and treatments; the doctor's reasoning powers are
generically 'economic' in that they serve to select
amongst alternatives. Thus a rational appreciation of the
thaumaturgic process of diagnosis soon became conceivable:
'Traditionally the process of diagnosis was left
undefined, a natural art, or explained as a
process of intuition' (Gale and Marsden 1983: 8;
cf. the pioneering work of Elstein in the USA,
Elstein et al. 1978).
Now, however, it can be seen that diagnosis actually
functions according to the best Popperian principles: the
doctor generates hypotheses on the basis of 'broad
psychological processes' (ibid: 131) which he then tests.
The uses of intuition here are not opposed to the use of
logic or reason:
'Intuitive methods, of course, are merely the
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use of pathways which have been mapped out in
the thought processes of the brain by laborious
and continuous use and to this extent are based
on logical or scientific method' (Crombie 1964:
588).

Interestingly enough,

such a rationalised - even

probabilistic - perspective actually allowed for a
reconciliation with the

'aesthetic'

-

even self-

consciously 'Hippocratic' - conception of diagnosis:
'If we believe that perception is a creative
process and the perceiver selects a few of the
mass of stimuli presented to him and uses his
imagination to create a picture, then we can say
the same about clinical diagnosis. For diagnosis
is but an extended form of perception and we
even use the expresson "clinical picture" as if
we were artists rather than doctors' (ElliottBinns 1978: 116-7).

Again, we have here, then, a kind of 'phenomeno-technical'
understanding of the doctor's powers. The general
practitioner thus becomes the most 'creative' of all
practitioners for whom 'history and examination is for
confirmation only, as it were framing the picture rather
than painting it' (ibid: 117).

Clearly for such diagnostic principles to be properly
instilled the doctor needs to learn how to monitor his own

346

powers of reasoning; after all, this is the only way to
test the validity of his otherwise largely self-validating
powers. The task, then, became for the doctor to monitor
his own powers of reasoning in order to guage their
effectiveness. The principle of medical audit (Mourin
1976), for example, was about 'self-criticism' (the
analogies with Balint's work will be obvious): 'it is by
reflection on experience that one learns' (Williamson
1973: 698):
'The main aim of audit is to analyse critically
the methods used to define the patient's problem
and the action taken to resolve it... so that
the service offered to the patient can be
improved' (ibid: 697; cf. Duncan 1965; also
Hodgkin 1973: esp. 767; and on how 'selfevaluation' actually differs from audit,
Birmingham Research Unit 1977: 266).
But it was also about knowledge - not about the totality
of the 'free field' but about establishing the 'normal'
standards to be expected from doctors; that is, with 'in
its broadest sense, defining the 'normal value' upon which
all medical practice is based' (Williamson 1973: 706). The
question of 'audit' in the context of specifically
educational research. Now, in the context of our general
discussion of devices of inscription, let us only note an
influential import from America embodying a similarly
reflexive and evaluative rationality; the 'problem-centred
medical record' (POMR). This, as a Journal editorial
noted, entailed a change of emphasis from worrying about
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the exact accuracy of diagnostic categories to 'problems
presented by the patient or perceived by the doctor'
(Editorial 1973: 301; Tait and Stevens 1973). This form of
record was designed to highlight various problems and to
monitor the doctor's progress in handling them (Weed
1963). What the POMR highlighted was not so much the
biography, or even the cure, of the patient as an
assessment of the powers of the doctor:
'The effect of this kind of record is also to
shift the focus of attention away from the
results and more towards the doctor's intention'
(Editorial 1973; 301; cf. Clarke 1974: 771).

4.11. This general shift towards an evaluative and
reflexive, problem-centred rationality - here manifested
at the level of the doctor's own self-surveillance - can
also be seen at work on a more 'macro' level, that is on
the level of, as it were, the self-surveillance of the
profession as a whole. At the widest level, there emerged
in the 1960s a concern, less to know and map the health
field objectively, as to predict problems and tasks
strategically. This development corresponds well to what
Rudolf Klein has called the 'politics of technocratic
change' of the 1960s (Klein 1983: chapter 3) which saw a
general governmental emphasis upon accounting techniques
of cost-benefit analysis, P.A.R. (Programme Analysis
Review), efficiency studies and so forth (ibid: 64-5).
Within the health service itself, there emerged the
'forward planning' emphasis of the Hospital Plan and the
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'Health and Welfare' programme for community care
(Ministry of Health 1963). Like the 1962 Hospital Plan,
the latter programme outlined a long-term (ten years)
planning initiative for the local authority health field
(ibid: 1-2), devising rationales and setting monitorable
targets. Again there is a kind of 'audit' mentality of
self-surveillance at work here:
'Forward planning ... fulfills a number of
important purposes. In the first place it
provides the opportunity ... to review past
performance, ... present needs and future
expectations' (ibid, revision to 1975-6 [Cmnd
3022]: 1).

Within general practice itself the Gillie Report (Central
Health Services Council 1963) was also part of this
literature of macro self-surveillance, its task to
specify, plan and predict:
'To advise on the field of work which it would
be reasonable to expect a family doctor to
undertake in the forseeable future, having
regard to the probable developments during the
next fifteen years' (ibid: 5).
One problem, however, was a dearth of studies - 'objective
data' - outlining what it was that general practitioners
actually did (ibid: 55). The literature produced by the
College concerning 'Present State and Future Needs' in
general practice was designed to fill exactly this kind
of gap. Begun in 1965, these reports attempted to meet the
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need not for a total mapping of the free field but for
'critical analysis and evaluation of our work as an
essential pre-requisite for the best and most effective
use of our resources' (RCGP 1970: Preface). These reports
supplied a variety of infrastructural information for
general practice giving details of workload, manpower,
content of general practice, ancillary trends and services
and so on. But these analyses were intended not just as
descriptions but as tools for evaluation, instruments for
acting upon the present. Central to this concern was also
the practice of prediction, the consideration of 'future
needs' (Pridham 1962); for each evaluation could only be
temporary in relation to an uncertain future, when, in
turn, further re-evaluations would have to be made.

This rationality had, in turn, a corollary on the level of
the practice itself; in the form of the setting up of
'diagnostic indexes' and 'age/sex registers' (and, later,
screening facilities) of practice populations, intended to
provide constantly re-evaluated pictures of the diagnostic
state of the practice (Editorial 1971a: 59-60; cf. Drury
and Hull 1979; Jameson 1970). Of course, the importance of
such devices at the level of the practice had been
recognised in the 1950s. But now these ceased to be
factors primarily for research but became essential
prerequisites for the daily, clinical conduct of general
practice itself. What was required was less a logistics to
king the circumstances of practice to visibility; rather
these logistical devices serve the purposes of a constant
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institutional vigilance. A re-evaluation of the relation
between information and temporality was clearly at stake
here. Very schematically this might be characterised
simply as a problematising of temporality; one has to
establish temporalities, what the future holds, the exact
specifics of the presend. Time has ceased, for the general
practitioners to be a 'medium'; it has become something
problematic, and an 'input' or a 'resource' for general
practice (cf. the comments in Armstrong 1985); a
consideration that may be clarified by a brief discussion
of the uses - conversely - of 'space' in this context.

4.iii. For a transformation was also taking place in
relation to how the space of the surgery itself was
conceived. Earlier, we saw how architectural writings on
general practice in the 1950s stressed that the surgery
should be a 'homely' place - even if the home itself was,
to an extent, itself partly conceived as a 'scientific'
domain. Now, it could be said, the link between home and
surgery is sundered. With the emphasis on the specifics of
the doctor-patient relationship in the consultation - to
which we turn below - the epistemological necessity that
the home should be linked 'homologically' to the surgery
was displaced. The ideal surgery became a much more
'artificial' space with standard furniture, lighting and
so on; indeed its primary attrubute came to be that it
should induce efficiency rather than conducive of cure
(M.O.H. 1967; cf. Richard 1962). This is because the
atmosphere derives now not from the space of the surgery
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but from the person of the doctor. So in a certain limited
sense, from the 1960s on, the earlier force of the linkage
between architecture and therapeutics was dimished. Since
'each consulting room is stamped with the personality of
the doctor who uses it' (Jones et al. 1978: 100) the
nature of the actual space of the consultation is less of
an integral part of the therapeutic process. Of course,
this is not to say that architecture loses its
significance for general practice. One important
consideration, for example, remained that of freedom of
access to the doctor and amongst colleagues; a problem
compounded by large group practice or health centre
buildings. In addition it became seen as increasingly
necessary to separate out functions in the surgery, and,
in particular to free the realm of interpersonal verbal
communication from that of other - lesser - functions.
Hence one can still read off discursive priorities from
architectural principles;

functions became separated

through the architecture of the building so that treatment
routines,

'scientific

investigations',

examination, and history-taking and private

bodily
interview

could occur in different spaces; the central being that
of the private interview

(Adams 1962; M.O.H. 1967; 25-

31).

Overall, however, it can be argued that, in terms of
therapeutics, the functions of space have lost their
importance in relation to a temporal perspective of selfsurveillance and vigilance according to which the
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particular characteristics of the present are assessed and
monitored in the light of the past and with a view to
future development. The strong link between a personalist
and a temporal perspective should not be surprising, but
it is interesting to note that general practitioners
themselves sought to characterise general practice as
being, somehow, a uniquely 'temporal' discipline (e.g.
Editorial 1973: 749). Thus, one very influential work
attempted 'to demonstrate that [the general
practitioner's] understanding and use of the time scale is
peculiar to general practice' (RCGP 1972: 6ff.) and
observed that time was at once a diagnostic tool ('we must
understand the fragmentary, yet continuous, nature of
consultations in general practice which may form an
evolving process lasting days, weeks, or even years';
ibid: 6), a therapeutic tool and an organisatioal tool.

It was as if time had ceased to be an empty category for
the practitioners, a framework for events, but had itself
become a conditioned variable, and a resource to be used
and understood. Perhaps the most important area where this
was

so was that of the consultation - around which, by the

mid-1970s, a very large literature had built up - and the
concern to map in minute detail the gestures and
strategies of its succesive segments and phases.

353
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

OPERATIONALISING THE REGIME OF SELF-SURVEILLANCE

1. Communication and Consultation

It was around, above all, the specificity and sanctity of
the consultation that general practice's claim to be an
independent clinical discipline was to be laid from the
1960s on. This area was one in which Balint's own work had
a more or less direct influence, although, as Armstrong
has demonstrated, the discourse of the 'doctor-patient
relationship' and its offshoots has a genealogy that
stretches prior to and laterally beyond Balint (Armstrong
1982; Heath 1986: 2). However, this discourse, in fact,
only became central in general practice when connected to
the renewed interest in training. In an introduction to an
important collection on language and the consultation in
general practice, Tanner noted that the emphasis upon the
consultation had been largely due to:
'the recent efforts, mostly sponsored by the
Royal College of General Practitioners, to set
up postgraduate training programmes for
practitioners, both practicing and in training'
(Tanner 1976; 1).
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In Balint's own work, as we have seen, this link is
specifically made; the doctor must train himself to
receive the patient's full communication in the context of
the consultation.

1.i. A subtle transformation was at stake here; one which
marks the transition to a 'consultationism' similar to
that found in Balint's work. For from the 1960s the
'doctor-patient relationship' ceased, in effect, to refer
solely to an ongoing relationship between the doctor and
the patient that he knows well, marked by trust,
confidence and so on. This aspect does not disappear but
it is overshadowed by a more important emphasis, one that
stresses the process of communication almost exclusively
within the narrow confines of the consultation itself.
Thus, the consultation becomes a closely circumscribed
domain where a unique kind of situational logic applies.
Increasingly, studies in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were
to focus upon describing this unique logic and its
variations; and the aim of postgraduate training became
above all to inculcate the special skills of communication
in the consultation.

The theme of communication draws attention to two
emphases. Transformation: communication is intimately
connected to the philosophy of vocational training and
the demands of therapy. Communication, training and
therapy are intrinsically transformative endeavours:
'The purpose of communication is not just to
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deliver a message but to effect a change in the
recipient in respect of his knowledge, his
attitude or eventually his behaviour.., good
communication is difficult. Few can master it
without special tuition and constant attention
to its effectiveness' (Bennett 1976: 4).
Individuality: the practice of communication always
entails an enhanced emphasis on uniqueness, singularity:
'... Communication must be matched to the
knowledge, social background, interest,
purposes, and needs of the recipient. It
requires empathy, which is the power of
projecting one's personality into and so fully
understanding, the object of contemplation ...
(ibid: 4).
Part of this individualistic emphasis linked up, of
course, with the question of relationships and selfsurveillance:
'Communication forms relatonships; without
communication there can be no relationship ...
The doctor needs more than most to monitor his
own behaviour. This is termed 'knowledge of
self' ... but it is difficult because it
resembles an emotional striptease' (Recordon
1972: 818).

The

vocabulary of communication, then, was found to be

any

fitted to the task of linking together otlierwise

disparate aspects of general practice; it works in the

literature like a kind of 'operator' moving across the
field and translating all activities into its own
language. For example, the notion was able to link the
prerogatives of diagnostics (Drury and Hull 1979: 92ff.);
the patient has to communicate his or her problem to the
doctor: treatment; the doctor's job being to understand
the patient's communication and then to communicate the
meaning and purpose of the treatment back to the patient
(Fitton and Acheson 1979: 84; Browne and Freeling 1967:
44; Stimson and Webb 1975): cure; since merely by
communicating a level of self-understanding to the patient
the patient's condition may be improved (a great theme of
Balint's work): prevention; health education being a form
of communication, for example, on matters of lifestyle
(Fletcher 1973: part 2): professional organisation;
governing relations between consultants and the GP and the
GP and his group colleagues and the team (ibid: chapter
3): trainir% itself; training is 'communicative' in that
it induces 'a change in the recipient', or of perspective
in the trainee (e.g. Fitton and Acheson 1979: 6).
Moreover, the notion of communication was a peculiarly
'doctor-centrist' one. For, as Bennett commented,
communication per se never fails; only the communicator in this case the doctor - is subject to failure (Bennett
1976: 127). Hence, one of the first emphases of this
literature was with the transformation of the persona of
the doctor as communicating-device.
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1.ii. It goes without saying that the communication
paradigm fed directly into the emphasis upon the
consultation, the paradigmatic person-to-person encounter.
This was, after all, where consultation was both at its
most problematic and its potentially most powerful. Browne
and Freeling's The Doctor-Patient Relationship (1967) was
one of the most important early contributions - besides
those of their mentor, Balint himself - to this field
(although Shorten 1966 is perhaps the first 'micro-study'
of the consultation). The doctor in the consultation, they
claimed, possessed a very special skill:
'There is a sixth sense to provide information
about the patient; the emotional experience
evoked in the examining doctor by the attitude
and bearing of the patient' (Browne and Freeling
1967: 1; cf. Berne 1961: 84-90).
The consultation was not merely the place where this sixth
sense was deployed, but was also a variable in itself. It
was not where one simply diagnosed a pathology that
existed prior to the consultation 'because any interview
involves interaction between doctor and patient which
begins to modify the situation being presented' (ibid: 1).
Therapeutics, then, is going on all the time in the
consultation; something which has key epistemological
import. For, just as in Balint's work, the primary focus
was directed not towards 'scholastic' theories of
communication but directly towards training in skills of
consultation. To gain 'knowledge' in general practice came
increasingly to signify a mastery of this 'sixth sense' -
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and no epidemiologist or even sociologist could provide
this information. Hence on the basis of, as it were, an
epistemological 'enclosure', general practice knowledge
was to be increasingly confined in its signification to
the acquired learning of general practitioners themselves.
This knowledge had to be earned not simply taught:
'The transaction between doctor and patient is
an interaction. It cannot be demonstrated by
teacher to student or carried out under direct
supervision' (ibid: 63-4).
Rather, what is at stake is a form of knowledge that
eludes codification or strict rules of application by its
very nature:
'The consulting room is as confidential as the
confessional, but the doctor has no rigid data
of religion either to turn to or to beset him'
(ibid: 73).

In fact, this 1 consultationist' emphasis represents the
precondition of that whole secondary emphasis upon the
'doctor-patient relationship' which has been so very
visible in the literature since the 1960s. The
consultation became a kind of enclosed space that was
'scientific' in that it was a space closed off from the
world and its complexities, a domain with a finite number
of homogeneous variables (emotions passing between doctor
and patient), a pure space of communication. The
consultation:
'That most curious and fascinating of micro-
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social systems, where, under a burning glass the
symbolic interaction between patient and
physician can be examined' (Stevens 1974: 6).

But this emphasis also had the effect of obscuring other
domains. In particular the priority of the 'home visit'
has now declined in significance; as indeed it had in
actual - statistical - importance (by 1978 home visits
represented only 0.1% of consultations: Pereira Gray 1978:
14). It was as if the home had become too inconsistent a
domain in comparison to the consultation where one's
emotions could be mobilised repetitively, visit after
visit, alongside the stable personality of the doctor.
Although, in fact, this may have been an epistemological
rationalisation; a change of emphasis due to 'political
exigency' as much as anything else. For, particularly
after the Seebohm Report, the domain of the home became
linked above all with the person of the social worker or
the health visitor, rather than the doctor (on this
question; Hasler and Stewart 1968: 33; Editorial 1968)

1.iii. It was not surprising that this 'scientific' aspect
of the consultation should give rise to forms of study
that attempted to treat the consultation as the equivalent
of a laboratory (Editorial 1975). One expression of this
was the interest in language and behaviour within the
consultation; a form of analysis that combined the
paradigm of communication -

and the generation of
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knowledge about forms of communication

with the more

immediate demands of training.

Byrne and Long's study of 'verbal behaviour' in the
consultation in their Doctors Talking to Patients (1976)
is a good example of this, a work which could not be
further away from the epidemiological emphases of the
project of taxonomy (Byrne and Long: 14-15). Conducting a
micro-verbal analysis of consultations Byrne and Long
criticised the prevalence of what they termed 'doctorcentred behaviour' amongst general-practitioners, opposing
to this, of course, a 'patient-centred' model according to
which the doctor would be sufficiently self-aware as to be
'elastic' in relation to the particular needs of the
individual patient:
'What we are offering here is a sort of camera
with which one may take a picture of one aspect
of a doctor's performance, even a self-portrait.
Given such a picture, the doctor concerned is
then left to decide whether or not he is
satisfied with what he sees. Any doctor who
wishes to do so, trainee or principal, may learn
to analyse his own behaviours ... and monitor
his progress in the use of new behaviours'
(Byrne in Tanner, ed. 1976: 70)
Vocational training, they claimed, was the only means of
instituting this model persona as the norm. However, other
studies tended to be less obviously prescriptive as this
whilst being more overtly

'academic', even multi-
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disicplinary in orientation. Tanner's volume for example sponsored by the College - included contributions from
linguists, psychologists and educationalists as well as
from general practitioners.

Yet what is one to make of this literature? For whom is
the central discovery that 'medicine is more concerned
with language than any other profession with the possible
exception of law' significant (Tanner 1976: 11)? What
practical or theoretical interests is this literature
designed to serve?

Certainly it seems fair to assume that the interest in the
field of consultation analysis went way beyond its
immediate use-value to practitioners themselves. David
Crystal commented, for example, in his contribution that:
'All a linguist can do is analyse interactions
and see whether one's intentions of success or
failure can be supported by pointing to specific
features of the language use' (ibid: 50).
He did not himself, however, attempt such an analysis in
his article but was more interested in the formal
properties of language in the consultation. It is not
surprising, then, that by 1983 Pendleton could note that
whilst there had been a huge upsurge in studies into the
linguistic features of doctor-patient interaction, this
had contributed little of substance to assessing the
actual effectiveness of consultations (Pendleton and
Hasler 1983, 5-53: 46). Moreover, whilst communication
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studies were an essential input into training, it should
be remembered that this input occurred less upon the level
of formal knowledge (that is, the theoretical elaboration
of what to train) than upon the question of how the doctor
should act within the consultation; a preoccupation, for
example, of the influential 'social skills' approach to
consultation training evolved at Oxford (see Wakeford in
Pendleton and Halser 1983: 233-247; also Hasler 1978: 3524). Nevertheless, this latter theme - the notion of skills
specific to the consultation

inevitably came to be

overlaid upon the former theme concerning the matter of
'what was going on' in the consultation. In any case; the
'method'

of

consultation,

rather

than

its

more

traditionally 'clinical' dimensions, came itself to be
largely constitutive of what was meant by Iknowledge'in
general practice and consultation studies took on an
almost exclusively pedagogical import.

1.iv. But in fact, what is most interesting about this
work is less its supposedly practical uses but precisely
the way in which the consultation - and the general
practice consultation in particular - had carved out for
itself such a central position for those elsewhere who
wished to analyse human interaction. This can be seen on
two levels; first in the domain of the social sciences and
secondly, in that of medicine itself.

It would be difficult to ascribe priority to either the
social sciences or medicine with regard to

the
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introduction of interest in the consultation. Armstrong is
surely correct to place a major emphasis upon the works of
Parsons in the 1950s (although he also looks to earlier
works such as those of Brackenbury in the 1930s, and
Parsons himself largely took over the theme from his
mentor L.J. Henderson; Gerhardt 1990: 2; cf. Armstrong
1982). It would be difficult to imagine the theme having
anything like the resonance it did, however, without the
influence of psychoanalysis which took the meeting between
analyst and analysand as its very object. It was no doubt
in part this context that gave consultation studies such
visibility from outside. Thus from a large number of
perspectives, the general practice consultation became a
kind of model space of interaction; a natural setting for
the study of person-to-person interaction in general.
Although, much of this writing carried, and carries,
prescriptive elements, the interest in general practice is
not merely instrumental in relation to that discipline.
For Parsons, of course, the consultation was a model for
the 'social system' in general (Gerhardt 1990; 29, Parsons
1951) and those who have followed him into the field have
necessarily had to modify (and, arguably, trivialize) his
emphasis, as Gerhardt has demonstrated, in order to bring
socio-critical elements into the perspective. Our interest
here, however, does not concern the virtue of all those
studies that have taken the general practice consultation
as their research object but rather it concerns the very
fact itself of the visibility these studies have conferred
upon general practice in general, a branch of medicine
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that seriously seemed as if it might wither away at the
beginning of the 1950s. Under this increasingly scientific
- that is, analytical, objectivising - gaze, the general
practice consultation has become an intense ethical site
in the sense that every smallest gesture, tiniest move,
most insignificant statement is subject to an obsessive
dissection. 'Ethical' because this literature shows that
at each step in the consultation order can be maintained,
a satisfactory solution achieved, only on the basis of
choices - of which the general practitioner must be a
master - which, though apparantly insignificant, maintain
the interaction at its fragile equilibrium. Moreover, the
justificatory infrastructure of all these detailed microanalyses was that, to be able to make these choices both
in an 'elastic' manner and as part of routine day-to-day
performance an entire 'regime' of self-surveillance is
required.

This is because an attention to ethical choices always
presupposes a sphere of freedom, that is, an area where a
multiplicity of choices are possible. How is the doctor to
do the right thing given all these options? Given this
ethicalisation of the consultation it was inevitable that
consideration should be made more and more of the kind of
person the general practitioner should be so as to be able
to make these choices spontaneously. The focus should not
be upon the body of knowledge at his disposal so much as
upon his own disposition in relation to the body of
knowledge that he wields. The ethicalisation of the
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consultation has thus made possible the birth of the
general practitioner as a particular kind of person; and
hence of a particular kind of professional being. The socalled 'renaissance' of general practice is then
inseperable from this ethicalisation, which allowed
general practice to perform an act of 'enclosure' around
its activities.

For the enhanced profile of general practice also
depended upon the fact that general practice was able to
claim an exemplary status within medicine itself in
relation to the characteristics of the consultation. This
act of 'enclosure' was achieved, of course, only by
vaunting the sanctity and uniqueness of the 'the central
medical act, the consultation' (RCGP 1972: xii, also
chapters 2 & 3). This was largely due to that emphasis already referred to - into the diagnostic pathways
employed by the doctor. Under the impact of writers like
Karl Popper (and, later, Americans like Elstein), it came
to be noted that doctors typically deployed a kind of
problem-solving deductive intuitionism in their practices.
An important RCGP publication from 1972, for example,
stated that the notion of innocent

i.e. inductive

observation was, in fact, a myth:
In reality, of course, no such innocent
observation is possible ... it is the process of
recognition and testing which is the basis for
clinical problem-solving' (RCGP 1972; 22, 44).
This general interest clearly privileged the domain of
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general practice since it was the area where initial
diagnostic choices were at their widest. Soon, textbooks
upon clinical method in general tended to take general
practice as their model, so that it came to be argued usually, in the context of training - that a period in
general practice was essential for all doctors who wished
to learn good habits of clinical method (ibid: 22; cf.
Wright and MacAdam 1979; Fraser 1987: esp. 82-3; also
Wright 1975: 721; Marinker 1978: 203). It is interesting
that one side of this work was a clear challenge to the
'charismatic' approach to the question of diagnosis
apparantly favoured by hospital consultants. Thus in
contrast to the 'traditional' approach according to which
'the process of diagnosis was left undefined, a natural
art, or explained as a process of intuition' it was
recognized that although diagnosis came after long
experience to be a matter of intuition it nevertheless
followed wholly rational principles of hypothesis
generation and testing (Gale and Marsden 1983).

What is important here is the notion that general practice
was the optimal place - in the context of all medicine to teach the situational logic of clinical method. And of
course, the proviso went with this that training should
take place not in an abstract manner - for instance, in
the lecture theatre - but in situ, or as it was termed,
in a situation of 'hot learning' (RCGP 1972: 9). Hence, it
was characteristic of discussions of training to emphasise
practical forms of the inculcation of knowledge. After
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all, the process of learning is not the mere inculcation
of knowledge but - in a clear parallel with the
communication literature - involved actual changes in
behaviour:
'All learning results in a change in the
learner's behaviour. Teaching is therefore the
attempt to modify his behaviour in a given
direction' (RCGP 1972; 1).
Indeed, a distinction can be made between 'training' which
is the inculcation of task-orientation and specific
skills, and mere 'education' which entails more of a fixed
content and more formal methods (Cormack et al. 1987: 345). As for methods of training these would have to avoid
all formal forms such as lectures, and instead focus upon
small group work (task-centred or process-centred). For
general practice is, after all, primarily about
relationships:
'He will usually work in a group with other
general practitioners ... with the help of
paramedical colleagues ... Even if he is in
single-handed practice, he will work in a team
and delegate when necessary' (RCGP 1972; 1).
Group work is good for the students in that 'it challenges
their beliefs and attitudes and abilities to work with one
another in order to explore developing relationships'
(Cormack at al. 1981: 65). Thus all learning in the
context of postgraduate education is self-learning, selfdiscovery; but also discovery of self. But in order to
institute such a regime of self-learning, an entire
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'infrastructure' was required; a whole set of linkages
which would allow a particular kind of doctor to appear,
without the mediation of formal, 'scholastic', knowledge.
What was the nature of this infrastructure to be?

The form that teaching employed entailed a homology
between patient and doctor and trainer and trainee, very
similar to those we have found within Balint's work:
'Just as the patient goes to the doctor seeking
help with health, so the trainee goes to the
trainer seeking help with his education. Just as
the doctor has experience of patient's problems,
special skills in helping them and a wish to do
so, so the traineer has special experience of
trainee's problems, special skills in training,
and a wish to help' (Pereira Gray 1982: 133; cf.
Freeling and Barry 1982; 11).

A 'line of force' was thus created running from the
patient at one end to the skills of the trainer at the
other. But where there is homology so there is economy;
simplification. A similar strategy to that of Balint's
'doctor-centrism' is at stake here. Just as Balint
economised by not working with patients directly but with
doctors instead, so the College turned the burden of its
attentions to the question of the trainer and his
relations with the trainee. It was to be, above all, to
the 'training of the trainers' that the main efforts of
the College - especially

from the mid-1970s - were
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destined to turn (e.g. Freeman and Byrne 1976 [2nd ed.];
Freeling and Barry 1982, an account of the Nuffield
Project set up in 1973 involving the RCGP and the
Tavistock Clinic; also Editorial 1972 and for an earlier
emphasis, Report 1965: 74)). After all, if one gets the
right trainers, the rest of the equation will take care of
itself. A chain of identifications is created: trainees
identify with the attributes of trainers; trainees become
doctors, and patients identify with doctors. To institute
the regime of self-surveillance as it ultimately effects
the patient it is, in fact, to the trainers that one must
begin.

But if the trainer is the key personage at the end of this
chain of identifications, it is the trainee who is, as it
were, the pivot that links the trainer on the one hand,
and the whole person of the patient on the other. The
patient will be the subject of the next chapter. For now,
however, we are in a position to begin with this personage
at the centre of this chain of identifications; the
trainee.

4. Trainees: Individuality, Ethics and Ideals

Those sitting the MRCGP and those undertaking vocational
training can be considered together since the former was
designed specifically to 'map' the latter; thus, the MRCGP
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was effectively conceived as a certificate of vocational
training. What is it that this exam is designed to assess?

4.i. The MRCGP examination was designed to test 'the
knowledge, skills and attitudes of the candidate in 'whole
person' medicine' (Moulds et al. 1978; 3). Thus, the
destiny both of the College MRCGP and, through it,
vocational training in general are aligned specifically to
the project of 'whole-person medicine'. Taking a
publication from the middle of our period as an index
(Moulds et al. 1978; cf. Hall 1983), the exam has five
components; an essay-paper which examines diagnostic
ability and clinical management on the basis of 'gobbets'
of case-records. The gobbets appear as parts of a long
'narrative' of a single case-history (taken in stages,
with the candidate not allowed to look ahead at the
outcome of each stage) in order for the 'longitudinal'
and contingent dimensions of general practice to be
tested. Second, a traditonal essay paper dealing with
subjects clinical, administrative, psychological and so
on. 'Correct' answers are arrived at by peer consensus on
the part of the examiners. Third, a very wide-ranging
multiple choice paper. Fourth, an oral based on the
candidates 'log diary' of his experience in the training
practice and centred primarily on organisational and
administrative matters. This oral:
'brings candidate and examiners into direct
contact, thus affording the former a chance to
express

his

personality,

expertise

and
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compassion and the latter the opportunity to
assess these attributes (within the limits of
their own skills in the matter)' (Moulds et al.:
22).
Lastly, a 'problem-solving' oral based on clinical
material.

4.ii. What sort of doctor is the ideal here? First of all,
the practitioner must be 'reflexive' and person-centred.
We are struck by the huge range of subjects that the
general practitioner has to know. In another work, largely
concerned with the content of vocational training, Freeman
and Byrne (1973) outlined six major areas, each divided
into a multiplicity of subsections, in which the doctor
should be competent; clinical knowledge, society and
medicine, the practice, research, continuing education and
attitutes. Just as in the 1950s, so now the domain of
evidence of general practice is very wide.

Yet the accomplished trainee is not expected to be the
unequivocal master of all things. And nor is an attempt
made to hone down all the varieties of practice
circumstances to some underlying principle. What is
required is not omniscience but evidence of a certain
level of 'competence', an ability to deal with the
everyday uncertainty and heterogeneity of practice (ibid:
86). A related point was to be voiced by Marinker:
'The so-called facts of clinical medicine and
the theoretical frameworks which underpin them
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will change considerably through the
professional lifetime of the students and
trainees whom we teach. What will not change are
the criteria by which they judge the quality of
their own thinking and that of their colleagues'
(Cormack et al., eds. 1981: 122, 107).
Above all, what is required is a 'reflexive' kind of
rationality able to derive an orientation towards future
action on the basis of past knowledge and experience. Now
competence is indexed by personality; indices of good
trainees tend to focus not upon actual 'results' so much
as upon general factors of personality. Important amongst

these might be the attribute of 'flexibility' (see the
critique of 'rigidity' in Byrne and Long 1976: e.g. 112)
in the face of events or 'elasticity' in relation to the
individuality of patients (Fletcher 1973). Study of the
non-'medical' sciences can help here in that they raise
the trainee's sensitivity to individual, personal factors;
thus contributing to the development of 'maturity' (an
important term) in the trainee; that is, they have as much
of an ethical as an epistemological import. Thus, for
example, the Gillie Report stated that:
'There is evidence that appreciation of human
environmental problems adds to the students' own
maturity and counteracts the sectional and
mechanistic outlook that can result from
intensive academic training in matters of
scientific exactitude and specialised technique'
(Central Health Services Council 1963: 49).
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Similarly, the best trainees, in Freeman and Byrne's
account were those who showed a good 'all-round balance'
on the 'personal' index of variables of intelligence,
aptitude and ability, personality and attitude (ibid: 7).
An important attribute here is that of 'confidence'; not
just in the sense of self-belief so much as selfknowledge, and the ability to act as a 'support' for
patients:
'The doctor should be willing to take his
patients into his confidence and to explain his
proposals in terms appropriate to the individual
patient. He should give patients confidence,
give them his full co-operation and relieve
their anxiety' (ibid; 15).
Thus, what is at stake here is less an omniscient
scientist than explicitly a 'person-centred' practitioner
- 'kind, courteous, honest and humble' (ibid: 24) - with
'the capacity to define a patient's problems, to undertake
management and therapy and to relate with patients and
colleagues' (ibid: 11).

Second, the heterogeneity of information at his disposal,
means that the (trainee) doctor should be sensitive, above
all, to individuality, to the unique event. This
uniqueness is manifested, first of all, in the person of
the patient. The whole person is the amalgam of a variety
of perspectives. As Armstrong has described:
'This "whole person" is the product of a series
of

smaller

discourses

(on

compliance,
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communication, etc.) which, though intertwined
with one another, have contributed several
elements to the final perception of the patient;
a "subject" imbued with personal meanings,
constructs, feeling, subjectivity, etc. The
whole person is a multi-dimensional rather than
a unitary being' (Armstrong 1982; 119).
These dimensions meet up, as it were, in the doctor's own
intuition; the doctor, as Marinker is to put it, must
'compose all of his diagnoses simultaneously in physical,
psychological and social terms', the relative weight of
which will determine the individuality of each case
(Cormack et al 1981; 125). But, secondly, this quasiintuitive process itself requires self-surveillance on the
part of the doctor:
'the doctor has to learn how to cope with this
information, and how to take decisions about
priorities and appropriateness. In this the
study of the patient begins to encompass a study
of the doctor himself' (ibid: 128).
We find here once more what we earlier termed a doctorcentrist emphasis proper to forms of 'person-centred'
medicine. The advocacy of person-centred medicine always
begins with the self-cultivation of the doctor.

To sum up: the examiners seem to be searching for evidence
of an 'ethical' vocation in the candidate. This is less a
matter of 'what must I do?' in a set of given situations
but 'what must I be?' in general terms in order to
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accomodate, through the necessary situational logic, a
variety of circumstances, typical and unforeseen; in other
words, the doctor must be a persona able to cope with
uncertainty. A certain sense of balance is a requirement
here. The doctor must have a level of humility in the face
of his generic lack of knowledge, yet should be strong
enough to give support for those more in need, more
uncertain even than he:
t

• • •

however laudable it may be for a general

practitioner to display a proper sense of
humility at all times, it must be pointed out
that many experienced examiners hold strongly to
the idea that a doctor who has not yet learned
that a patient wants his doctor to be confident,
wholly absorbed by his disease and yet deeply
compassionate and objective, all at the same
time, is not yet suitable for membership of the
Royal College of General Practitioners ... you
should display to your examiners that although
you are a reasonably confident and safe doctor
you are at the same time deeply aware of your
own limitations in coping with all the trials
and tribulations to which humankind is prone'
(ibid: 23).
Again, there is evidence here that general practice has
become largely an 'ethical' matter; a domain where what
matters is the particular quality of the human being in
question.
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4.iii. That it is above all the personality - or, at
least, the doctor's personal competence - that is at stake
in vocational training can further be seen from Freeman
and Byrne's assessment of the aims and effects of
training. That there should be any doubt about the aims
which training sought to achieve may seem slightly
suprising. Yet, in fact, early writings on this matter
were rather vague. The Todd Report, for example, seemed to
place the reasons for the setting up of vocational
training squarely in the realms of the promotion of
professional satisfaction:
'doctors are dissatisfied with the absence of
information about the prospects offered by
alternative careers, the lack of clearly defined
paths towards them and the inadequate or uncordinated provision of appropriate training'
(Royal Commission 1968: 41).
However, it was only in 1976 (2nd ed.) that Freeman and
Byrne were able to report that:
'there does appear to be good reason for the
implementation of vocational training. It is the
first time that systematic and objective
evidence has been produced on this widely
assumed point' (Freeman and Byrne 1976: 11).
Freeman and Byrne claim that those schemes judged by them
as being of high quality were most effective at changing
the personality of the doctor, entailing a movement away
from:
the

characteristics

of

rigidity,
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authoritarianism and cynicism towards a doctor
committed to patient-centred medicine, that is,
a form of medicine that seeks to interpret the
wishes of the patient and to respect the
patients autonomy' (ibid: 1976; 11).
Reviewing these findings Pereira Gray wrote that:
'Many trainers think there are major aspects of
personality which may affect attitudes to
practice and patient care ... (if) training
courses have the ability to alter these
variables it is a finding of immense
significance' (Pereira Gray 1982: 215).
So, just as for Balint - and Freeman and Byrne have a
similar liking for group methods (since weaker traineees
gain when in groups with better trainees) - the aim is to
produce something like a 'limited but fundamental' change
in the doctor's personality. Again, what is at stake, what
is being mobilised here, is the ethical quality of the
doctor. This has ceased to be merely a necessary condition
for good doctoring; it has now become constitutive of it.

4.iv. But this 'ethical' ideal of the doctor's persona
seems actually to be formed upon the recognition of two,
perhaps not entirely complementary, principles. First,
that stressing the importance of (diagnostic) patternrecognition and, second, that stressing the (more
mystical) apostolic function of the doctor. Now, what can
be described as the traditional ideal of 'clinical
experience' located a 'charismatic' element in both. The
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'clinical mentality', as Freidson termed it, was as much a
matter of 'tacit' as it was of 'technical' knowledge
(Freidson 1970; cf. for the distinction between 'tacit'
and 'technical', Jamous and Peloille 1970; also the
fascinating piece by Roche, 1984). The doctor's skill at
diagnosis was seen here as entailing more or less
'thaumaturgic' powers; hence the ability to diagnose was
an element of the doctor's charisma (cf. Foucault 1973:
81). For the general medical practice of the 1970s,
however, the two become separated. Diagnostic skills,
though they become intuitive through experience, are
basically rational and do not derive from the 'charisma of
illumination' (to adopt Max Weber's apt term). On the
contrary, they locate the basis of the doctor's powers in
the highly 'rational' - if subconscious - fabrication of
diagnostic

1 schemas'. Hence,

the possibility of a

technological extension of such schemas - for example,
through methods of computer modelling that explain or
reproduce artificially diagnostic processes (RCGP 1985a) has not at all been posed in opposition to whole-person
medicine; presumably since both are dependent upon the
doctorcentrist foregrounding of the doctor's own reasoning
powers.

Nevertheless, a curiously 'irrational' component seems
also necessarily to inhere within this very 'rationality'.
For whole-person medicine itself dictates that the doctor
must be conceived as being essentially 'supportive', and
must have a link to the patient, based on the emotional

379
'rapport' of the 'doctor-patient relationship'. This sense
of rapport, or sympathy, is an important mechanism of
individualisation:
'The sense of welcome, of interest in this
person as a person distinct from the one before
and the one after, and of readiness to listen to
whatever problem this person chooses to present
- these things can go far to determine the
success or failure of the consultation' (RCGP
1972: 44).

A 'structural' problem seems to arise here in that the
debunking of the doctor's charismatic powers may serve to
undermine the grounds for the success of his powers of
reasoning (a topic which aroused some anxiety amongst
general practitioners at a recent conference of the MSD
Foundation; 1989). If the doctor's skills are simply those
of 'pattern-recognition', for example, what grounds can
there be for seeking to promote and maintain the personal
and 'irrational' - yet therapeutic - rapport with the
patient? Of course, these are, in fact, two strands of the
same doctor-centrist logic whereby what is at stake is
always the doctor's power (rational or irrational) to
define everything that happens in the consultation. The
different lineages of these two sides of the doctor's
competence - 'rational' and 'irrational' - will appear
later in our discussion of the 'governmental
consciousness' of the regime of self-surveillance; now we
turn to the trainers.
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5. Trainers: Operationalising the Regime of SelfSurveillance

Through the figure of the trainer were to pass all the
problemisations of what an ideal practitioner was. The
trainer is, so to speak, the end-term of the regime of
self-surveillance.

5.i. Trainers obviously had an exemplary status:
'future teachers should be drawn from those
doctors who are known not only as able and
thorough clinicians, but who also have training
in teaching skills and techniques ... [The
College] proposes to assume responsibility for
advising on standards in teaching practices, and
for reviewing them periodically. It intends to
continue its policy of approving vocatonal
training shcmes for general practice, for the
purpose of its membership examination' (Report
1972: 79, 83).
The College was to take as its task how, as it were, to
'operationalise' the required qualities, and it was to do
this especially through the device of monitoring training
schemes themselves by designating that any graduates from
an approved scheme should be eligible automatically to sit
the MRCGP exam. What, in fact, the College sought was
restrictions upon practice such that only those
practitioners that it had approved could be responsible
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for the training of others. Thus, by the time it had come
to greet the 1976 NHS Bill, the College was fully
committed to a strategy of professionalisation through, as
it were, self-discipline:
'The Bill will create a precedent in British
medicine since it formally places a constraint
upon a doctor's right to practice in the NHS
which goes beyond the traditional requirement of
being a fully registered medical practitioner'
(Editorial 1976: 631; cf. the comments of
Pereira Gray 1982: chapter 17, esp. 189).
Of course, it would be naive to view this stratew .z.
discipline as in some manner working against the interests
of the profession itself. On the contrary; 'professional
control has in fact been completely retained by the
medical profession' (Pereira Gray 1982: 189). What was at
stake was, rather, the profession's right to discipline
itself, and, in so doing, to define its territory and
tasks. The College's strategy hence became that of
disciplining the rest of the general practice profession
in the name of the 'person-centred' philosophy that it
espoused.

5.ii. What were these values to be? One of the first of
the courses to consider the question of trainers was the
Nuffield Project that the College set up in collaboration
with the Tavistock Clinic in 1973 in order:
1

to disseminate widely among GPs expertise in

identifying the core content of general medical
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practice and in designing and operating
curricula appropriate to teach it' (Freeling and
Barry 1982: xi).
The authors sought to construct 'above all a curriculum
which includes a good deal of self-directed learning [to]
foster self-awareness, personal flexibility, and skills
and critical review' (ibid: 8). The authors delineated a
'double-motive' to their research; to institute a personcentred medicine and a learner-centred education (ibid:
11). On the basis of small-group training methods the
courses would seek to instill in the trainers the values
of a good recall of factual knowledge, of the performance
of manual skills, of interpersonal skills and of selfunderstanding (ibid: 13). The most valued skills were the
making of clinical judgements and problem-solving in
addition to communication skills, the gathering of
information, and relating to colleagues (lowest of all in
the hierarchy were surgical skills) (ibid: 115). In other
words, we have a set of emphases here which are exactly
analogous to those referring to the trainees; loosely, the
import of

autonomy,

self-reliance,

self-reflection,

critical judgement, sensitivity to individuality,
pragmatism, discretion and so forth. What was actually at
stake was, in fact, less the vaunting of an extreme ethic
of humanisation but a balance to be achieved between
extremes of behaviour, in order to produce a well-rounded,
well-adjusted doctor, a composite personality. In short, a
personality well fitted to the project of recuperation;
reasoned but sensitive to the modulations of the realm of
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personal qualities. Thus, for example, the authors sought
to use a form of personality measurement derived from the
work of Jung, and Eysenck, which sought to operationalise
and idealise the median point between the values of
'tough-minded / tender-minded', 'conservative / radical',
'extraversion / introversion'

,

1

sensing / intuition',

'thinking / feeling' and 'judgement / perception' (ibid:
29); the good practitioner being the one who best
reconciled these extremes of desirable conduct.

5.iii. If there was a problem with this kind of evaluative
method it lay in the fact that it sought to assess
trainers outside the context in which they themselves
worked; that is, their own practices. Its premises were
viewed as being too abstract. A document from the very end
of our period serves to illustrate the problems that arose
when this deficiency was addressed and to show how
considerations of the nature (or the 'core content' as the
doctors liked to put it) of general practice tended to
resort to considerations of the persona of the doctor
himself. This report is useful in that it sought to focus
not (as in the earlier vocational training literature)
upon the doctor's potential but upon actual competence.

In 1980 the College set up two working parties to devise a
method of 'assessing the performance of established
general practitioners in the setting of their own
practices' (RCGP 1985b: 1). The context of these
investigations was really two-fold; first, that of the
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trainers literature (a practice that was well-assessed
would qualify as a training practice) and secondly, as
part of the increasingly burgeoning literature on 'audit'
(especially self-audit) and 'quality'. It is striking how
the person-centred influence was still very much a feature
of the working parties:
'between them the seven members brought a long
experience of family medicine, work in Balint
groups, involvement in medical education at all
levels, intimate knowledge of the MRCGP
examination, and active participation in trainer
selection procedures' (ibid: 1).
Yet, they took what was conceived as a novel form of
practice-assessment (although the emphasis as such was
hardly novel):
'The working party decided to tackle the problem
in a totally different way, going back to first
principles and focusing primarily on the general
practitioner rather than on general practice.
What were the attributes that really mattered?
Which qualities would he or she need to possess
in order to discharge adequately the diverse and
formidable oblications of a general practitioner
in today's society?' (ibid: 1-2).
In fact, as will become evident, the findings of the
working parties represent a useful crystallisation of
long-standing themes rather than any novel conceptual
innovations.
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The working parties decided that the ideal doctor should
have four desirable attributes in particular. First,
clinical competence. The doctor should use a personal but
logical, observant and unrushed approach to clinical
matters:
'he carefully follows up his patient and
actively seeks to learn the consequences of his
action or inaction ... He employs opportunistic
health education and constantly re-inforces
advice on lifestyles; and by giving relevant
information freely to patients tries to
encourage them to share responsibility for their
own health care' (ibid: 2).
Second, accessibility. Above all, the patient - as well as
the doctor's own colleagues - should have more or less
free acess to the doctor. Third, the ability to
communicate. The doctor should be attuned to the
'wavelength' of his patients and colleagues. This also
involves a 'transformative' element:
'He shares information and decision-making with
the patient as much as possible; the patient
feels supported and encouraged by the doctor,
and better informed than before, and so feels
more capable of handling future episodes of
similar illness' (ibid: 2).
Fourth - and probably most importantly - there is
'professional values', that is, above all:
'the doctor's perception of his relation to
individual patients and

to

the practice
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community; his ideals and sense of priorities;
the spirit which motivates and guides him in the
general evolution of practice' (ibid: 2).
Professional values relates to patients as well as his
colleagues:
'He sees that part of his professional role is
to bring about a measure of independence; he
encourages self-help and keeps in bounds his own
need to be needed' (ibid: 2).

This document may be said to lie at the apotheosis of the
discursive logic of 'person-centred' medicine in general
practice. That discipline is now conceived, not as a body
of thought with its own proper object, but as
fundamentally a kind of ethic. What has become important,
above all, is the mobilisation of professional values,
that is the virtuous qualities of persons. Indeed it is
this ethical context of general practice that is now held
to provide in the first place the grounds for its
disciplinary specificity and, hence, autonomy. General
practice has become simply that form of activity practiced
by a specific kind of persona invested with a requisite
number of 'values', the general practitioner. It has
become a technology for the instillation of particular
modes of personhood.

It is not surprising, in this context, that it was soon
discovered that the personality of the trainer has a
direct bearing upon that of the trainee. Trainers are not
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merely 'exemplary' in relation

to trainees; rather the

former have a direct influence on the educational outcomes
of the latter. A study in 1982,

for example, found that

the knowledge and skills of the

trainer - his 'personal

interests and attitudes' - were more important variables
in education than the actual methods used in training.
Thus the results of a survey to sample the influence of
trainers on trainees showed that:
'the teachers clinical knowledge and problemsolving skills in patient management are major
determinants in the trainees learning and
performance, irrespective of the trainees scores
on entry, and that compatability of cognitive
style and personality between teacher and
trainee helps the learning process' (RCGP 1982).
In short, the trainer acts upon the trainee in a manner
analogous to the way in which the doctor is held to act
upon the patient; the latter in each case comes to
identify with the former. Thus the trainer is a kind of
relay point directed ultimate l y at a certain kind of
patient.
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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE GOVERNMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE REGIME
OF SELF-SURVEILLANCE

1. Autonomy, Maturity, Responsibility

In what follows, some 'lines of force' will be analysed
which link the logic of Balintism to a wider 'neo-liberal'
problematic of government. It should be made clear at the
outset, however, that what is to be detailed here will be
just one mode in which Balintism has been mobilised by the
practitioners associated with the College. We seek to show
how the logic of Balintism has been 'taken up' in a
particular ethico-political context; and how this has no
doubt entailed something of a translation of some of
Balint's own original teachings into a more or less novel
context.

1.i. Earlier we linked general practice in the 1950s to a
wider - 'welfarist' - rationality of pronatalism. This had
several elements: in particular an emphasis upon the large
space of the population, an emphasis upon the status of
the child - which lead to a problematisation of the role
of the mother - and a normative aspiration towards the
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promotion of 'solidarity'. The person-centred perspective
that we have seen in this chapter being grounded in the
notion of training since the early-1960s, however, became
amenable by the end of the 1970s to what can be described
as a 'neo-liberal' logic of governmentality. This term is
intended, however, in a rather limited sense. Perhaps this
is best expressed by saying that person-centred general
practice - existing as it does necessarily within a
predominantly welfarist institutional network, the
National Health Service - has found itself aligned with
certain typically non-welfarist but rather neo-liberal
themes (for which; Rose and Miller 1991).

The governmental rationality of neo-liberalism can best be
described in relation to what it opposes. One might
describe its programmatic trajectory as a 'degovernmentalisation of the state'; the removal of the
varied regulatory apparatuses of life-conduct away from
the purview of the state:
'Neo-liberal political rhetoric breaks with the
assumptions, explanations and vocabularies of
the field of political discourse mapped out by
welfare. Against the assumption that the ills of
social and economic life are to be addressed by
the government, it deploys theories of
government overreach and overload' (Rose and
Miller 1991: 48-9).
One particular target here is the so-called 'culture of
dependency' (ibid: 49) whereby citizens are held to become
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morally (if not also economically) dependent upon the
state apparatus, towards which they have a relation of
passivity and reactivity, Thus a neo-liberal logic of
government would seek to replace this regime of dependency
with a citizenship model based upon:
'active entrepreneurship ... to replace the
passivity and dependency of responsible
solidarity as individuals are encouraged to
strive to optimise their own quality of life and
that of their families' (ibid: 49).
The economic vocabulary is endemic here. Both in the
literal sense that the individual is to become a kind of
'entrepreneur' maximising his or her own resources in the
market place - regardless of the regressive norm of
solidarity and collectivity - and because economic
calculation is held up as a desirable metaphor for social
behaviour in general, goal-directed, rational, always
striving for the maximisation of resources:
'Economic entrepreneurship is to replace
regulation, as active agents seeking to maximise
their own advantage are both the the legitimate
locus of decisions about their own affairs and
the most effective in calculating actions and
outcomes' (ibid: 49).

Now, it will be argued in what follows that there are
certain very striking features of the project of selfsurveillance and training that have certain points of
alignment with this general neo-liberal project - at least
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at

the

'programmatic'

level

(for

'ideologically',

differences have frequently been all too obvious). This is
not to argue that general practice has become
straightforwardly neo-liberal; rather that much of its
defining philosophy has lent itself to wider neo-liberal
trends 1 .Thus, our argument is not that general practice
embodies a govermental rationality of neo-liberalism but
that its own 'governmental consciousness' is, in certain
respects, consonant with that project.

In the 1960s, programmatic writings about general practice
changed the burden of their emphases away from an
implicitly 'welfarist s governmental consciousness towards
a programmatic emphasis upon the inculcation of autonomy
and individuality. Thus, for example, the 'population'
emphasis (exemplified by epidemiology) was transferred
firmly towards a focus upon precisely what is particular
or unique about the individual. The emphasis upon family
relationships in the home moved decisively towards the
homogeneous space of individual - adult - persons in
general. Of course, the home and the family remained
important (after all, the label of general practice as
'family' practice stems from the 1960s) but they certainly.
lose their centrality of emphasis in relation to the
vaunting of persons and their relationships in 4eneral;
family relationships become important only in the context
of their particular emotional mobilisation within the
consultation.
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One consequence of this movement was that general practice
now lacked an explicit sphere of specificity beyond the
generality of attendees at the surgery. Thus, certain
exemplary targets, specific categories of person such as
the child and the mother, lose their high profile in the
literature. What came to replace these targets was only a
homogeneous field of relationships; anybody who turned up
at the surgery became, in this sense, an exemplary kind of
target. Nevertheless, it is of course possible to argue
that this generalisation of the concerns of practice was
itself predicated on an implicit privileging of certain
targets; and a scrutiny of these might be expected to
yield insight into the nature of general practice as a
particular mode of tutelage, a particular technology
confronting a particular kind of subject.

1.ii. The most obvious candidate here would be the
depressed or anxious woman. This troubled personage might
act as a kind of yardstick for the ethical imperatives at
stake in the age of training, a personage who - although
rarely singled out on a theoretical level - appears again
and again in case-histories and accounts of general
practice.

Take, for example, the case of Mrs Gale reported in
Pendleton and Hasler (1983) in the context of a chapter
devoted to 'the doctor as the equivalent of a laboratory
investigation' (166-174; cf. RCGP 1972: 4-8 for similar
cases; Recordon 1972: esp. 819-821; also Balint 1957
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passim for this kind of case-study). Mrs Gale consulted
her doctor with two exemplary disorders of this period;
anxiety and depression (ibid: 171-3). What is at stake in
the doctor's attempt to treat this condition? The doctor's
actual role is to give support to the patient through the
use of 'empathy' (ibid: 166). By observing his own
reactions (that is, by making a 'laboratory investigation'
of himself) the doctor should be able to isolate what is
most dangerous - contradictions in the identity of the
patient:
'the doctor should identify any incongruities
between components of his observations,
including his empathic ones, and seek to explain
them and make predictions

to

test his

observations' (ibid: 166).
The therapeutic ideal at stake here is that of
'consistency'

in

the

patient.

But

what

defines

'consistency' here? Not, to be sure, any ideal norm
posited by the doctor. On the contrary, the patient should
be consistent only in relation to herself. Closely tied to
the notion of consistency is that of 'maturity'. A mature
person is somebody who is able to retain consistency in
the face of the unforeseen variety of life-situations; in
other words - and an analogy with the ethical stance of
the doctor can be drawn here - the patient should be able
to remain flexible in the face of uncertainty:
'Maturity is seen as the ability to integrate
new experiences in such a way as to produce the
optimum response' (ibid: 173; cf. Browne and
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Freeling).
The doctor's role, given this situation, is to act as a
kind of 'prop' for the patient during the period of low
maturity - 'to help patients avoid maladaptive responses
and achieve optimum development as individuals' (ibid: 74)
- and thus, during this period, give the patient the
shelter to develop her personal autonomy anew. In this
process, the doctor may use his charismatic 'authority'
selectively and put himself forward - 'offer' himself in
Balint's terms - as the 'model' with which the patient can
identify:
'therapeutic activities included acting as a
confidant with whom the failure of situations to
develop could be shared, and acting as a model
for new coping behaviour ... allowing the
patient to work through stressful life-events in
the safe house of a secure doctor-patient
relationship ... (and) the opportunity to obtain
stimulus within it' (ibid: 173, 171).

There has certainly occurred here something of a shift of
vocabulary from the terms of Balint's own work. But if
Balint's psychoanalytic vocabulary has been translated
here - by his own pupils - into one of life events and
coping that was to gain an enhanced currency across the
1970s then, nevertheless, the basic rationality remains
un-changed, the doctor is to act as a kind of temporary
support during treatment, a 'container', as Bion would put
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it, for the patient's underlying anxieties which are now
expressed as illness.

What is the condition with which Mrs Gale was suffering?
'Depression' - defined as a 'reaction to situations which
threaten self-perceived maturity' (ibid: 173) - clearly
has a kind of ethico-political meaning. It is the absence
of autonomy. And autonomy itself - certainly, as we have
seen, the most positive ethical value for the doctor - is
thus the highest ethical value for patients. It is not
surprising, then, that the 'cure' of Mrs Gale entailed her
perceiving only what she already knew herself; with the
aid of the doctor who, as it were, 'lent' his maturity and
autonomy to her she herself was able to return to maturity
and autonomy. The capacity for reflexivity - perhaps
better expressed as self-responsibility - is clearly a
condition of a return to normality; the patient has to be
able to monitor herself anew. So, although the doctor has
used a certain amount of 'authority' it was only so that
the patient might regain this self-perception; as is
proved by the fact that after the event the patient
realised that the doctor had done what she had wanted all
along. Thus the case showed how:
'the doctor was concerned to allow Mrs Gale to
retain her personal autonomy and that she saw
herself as having done so since she told the
doctor he had done what she had hoped for'
(ibid: 171).
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The case of Mr Gale seems to raise two themes. The first
is the curative model implicit in the treatment itself,
and the second relates to expertise in general. As for the
model of cure, it seems clear that what is required is
that the patient should be returned to a state of
maturity, responsibility and autonomy; values, in fact,
that we have already seen to be crucial for both trainees
and trainers. There is an implicit model of pathology at
stake here. Going to see the doctor seems to represent, by
definition, a temporary lack of maturity and
responsibility. The doctor acts as a 'support' whilst the
patient is unable to support him- or herself without help.
This is indeed why the doctor must be autonomous, mature,
and self-responsible in an exemplary way; in order to take
on the burden of supporting somebody else, of, as it were,
temporarily supplying their maturity, autonomy and selfresponsibility. And - second - this raises an interesting
problem. For in the final analysis, what actually
separates doctor and patient as ethical subjects?

Lill. Patients themselves are, on the logic of the
person-centred model, clearly conceived as possessing a
certain form of expertise; namely into their own self. A
recent volume on the nature of the consultation ('meetings
between experts') has can serve as a summation of this
theme:
'patients already act as experts in their own
self-care and have to be considered as
individuals who interpret and make sense of what
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happens to them' (Tuckett et al. 1985: 14, also
217-9).
On the other hand, if patients have expertise, then
doctors are themselves not unlike patients (cf. on this
theme; Arney and Bergen 1985: 47). Bennet has expressed
this shamanic idea very forcefully in his plea for
medicine to adopt a psychotherapeutic model, by claiming
that the doctor is by definition a kind of 'wounded
healer', somebody who can only cure because he himself has
suffered (Bennet 1979: 181-7; cf. Bourne 1976: esp. 492).
In this case the doctor's expertise derives from his
experience; he is not substantially different from those
he has treated except in that he has turned it to the aid
of others.

Most accounts, however, seek to rescue a dividing line
between doctor and patient by allusion to various
equivalents to that contradiction in the doctors functions
that we referred to at the end of the last section,
between the doctor's rational powers of 'patternrecognition' and something more mystical, approximating to
what Balint called the 'apostolic function'. Effectively
all notions specifying the nature of the doctor's
expertise have to emphasise the continued import of the
latter in the face of its possible eclipse on the basis of
the former.

Freeling, for example, distinguished between the doctor's
power and the doctor's authority (Freeling 1978).
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Authority, he says, is formal (deriving merely from the
doctor's education, greater experience and so forth) but
power is conferred on the possessor by those who are being
treated:
'Power is accorded to those who show their
patients that they can be trusted to use it
altruistically' (ibid: 335-6).
Authority should not be used therapeutically, according to
Freeling; when it is 'we fail to help our patients develop
appropriate attitudes, perceptions and skills concerning
control, and their difficulties may be confounded' (ibid:
338). But power is acceptable since it is, effectively,
actually conferred by the patient: 'power is given to
those "who can" it is not given to those who must possess
authority before they dare "do"' (ibid: 336). A similar
idea is expressed in less apparently mystical terms by
Pendleton and Halser with their conception of 'intimacy':
'As

intimacy

increases,

social

distance

decreases: as social distance decreases the
doctor gives up the authority which is donned
with the costume of the role and may be rewarded
instead with the power given freely by one
person to another, based on informed trust, to
offer insight to the patient. The offer of
intimacy by the doctor may well be one way of
pursuing the aims of optimum development and
avoidance of maladaptation by the patient. It
must be emphasised, however, that intimacy can
be offered, but must not be demanded. A demand
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for intimacy backed by the authority of the
doctor's role comes close to a rape of the
patient' (Pendleton and Hasler 1982: 166).

Clearly the doctors are wrestling with perceived ethical
problems here; in particular the recognition that their
medical status itself confers psychological powers
(indeed, this is what Balint had largely meant by the term
'apostolic function') and that the usage of person-centred
medicine might itself imply the usage of such 'medical'
authority. This 'libertarian' anxiety expressed about this
is itself of interest in the light of our comments above
concerning neo-liberalism; this desire to leave the
patient in control so far as is possible and, even when
using one's 'power' (in Freeling's sense) to rationalise
this in terms of the will and demands of the patient. If,
however, the doctor is to retain something specific that
is expertise then it can be analysed along two axes, the
formal and the substantive. Formally speaking the doctor's
persona is continuous with that of the patient; his skills
become discontinuous only, so to speak, in the context of
time: the doctor's skills are distinguished from the
patient only by their greater intensity (the wider depth
of experience over time) and focus (a period spent in
training). Similarly, the doctor's expertise largely seems
to reside in knowing when to deploy himself, when, so to
speak, to turn himself on. He does this, as we have seen,
only at that point at which the patient has ceased to be
an expert of his or her self and has displayed that
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foundational symptom of all pathology in person-centred
medicine; dependency. In the substantive sense, the doctor
is a living incarnation of the value of the attributes of
autonomy, responsibility, maturity and individuality
themselves. He is both advertisement for them and, as we
argued in the chapter on Balint, a living instrument for
their dissemination. For of course, the doctor does not
merely display the values of reflexivity, self-dependency
and so forth; rather, his whole persona is designed to
exemplify them. The doctor is a 'master of living' who has
found his calling; and this is summed up by his being a
master of how to use himself, his reflexive selfresponsibility in all things.

The expertise that the general practitioner calls his own
is the result of the equilibrium he has gained through his
exemplary work upon his self. Through his self-reflection
- stabilised by his relations with others in his peer
group - the doctor becomes a kind of Archimedian point, a
point of 'closure'; and on the basis of this, a receptacle
for the 'dis-closures' of others. For his expertise
largely resides in his being silent, a stable receptacle
for the catharses of others ('Silence ... can be really
productive'; Recordon 1972: 819). If 'confession' can be
defined as the 'diagram of a certain form of
subjectification that binds us to others at the very
moment we affirm our identity' (Rose 1990: 240) then the
GP is the stable surface upon which the subject can
objectify himself. By being precisely like a 'surface' -
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by being silent - the GP finds that he can illuminate the
very individuality of the patient. Indeed many have
testified to the skilled powers of 'listening' and its
intimate connection to pure individuality:
'Good listening is difficult to achieve,
especially when the doctor is under pressure,
but it helps more than anything else to make the
patient feel he is being treated as a unique
person' (RCGP 1972: 15; cf. the comments in the
Gillie Report, Central Health Services Council
1963: 30).
Similarly, Byrne and Long point out how one must listen
selectively and extol the virtues of the use of 'silence',
also pointing out that:
'[there] is a strong correlation between those
doctors who use silence regularly and those
doctors who have been influenced by the late
Michael Balint' (Byrne and Long 1976: 15 & 367).

Clearly it would be unwise to over-interpret this
material. No doubt, the contemporary notion of treating
the patient as a 'person' entails different modalities in
different contexts. In this 'programmatic' dimension of
the general practice literature, however, a more or less
clear model of the doctor's expertise can be drawn up.
Here, the function of general practice expertise is
largely the promotion of 'confession'. For example, Byrne
and Long conclude an account of what they see as an
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exemplary consultation with the comment that the doctor:
'has consistently taken the view that this
consultation is complete and only requires the
patient to go away and think. He has caused her
to verbalise a whole range of fears and confront
issues and to him that is enough' (ibid: 18)
The point about such verbalisation is that it is itself a
form of self-recognition on the part of the patient; a
taking of responsibility for the self. Indeed, we see here
that the taking of responsibility for oneself is not
merely conducive to health but is itself an aspect of
health; and, in other words, health takes on a distinctly
ethical dimension (on this notion of taking responsibility
for oneself and one's health, see RCGP/Channel 4 1982).

In short, there is at work here something like a project
of 'responsibilisation', wherein the primary task of the
doctor is to help others to take responsibility for
themselves. Paradoxically enough, the doctor is encouraged
to use the dependency of patients in the general project
of liberating patients from their bonds. A sentiment that
appears relatively early in the literature:
'We, in general practice, have the task of
liberating people who are enslaved by their
emotional dependence on others and, in giving
them help and spirit, we must never lose sight
of the ultimate aim of encouraging them to throw
away their social crutches, stand on their own
feet and live independent lives' (Williams 1967:
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260)
Later, in 1982, doyen of anti-medicine Ivan Illich himself
- addressing a sympathetic audience of the Royal College
of Practitioners in Dublin - urged general practitioners
to take upon themselves the role of 'de-medicalisation';
again, to free patients from their dependency upon the
medical profession (Illich 1982). A strange irony perhaps;
that the solution to this dependency should be the renewed
ministrations of the profession itself.

2. An Accounting Rationality: Economics and SelfSurveillance

So far, the discussion has sought to illuminate a line of
force running from the Balintist prescriptions concerning
the apostolic powers of the doctor towards a modified
therapeutic vocabulary that has something in common with
wider neo-liberal themes. But now if we take the other
side of the doctor's capacities of self-surveillance
considered at the end of the last chapter - that more
'rational' dimension relating to the doctor's powers of
pattern-recognition - we can see that this also displays
powers of alignment with some of the values of a neoliberal governmentality.

3.i. Prominent here is, in fact, an economic rationality
itself. For it is striking how closely the theme of
reflexive self-surveillance ties in with the neo-liberal
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economic emphases of audit and financial regsponsibility,
indeed with the neo-liberal privileging of the economic
sphere as an obligatory passage point for governmental
mobilisations of all sorts. Of course, in a rather literal
sense psychoanalysis and its offshoots have long
maintained a link with 'economic' forms of thought, for
example, in that the psyche is itself conceived as a kind
of 'economy' of forces with flows, inputs and outputs.
Balint himself found economic metaphors tempting; for
example, in his notion of the 'doctor-patient
relationship' as a 'mutual investment company'. But,
although it is no doubt embedded within this commonplace
parallelism, there is a link between psychological forms
of thought and 'economic' reasoning which - though no less
literal - is somewhat different. Or rather, more of a realignment than a straightforward 'link'; for this was no
doubt the product less of a natural affiliation than an
effort, a labour of alignment. What is at stake here is a
kind of 'accounting' rationality; the priority given to
reflexivity and problem-solving in both forms of thought.

This point can be established immediately. We wish to draw
attention to the way in which this rationality of selfsurveillance which we have seen extending from the heart
of clinical activity itself actually links (accross an
entire 'philosophy' of all aspects of practice) explicitly
in some quarters to a veritable business ethic. An
influential manual of practice management from
practitioners based at Exeter University (Jones et al.
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1978

3rd ed. 1985; cf. Philips and Wolfe 1977) can

usefully serve as a yardstick for this. For this work
seeks

to be both person-centred and financially

sophisticated.

In the course of an opening chapter designed to explain
'the philosophy which underlies ... working arrangements
and decision-making' the authors praise the work of
Michael Balint (whose views 'have influenced and
decisively influenced, the last twenty-five years of the
development of the discipline of general practice'; Jones
et al. 1978: 8) for the basic insight that:
'[in] order to be good general practitioners we
must first understand ourselves. We must
understand the strength and weakness of our
personalities, the way we affect other people,
and the way we cope with some of our more
important inner feelings' (ibid: 8).
Building on the insight that 'the personality of the
doctor is thus of special importance ... the key to
succesful medical care' the authors go on to outline how
self-management on the economic level is a vital part of
the doctor's self-understanding. Indeed, that economic
audit is part of general self-surveillance, thus
underlabouring for professional values and indirectly
improving standards of patient care:
'The doctor no longer feels a prisoner of forces
beyond his control. It is our experience that
once practitoers do organise feedback and do
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know what is going on then professional morale
rises dramatically' (ibid: 163).
Thus if practitioners take responsibility for their own
'book-keeping and accounts' (chapters 14 & 15) including
the mastery of 'extended income analysis' and 'extended
expenditure analysis' they will come to appreciate all the
more 'the direct relationship between financial management
and the ability to provide a service to patients, staff,
and partners' (ibid: 231).

Obviously, it needs to be stressed once more that what is
entailed here is a re-alignment of themes rather than
their straightforward 'inheritance' from Balintism. There
is nothing in Balint's own work to suggest that he was in
favour of general practitioners taking over the financial
running of their practices. What is interesting is the way
in which the basic rationality of self-surveillance is
used; that is, how Balintist themes have lent themselves
to being taken up and modified in these directions.

2.ii. We can also cite further evidence of an alignment
(or, what is always the same thing in any case, a realignment) between 'economic' forms of problematisation
and whole-person medicine in general practice by reference
to the theme of 'quality' which became a dominant preoccupation of the College in the 1980s. Thus in 1983 the
College launched a 'quality initiative':
'to encourage high standards by asking doctors
to describe their services and to introduce the
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principles of quality assessment into their
everyday clinical practice' (RCGP 1985 [Quality
in General Practice]: 1).
This concern - although voiced in terms of a new theme to
complement that of vocational training that had dominated
the College's activities in the 1960s and 1970s - was also
recognised to be in strict continuity with the themes of
the project of training itself; above all in the common
link upon self-surveillance and self-assessment. In
particular, the key notion of 'audit' certainly straddles
both concerns. As the College put it:
'This interest [in quality] accelerated with the
development of vocational training for general
practice because doctors had to think seriously
about what they did and why, in order to explain
their actions to their trainees. Standard
setting and performance review activities in
teaching practices, started at the level of the
individual doctor and practice and are beginning
to lead to the building of general standards'
(ibid: 3).
Of course the principles of audit, review and selfassessment was directly linked to the strictly 'clinical'
concern to monitor oneself and be reflexive - with the
help of one's peers - in order to use oneself on patients.
Doctors, let it be noted, were quite explicit about this
link between economic and psychotherapeutic rationalities.
If there was no doubt a certain re-interpretation of the
significance of past activities here, then the basic sense

408
of a common genealogy was correct. Indeed:
'Balint seminars ... were in fact one of the
earliest examples of critical audit in UK
general practice' (Pendleton et al. 1986: 6).
When conceptualised in terms of 'audit' this principle was
able to link up a very wide variety of elements, including
as Marinker extolled - professional values themselves:
'Medical audit brings together a number of
elements previously seen as having only an
implicit connection', going on to include
functions of the clincian, the epidemiologist,
the 'medical ethicist', the manager and even the
politician (Marinker in ibid: 4).
Meanwhile:
'discussions about medical audit, in what
priority, by what means, to what ends, are
certain to involve a conscious display of values
about the practice of medicine' (ibid: 5).
Similarly, what most impressed Avedis Donabedian (the
American guru of the 'audit' craze) about the College's
work on quality (especially in RCGP 1985b) was that it
placed professional values at the foundation of the very
possibility of audit, and thus even at the very
epistemological basis of general practice itself as an
independent disicpline:
'It builds directly on the only firm foundation
for professional excellence: the sharing of
knowledge between peers, the assumption of
personal

responsibility

by

individual
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practitioners, and the commitment to a lifetime
of learning through continual self-study'
(Donabedian in Pendleton et al. 1986: 181)

How are professional values to be linked to a specifically
'economic' rationality? A look at one of the most famous
(even notorious) documents in medical neo-liberalism
should be sufficient to make this link explicit (Secretary
of State for Health 1989; cf. Rose and Miller 1991).

As is well known, the intention behind Working for
Patients is the promotion of a 'personal' health service
(ibid: 6-7; providing a service which 'treats patients as
people'; cf. 48) combined with the maximisation of
economies upon resources compatible with this end. The
motto of this interesting work might have been 'delegation
with accountability'; everywhere it is sought to combine
the conferring of power (and autonomy as to its use) with
the obligation of responsibility for it. Central here is
the notion of 'self-government' whether in the hospital
service or the more micro world of the general practice
surgery. Commending the RCGP on its 'quality' initiative
the report states that:
'General practice will play an even greater role
in assisting patient choice and directing
'

resources to match patient needs throughout the
whole Health Service as a result of the
government's new policies.

The Government

believes that, in order to play this key role to
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the full, general practice will need
strengthening in four areas; patient choice [by
the maximisation of communication: 55], audit
['based on peer review and on self-audit by GPs
and GP practices': 56], prescribing costs
[collecting data on prescribing patterns], and
management' (ibid: 54).
Clearly, person-centred medicine has points of alignment
with this project, especially in its conception of the
general practitioner as an autonomous and responsible
agent of self-audit; an agent, in fact, in a kind of
general chain of responsibilisation and delegation.

Once again, it should be made clear what is being claimed
here. It is not being claimed that person-centred medicine
seeks deliberately to ally itself with more of less
'Thatcherite' policies in relation to the health service.
After all, was not one of the major complaints about the
legislation that it served to undermine the integrity of
the 'doctor-patient relationship'? Yet, what is certainly
a conflict upon an 'ideological' level can be seen to be
an at least potential alignment upon a 'programmatic'
level. In fact, this chapter might be said to have shown
that two modifications or re-alignments were at stake.
First, as we have seen, certain Balintist themes were realigned from within general practice; those relating, on
the one hand, to the model of cure (make the patient
autonomous, responsible and mature) and, on the other, to
matters of self-surveillance, audit and quality. Second,
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is the mobilisation from outside of some of these themes
of self-surveillance. Here, the importance of audit and
reflexive surveillance have made general practice
potentially fertile ground for the incursion of neoliberal governmental rationalities. And, after all, it is
how a discipline such as general practice is problematised
by others that will always be decisive upon a
'governmental' level.

2.iii. There are, however, two themes that specifically and, more directly, that is, upon an 'ideological' level pit the ideals of general practice against the otherwise
solidaristic and welfarist ideals that are traditionally
regarded as being at the centre of the functions of the
Health Service.

First, the theme of the sanctity of the private contract.
For of course, general practice has always been something
of an enigma within the health service in that general
practitioners are not supposedly employed by the 'state'
but are

so-called 'independent

contractors'

Ca self-

employed person who agrees to provide a s ervice
someone else': Jones et al. 1988: 11) who

for

ccontract for

their services with Family Practitioner Committees. Of
course, there are strictly clinical reasons for this; in
fact, the general practitioner is really a kind of bulwark
against the 'state'; his real contract is with the
individual patient whose interests he serves. A salaried
system, for example, would totally undermine such a state

412
of affairs since it would involve 'impersonality, lack of
consumer choice, a diminution of the individual within the
system' (ibid: 12-3). In fact:
'Those who follow Balint and the belief that the
human aspects of the doctor-patient relationship
are central will believe that the balance must
tilt towards some version of an independent
contract. Impersonality must threaten personal
care' (ibid: 16).
This sense that general practice is, as if by way of its
very 'essence', partly about the activity of 'rolling back
the state' is reinforced by the evidence given by the
College to the Merrison Committee (RCGP 1985d). Noting the
vital importance of the preservation of full clinical
responsibility in the hands of doctors ('essential to the
satisfactory relationship between doctor and patient',
ibid: 7) the report notes that independent contractor
status is central to this notion of self-responsibility,
its preservation being 'essential if patients are to have
an independent medical advocate and advisor in a statedominated health service' (ibid: 8).

Let us note in passing, at this point, that even when
person-centred general practice moves towards the very
edge of welfarism in the domain of 'prevention' - it
typically tends to personalise even this field. It is not
at all that it resists the category of the 'social' but
rather that it converts this category itself into a
dimension of the 'personal' (e.g. Cargill 1965: 81ff.).
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Again, this is achieved by a technique that takes 'time'
as its key frame of reference. For the point about
prevention is that it is 'anticipatory', it should occur
before disease has actually set in. But prevention anticipatory care' - here is firmly attached to persons
rather than circumstances or environments; above all, it
consists of health education within the consultation
itself. Thus even when it relates to the realm of the
'social' most clearly (bad housing, deprivation and so
forth) the point of application seems to centre most
typically upon the promotion of individual coping
strategies for dealing with such circumstances rather than
upon such circumstances themselves (RCGP 1983: this,
incidentally is not a criticism; for the assumption is
presumably that 'social' preventive strategies are up to
other - especially - government agencies).

Second, we may point out a further 'ideological' function
of general practice (and indeed all properly 'clinical'
thought) which has a bearing upon its 'governmental'
utility. This is its strict 'anti-rationalism' (to laden
this phrase with all the meaning given to it by, for
example, Michael Oakeshott). The whole of person-centred
clinical medicine is geared to an empiricist, pragmatic
approach that vaunts the virtues of experience and the
high sanctity of the individual; an 'art' form in fact.
Person-centred medicine is an 'appraisive vocabulary' that
views everything through these values; indeed it is itself
a kind of system of evaluation that is able to pass
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judgement on anything that fails to meet its criteria. But
'ideology' is really the wrong term here. For personcentred medicine is neither a 'mere idea' nor is it in
some manner 'false' as this usage would suggest. On the
contrary, it is productive of values, it is a criterion of
truth and - as we have tried to demonstrate throughout
this chapter - it is, rather than a mere set of ideas, a
kind of technology; a closely worked out series of
linkages, associations and problematisations that seeks
to bind both its practitioners and others to its logic
and to offer up an entire mode of ethical orientation to
the world.

3. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter we have sought to outline the basic design
proper to person-centred medicine. This has been described
as a 'regime' of self-surveillance. This term was intended
to highlight the way in which the notion of selfsurveillance - self-evaluation, self-monitoring - has been
a central problematisation at all levels of general
practice; from the paradigmatic self-scrutiny of the
individual doctor, paradigms of diagnostic activity,
running a practice and so forth to the way that the
profession as a whole scrutinises itself and the 'state of
the discipline'. Hence, from the 1960s - and, no doubt, in
no small part due to the founding emphasis of Balintism
upon the self-constitution of the doctor - general
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practice posited its condition of coherence upon this
notion of self-surveillance; or, more specifically, of
self-cultivation through self-surveillance. As a
coherence-condition this paradigm - actually afforded a
certain kind of validity that had advantages over previous
forms. For the paradigm of self-surveillance also enabled
the qualification of general practice in this period as a
certain kind of 'regime of truth' (to use Foucault's
term). Here the 'verification' of a form of treatment
derives from a kind of 'ascecis' of the doctor; the
conditions of proper practice are produced through selfcultivation. This provided the grounds for the positing of
a sense of 'exclusive insight' proper to the general
practitioner that went beyond the mere accumulation of
'experience', the notion of a limited but important
'change of personality' resulting from group training
provided the conditions for the general practitioner's
activities to be effectively self-validating (cf. the
distinction between 'clinicians' and 'officers of health';
above page 102). Hence, in a curious way, in spite of
being what might be described as an 'auditory' rather than
an 'inscriptional' rationality, the regime of selfsurveillance was actually more 'scientific' than its
predecessors in that it was able to provide the grounds as it were internal to itself - of its own validity.

This 'regime' was designed to work in a particular - one
might say, 'technological' - manner. From the basic
principle of self-surveillance, a whole progression of
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'identifications' was erected that ran through the persons
of trainer, trainee and - finally - the whole person. Thus
the emphasis on the doctor and his personality was
conditioned upon the aspiration to found a 'patient'centred medicine; one worked upon doctors in order to
'mobilise' the whole person. There is no need to labour
the central paradox here. For the ideal of patientcentredness is hardly a sacrifice on the

part of the

doctors. In fact, the direction of that 'progression'
that leads from that particularly 'exemplary' kind of
doctor, the trainer, to the whole person can also, of
course, be reversed. The aspiration of patient autonomy
also - and simultaneously - valorises the aspiration for
the ('professional') autonomy of the doctor. Hence the
anti-medical ideal of the complete autonomy of the patient
functions, in part, as a rationalisation of the
professional ideals - and above all, the demand for
professional autonomy - of the general practitioners
themselves. Patient-centrism is validated only at the cost
of doctor-centrism.
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CONCLUSION

1. A Perspectivism of the Present

The purpose of this study has been ultimately to draw up
an anatomy of person-centred medicine in general practice.
We have attempted to illuminate the differentia specifica
of the person-centred regime - Balintism and the 'regime
of self-surveillance' - in relation to other programmes in
general practice from which it differs. Such a 'negative'
approach is integral to the tasks of a 'history of the
present'; to produce what Paul Veyne has described as an
'inventory of differences'. The present is not tied to the
past on the basis of the evolution of a progressive
'identity' ('general practice') but marks a break from
the past. Hence this study was not undertaken on the basis
of a 'narrative' methodology. Its very condition of
possibility entailed a certain perspectivism whereby the
difference of other regimes of discourse in general
practice was established on the basis of certain 'presentcentred' themes. The analysis was not situated in evolving
'historical' time, but in - as Canguilhem puts it - an
'ideal-space time'. One could certainly write an
evolutionary account of ideas about general practice, but
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that has not been our method here. Rather, in this study,
person-centred medicine has constituted less the
culmination of a continuous narrative than the 'reflective
origin' that stands - paradoxically, one might think - as
both the condition and the object of the analysis itself.

Thus the analyses of the worlds of clinical medicine, the
work of James Mackenzie, the epidemiological model
deployed by the early College of General Practitioners,
Balintism, etc. were largely dependent upon an assessment
of themes in relation to the present. Taking the instance
of Mackenzie, we were not only concerned to show how his
programme was designed to work and within which discursive
conditions it was embedded, but also to illuminate how it
distinguished itself from current themes characteritstic
of our own present. These related especially to the person
of the doctor (what kind of medical subject is presupposed
by Mackenzie's programme?), the role of psychology
(minimal), and the question of the patient. But beyond
this, our very methodology has been guided by presentcentred concerns. The grid of analysis - the heuristic
configuration that has been labelled epistemological
articulation, organisational adequation and 'governmental
consciousness' - was itself tied to this perspectivism of
the present; and this point relates to person-centred
general practice as the 'object' of the study.
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2. A Machination of Forces

What seems to be most significant about the person-centred
regime of self-surveillance from the viewpoint of the
sociology of knowledge is the way in which it has tied
together these epistemological, organisational and
governmental demands. Its success relied largely in the
way it was able to draw these themes as tightly together
as possible; thus, the form of knowledge, the pattern of
organisation and the 'telos' of 'government' all merge in
the exemplary figure of the doctor. This insight can be
used on the one hand for passing perspectival 'judgement'
upon previous regimes, and, on the other hand, for drawing
up an assessment of the person-centred rationality of
general practice itself.

2.i. The Birth of Clinical Medicine

Foucault's account of 'the clinic' provided an exemplary
instance of the tying together of organisational,
epistemological and 'governmental' demands. Above all, the
structure of clinical knowledge - where to 'discover' and
to 'know' became of the same epistemological order as to
'teach' - provided an example of epistemological economy
and coherence; a coherence that was grounded within the
spatial-organisational order of the teaching hospital
which was an amalgamation and modification of various
structures (the university, the old form of the hospital,
the 'free field'). In addition, we observed what was
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termed the 'governmental consciousness' of clinical
medicine; its foundations upon the Enlightenment notion of
a 'medicine in liberty' with the liberal underpinnings of
the 'contract'.

But the concept of the clinic is a 'popular' as well as a
'scholastic' one. These popular connotations feed into
what we have understood as the 'anti-medical' dimension of
clinical thought. The clinical spirit - understood, to be
sure, in a more spontaneous sense than the series of
discursive relations examined by Foucault - is also at
work in the other medical programmes considered in this
study. In opposition to the forces of reduction and
specialisation a demand for a 'return' to the clinic has
often, within general practice, accompanied the critique
of the legacies of clinical medicine. Against the
narrowing of clinical rationalities (behind hospital
walls, into laboratories, specialisms) tends to be posited
a return to that archetypal confrontation at the 'bedside'
- doctor and 'sick man'. All of the general practice
regimes considered here have taken this clinical reference
as a guiding spirit of their concerns. What is the basis
of this spirit? Mackenzie's emphasis upon experience in
situ and the use of the doctor's senses (without
instruments); the epidemiological emphasis upon the 'free
field' and the sick individual hidden from hospital
structures; Balint's emphasis upon the doctor's powers in
the situational context of the consultation - all of these
are posited as 'returns' to long-established clinical
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principles. And if there has indeed been a common basis to
this return, what has been important has been not simply a
nostalgia for the 'real world' of people (treat the
patient and not the disease) but a polemical relation of
opposition to everything that might threaten the project
of a 'medicine in liberty' (for example, perceived
overemphases upon the corpse, the machine or instrument,
the hospital, the specialty, etc.). The 'medicine in
liberty' and its constant failure and re-constitution is
perhaps what best constitutes the spirit of the clinic.
What has made this impulse for a 'return' problematic has
been, above all, the changing governmental context in
which medical programmes had to situate themselves.

2.ii. Mackenzie

It was James Mackenzie who most forcefully set out to tie
the fortunes of a more or less traditional clinical
medicine to the discipline of general practice. For
Mackenzie, only the general practitioner, with his
immediate access to pathology and the patient, was in a
position to re-site clinical ideals around the themes of
early diagnosis and the functional prognosis of disease.
Today the work of Mackenzie is well-recognised by those
who have formed the main objects of interest in this
study; those writers associated with the Royal College of
General Practitioners. Yet a corollary of our analysis of
Mackenzie's programme is that there can be no question of
a straightforward 'return' to Mackenzie's principles (nor
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besides a criticism of his work for not fulfilling the
demands of various modern schools of thought). Part of the
reason for this is epistemological. Mackenzie's work was
grounded first and foremost upon the workings of a
particular organ, the heart; the programme he produced was
indeed a 'physiological' version of general practice that
has not meshed well with modern person-centred ideals. But
more important were the 'governmental' implications of
this physiological programme. This turned upon the link
between the physiological 'effort' of which one was
capable and the obligations (especially in relation to
labour) that might be demanded of the individual. Such a
physiological model might certainly have a degree of
penetration in the context of what was termed, following
Luhmann, the 'social state' - that is, that form of
provision which provided social security for certain
sectors of the population; namely, those with specific
tasks or obligations in hand (that is, 'labourers') in
relation to the maintenance of the well-being of
population. However, a model of health based upon 'reserve
strength' and the capacity for 'effort' would not align
well with ensuing governmental rationalities.

2.iii. The Free Field

In contrast to Mackenzie's 'social' programme, the
taxonomising regime of the 'free field' that dominated
the early works of the College of General Practitioners
has clear affinities with a 'welfare' state rationality;
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that is, a governmental rationality based upon universal
provision. By the post-war years, the sphere within which
general practice sought to intervene had become the
universalist space of the population as a whole. It was
only within this space that certain privileged targets
came to appear, such as the child and the mother. This had
clear implications in relation to the 'governmental
consciousness' of the discipline. General practice now
became conceivable as a network of observers conducting a
surveillance of the entire space of the population. If it
is the case, as Michel Foucault and others have suggested,
that one of the primary tasks of any mentality of
'government' is to align the micro and macro dimensions of
its activities then here we have a cLear exampie of the
programmatic realisation of this aspiration; the dream of
a multiplicity of like-minded observers monitoring each
pathological

fluctuation

(however

minor)

in

the

population. Yet in the free field the macro world is
merely the sum of micro parts; individual practitioners
going about their tasks. Hence the vocabulary of
'collectivity' amongst practitioners. But the clinical
dimension of this micro domain was scarcely able to
connect with the macro world (except in a certain
exceptional contexts as with the matter of Pickles's
evidence to the Royal Commission on Population). The
effect of this was that the sick individual, held to be
the central focus of the general practitioners tasks,
actually became elided from view.
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3. On the Specificity of Person-Centred Medicine

3.i. Balintism

Person-centred medicine (chapters 3 & 4) also sought for
itself a particular governmental consciousness. This
became more or less well-aligned with the long-standing
'ontological' infrastructure of general practice, that
demand that the basis of general practice was its
'frontline' attention to the individual patient. What was
this governmental consciousness? On the one hand, there is
certainly an element of 'welfare' in the work of Balint
and his successors. After all, they are working within a
space of universal provision. On the other hand, what is
at stake is a rationality that is by nature opposed to
some of the founding governmental values of welfare; the
demand for collectivism, solidarity and so forth. If this
dimension of Balintism has been termed its 'neo-liberal'
governmental problematic then this should not be taken to
mean that general practice becomes from the 1960s
straightforwardly a neo-liberal rationality working to
undermine the values of the welfare state. Rather,
Balint's work made possible a certain rupture with a
welfarist governmental consciousness, which then made
possible subsequently a limited alignment of general
practice with neo-liberal forces and influences.

So what was highlighted in Balint's work that can serve to
mark this mutation? Whilst on one level the attempts by
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Balint and his successors to highlight the importance of
the individuality of the doctor represents only a stage in
a long line of similar concerns, the fact that this was
done in terms of the subjective reflexivity of the doctor
does indeed represent a point of discontinuity with the
earlier literature. Three dimensions of this discontinuity
can now be briefly discussed.

First dimension; the doctor. In person-centred medicine
the doctor takes on a novel epistemological function. In
fact, as was argued earlier, all forms of 'clinical'
medicine lay a certain emphasis upon the perceptual powers
of the doctor. If we can follow Foucault here; with the
disappearance of the disease as a

'species'-entity,

pathology becomes tied to the corporeal density of the
body so that a 'subject of consciousness', eaclowed vith
the powers of empirical experience, is required to
decipher its presence. A re-iterated emphasis upon the
powers of the doctor - a shifting of epistemological focus
- occurs also with the various forms of 'anti-medicine'
that we have been discussing in this study. A medical
rationality pitted against 'reifying' notions of disease
appears inevitably to end up by laying an enhanced
emphasis upon the powers of the doctor.

The person-centred approach in general practice turned
this 'doctor-centrist' emphasis to its own epistemological
account. It located the persona of the doctor as the
central focus of clinical practice itself. The concern
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with the subjective reflexivity of the doctor that was at
stake here entailed not just an augmented valorisation of
the general practitioner's 'professional' powers, but a
transformation in the very epistemological structure of
general practice. Foucault has distinguished between two
modes of 'telling the truth'. The first 'Cartesian' mode
situates truth within the anonymous forms of Reason
itself; truth-telling is a matter of 'evidence' rather
than 'ascecis i (Rabinow, ed. 1986: 371). Thus, in this
Cartesian mode, the subject can be non-ascetic; indeed, as
Foucault says, the subject of knowledge can in principle
by anybody. In the second mode, truth-telling requires a
prior - 'ethical' - labour upon the self; one has to have
constructed oneself as a particular kind of persona in
order to have access to truth. Here, then, an
epistemological demand is attached to a particular ethic
of self-culture. The regime of self-surveillance follows a
similar kind of logic; in order to be able to practice his
craft the doctor must be practiced in all of the
'techniques of self' proper to his profession, techniques
which can be summarised under the heading of a constant
observation of self (with the help of peers and others).
And as we have seen, it is only upon the basis of such
techniques being acquired by the doctor that they can be,
as it were, transferred to the person of the patient; for,
as we saw earlier, the doctor is held also to be an
'exemplary persona', a figure with whom the patient should
'identify' in certain respects. There is perhaps a lesson
here for those who are interested in producing analyses of
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the 'social consequences' of person-centred forms of
medicine. Such analyses typically begin with the patient,
the target of medical power; whereas, in fact, the patient
is only the final result of the process, the 'end-product'
of an entire 'technology'.1

Second dimension; technology. The concept of technology
implies a structure or a network that is 'outside' the
individual, that compels him or her to approach selfunderstanding. Just as the birth of 'the clinic' entailed
the founding of a general science of the 'individual fact'
so the person-centred perspective is distinctive in that
it constitutes a general technology for the production,
mobilisation and deployment of 'personal qualities'.
'Technology' here is meant in an organisational as well as
an epistemological sense. It refers to the way in which
the doctor's persona is problematised as the central relay
for the production of 'knowledge' in general practice. The
term also refers to the means by which this is to be
achieved - the group practice, the teaching seminar, the
'doctor-patient' relationship in the consulation, etc.
What is at stake here is an invention of a technical
order.

The notion of technology perhaps seems inappropriate in
the context of a psychotherapeutic rationality like that
of person-centred medicine. After all, are not
technologies by definition exclusive of persons? But
perhaps, as Nikolas Rose has suggested, it is time to
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complement a 'social' understanding of technology with a
'technological' understanding of the social. For only by
looking at this technological level can one begin to
assess the nature of the varied objects and concepts that
a particular discipline will allow to appear. This can be
illustrated with reference to the theme of 'person'centredness itself. As we have noted, the idea that
general practice is a discipline entitled to claim unique
access to the individual has been a long-standing one.
However, it is the particular 'technology' of general
practice that transforms this demand into a conceptual
fabrication. And the kind of patient that will appear will
depend upon the technological apparatus in question. For
instance, as was seen with Mackenzie's work, one can
construct an anti-medical technology that will be
'patient'-centred without being 'person'-centred.
Similarly the project of taxonomy sought to invoke the
'sick individual'. On its own terms, it failed to do this.
In short, it is the technological apparatus that turns
words and representations ('treat the patient and not the
disease') into something like concepts, that is, workable
formulations within discourse.

This notion of technology also has a particular resonance
specifically in the context of person-centred medicine.
For this rationality was specifically predicated upon a
resistance to the perceived 'technological' aspects of
medicine; its specialisms, obsessions with innovations,
diagnostic apparatuses and so forth. But person-centred
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medicine is a technology that has the merit - so far as
anti-medicine is concerned - of not looking like a
technology; all of its operations appear to be entirely
spontaneous, naturalistic and immanent to the properties
and qualities of persons. The role of psychological
knowledge has been instrumental here. Psychology has
provided a vocabulary (of persons, groups, relationships)
capable of conferring both the capacity for the
visualisation of intervention within a particular range of
phenomena - an exclusive 'field' of general practice.
Psychology both programmes a field and makes it
programmable; it constructs an object-world composed
wholly of persons and relationships and provides the
grounds for intervention within that world.

Where David Armstrong's has suggested a progressively
developing encounter between the psycho-sciences and
medicine, we have here evidence of a new relation between
psychology and medical knowledge. Pychology does not
merely 'influence' prevailing modes of medical treatment.
Psychology here is not 'applied' to a field; rather, it
helps to construct it. Nevertheless, the impact of
psychology is also evidence of a fundamental continuity;
even of something like a genuine 'return' to clinical
principles. For psychology provides the tools for a
reassertion of the clinical principles of the exposure of
individuality on the one hand, and of the maintenance of a
certain form of liberty, on the other. Individuality:
psychology provides the doctors with a sensitivity to
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individual difference. This link materialises in the
fusion of personalities within the doctor-patient
relationship; in 'using' his personality, the doctor is
able to mould himself to the personal characteristics of
the patient, to provide - all but instinctively - the
correct form of treatment and advice for that particular
individual. Liberty: but psychology, as we have seen,
never proceeds in this task through direction or
instruction. The usage of psychological knowledge and
techniques seems always to have been accompanied by an
anxiety concerning the ethics of medical power, an anxiety
that one's methods might be contrary to liberty and
freedom. No one is more suspicious of medical reductionism
than an 'enlightened' general practitioner, attuned to
psychological influences in the 1960s and 1970s.

In short, psychology offers itself increasingly as the
basis of the solution to the problem of the 'betrayal' of
enlightenment, discussed in the introduction to this
study; it is a technology well-fitted to the project of
recuperation. It is presented as a rational form of
knowledge (rational in the sense that it is coherent, and
- with the help of one's peers - reproducible) which does
not betray the principle of the sanctity of personal
qualities.

Third dimension: medical power. The notion of technology,
of course, always implies a 'telos', a purpose for which
technology serves, an end which it seeks to achieve. If
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person-centred medicine in general practice has been a
technology of something then it has been a technology of
the self; seeking to bring about in its targets a modified
relation to self. It is to this 'telos' that we now turn.

3. ii. Before putting forward our own assessment of
person-centred medicine as a form of medical power, a
preliminary methodological foray will be in order. The
vocabulary of social control and its equivalents would be
inappropriate here. This concept seems to ally a rather
general and in itself unremarkable phenomenon - the fact
that therapeutic (amd other) discourses have effects upon
their targets - with the suspicion of repression tied to
these effects. But one should not seek to encompass too
much diversity with blanket-notions of control. If it has
been the case - as writers such as Foucault, Elias, Weber
or Oestreich have attempted to demonstrate - that the
programmatics of the shaping of subjectivity has been in
part constitutive of what we think of as 'Western
modernity' then this should not lead us to view the
project of shaping simply as one project. One must attempt
rather to describe these technologies of human conduct and
subjectivity in their locality and specificity without
overstating their common features and, perhaps more
importantly, without overstating their rates of 'success'
or effectiveness. For in the end discursive technologies
such as the one we have been outlining in relation to
general practice are indeed just discourses. There is a
gap, that is to say, between what they seek to do and what
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they typically achieve. The mistake is to assume that the
recognition of this implies either a denigration of
discourses as such or a form of idealism asserting the
primacy of discourses over behaviours. For discourses are
not sets of ideas (this is why other terms have been used;
'rationality', 'technology' and so forth, which emphasise
that discourses are subject to practical -

I non -

discursive' - conditions of emergence and restrictions of
scope); they are more like tools people use and draw upon
to make sense of the world and to act upon that world.
Discourses, then, are generically 'performative'; to
describe general practice as a person-centred discipline
is to take a step towards making it so. Moreover,
discourses have a privilege in another sense. For it is
only through 'discourse' itself that the rates of success
or failure of discourses as such can be measured. The
discursive regime of person-centred general practice thus
works primarily - and most importantly - as an aspiration.

To use the language of social control to describe the
specificity of this aspiration would be misplaced first
because, as we have noted, the rationality of the whole
person is itself specifically a libertarian one that seeks
to evade all the tendencies of techno-medicine that are
reductive of the person, or which would seek to instruct
or direct that person. We may decide that it fails in
this. If so we might want to use a sociological language
in order to account for this failure; to say, for example,
that person-centred medicine is merely another form of
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social control, that it seeks to shape humans by speciously or tendentiously - invoking their 'freedom' and
subjectivity (cf. the comments in Rose 1990: 240).
Armstrong's work - in spite of his justified suspicion of
the notion of social control - is effectively a variant of
this. But Armstrong's work also invokes the rationality of
the theses of social control in a slightly different
sense. For he implicitly assimilates the targets of
medical discourse with 'actual' people and thus overstates
the effectivity of that discourse itself. This approach
seems to assume that the elaboration of a programme
automatically implies its realisation in some real world
of behaviours which it has somehow 'constructed' through
discourse (although cf. Armstrong 1983; 133, footnote 50).
Thus, for Armstrong, medicine becomes like a Ipanopticon'
which represses - or equally, promotes - forms of
subjectivity through the very exercise of visilbilty. But
this is to overlook the fact that, on the one hand,
medicine simply does not have a single, unitary 'project'
in relation to human conduct - which is precisely why we
have focused here not upon tendencies within medicine 'in
general' but upon the intellectual fabrication of one
discipline, general practice - and, on the other hand,
that people themselves can indeed escape the effects of
discourses - or at least, of any single discourse.
Patients as such, we would argue, do not exist. Subjects
'in actuality' are crossed by innumerable discourses;
people are, as Deleuze felicitously puts it,
'groupuscules' rather than identities. 2
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Medical discourse does not simply 'produce' a kind of
patient by its mere exercise in the surgery or wherever.
The 'social construction' of the patient is not a literal
'material'
material' - endeavour; or, at least, it is not just
this. David Silverman (e.g. Silverman 1987) - no doubt
hoping to evade some of the idealist logic of the
'discursive' approach of Armstrong - has examined
consultations on the basis of ethnographic obeservation
with a view to classifying them as 'person'-centred,
'clinical' and so forth. Such studies are undoubtedly
valuable. Silverman has shown, for example, how 'whole'
person medicine can, when deployed in the surgery, in some
circumstances be a self-defeating enterprise (Silverman
and Bloor 1990). But such analyses misplace the
functionality of medical technologies and discourses. In
the surgery many influences are at work and many
discourses will be invoked. One cannot reduce complex
behaviours into composite models of 'discourse'; general
practitioners and patients are all sorts of things fathers, housewives, workers, sick, malignering and so on;
so, in the surgery itself, a multitude of discourses will
be drawn upon. In this sense, one has to take a more
'abstract' approach if one wishes to isolate the features
of

person-centred medicine. Certainly, as the work of

Silverman effectively demonstrates, a condition of the
discursive success of person-centred medicine has been its
scope and penetration into the minutest aspects of
activity within the consultation; or rather, in the way it
has worked by attempting to elaborate lines of force of
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maximum strength able to link up within general practice
the macro and micro, the centre and the periphery, and so
forth. Nevertheless, the significance of the rationalities
that we have been discussing does not lie in their
effectiveness (or lack of it) in the surgery alone. If
this were the claim one would probably be justified in
arguing that person-centred forms of thought had not been
particularly significant. Rather, one has to locate the
question of medical power or tutelage at a more general
level, very broadly speaking a a 'political' or perhaps an
'ethical' one rather than on the level of actual or
behavioural clinical effects. It is to this question that of an assessment of the 'power' of these discourses that we now turn.

Once again, Foucault employs a distinction from his later
work that might prove useful in the context of defining
what person-centred medicine is a technology of. This
distinction is

between a 'technology of power' and an

ethical 'technology of self' (Foucault 1988: esp. 18). The
former of these, claims Foucault, works by determining a
norm of subjectivity and then seeking to impose this upon
the conduct of individuals. The latter works not by
instruction or direction in relation to subjectivity but
by supplying the means and ideas for others to work upon
themselves. These are:
'Technologies of the self, which permit
individuals to effect by their own means or
with the help of others a certain number of
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operations on their own bodies and souls,
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to
transform themselves in order to attain a
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, or
immortality' (ibid: 18; cf. the introduction to
Rose 1990).
This distinction affords a means of distancing the
analysis presented here from those such as that of Arney
and Bergen which seek to invoke a generalised
medicalisation of 'life' ('the management of living') as
the predominant contemporary task of medicine. Arney and
Bergen's analysis classifies modern medicine as a
technology of power; medicine encroaches ever further upon
previously un-considered domains such as alcoholism, pain
and so forth. Thus more and more aspects of subjectivity
are said to come under the control of medical power; the
dominant metaphor here being one of an ever-increasing
management of life. Aside from the fact that it almost
certainly understates the long-standing interest that
medical rationalities have actually taken in relation to
such questions of 'life' management, this argument
overstates both the aspirations and the effectivity of
medical power (at least in its person-centred form). For
what has been at stake here has been less a question of
taking over previously un-acknowledged areas of interest
so much as an enhanced attention to questions of selfcultivation in general (in relation to which 'problems of
living' and so forth merely represent an appropriate
'ethical substance'). What is important is not that people
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are normalised into certain forms of conduct as a result
of this shift of attention, but that they are encouraged
to use such problems (depression, organic illness, trivia,
etc) as material through which to labour upon the self in
order to achieve some kind of self-recognition and
autonomy. What has been at stake has been less the demand
for an ever-finer management of life-problems, an evercreeping 'medicalisation' of life, but an attempt to use
medicine as a medium through which the autonomisation of
subjectivity can be encouraged (as such, the project has
been entirely in line with one of 'de-medicalisation';
Illich 1982).3

Certainly, the mode of inculcation for this selfrecognition and autonomisation does not derive from any
form of more or less codified knowledge passed on from
doctor to patient. Rather, to borrow a phrase, the doctor
acts at a distance' upon the patient's subjectivity.
There is no moral 'content' to his 'teachings'; rather, if
- as Balint put it - 'teach he must', then the doctor does
this through his own self and in, as we have seen, only in
an exemplary fashion.

What is the nature of this 'exemplarity'? In the first
case, the doctor has a kind of substantive exemplarity; he
is the pillar of the community, a 'support' for the
patient, a particular kind of 'individual' averse to all
the humbug and trappings of 'theory', and so forth. This
might be described as the 'ideological' function of the
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doctor. Yet this aspect actually takes second place to a
form of exemplarity which is actually rather empty of
substantive content. This exemplarity takes on only a
kind of formal nature; what is important is not that the
patient should work upon him or herself in order to become
like the doctor in substantive terms. All that matters is
that the patient must be somebody who recognises the
importance of self-cultivation, that is, somebody who in
one way or another reflects upon his or her own attributes
of 'self'. Thus the anti-normalising 'tolerance' of the
person-centred general practitioner is not a cynical one,
disguising a demand for the normalisation and ever more
finely-honed management of subjectivity - rather, the aim
is an autonomisation of subjectivity, an impulsion for
subjects to think for themselves, to act upon themselves,
to recognise who they are; in short, to become, as it
were, entrepreneurs of their own conduct.

3.iii. But if this is an accurate rendering of the form of
'power' proper to person-centred general practice, we may
ask whether we should accept or reject it. The answer to
this must be an ambiguous one. There is a sense in which
such technologies of subjectivity as we have been
discussing are inevitable in our societies. The purpose,
then, would be indeed more to understand - without
necessarily seeking to evaluate - the 'ontology of
ourselves' proper to the present; to reflect upon the
kinds of subject we are increasingly called upon to
become. This is not a useless form of activity; it might
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lead to novel forms of inventiveness, for example, and
prevent the 'hijacking' of such technologies for
disreputable projects, or at least expose the weakness of
such discourses in the face of such 'disreputable'
projects; for example, the amenability of a theme such as
person-centredness to projects such as that of the
application of Thatcherite economic policies within the
Health Service. But we can indeed go a little further than
this.

In the introduction to this study a distinction was made
between the task of 'critique' and that of 'detachment';
the purpose of a study such as this being to dismember
discourses that might otherwise seem ethically obligatory.
Person-centred medicine has above all two 'detachment'possibilities. The first, is the tying of these forms of
subjectivity to expertise; the fact that it is becoming
increasingly imperative for people to turn not just to
others, but to 'expert' others for help with their
subjectivity. A dependency 'spiral' is at stake here; in
order for people to become less subject to 'dependency',
their very dependence upon the powers of subjective
expertise will have to be exploited. And this gives us a
clue as to why the person-centred project always seems to
fail and yet to be promoted by its very failure; the
escape from dependency requires ever more dependence. Or,
in the specific context of this study, the logic of
'doctor-centrism'; the struggle against the powers of
t

medicalisation' comes to imply a spiralling enhancement
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of the doctor's expertise even as an 'opponent' of
medicalisation. This is a question, then, of what might
be called the 'functionality of failure'; the more the
project fails, the more it seems necessary. Second, what
might be questioned is the assumption of identity, the
very notion of a project of subjectivity that seems to be
in evidence here, along with its evaluative corollaries the values of 'maturity' and so forth; here the task might
be to question whether one's life should take the form of
a coherent 'project' of subjectivity at all.

4. Social Theory and the Sociology of Morality

But diagnostics of this sort have not been the main
objective of this study. Rather, we have used the
technology of person-centred medicine as a kind of
institutional 'laboratory' for considering the wider
question of the significance of technologies of
subjectivity in general in societies such as ours. This is
a theme proper to the 'sociology of morality'.

Earlier the possibility of a form of sociology was invoked
that would take as its subject-matter the ways in which
human beings come to recognise themselves as subjects of
the present. This would be a kind of 'philosophical
anthropology' geared to the uncovering not so much of the
constraints upon modern subjectivity as upon the
'obligations' that confront us as 'necessary'. Today the
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project of anti-medicine seems like a necessary
commitment; that is, the commitment to make medicine less
of a reductive, necromantic, specialist activity and more
of a 'person t -sensitive one. Who could argue with such a
project? To contest, or even to analyse its workings may
seem to be a question of bad faith; yet this again, we
argued, should be a question for what we termed the
'history of the present' - the questioning of the divide
that separates 'right' from 'wrong', 'true' and 'false'
in the interests of opening up a space for the constant
and impossible 'practice of liberty'.

Medicine today is certainly in need of such a spirit of
inventiveness from those who would wish to subject it to a
'social' critique. Hence, the extraordinary sense of
repetition and 'deja-vu' which one feels on encountering
'critiques' of medicine from sociological perspectives;
return to the patient, be sensitive to the individual and
so forth. Until one cannot help coming to the conclusion
that such invocations, far from being instances of a
radical spirit, are actually inscribed within the very
conditions of medicine itself as a particular kind of
activity. Moreover, social scientists - above all medical
sociologists - and others often seem to be unaware of the
fact that the anti-medical impulse has long been an
aspiration within medicine itself and could hardly be said
to originate from a logic of critique developed from
beyond its borders. Hence it may be of more interest less
to join this chorus than to subject anti-medical
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discourses themselves - as 'exemplary instances' of the
present - to analysis. This is what we have attempted to
do in this study.

As the introduction to this study sought to demonstrate,
medicine has long had a kind of strategic relation to the
great theme of the betrayal of enlightenment. Clinical
medicine has been both an exemplary instance of
enlightenment rationality and an instance of the betrayal
of that rationality. Take, for example, the connotations
within everyday speech of the word 'clinical'; either an
attention to patients (as opposed to laboratory work,
etc.) or, conversely, a 'coldness', a 'detachment' of
manner. This Janus-faced consequence of clinical medicine
- you just have to hate it and love it - serves perhaps as
a reminder of Foucault's well-known claim that, of all the
human

sciences,

medicine

is

closest

to

the

'anthropological structure' that sustains them all
(Foucault 1973: 198; and above: 56). This paradigmatic
position perchance makes medicine something of a potential
index, a privileged 'social laboratory', for measuring the
tendencies and anxieties characteristic of our present.

So what are these tendencies and anxieties generally taken
to be? Derek Sayer has recently offered a useful overview
of the major themes linking the social sciences with the
question of modernity (Sayer 1991; esp. 141-3). As he
demonstrates, this relation can be reduced to one great
theme; namely 'the contrast ... between personalised and
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impersonal modes of administration and forms of power'
(ibid: 141). Modernity in classical social thought is the
progressive separation of rule, administration and
governance from the qualities of persons; and the task of
the social sciences is to restore a certain 'regard for
persons' in social life and regulation.

But, perhaps what we have seen here in this study offers
evidence - certainly of a 'local' but, given the medical
context, perhaps not of an entirely marginal kind - of a
shift in modes of governance that would have to be taken
account of by the social sciences in their reflections on
the state of 'modernity'. In the first instance, what has
been at stake is a resurgence, a re-valorisation, of the
old link between clinical thought and liberalism.
Liberalism has been described as an 'ethos' which stresses
the limitations of government (see e.g. Burchell in
Burchell et al. eds. 1991); just as clinical thought
gained its emergence, in Foucault's account, in a
generically 'liberal' context so today a much-modified
clinical rationality, making particular use of the ethos
of psychology, once again sustains points of alignment
with a particular kind of liberal order. Second, the reforging of this link between clinical rationalities and
liberalism entails an effective operationalisation of the
demand that personal qualities should not be sacrificed to
the obligations of a rational life-order. Hence, the
felicitious admixture within person-centred discourse of
'scientistic' and 'affective' vocabularies (the doctor's
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powers; the consultation). Person-centred medicine is an
example of a

technology geared to the institutional

reconciliation

of

the

'rational'

prerequisites

of

coherence and reproducibility with the mobilisation of
genuinely personal and individual - one is tempted to say,
'irrational'

-

qualities.

In short,

person-centred

medicine provides evidence that it is now held to be
possible to conduct a truly ethical life within a rational
life-order; or, rather, that ethical values can be
mobilised in a rational manner (cf. on this; the
conclusion to Rose 1990). Hence, this clinical rationality
can serve as evidence that an increasing aspiration of
the present should be that the exercise of authority
should reside as much within the qualities of persons as
in the anonymity of rules and the logics of bureaucracy.
Max Weber's vision of those 'last men' who sought to
'invent happiness' may have come true. Persons have become
the instruments of rational discourse.

Hence, lastly, the instance of person-centred medicine
perhaps affords evidence of the opening up of a kind of
'ethical space' in our societies (cf. Gordon 1986 and Rose
1990 who both broach this theme); a generalised
valorisation of self-cultivation per se; or - as Foucault
wrote of a different period - an 'insistence on the
attention that should be brought to bear on oneself'
(Foucault 1990: 39; and 37-68). Person-centred medicine is
a good example of a form of discourse which has seen a
general detachment of moral prohibitions from the
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injunctions of expertise; where expertise has taken on an
ethical import. Hence, the demand for a sociology of
morality - one that would consider, as stated earlier, the
'supply-side' of our moral and ethical ideals - is one
that may be particularly pertinent today; for the
condition of its importance lies in the very nature of the
'present' itself.
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FOOTNOTES

Preface

1. For the nineteenth century history of general practice,
the outstanding study is Loudon 1986 (also Honigsbaum 1979
for the twentieth century), and for a (more contemporary)
bibliography, Hammond 1983. Loudon observes, however, how
difficult it has been actually to define the 'general
practitioner'. The question of the self-definition of
general practice is the main subject-matter of the present
study.

2. In doing so, it will also be our concern to outline a
somewhat different Foucault from the Cassandra of social
control and 'medicalisation' so often portrayed in the
literature; in particular recourse will be had to
Foucault's early and late works, neglecting somewhat the
'power' phase of the mid-1970s. All sorts of writers cast
Foucault amongst the prophets - above all, Illich - of
medicalisation and professional monopoly (even an
authority such as Ludmilla Jordanova in an otherwise very
useful overview of approaches; 1983: 92). This thesis will
seek to show the existence of a more subtle Foucault than
is often portrayed; yet one who is perhaps rather closer
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to Anglo-Saxon modes of thought than has been generally
acknowledged (on Foucault's 'Anglo-Saxon' credentials, see
Gordon 1986d: 831-2; and, for a similarly 'Anglo-Saxon'
verdict, Bowker and Latour 1987).

3. This is not to say, however, that general practice has
been the only 'anti-medical' discipline (in the particular
sense meant here) within medicine itself. One thinks, for
example, of the classic themes of 'social medicine': for
which, see the historiographical overview in Porter and
Porter 1988.

4. Yet in focusing upon this organisational
'infrastructure' the omissions are again extensive. We
have a great deal to say about the College of General
Practitioners, yet little to say about the British Medical
Association (BMA) or the general practice section of the
Royal College of Physicians. We quote a great deal from
the College journal, yet scarcely refer to The Lancet or
even specific general practitioner publications such as
Update or educational publications such as The Journal for
Postgraduate Medical Education. This narrowness can, of
course, be defended in principle; only at the College of
General Practitioners has there been evidenced a
consistent anxiety to determine intellectually - that is,
above all, in a 'non-political' manner - what general
practice is all about, and it has been this endeavour that
we have attempted to isolate. As such, the study is a kind
of 'case-study' of general practice, the evidential
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criterion for which being a matter of intelligibility
rather than exhaustiveness (on which distinction, Cousins
and Hussain 1984: 3). Obviously, the merits or de-merits
of this approach will be up to others to determine.

Chapter 2

1. It is of paramount importance to make it clear that by
'anti-medicine' is not meant an ethos that rejects
medicine wholesale, that is literally against all forms of
medicine. Nor is this term meant to apply to the views of
particular individuals; rather anti-medicine is,
precisely, an ethos, a way of thinking that is drawn upon
by different sets of people in different contexts. An
after-dinner speaker bemoaning the spread of technology
and calling for an enhanced attention to the individual, a
medical historian using the theme of a medicine devoted to
death as a principle of empirical coherence, and certainly most commonly - a medical sociologist denouncing
the 'medical model' or the 'machine metaphor'; all these
are instances of the anti-medical ethos. But nor should it
be implied by our account that anti-medicine is a wholly
negative affair, that it is a priori wrong or misguided.
On the contrary, writers have produced rich accounts of
medicine from what is being labelled here an 'antimedical' perspective. One thinks particularly of the work
of Reiser (1978) on the history of medical technologies
(the whole premise of which is that medicine has been
moving further and further away from the person of the
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patient) or the work of the sociologist Jewson (1976; cf.
also such diverse sociological works as Morgan et al.
1985: 29; or Mishler et al. 1981: 237-44; and, for
variations of the 'machine model', Hart 1985: 10-12; or
Stacey 1988 often Foucault is invoked in support of
these anti-medical views; e.g. Illich 1977: 40).

Chapter 3

1. Obviously, some caveats will be in order here. The
first concerns the 'internal validity' of Foucault's
account of the French clinic. Obviously the way that this
is assessed depends upon an understanding of the
methodological 'status' of Foucault's analysis itself
(discussed further below in the text). Nevertheless, for
favourable verdicts on Foucault's account from French
writers; Leonard 1981 (esp: 22-3), Jamous and Peloille
1970: esp. 121-2; and for an account of the French
hospital in this period from the perspective of social
history; Joerger 1984. Second, there is the question of
the differences between France and England, which were
naturally extensive. This question is complicated by the
sheer heterogeneity of the hospital 'system' in this
period; for an idea of this in the British context, see
the articles collected in Granshaw and Porter (eds) 1989.
However, as the discussion should make clear, what is
important for the purposes of this study is less the
empirical specificity of the hospital at this time, than
the epistemological 'aspiration' behind the notion of the
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modern clinical hospital per se; that is, the hospital as
a kind of 'ideal-type'; it is this that has been
constitutive of what is meant by 'the clinic'.

Chapter 4

1. Naturally this discussion does not exhaust the question
of the relation between epistemological histories and
social history proper. What is certain is that this is not
an opposition between the naive empiricism of historians
and the sophistication of 'epistemologists'. On the
contrary, whilst social historians of medicine have been
concerned to reflect upon their methods (for example, the
articles in Porter and Wear 1987) there has been
remarkably little discussion from within epistemological
history of the relation such histories might have to
social history itself - certainly Foucault's own work is
ambiguous on this issue. A discussion that might act as a
useful pointer in this direction, and which by no means
underestimates the tension that might persist between
social history and the history of 'concepts', Kosselleck
1988.

Chapter 6

1. The notion of the birth of the 'social' is a theme of
much 'Foucauldian' sociology: see Donzelot 1979, Hirst
1981 and Burchell et al. 1991. More rarely is this notion
distinguished from a

'welfare' rationality, as in
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Luhmann's analysis. Main sources for social insurance in
Britain during this period are Harris 1965 and Gilbert
1966.

Chapter 15

1. In the 1950s the Postgraduate Education Committee of
the College had been concerned mainly with the issue of
'practice descriptions' and advice to young practitioners;
now it becomes the hub of College activity defining the
very identity of general practice.

Chapter 16

1. An important corollary of these developments was the albeit as yet very limited - academic entrenchment of
general practice; an entrenchment that at this time was
confined in England only to Manchester and Birmingham
Universities. The difficulties experienced by such
departments as to the exact nature of their tasks was
acknowledged with all the advantages of hindsight some two
decades later in the 'Mackenzie Report'. This concluded
that the general practitioner could not be expected to
contribute to research as part of his daily practice;
research being now a matter only for professionals (Howie
et al. 1986: 18). However, academic departments themselves
were to be confined mainly to educational research (that
is, research into methods of general practice teaching),
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rather than to research into the nature of the 'field' of
general practice itself.

2. That is, the dream of a classification that would
uniquely serve the demands of general practice - based on
morbidity as opposed to mortality statistics - as a
particular epistemological domain had disappeared. What
did not disappear was the need for classification systems
particularly amenable to the circumstances of general
practice with its myriad of common and minor afflictions.
Thus in 1974 the World Organisation of Colleges and
Academies of General Practice (WONCA) introduced a new
classification (based primarily on mortality statistics)
appropriate to the conditions of primary care throughout
the world; this replaced the previous College
classification. Likewise the College was to collaborate on
a second National Morbidity Study (which appeared in
1974); however, the notion that this would make visible a
new field exclusive to general practice had now
disappeared (on the difference between the two national
surveys; Crombie et al. 1975).

3. In addition, this re-structured paradigm of
epidemiology included attempts to record data from the
domain of family relations; that is, to bring the the
interpersonal environment itself into the domain of
inscription. Prominent amongst these was the notion of the
'F' Book (Kuenssberg 1964). The notion of records
containing 'family trees' of emotional relationships - a
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model clearly aligned with that of genetic family trees was regularly re-invented over the 1960s and 1970s (see
inter alia Jameson 1968 and 1970; Wallace and Harvard
Davis 1970; Birmingham Research Unit 1976; and Zander
1977).

4. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this emphasis on temporality
was tied to the question of remuneration that so dominated
the mid-1960s; hence the great interest in 'time-andmotion' studies (e.g. Wood 1962).

Chapter 18

1. Nor is it to argue that neo-liberalism itself implies
necessary adherence to right-wing or reactionary values;
on the contrary, its basis is more often than not
emancipatory and humanist.

Conclusion

1. A methodological corollary to this; it can be suggested
that analyses of medicine would benefit from a closer
attention to the social construction of the doctor's
persona (along the lines of what Temkin called, a propos
of Zimmerman, the 'philosophy of the physician'); in
short, an analysis of the 'doctor's view'. Nevertheless
this by no means invalidates the project of reconstructing
the 'patient's view' that has been so influential recently
(e.g. for the eighteenth century; Porter and Porter
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1988b). There is nothing in the approach presented here to
suggest - as Armstrong has done - that this project is an
epistemological 'impossibility' or a methodological
anachronism.

2. Again, this should not be taken to imply that we are
arguing that one cannot write a history of the 'patient's
view' - or at least of the 'subject-position' of
'patienthood'! - throughout history. There is no need to
succumb to that temptation - apparantly generic to AngloSaxon appropriations of post-structuralist thought - of
over-interpreting the niceties of epistemology for the
purposes of iconoclasm.

3. Thus what is at stake here is a kind of 'spiral' of
dependency whereby the very dependency of the patient on
the doctor (Balint's 'apostolic function') is used to
encourage the breaking of dependencies. Thus dependency is
seen as its own solution (see page 439).
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